Sadler v. Lantz et al
Filing
300
RULING granting 207 Motion for Summary Judgment as to defendants Murphy and Stolfi. Signed by Judge Christopher F. Droney on 9/30/11. (Johnson, D.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
GARY SADLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
THERESA LANTZ, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL CASE NO.:
3-07-cv-1316 (CFD)
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED BY DEFENDANTS MURPHY AND STOLFI
The plaintiff Gary Sadler, incarcerated at MacDougall Correctional Institution
(“MacDougall”), commenced this civil rights action pro se against a number of
Connecticut Department of Correction officials for a number of different claims,
including inadequate medical attention and insufficient legal assistance. The claim that
is the subject of this opinion concerns whether prison officials may prohibit inmates
from receiving blank greeting cards in their mail. In claim four of the amended
complaint Sadler claims that MacDougall Warden Murphy and Correctional Officer Stolfi
violated his First Amendment right to freedom of expression and to receive incoming
mail when they applied State of Connecticut Department of Correction Administrative
Directives to reject correspondence addressed to him which included a blank greeting
card.1 Pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants
Murphy and Stolfi. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
1
Claim four of the amended complaint originally included an allegation that
Commissioner Theresa Lantz, Warden Murphy and Correctional Officer Stolfi improperly
adopted that Administrative Directive and that Commissioner Lantz also unlawfully approved
that Directive. On September 26, 2009, the court dismissed the allegations against defendants
Lantz, Murphy and Stolfi relating to the alleged improper adoption of that Administrative
Directive as well as all other allegations against defendant Lantz set forth in claim four of the
amended complaint. Thus, no claims remain pending against defendant Lantz. See Rul.
Pending Mots., Doc. No. 116.)
I.
Standard of Review
In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to
establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56(c), Fed. R. Civ. P.; Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The moving party may satisfy this
burden by demonstrating the lack of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.
See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings, discovery materials on
file and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. See
Miner v. Glen Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir. 1993). A dispute regarding a material
fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
When a motion for summary judgment is supported by documentary evidence
and sworn affidavits, the nonmoving party must do more than vaguely assert “the
existence of some unspecified disputed material facts” or present “mere speculation or
conjecture.” Western World Ins. Co. v. Stack Oil, Inc., 922 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1990)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position is insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for him. See Dawson v. County of
Westchester, 373 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 2004).
The court resolves all ambiguities and “draw[s] all permissible factual inferences
in favor of the” nonmoving party. Patterson v. County of Oneida, NY, 375 F.3d 206,
219 (2d Cir. 2004). If there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable
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inference could be drawn in favor of the opposing party on the issue on which summary
judgment is sought, summary judgment is improper. See Security Ins. Co. of Hartford
v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Where one party is proceeding pro se, the court reads the pro se party’s papers
liberally and interprets them to raise the strongest arguments suggested therein. See
Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994). Despite this liberal interpretation,
however, an unsupported assertion cannot overcome a properly supported motion for
summary judgment. See Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1991).
II.
Facts2
The plaintiff is serving a thirty-year State of Connecticut sentence for
manslaughter and was confined at MacDougall during 2007. MacDougall is a high
security facility.
2
The facts are taken from defendants’ Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement along with the
attached exhibits and affidavits. [See Docs. Nos. 213, 209, 212.] Local Rule 56(a)2 requires
the party opposing summary judgment to submit a Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement which contains
separately numbered paragraphs corresponding to the Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement and
indicates whether the opposing party admits or denies the facts set forth by the moving party.
Each admission or denial must include a citation to an affidavit or other admissible evidence. In
addition, the opposing party must submit a list of disputed factual issues. See D. Conn. L. Civ.
R. 56(a)2 & 56(a)3.
With their motion for summary judgment, defendants filed a Notice to Pro Se Litigant
[Doc. No. 206] informing the plaintiff of his obligation to respond to the motion for summary
judgment and of the contents of a proper response. The court permitted the plaintiff until
September 19, 2011 to file his response to the motion for summary judgment. To date, the
plaintiff has not filed his response. Because the plaintiff has not filed a Local Rule 56(a)2
Statement, the facts in the defendants’ Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement are deemed admitted.
See D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a)1 (“All material facts set forth in said statement will be deemed
admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party in
accordance with Rule 56(a)2.”).
The plaintiff had previously filed a motion to stay action on this summary judgment
motion [Dkt. #231]. That motion was denied on August 30, 2011 [Dkt. #287] and a response
was ordered to be filed by September 19, 2011. None was filed.
3
Peter J. Murphy has been the Warden of MacDougall since April 2007. He has
attended courses at the training academy for the State of Connecticut Department of
Correction (“DOC”) as well as the National Institute of Corrections. These courses have
included training on security issues, safety and management of inmates and safety of
the public.
Correctional Officer Stolfi has been employed by the DOC for over nine years.
Part of his training to become a correctional officer included a month-long course of
general training at DOC’s training academy and additional instruction on inspection and
review of incoming and outgoing inmate mail. DOC’s Security Division has certified
Officer Stolfi as a “phone monitor.” As a phone monitor, Officer Stolfi is also certified to
inspect and review inmate mail. At MacDougall, Officer Stolfi completed a course on
reviewing and inspecting incoming and outgoing inmate mail. This course also involved
training in safety and security concerns related to the inspection and review of inmate
mail.
On May 15, 2007, Officer Stolfi was inspecting incoming inmate mail as part of
his responsibilities as phone monitor at MacDougall. Officer Stolfi was checking
incoming inmate mail for materials that might compromise the safety and security of the
facility, including contraband. When Officer Stolfi inspected a letter mailed to the
plaintiff, he found a blank greeting card and laminated photographs in the envelope with
the correspondence. Officer Stolfi completed a “Returned Letter or Funds Notification,”
indicating that the correspondence included unauthorized enclosures, and returned
those materials to their sender. The plaintiff does not challenge the rejection of the
laminated photographs.
4
On May 29, 2007, the plaintiff submitted an Inmate Request Form in an attempt
to informally resolve the rejection of the blank greeting card. On June 4, 2007, a DOC
reviewer sent the plaintiff a written response indicating that blank greeting cards had to
be purchased in the commissary and laminated pictures were not permitted in the
prison facility. The reviewer informed Sadler that the correspondence as well as the
photographs and greeting card had been returned to its sender. The sender was listed
on the Returned Letter or Funds Notification as “Sadler,” 1789 Pembroke Street,
Bridgeport, CT 06608.
On June 4, 2007, the plaintiff filed a Level 1 Inmate Grievance noting that the
Returned Letter or Funds Notification did not indicate how the blank greeting cards and
photographs posed a threat to security. On June 28, 2007, Warden Murphy denied the
Grievance and stated that the items were properly rejected pursuant to Administrative
Directive 10.7(4)F because contraband items were enclosed with the correspondence
addressed to Sadler.
On July 2, 2007, the plaintiff filed a Level 2 Inmate Grievance appeal of the
denial of the Level 1 Grievance. On July 9, 2007, DOC District Administrator Wayne T.
Choinski denied the appeal.
DOC Administrative Directive 6.10 (“Administrative Directive 6.10"), which was in
effect at the time of the rejection of the card, provided that an inmate “may possess
only that property authorized for retention upon admission to the facility, issued while in
custody, purchased in the facility commissary, or approved at the facility in accordance
with this Administrative Directive.” Id. at 6.10(1). Contraband is defined as “anything
not authorized to be in an inmate’s possession; . . . “ Id. at 6.10(3)B. The main
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purpose of Administrative 6.10(1) is to minimize the opportunity for contraband to be
sent to inmates from individuals outside of prison. In addition, the directive serves to
minimize the time spent by correctional staff in searching correspondence.
Administrative Directive 10.7, which was also in effect at the time of the rejection
of items mailed to the plaintiff, provided that:
All incoming general correspondence shall be opened and
inspected for contraband and money . . . All incoming
general correspondence may be rejected if such review
discloses correspondence or material(s) which would
reasonably jeopardize legitimate penological interests,
including, but not limited to, material[s] which contain or
concern: (a) the transport of contraband in or out of the
facility . . . Incoming general correspondence containing any
of the foregoing may be restricted, confiscated, returned to
the sender, retained for further investigation, referred for
disciplinary proceedings or forwarded to law enforcement
officials.
Id. at 10.7(4)F(1). These Directives provided the basis for the prohibition of blank
greeting cards.
The defendants have presented affidavits that state that the blank or unsigned
greeting card found enclosed in the correspondence to the plaintiff was considered to
be contraband because such cards could be used to transport drugs or needles into the
prison facility by melting drugs onto the card or concealing the drugs or needles in the
folds or layers of the paper material of the card.3
For example, Captain Michael E. Beaudry has been a Security Risk
Group/Investigator/ Intelligence Coordinator at MacDougall since 2003. In this position,
Captain Beaudry has supervised the mail room and mail handlers at MacDougall. In
3
Apparently, the receipt of signed greeting cards does not create such a risk because
the sender is identified, and the number of such cards is limited.
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the last two to three years, Captain Beaudry has observed or investigated narcotics and
needles concealed in cards sent to inmates at MacDougall.
Blank greeting cards sent to an inmate apparently could also be used by that
inmate for barter, trade or gambling with other inmates. Bartering and gambling are not
permitted at MacDougall because of the problems these activities create. Gary S.
Wright has been the Deputy Warden at MacDougall since 2009. As the Deputy
Warden, he reviews all incident reports, including reports of inmate fights and assaults.
He stated that he is aware of incidents at MacDougall involving inmate fights over items
that had been bartered.
Captain Beaudry has investigated inmate fights or verbal arguments involving the
bartering of items of personal property that used to be permitted to be sent to inmates
from individuals outside of prison. His affidavit supports the view of Deputy Warden
Wright.
It is important to note that blank greeting cards may, however, be purchased
from the prison commissary. On May 15, 2007, the prison commissary at MacDougall
sold stationery, envelopes, post cards, greeting cards and postage. Inmates may use
money from their inmate accounts to purchase items, including, stationery, post cards
and greeting cards from the prison commissary. Family members may add deposits to
those accounts.
III.
Discussion
Defendants Murphy and Stolfi move for summary judgment on two grounds.
They argue that (1) they did not violate the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights because
the administrative directives upon which they relied to reject the blank greeting cards
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mailed to the plaintiff were reasonably related to legitimate penological interests and (2)
they are entitled to qualified immunity.
It is well settled that “convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional
protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison.” O'Lone v. Estate
of Ahmad Uthman Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (internal quotations
omitted)(internal citations omitted). Inmates rights, however, are subject to limitations
and restrictions due to the fact of their confinement and the legitimate goals and
policies of correctional facilities. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).
In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the Supreme Court established that
restrictive prison regulations, including restrictions on First Amendment rights, are “valid
if [they are] reasonably related to legitimate penological interests [and] . . . [are not] an
exaggerated response to prison concerns.” Id. at 89-90. Turner set forth four factors
for assessing reasonableness of a regulation. First, is there a “‘valid, rational
connection’” between the prison regulation and a legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it .” Second, are there “alternative means of exercising the right that
remain open to prison inmates.” Third, what impact will accommodation of the asserted
right” have on prison staff, “other inmates and on the allocation of prison resources
generally.” And, fourth, are there “ready alternatives” that completely “accommodate[]
the prisoner’s rights at de minimus cost to valid penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S.
at 89-91 (internal citations omitted). The burden is on the inmate to disprove the
validity of the regulation at issue. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2008)
(citation omitted).
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A.
First Factor
Administrative Directives 10.7 and 6.10 are neutral in character. They ban
property sent to inmates from outside of prison without consideration of content. There
is no indication that the defendants’ policy pursuant to these directives suppress inmate
expression, but are concerned with increasing safety and alleviating the security issues
posed by certain items being mailed to inmates from outside of prison.
The defendants have submitted evidence indicating that the purposes of
Administrative Directives 6.10 and 10.7 were to prevent unauthorized bartering and
smuggling of contraband through the assistance of third parties outside the prison. The
defendants have represented that drugs and weapons, such as needles and razor
blades, could be inserted into the folds of blank greeting cards. Drugs could also be
melted onto the card itself. In addition, bartering may result in disagreements among
inmates with the risk of violence.
These objectives and their connection to Administrative Directives 6.10 and 10.7
were substantiated by, among other submissions, the Affidavit of Warden Murphy.
(See Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J, Murphy Aff. ¶¶ 10-11, 18-20.) Deference is owed to
the professional judgment of Warden Murphy as reflected in his affidavit. See Beard v.
Banks, 548 U.S. 521, (2006) (citing Overton, 539 U.S. at 132). Applying the first Turner
factor, the Court concludes that Administrative Directives 6.10 and 10.7, as applied
here, have a rational connection to the identified safety and security issues associated
with bartering and the inmate receipt of contraband in the form of drugs and potential
weapons.
In sum, the defendants have identified legitimate, neutral prison interests served
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by their application of Administrative Directives 6.10 and 10.7. They supported these
prison interests with evidence of professional judgment which is entitled to deference.
Accordingly, the defendants have met the first Turner factor.
B.
Second Factor
In considering alternative means available to an inmate for exercising a right
restricted by prison regulation, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the
“alternatives ‘need not be ideal ... they need only be available.” Overton, 539 U.S. at
135. The defendants have shown that the plaintiff could have purchased greeting cards
from the commissary at MacDougall. In addition, if the plaintiff lacked funds to
purchase the cards from the prison commissary, his family members could have
deposited money into his inmate account to enable him to do so. See Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 417-18 (1989) (explaining how cases applying second Turner
factor reflect that it must be approached “sensibly and expansively,” so as to
encompass different practical alternatives that satisfy same broad underlying function);
Johnson v. Goord, 445 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 2006) (inmate had alternative to prison’s
limitation on number of free postage stamps by having ”his friends or family send
money, which [could] be used to purchase stamps from the commissary”). The
defendants have satisfied the second Turner factor.
C.
Third Factor
The defendants have submitted evidence that the Administrative Directives
prohibiting blank greeting cards from being sent to inmates are necessary to prevent
additional extensive searches of incoming mail for contraband. If blank greeting cards
were permitted to be mailed to inmates, especially in bulk, prison officials would have to
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devote significantly more time inspecting and supervising the inspection of inmates’
mail. This additional inspection time could cause further delays in processing inmate
mail. Prison officials could also be required to assign staff members to investigate
suspected incidents of bartering using items sent in from outside the prison, including
blank greeting cards. These tasks would burden both staff and prison resources.
Warden Murphy stated that accommodating the plaintiff’s request to receive
blank greeting cards from individuals outside of prison would interfere with the purpose
of Administrative Directive 6.10 to minimize the opportunity for contraband to be sent
into the prison and would overburden correctional staff with having to perform extensive
searches of an increased volume of incoming property through the mail for contraband.
In addition, permitting unsigned greeting cards to be mailed to inmates would also
increase the likelihood of inmate barter or trade, gambling and thefts and inmate
arguments and fighting, with the potential for injuries to both correctional staff and
inmates. (See Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J, Murphy Aff. ¶¶ 11-13, 18-20.) The court
defers to the experience and judgment of Warden Murphy. See Overton, 539 U.S. at
135 (“When . . . consequences [such as reallocation of prison resources and
correctional officers’ ability to protect staff and inmates] are present, we are ‘particularly
deferential’ to prison administrators’ regulatory judgments.”) (quoting Turner, 482 U .S.
at 90).
The court concludes that accommodating the plaintiff’s request to receive blank
greeting cards in the mail from relatives and friends outside of prison would unduly
burden prison staff and resources and potentially endanger the safety and security of
inmates as well as prison staff. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 92 (inmate’s asserted rights
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“can be exercised only at the cost of significantly less liberty and safety for everyone
else, guards and other prisoners alike”). The third Turner factor is resolved in the
defendants' favor.
D.
Fourth Turner Factor
The Supreme Court explained that “the absence of ready alternatives is
evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation” and “may be evidence that the
regulation is not reasonable, but is an exaggerated response to prison concerns.”
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. The Court went on to clarify that “[t]his is not a ‘least restrictive
alternative’ test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every
conceivable method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint.” Id. at
90-91. Rather, this factor weighs against the regulation if the inmate “can point to an
alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid
penological interests.” Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
The defendants are not aware of any obvious and easy alternatives that would
further the prison’s interests in safety and security and also accommodate the plaintiff’s
First Amendment rights under these circumstances. Nor has the plaintiff offered any
alternatives. Thus, the plaintiff has not met the fourth Turner factor.
The defendants have asserted and substantiated a set of legitimate penological
interests rationally related to the Administrative Directives. In addition, all of the other
Turner factors support the conclusion that the challenged directives, as applied, were a
constitutionally valid exercise of prison administrative authority. Accordingly, the court
concludes that Administrative Directives 6.10 and 10.7 relied on by the defendants to
reject the blank greeting card in the correspondence mailed to the plaintiff was rationally
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related to the legitimate penological interest of maintaining safety and security within
the prison. The motion for summary judgment is granted on this ground as to the
claims against defendants Murphy and Stolfi.
IV.
Qualified Immunity
The defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity for the reasons set forth in
their brief [Dkt. #208] at pages 35 to 39.
V.
Conclusion
The Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 207] filed by defendants Murphy
and Stolfi is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut this 30th day of September, 2011.
/s/ Christopher F. Droney
Christopher F. Droney
United States District Judge
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