Pais v. Waterbury et al

Filing 35

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 33 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Dominic J. Squatrito on 6/4/13. (Glynn, T.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
FERNANDO PAIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF WATERBURY, TIMOTHY
JACKSON, and MILFORD HAYES,
Defendants.

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No. 3:08-cv-01156 (DJS)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Fernando Pais, brings this action against
the defendants

—

the City of Waterbury, Timothy Jackson

and

Milford Hayes — alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, of the Connecticut
Constitution,

and

of

Connecticut

common

law.

exists under 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1367(a).
defendants’

Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Jurisdiction

Now at bar is the

Judgment.

For

the

following reasons, the Motion (doc. #33) is granted in part and
denied in part.
I.

BACKGROUND1
Fernando

Connecticut.

Pais

is

an

individual

in

Waterbury,

Timothy Jackson and Milford Hayes are detectives

of the Waterbury Police Department.

1

residing

Mr. Pais brings this action

Unless otherwise indicated, the following is drawn from filings related
to the motion at bar.

1

against

Detectives

Jackson

and

Hayes

in

their

individual

capacities only.
Until he was laid off on November 14, 2007, Mr. Pais worked
as a laborer for NJR Construction Company.
On

November

30,

2007

—

sixteen

days

after

Mr.

Pais’

employment was terminated — NJR Construction reported that one
of its trucks was stolen.

Four days later, on December 4, 2007,

Officer Daniel Stanton of the Waterbury Police Department found
the missing truck on Griggs Street in Waterbury, Connecticut.
Early the next morning, on December 5, 2007, Nick Mancini —
the

owner

about

the

of

NJR

Construction

recovered

truck.

—

contacted

At

that

Detective

time,

Mr.

Jackson

Mancini

and

Detective Jackson were already personally acquainted.
Mr. Mancini explained to Detective Jackson that the truck,
at the time of its disappearance, contained $30,000.00 worth of
unspecified tools, and that these tools were missing from the
truck after its recovery.

Mr. Mancini further explained that he

suspected

having

Mr.

Pais

of

stolen

the

truck

and,

by

implication, the missing tools.
At

approximately

accompanied

by

residence.

There,

9:00

Detective
without

a.m.

that

Hayes,

day,

Detective

proceeded

to

specifying

the

reason

Jackson,

Mr.
for

Pais’
their

visit, they asked Mr. Pais to voluntarily accompany them to the
Waterbury Police Department for questioning.

2

Mr. Pais agreed.

Upon

arrival,

the

three

men

proceeded

to

the

Detective

Bureau where Detective Jackson directed Mr. Pais to an interview
room.

Detective

Jackson

then

entered

that

interview

closed the door, and engaged Mr. Pais in discussion.

room,

Detective

Hayes, in contrast, did not enter the interview room.

Rather,

he proceeded to his desk at the far end of the adjacent room and
turned his attention to other matters.
Shortly thereafter, at approximately 9:50 a.m., Detective
Jackson

struck

Mr.

Pais

in

the

face,

causing

the

latter

to

suffer pain and significant bleeding from his nose.

Detective

Jackson

of

their

a

nearby

and

Mr.

Pais

offer

differing

accounts

interaction immediately preceding this incident.
After

being

struck,

Mr.

Pais

was

escorted

to

washroom by Detectives Jackson, Hayes, and an unidentified third
Detective.

There, Mr. Pais was instructed to remove his blood-

stained clothing and to wash away the blood having accumulated
on

his

face,

chest,

and

hands.

Mr.

Pais

requested

medical

attention to address his injury, but none was provided.
Mr.

Pais

was

then

approximately six hours.

placed

in

a

Detective

cell

for

Throughout this period, he continued

to bleed and to request medical attention.
disregarded.

holding

His requests were

Ultimately, at 4:06 p.m., Mr. Pais was arrested by

Jackson

and

charged

interfering with an officer.

with

disorderly

conduct

and

Mr. Pais subsequently brought this

3

action.
Mr. Pais’ complaint focuses on Detective Jackson’s physical
contact with him in the interview room and on his resulting
injury, on his subsequent detention and denial of medical care,
and

on

his

arrest.

Specifically,

Mr.

Pais

alleges

that

Detective Jackson’s physical contact with him in the interview
room constitutes an unreasonable use of force in violation of
the

Fourth

Amendment

to

the

U.S.

Constitution

and

of

the

Connecticut Constitution (included in the First and Third Causes
of Action), and constitutes the common law torts of assault and
battery (included in the Second Cause of Action). Additionally,
he claims that the defendant Hayes, who could have interceded,
failed to do so despite having a duty to do so (included in the
First Cause of Action).
Mr.

Pais

also

alleges

that

his

subsequent

prolonged

detention and denial of medical care violated his rights under
the U.S. Constitution and the Connecticut Constitution (included
in the First and Third Causes of Action).

He further alleges

that his arrest and prosecution violated his rights under the
U.S. Constitution and Connecticut law. (included in the First,
Second, and Third Causes of Action). He also generally alleges
that

Detectives

outrageous
distress

Jackson

conduct
upon

him

and

Hayes

for

the

purpose

in

violation

4

of

engaged
of

in

extreme

inflicting

Connecticut

and

emotional

common

law

(included in the Second Cause of Action) and conspired with each
other to deprive him of his constitutional rights (included in
the First Cause of Action).
Mr. Pais alleges that the City of Waterbury developed and
maintained policies or customs resulting in the violation of his
constitutional
alleges

that

Detectives

rights
the

Jackson

(Fourth

City
and

is

Cause

of

statutorily

Hayes

for

any

their conduct (Fifth Cause of Action).

Action).
obliged
liability

Finally,
to

he

indemnify

arising

from

Detectives Jackson and

Hayes and the City now move for summary judgment as to some of
these claims.2
II.

GOVERNING STANDARD
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Thus, on a motion for summary judgment,

the Court must “determine whether, as to any material issue, a
genuine factual dispute exists.”

Kaytor v. Electric Boat Corp.,

609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

2

The motion at bar offers no challenge to the claims against Detective
Jackson related to his physical contact with Mr. Pais in the interview
room, or to the claims against Detectives Jackson and Hayes related to
their subsequent denial of Mr. Pais’ requests for medical attention.
(Doc. #33, p. 1, n.1). The motion also does not address the plaintiff’s
claim that the defendants inflicted emotional distress upon Mr. Pais in
violation of Connecticut common law.

5

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A fact is “material” if it

“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,”
and

a

dispute

as

to

a

material

fact

is

“genuine”

if

“the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for

the

nonmoving

party.”

Liberty

Lobby,

477

U.S.

at

248;

Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712,
720 (2d Cir. 2010).

The Court must also determine whether the

undisputed

facts,

material

if

any,

entitle

the

movant

to

judgment as a matter of law under the controlling substantive
standards.

Celotex

Corp.

v.

Catrett,

477

U.S.

317,

322-23

(1986); Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 545.
In making these determinations, “the court should review
all

of

the

evidence

in

the

record.”

Reeves

v.

Sanderson

Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Kaytor, 609
F.3d at 545.

In so doing, “the court must draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and . . . may not
make

credibility

determinations[,]

weigh

the

otherwise “resolve disputed questions of fact.”

evidence,”

or

Reeves, 530

U.S. at 150; Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 545.
III. ANALYSIS
A.

Abandoned Claims

“[G]rounds alleged in the [plaintiff’s] complaint but not
relied upon in summary judgment are deemed to be abandoned.”
Ferraresso v. Town of Granby, 646 F. Supp. 2d 296, 305 (D. Conn.

6

2009); see also Garbinski v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,
Civil Action No. 3:10cv1191 (VLB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102707,
at *46 (D. Conn. July 24, 2012)(where a plaintiff’s response to
a summary judgment motion does not oppose arguments addressing
certain of the plaintiff’s claims, the “court may deem the
claims abandoned and grant summary judgment”).
In his response to the defendants’ motion for partial
summary judgment, Pais expressly states that “[t]he plaintiff
does not contest defendants’ motion with respect to the
[following] claim[s:] . . . the claim against the City of
Waterbury[,] . . . the claim of false arrest, malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment[,] . . . his Fifth Amendment
claim[, and] . . . the claim of unreasonable force or assault
and battery against defendant Hayes.” (Doc. # 34, pp. 1-2). The
plaintiff also did not oppose the defendants’ argument regarding
statutory indemnification pursuant to Connecticut General
Statutes §7-465 and §7-101a.3

The Court deems these claims

abandoned and grants the defendants’ motion with respect to the
claim against the City of Waterbury (Fourth Cause of Action),
the claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution and false

3

The Court notes that “Conn. Gen. Stat. §7-101a does not provide a direct
cause of action against a municipality. Moreover, Conn. Gen. Stat. §7-465
requires an allegation that the employee’s conduct was not wanton or
willful.” Karbowicz v. Borough of Naugatuck, 921 F. Supp. 77, 78 (D. Conn.
1995)(citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff has alleged that “Defendants
Jackson and Hayes acted intentionally, wantonly, and/or unlawfully . . . .”
(Doc. # 1, p. 5, ¶26).

7

imprisonment (included in the Second and Third Causes of
Action), the claim of unreasonable force or assault and battery
against the defendant Hayes (included in the First, Second, and
Third Causes of Action), the claim seeking statutory
indemnification pursuant to General Statutes §7-465 and §7-101a
(Fifth Cause of Action),
B.

and the Fifth Amendment claim.4

Failure to Intercede

Detective Hayes seeks summary judgment with respect to the
allegation that he personally failed to intercede on behalf of
Mr. Pais as to Detective Jackson’s excessive use of force. In
response, Mr. Pais confines his failure to intervene claims to
the

constitutional

violations

arising

from

his

“subsequent

detention, denial of medical treatment, [and] denial of access
to

an

attorney[.]”

(Doc.

#34-3,

p.

5).

Mr.

Pais

concedes,

however, that Detective Hayes “was not in the room when the
assault

happened,”

intervene

in

the

and

that

initial

he

“may

attack[.]”

not

have

(Id.

been

at

able

to

5,

8).

pp.

Accordingly, the motion at bar, to the extent it seeks summary
judgment with respect to the allegation that Detective Hayes
personally

failed

to

intercede

on

behalf

of

Mr.

Pais

as

to

Detective Jackson’s excessive use of force, is granted.

4

Although the plaintiff’s complaint does not expressly raise a Fifth Amendment
claim, the defendants address a Fifth Amendment claim in their motion for
summary judgment based on a factual allegation in the complaint.

8

C.

Conspiracy

Detectives

Jackson

and

Hayes

seek

summary

judgment

with

respect to the allegation that they conspired to violate Mr.
Pais’ constitutional rights. Although the plaintiff’s complaint
does not specify a basis for the claim of a conspiracy, for
purposes of the summary judgment motion both the defendants and
the plaintiff address the conspiracy claim in terms of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3)5(“§ 1985(3)”) (Doc. # 33-3, p. 22; Doc. # 34-3, p. 8).
In order to make out a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must
allege and prove that “the conspiracy [was] motivated by some
racial

or

perhaps

otherwise

class-based,

invidious

discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Robinson
v.

Allstate

Insurance

Co.,

11-4348-cv,

2013

U.S.

App.

LEXIS

1412, at *5 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 2013)(internal quotation marks
omitted). Here the plaintiff has provided no evidence, nor has
he alleged, that the purported conspiracy was motived by racial
or otherwise class-based animus. For that reason, his conspiracy
claim fails and the motion is granted as to that claim.
The Court further notes that a plaintiff pursuing a claim
that defendants conspired to deprive him of his constitutional
rights “must provide some factual basis supporting a meeting of
the

minds,

such

that

defendants

5

entered

into

an

agreement,

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)prohibits “two or more persons [from] . . . conspir[ing]
. . . for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws . . . .”

9

express or tacit, to achieve the unlawful end.” Id.
finds

that

the

plaintiff

has

not

provided

a

The Court

factual

basis

supporting a meeting of the minds, which is an additional reason
why his conspiracy claim cannot succeed.
D.

Qualified Immunity

Finally, Detectives Jackson and Hayes seek summary judgment
with respect to Mr. Pais’ constitutional claims on qualified
immunity grounds. Specifically, they argue that their actions
towards Mr. Pais were objectively reasonable.
Qualified

immunity

“protects

government

officials

from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

As such, “[q]ualified immunity balances two important

interests — the need to hold public officials accountable when
they

exercise

power

irresponsibly

and

the

need

to

shield

officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably.”

Id.

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the U.S. Supreme
Court set forth a mandatory two-step inquiry to ascertain the
availability

of

the

qualified

immunity

defense.

First,

the

Court must decide whether “the facts alleged show the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right[.]” Id. at 201.

10

Where

the plaintiff satisfies this first step, the court must decide
“whether the right was clearly established” at the time of the
defendant’s alleged misconduct.

Id.

still

but

considered

“beneficial,”

This two-step process is
is

no

longer

mandatory.

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120, 126-27
(2d Cir. 2012).
At
entitled

the
to

summary

judgment

qualified

stage,

immunity

defendants

where

“no

will

only

reasonable

be

jury,

looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to, and
drawing
could

all

inferences

conclude

that

it

most
was

favorable

to,

objectively

the

plaintiff[

unreasonable

for

],
the

defendant[s] to believe that [they were] acting in a fashion
that did not clearly violate an established federally protected
right.”

Farid

v.

Ellen,

593

F.3d

233,

244

(2d

Cir.

2010)

(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, a reasonable jury could conclude, based on record
evidence interpreted in the light most favorable to Mr. Pais,
that

Detective

Jackson

unexpectedly

punched

him

in

the

face

without provocation and fabricated a pretext to justify his act.
A

reasonable

jury

could

further

conclude,

based

on

record

evidence interpreted in the light most favorable to Mr. Pais,
that

Detectives

Jackson

and

Hayes

subsequently

concealed

his

resulting injury, needlessly prolonged his detention, and denied
him

access

to

necessary

medical

11

attention.

Given

these

circumstances,
objectively

a

reasonable

unreasonable

jury

for

could

Detectives

conclude
Jackson

that

was

Hayes

and

it

to

believe that their conduct did not clearly violate Mr. Pais’
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Mickle v. Morin, 297
F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that a reasonable jury
could credit the plaintiff’s version of the pertinent facts and
conclude that a police officer’s use of force “without warning
or

provocation”

Amendment

and

was
that

excessive
“no

in

violation

reasonable

of

police

the

Fourth

officer

could

objectively have believed otherwise”); Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d
845,

856

pretrial

(2d

Cir.

1996)

(recognizing

that

the

denial

of

a

detainee’s

needs

for

care

can

constitute

a

Fourteenth
bar,

to

Amendment

the

extent

medical

violation).
it

seeks

Accordingly,

summary

judgment

the
on

motion

qualified

immunity grounds, is denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment (doc. #33) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART.

Specifically, the motion is granted insofar as

it seeks summary judgment with respect to: (1) the Section 1983
claim against the City of Waterbury (Fourth Cause of Action);
(2) the claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution and false
imprisonment against the defendants Hayes and Jackson (included
in the Second and Third Causes of Action); (3) the Fifth

12

at

Amendment claim against the defendants Hayes and Jackson; (4)
the unreasonable use of force and assault and battery claims
against the defendant Hayes (included in the First, Second, and
Third Causes of Action); (5) the claim seeking statutory
indemnification pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 7-465
and § 7-101a (Fifth Cause of Action); (6) the failure to
intercede claim against the defendant Hayes relating to the
defendant Jackson’s alleged use of excessive force (included in
the First Cause of Action); and (7) the conspiracy claims
against the defendants Hayes and Jackson (included in the First
Cause of Action).
This case will proceed as to the following claims:
(1)

the unreasonable use of force and assault and battery
claims against the defendant Jackson (included in the
First, Second, and Third Causes of Action);

(2)

the claims against the defendants Hayes and Jackson
that the plaintiff’s prolonged detention and denial of
medical care violated his rights under the U.S.
Constitution and the Connecticut Constitution
(included in the First and Third Causes of Action);

(3)

the intentional infliction of emotional distress

13

claims against the defendants Hayes and Jackson
(included in the Second Cause of Action).

SO ORDERED this

4th

day of June, 2013.

____/s/ DJS______________________________
DOMINIC J. SQUATRITO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14