Walker v. Warden
Filing
50
RULING AND ORDER denying 34 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 9/23/11. (Glynn, T.) Modified on 9/26/2011 to reflect Ruling(Glynn, T.).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
MICHAEL WALKER,
:
Petitioner,
:
V.
:
WARDEN, STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
PRISONER
Case No. 3:07-CV-1796 (RNC)
:
Respondent.
:
RULING AND ORDER
Petitioner, a Connecticut inmate, seeks a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 vacating his conviction for
murder and other crimes.
He contends that the prosecution
violated due process by suppressing information favorable to the
defense, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and failing
to correct false testimony, see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959).
Petitioner has filed a motion for summary judgment
seeking the relief requested in the petition.
For reasons that
follow, the motion is denied and the petition is dismissed.
I.
Background
In 1988, following a jury trial in Connecticut Superior
Court, petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to prison
for eighty years.
The jury found that on the evening of May 12,
1987, petitioner and his cousin, Tracey Fisher, shot Barrington
Solomon and Thomas Dixon, killing Dixon.
Solomon and Dixon had
been sitting on the first floor rear porch of a dwelling at 104
Enfield Street in Hartford.
The prosecution claimed that Fisher
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and petitioner both fired shots to avenge petitioner’s brother,
Robert Walker, who had been shot by Solomon.
The key witness against the petitioner was Lehman Brown.
Prior to the trial, Brown was in pretrial detention on unrelated
robbery charges.
Brown’s defense counsel attempted to broker a
deal with the prosecution whereby Brown would provide information
about the Dixon murder in exchange for obtaining release from
pretrial detention.
Thereafter, Brown signed a statement
implicating petitioner in the shooting.
That same day, Brown’s
$10,000 bond was reduced and he was released from custody on his
own promise to appear.
Brown gave the following testimony at the trial.
He was
with the petitioner and Fisher early on the day of the shooting.
Later that day he visited a friend, Dion Smith, at her apartment
at 98-100 Enfield Street, the building adjoining 104 Enfield
Street.
After taking a nap, he went to the back porch, from
which he saw Fisher and the petitioner enter the back lot behind
98-100 Enfield Street.
Fisher, who was carrying an automatic
weapon, scaled the fence between the two properties and fired
shots at Dixon and Solomon.
Petitioner then took the gun from
Fisher and fired another series of shots at Dixon and Solomon.
Fisher and the petitioner then ran toward Garden Street.
Petitioner attempted to impeach Brown’s testimony by
suggesting that he testified in exchange for leniency in his
2
robbery case.
the state.
Brown responded that he did not have a deal with
He also testified that he was not released from
custody on the day he signed the statement implicating petitioner
in the shooting because he was being detained on unrelated
New York charges.
During rebuttal, the prosecutor impeached Brown’s testimony
with that of Dion Smith.
Smith testified that, although she had
been with Brown on the day of the shooting, she had never been
with him in or near an apartment at 98-100 Enfield Street.
The
prosecutor explained to the jury that it was his duty to produce
all relevant evidence, whether it helped or hurt the state’s
case.
He indicated that Brown “was probably not on the porch at
100 Enfield Street on the night in question,” but invited the
jury to credit the other portions of Brown’s testimony.
Brown’s testimony was otherwise corroborated during the
state’s case in chief.
Petitioner’s girlfriend, Sandrina
Freeman, told the police that petitioner “used to tell me all the
time that he wouldn’t be right unless he got the guy back that
shot his brother.”
Appendix P; Transcript at 280.
Solomon
testified that shortly before the shooting he saw petitioner and
Fisher driving toward the back of the residence at 104 Enfield
Street.
He told Dixon, “there goes my enemies.”
Shortly
thereafter, he heard shots and “felt a shot in his belly.” Id. at
50-52.
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Hartford Police Officer John Cunningham testified that he
heard two bursts of automatic gunfire, separated by approximately
five or six seconds.
Id. at 95. Janet Douglas, who lived with
Solomon at 104 Enfield Street, also testified that she heard
similar noises.
Id. at 23.
Two sets of shell casings were
recovered near the fence that separates 98-100 Enfield Street
from 102-104 Enfield Street.
Nadine Collier, who was at her home on Garden Street,
testified that she heard two series of shots and saw the
petitioner and Fisher, who was holding an automatic weapon, pass
by her window shortly after the second burst.
Id. at 206-210.
Collier later recanted this testimony at a trial on a different
habeas petition.
Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
State v. Walker, 214 Conn. 122 (1990).
See
In 1994, he filed a first
petition for habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel.
The petition was dismissed.
In 1996, Brown signed an
affidavit recanting his trial testimony.
Petitioner subsequently
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Superior Court
claiming Brown committed perjury at the trial and the prosecutor
knowingly presented the perjured testimony.
In the course of an evidentiary hearing on the petition, it
came to light that Brown was released from pretrial detention the
same day he signed the statement implicating petitioner in the
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shooting.
With the habeas court’s permission, the petition was
amended to allege a violation of Brady based on the state’s
failure to disclose that it had entered into an agreement with
Brown whereby he would be released in exchange for his testimony.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the state habeas court
dismissed the petition.
The court ruled that there was no Brady
violation because the petitioner had failed to prove the
existence of an agreement between Brown and the prosecution.
The
court also rejected the perjury claim, finding Brown’s trial
testimony truthful in all material respects.
Walker v. Warden,
No. CV960002314, 2004 WL 3052010 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 24,
2004).
The judgment was affirmed on appeal,
Walker v. Comm’r of
Corr., 103 Conn. App. 485 (2007), and the Supreme Court denied
petitioner’s request for certification.
Corr., 284 Conn. 940 (2007).
Walker v. Comm’r of
Petitioner then filed this federal
petition.
II.
Standard of Review
Habeas relief is not available with regard to claims
adjudicated on the merits in state court unless: (1) the
adjudication of the claims resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
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evidence presented in the state court proceeding.
2254(d).
28 U.S.C. §
A state court’s factual determinations are presumed to
be correct and may be rebutted only by clear and convincing
evidence.
§ 2254(e)(1).
III. Discussion
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), due process
is violated when the prosecution suppresses evidence favorable to
the accused if the evidence is material either to guilt or
punishment.
Evidence that the prosecution entered into an
agreement with a key witness in exchange for testimony is
impeachment evidence favorable to the accused.
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-155 (1972).
Giglio v. United
Such evidence is material
if it could “reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1995).
The petitioner’s Brady claim is unavailing because the state
court’s finding that no agreement existed between the prosecution
and Brown is supported by the testimony of the prosecutor, which
the court credited.
See Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 163 (2d.
Cir. 2003) (credibility determinations are properly within the
province of the state court that presided over the trial).
Petitioner argues that the state court’s determination is
unreasonable, citing the following: (1) Brown’s attorney entered
into negotiations with the prosecutorial team before Brown signed
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a statement and had the impression an agreement had been reached,
(2) Brown was released on a promise to appear the same day he
signed a statement without posting the $10,000 bond that was
initially set, and (3) Brown lied at the trial by insisting he
remained in custody under a New York detainer.
These facts do
not permit the state court’s determination to be rejected as
unreasonable in light of the evidence presented at the habeas
trial.
See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 342 (2006) (federal
courts may not “use a debatable set of inferences to set aside
the conclusion reached by the state court.”).
Even assuming there was an agreement, it would not have been
material under Brady.
Evidence is material when there is a
“reasonable probability” its disclosure would have resulted in a
different verdict.
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433.
There was ample
evidence, other than Brown’s testimony, to support the
conviction.
offense.
Petitioner had a strong motive to commit the
Other witnesses placed him on the scene before and
after the shooting.1
Physical evidence confirmed that the weapon
was fired from two locations and witnesses testified to hearing
two bursts of gunfire.
Brown’s testimony that he saw petitioner fire shots was not
1
Although Nadine Collier recanted her testimony, the state
court did not find her recantation credible. Petitioner has not
presented sufficient evidence to disturb the state court’s
finding.
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corroborated by other witnesses.
However, it is unlikely the
jury gave significant weight to Brown’s testimony.
Evidence that
he was biased because of an agreement with the prosecution would
have been cumulative to the impeachment evidence introduced at
trial.
See Shabazz, 336 F.3d at 166.
Smith testified that Brown
was lying about his vantage point on the night of the shooting
and the prosecutor admitted Brown had probably lied.
In
addition, Brown testified that he was on probation and facing
pending charges at the time of the trial.
In light of the
substantial corroborating and impeachment evidence introduced at
trial, the suppression of the alleged agreement does not
undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict.
Petitioner presents an alternative construction of his Brady
claim, arguing that even if no agreement existed the prosecution
should have disclosed that Brown was not being held on a New York
detainer when he signed the statement.
Petitioner did not
present his claim in this fashion to the state court and thus has
not satisfied the exhaustion requirement for federal habeas
petitions.
See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999).
However, this claim can be addressed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(2), which permits unexhausted claims to be denied on the
merits.
Petitioner’s unexhausted Brady claim fails for lack of
materiality for the reasons just discussed.
Petitioner’s perjury claim is essentially identical to the
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alternative construction of his Brady claim: the prosecution knew
or should have known Brown was lying when he testified he was
held on the New York detainer.
Petitioner did not present this
construction of his perjury claim in state court, instead
challenging Brown’s testimony as a whole.
Nevertheless, because
the claim fails, I will address it on the merits.
Due process is violated when the prosecution knowingly
presents false testimony if there is “any reasonable likelihood
that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the
jury.”
U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
Even assuming
the prosecution knew Brown lied about the New York detainer, this
claim fails for lack of materiality.
Brown’s lie obscured an
additional piece of evidence that would have called his motives
into question.
But disclosure of this lie would have been
cumulative to the impeachment evidence that was introduced.
As
discussed above, there was substantial independent evidence
implicating petitioner in the crime.
IV.
Conclusion
Accordingly, petitioner’s motion for summary judgment is
denied and the petition is dismissed.
So ordered this 23rd day of September 2011.
/s/ RNC
Robert N. Chatigny
United States District Judge
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