Erickson v. Staples, Inc. et al

Filing 134

ORDER: Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 112 ) is hereby DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 09/26/11. (Atmeh, S)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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:
KIMBERLIE ERICKSON,
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
v.
:
:
STAPLES, INC., and STAPLES,
:
THE OFFICE SUPERSTORE
:
EAST, INC.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:
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Civil No. 3:08CV973(AWT)

ORDER RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 112) is hereby GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. Summary judgment will enter in favor of the
defendants with respect to Count Four.1
I.

Count One: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q (Retaliatory Discharge)
The motion is being denied as to Count One because genuine

issues of material fact exist, inter alia, as to whether the
plaintiff’s speech regarding safety concerns and/or the
defendants’ compliance with the tax laws was speech on a matter
of public concern2 and as to whether a causal connection exists

1

Count Two and Count Five have been withdrawn.

2

Including as to whether, the plaintiff’s speech was pursuant to her
official duties, assuming arguendo that Garcetti even applies.

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between protected speech by the plaintiff and the plaintiff being
disciplined and discharged.
II.

Count Three: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-72 (Claim for Wages)
The motion is being denied as to Count Three because genuine

issues of material fact exist as to whether the claim for wages
accrued within the two-year limitations period for such a claim
under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-596, and as to whether the defendants
made a binding promise to give the plaintiff a raise.
III.

Count Four: Wrongful Discharge
The motion is being granted as to Count Four.

“Where a

statutory remedy exists for an alleged discharge in violation of
public policy, it precludes a common law wrongful discharge
action.” Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, Civ. No. 03:09cv268,
2010 WL 1287148 at *11 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2010).

Here, the

plaintiff can bring (and has in fact brought) a claim pursuant to
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q based on the termination of her
employment.

Therefore, the plaintiff’s common law claim for

wrongful discharge is precluded.
IV.

Counts Six and Seven: Title VII and CFEPA Retaliation
The motion is being denied as Count Six and Count Seven

because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
there was a causal connection between the plaintiff engaging in
protected activity and adverse employment action by her employer.

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V.

Claims for Punitive Damages
The motion is being denied with respect to the plaintiff’s

claims for punitive damages because genuine issues of material
fact exist as to whether the defendants acted with malice or with
reckless indifference to the plaintiff’s the federally protected
rights (see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)), and as to whether the
defendants acted with a reckless indifference to the plaintiff’s
rights or intentionally and wantonly violated her rights. (See
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q; Arnone v. Enfield, 79 Conn. App. 501,
521 (Conn. App. 2003)).
It is so ordered.
Dated this 26th day of September, 2011, at Hartford,
Connecticut.

/s/AWT
Alvin W. Thompson
United States District Judge

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