Lin et al v. Brennan et al

Filing 168

ORDER granting 136 Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint; taking under advisement 136 Motion for Prejudgment Attachment. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 8/16/12. (Hungerford, A.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
LIN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
No. 3:07cv1658 (SRU)
v.
BRENNAN, et al.,
Defendant.
RULING ON MOTION TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT
This action was first filed on November 13, 2007. On November 15, 2011, then-District
Judge Christopher F. Droney granted a motion for partial summary judgment. Thereafter, on
December 21, 2011, the case was transferred to me.
On February 14, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a motion to file a supplemental complaint, and a
motion for prejudgment attachment. Doc. 136. In their motions, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants had engaged in fraudulent transfers in response to the underlying lawsuit. The
defendants opposed the motions on timeliness grounds. For the reasons stated below, the motion to
file a supplemental complaint is GRANTED. The motion for prejudgment remedy is taken under
advisement.
I.

Background
The defendants in this case are the Mianus River Tavern, LLC (“the Tavern”), Thomas

Brennan, and Elias B. Reynolds (collectively, “the defendants”). The plaintiffs are Dehua Lin,
Xiufang Wu, and Guo Chen (collectively, “the plaintiffs”).
Brennan and Reynolds employed the plaintiffs through their LLC, Mianus River Tavern
LLC, between 1998 and 2007. During the course of the plaintiffs‟ employment, Brennan and
Reynolds allegedly withheld overtime pay from the plaintiffs, and in the months before the Tavern
closed in May 2007, the defendants allegedly failed to pay the workers any wages at all.

In the fall of 2007, the plaintiffs filed suit for their back wages and overtime. On November
15, 2011, Judge Droney granted the plaintiffs‟ motion for partial summary judgment against
Brennan and Reynolds. The Court concluded that the defendants were employers of the plaintiffs
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Connecticut Minimum Wage Act, and had violated those
Acts by failing to pay the plaintiffs overtime and other wages.
During the course of the litigation, the defendants allegedly transferred a number of assets.
On September 15, 2008, Reynolds allegedly transferred his half-interest in a single-family home to
his wife, Maureen O. Reynolds, for no consideration via a quitclaim deed. In 2009, Reynolds
allegedly abandoned his interest in a joint deposit account, an account he had previously shared
with his wife. Finally, on November 15, 2010, Brennan and Todd Zubrinsky allegedly transferred
property to TB & TZ, LLC, a Connecticut limited liability company whose principal members are
Brennan and Zubrinsky.
II.

Standard of Review
Under Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is permitted “to serve a

supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date
of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d).
“[T]he discretion exercised by the court in deciding whether to grant leave to amend is
similar to that exercised on a motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading.” See Novak v. Nat’l
Broad. Co., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 141, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that “the same standards apply”
to Rule 15(a) and Rule 15(d) motions). Consequently, “[t]he court should freely give leave when
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). There are several limitations to this standard.
Specifically, leave to file a supplemental complaint “may properly be denied for: „undue delay, bad
faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of
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the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.‟” Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191
(2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
III.

Discussion
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs‟ motion to file a supplemental complaint should be

denied because any supplemental pleading would be barred by the relevant statute of limitations,
and therefore be futile. Actions brought pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552e must be brought
“within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one
year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant.”
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552j(1)-(2) (1991). Likewise, actions brought under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52552f(a) must be brought “within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552j(2) (1991).
The plaintiffs have brought claims pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552e as well as Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 52-552f(a). The relevant transfers took place in September 2008, 2009, and 2010, and
the plaintiffs filed their motion in February of 2012. Because the plaintiffs‟ motion was filed within
four years of every relevant transfer, the plaintiffs‟ claims are not barred by the statute of
limitations, and are therefore not futile.
The defendants do not allege that the plaintiffs‟ supplemental pleading was made in bad
faith, evidenced undue delay or a dilatory motive, or is unduly prejudicial.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the motion to file a supplemental complaint, doc. 136, is

GRANTED. The motion for prejudgment remedy, doc. 136, is TAKEN UNDER
ADVISEMENT. It is so ordered. Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 16th day of August 2012.

/s/ Stefan R. Underhill
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge
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