Pais v. Waterbury et al
Filing
35
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 33 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Dominic J. Squatrito on 6/4/13. (Glynn, T.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
FERNANDO PAIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF WATERBURY, TIMOTHY
JACKSON, and MILFORD HAYES,
Defendants.
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No. 3:08-cv-01156 (DJS)
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Fernando Pais, brings this action against
the defendants
—
the City of Waterbury, Timothy Jackson
and
Milford Hayes — alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, of the Connecticut
Constitution,
and
of
Connecticut
common
law.
exists under 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1367(a).
defendants’
Motion
for
Partial
Summary
Jurisdiction
Now at bar is the
Judgment.
For
the
following reasons, the Motion (doc. #33) is granted in part and
denied in part.
I.
BACKGROUND1
Fernando
Connecticut.
Pais
is
an
individual
in
Waterbury,
Timothy Jackson and Milford Hayes are detectives
of the Waterbury Police Department.
1
residing
Mr. Pais brings this action
Unless otherwise indicated, the following is drawn from filings related
to the motion at bar.
1
against
Detectives
Jackson
and
Hayes
in
their
individual
capacities only.
Until he was laid off on November 14, 2007, Mr. Pais worked
as a laborer for NJR Construction Company.
On
November
30,
2007
—
sixteen
days
after
Mr.
Pais’
employment was terminated — NJR Construction reported that one
of its trucks was stolen.
Four days later, on December 4, 2007,
Officer Daniel Stanton of the Waterbury Police Department found
the missing truck on Griggs Street in Waterbury, Connecticut.
Early the next morning, on December 5, 2007, Nick Mancini —
the
owner
about
the
of
NJR
Construction
recovered
truck.
—
contacted
At
that
Detective
time,
Mr.
Jackson
Mancini
and
Detective Jackson were already personally acquainted.
Mr. Mancini explained to Detective Jackson that the truck,
at the time of its disappearance, contained $30,000.00 worth of
unspecified tools, and that these tools were missing from the
truck after its recovery.
Mr. Mancini further explained that he
suspected
having
Mr.
Pais
of
stolen
the
truck
and,
by
implication, the missing tools.
At
approximately
accompanied
by
residence.
There,
9:00
Detective
without
a.m.
that
Hayes,
day,
Detective
proceeded
to
specifying
the
reason
Jackson,
Mr.
for
Pais’
their
visit, they asked Mr. Pais to voluntarily accompany them to the
Waterbury Police Department for questioning.
2
Mr. Pais agreed.
Upon
arrival,
the
three
men
proceeded
to
the
Detective
Bureau where Detective Jackson directed Mr. Pais to an interview
room.
Detective
Jackson
then
entered
that
interview
closed the door, and engaged Mr. Pais in discussion.
room,
Detective
Hayes, in contrast, did not enter the interview room.
Rather,
he proceeded to his desk at the far end of the adjacent room and
turned his attention to other matters.
Shortly thereafter, at approximately 9:50 a.m., Detective
Jackson
struck
Mr.
Pais
in
the
face,
causing
the
latter
to
suffer pain and significant bleeding from his nose.
Detective
Jackson
of
their
a
nearby
and
Mr.
Pais
offer
differing
accounts
interaction immediately preceding this incident.
After
being
struck,
Mr.
Pais
was
escorted
to
washroom by Detectives Jackson, Hayes, and an unidentified third
Detective.
There, Mr. Pais was instructed to remove his blood-
stained clothing and to wash away the blood having accumulated
on
his
face,
chest,
and
hands.
Mr.
Pais
requested
medical
attention to address his injury, but none was provided.
Mr.
Pais
was
then
approximately six hours.
placed
in
a
Detective
cell
for
Throughout this period, he continued
to bleed and to request medical attention.
disregarded.
holding
His requests were
Ultimately, at 4:06 p.m., Mr. Pais was arrested by
Jackson
and
charged
interfering with an officer.
with
disorderly
conduct
and
Mr. Pais subsequently brought this
3
action.
Mr. Pais’ complaint focuses on Detective Jackson’s physical
contact with him in the interview room and on his resulting
injury, on his subsequent detention and denial of medical care,
and
on
his
arrest.
Specifically,
Mr.
Pais
alleges
that
Detective Jackson’s physical contact with him in the interview
room constitutes an unreasonable use of force in violation of
the
Fourth
Amendment
to
the
U.S.
Constitution
and
of
the
Connecticut Constitution (included in the First and Third Causes
of Action), and constitutes the common law torts of assault and
battery (included in the Second Cause of Action). Additionally,
he claims that the defendant Hayes, who could have interceded,
failed to do so despite having a duty to do so (included in the
First Cause of Action).
Mr.
Pais
also
alleges
that
his
subsequent
prolonged
detention and denial of medical care violated his rights under
the U.S. Constitution and the Connecticut Constitution (included
in the First and Third Causes of Action).
He further alleges
that his arrest and prosecution violated his rights under the
U.S. Constitution and Connecticut law. (included in the First,
Second, and Third Causes of Action). He also generally alleges
that
Detectives
outrageous
distress
Jackson
conduct
upon
him
and
Hayes
for
the
purpose
in
violation
4
of
engaged
of
in
extreme
inflicting
Connecticut
and
emotional
common
law
(included in the Second Cause of Action) and conspired with each
other to deprive him of his constitutional rights (included in
the First Cause of Action).
Mr. Pais alleges that the City of Waterbury developed and
maintained policies or customs resulting in the violation of his
constitutional
alleges
that
Detectives
rights
the
Jackson
(Fourth
City
and
is
Cause
of
statutorily
Hayes
for
any
their conduct (Fifth Cause of Action).
Action).
obliged
liability
Finally,
to
he
indemnify
arising
from
Detectives Jackson and
Hayes and the City now move for summary judgment as to some of
these claims.2
II.
GOVERNING STANDARD
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Thus, on a motion for summary judgment,
the Court must “determine whether, as to any material issue, a
genuine factual dispute exists.”
Kaytor v. Electric Boat Corp.,
609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
2
The motion at bar offers no challenge to the claims against Detective
Jackson related to his physical contact with Mr. Pais in the interview
room, or to the claims against Detectives Jackson and Hayes related to
their subsequent denial of Mr. Pais’ requests for medical attention.
(Doc. #33, p. 1, n.1). The motion also does not address the plaintiff’s
claim that the defendants inflicted emotional distress upon Mr. Pais in
violation of Connecticut common law.
5
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A fact is “material” if it
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,”
and
a
dispute
as
to
a
material
fact
is
“genuine”
if
“the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for
the
nonmoving
party.”
Liberty
Lobby,
477
U.S.
at
248;
Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712,
720 (2d Cir. 2010).
The Court must also determine whether the
undisputed
facts,
material
if
any,
entitle
the
movant
to
judgment as a matter of law under the controlling substantive
standards.
Celotex
Corp.
v.
Catrett,
477
U.S.
317,
322-23
(1986); Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 545.
In making these determinations, “the court should review
all
of
the
evidence
in
the
record.”
Reeves
v.
Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Kaytor, 609
F.3d at 545.
In so doing, “the court must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and . . . may not
make
credibility
determinations[,]
weigh
the
otherwise “resolve disputed questions of fact.”
evidence,”
or
Reeves, 530
U.S. at 150; Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 545.
III. ANALYSIS
A.
Abandoned Claims
“[G]rounds alleged in the [plaintiff’s] complaint but not
relied upon in summary judgment are deemed to be abandoned.”
Ferraresso v. Town of Granby, 646 F. Supp. 2d 296, 305 (D. Conn.
6
2009); see also Garbinski v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,
Civil Action No. 3:10cv1191 (VLB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102707,
at *46 (D. Conn. July 24, 2012)(where a plaintiff’s response to
a summary judgment motion does not oppose arguments addressing
certain of the plaintiff’s claims, the “court may deem the
claims abandoned and grant summary judgment”).
In his response to the defendants’ motion for partial
summary judgment, Pais expressly states that “[t]he plaintiff
does not contest defendants’ motion with respect to the
[following] claim[s:] . . . the claim against the City of
Waterbury[,] . . . the claim of false arrest, malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment[,] . . . his Fifth Amendment
claim[, and] . . . the claim of unreasonable force or assault
and battery against defendant Hayes.” (Doc. # 34, pp. 1-2). The
plaintiff also did not oppose the defendants’ argument regarding
statutory indemnification pursuant to Connecticut General
Statutes §7-465 and §7-101a.3
The Court deems these claims
abandoned and grants the defendants’ motion with respect to the
claim against the City of Waterbury (Fourth Cause of Action),
the claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution and false
3
The Court notes that “Conn. Gen. Stat. §7-101a does not provide a direct
cause of action against a municipality. Moreover, Conn. Gen. Stat. §7-465
requires an allegation that the employee’s conduct was not wanton or
willful.” Karbowicz v. Borough of Naugatuck, 921 F. Supp. 77, 78 (D. Conn.
1995)(citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff has alleged that “Defendants
Jackson and Hayes acted intentionally, wantonly, and/or unlawfully . . . .”
(Doc. # 1, p. 5, ¶26).
7
imprisonment (included in the Second and Third Causes of
Action), the claim of unreasonable force or assault and battery
against the defendant Hayes (included in the First, Second, and
Third Causes of Action), the claim seeking statutory
indemnification pursuant to General Statutes §7-465 and §7-101a
(Fifth Cause of Action),
B.
and the Fifth Amendment claim.4
Failure to Intercede
Detective Hayes seeks summary judgment with respect to the
allegation that he personally failed to intercede on behalf of
Mr. Pais as to Detective Jackson’s excessive use of force. In
response, Mr. Pais confines his failure to intervene claims to
the
constitutional
violations
arising
from
his
“subsequent
detention, denial of medical treatment, [and] denial of access
to
an
attorney[.]”
(Doc.
#34-3,
p.
5).
Mr.
Pais
concedes,
however, that Detective Hayes “was not in the room when the
assault
happened,”
intervene
in
the
and
that
initial
he
“may
attack[.]”
not
have
(Id.
been
at
able
to
5,
8).
pp.
Accordingly, the motion at bar, to the extent it seeks summary
judgment with respect to the allegation that Detective Hayes
personally
failed
to
intercede
on
behalf
of
Mr.
Pais
as
to
Detective Jackson’s excessive use of force, is granted.
4
Although the plaintiff’s complaint does not expressly raise a Fifth Amendment
claim, the defendants address a Fifth Amendment claim in their motion for
summary judgment based on a factual allegation in the complaint.
8
C.
Conspiracy
Detectives
Jackson
and
Hayes
seek
summary
judgment
with
respect to the allegation that they conspired to violate Mr.
Pais’ constitutional rights. Although the plaintiff’s complaint
does not specify a basis for the claim of a conspiracy, for
purposes of the summary judgment motion both the defendants and
the plaintiff address the conspiracy claim in terms of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3)5(“§ 1985(3)”) (Doc. # 33-3, p. 22; Doc. # 34-3, p. 8).
In order to make out a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must
allege and prove that “the conspiracy [was] motivated by some
racial
or
perhaps
otherwise
class-based,
invidious
discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Robinson
v.
Allstate
Insurance
Co.,
11-4348-cv,
2013
U.S.
App.
LEXIS
1412, at *5 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 2013)(internal quotation marks
omitted). Here the plaintiff has provided no evidence, nor has
he alleged, that the purported conspiracy was motived by racial
or otherwise class-based animus. For that reason, his conspiracy
claim fails and the motion is granted as to that claim.
The Court further notes that a plaintiff pursuing a claim
that defendants conspired to deprive him of his constitutional
rights “must provide some factual basis supporting a meeting of
the
minds,
such
that
defendants
5
entered
into
an
agreement,
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)prohibits “two or more persons [from] . . . conspir[ing]
. . . for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws . . . .”
9
express or tacit, to achieve the unlawful end.” Id.
finds
that
the
plaintiff
has
not
provided
a
The Court
factual
basis
supporting a meeting of the minds, which is an additional reason
why his conspiracy claim cannot succeed.
D.
Qualified Immunity
Finally, Detectives Jackson and Hayes seek summary judgment
with respect to Mr. Pais’ constitutional claims on qualified
immunity grounds. Specifically, they argue that their actions
towards Mr. Pais were objectively reasonable.
Qualified
immunity
“protects
government
officials
from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
As such, “[q]ualified immunity balances two important
interests — the need to hold public officials accountable when
they
exercise
power
irresponsibly
and
the
need
to
shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably.”
Id.
In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the U.S. Supreme
Court set forth a mandatory two-step inquiry to ascertain the
availability
of
the
qualified
immunity
defense.
First,
the
Court must decide whether “the facts alleged show the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right[.]” Id. at 201.
10
Where
the plaintiff satisfies this first step, the court must decide
“whether the right was clearly established” at the time of the
defendant’s alleged misconduct.
Id.
still
but
considered
“beneficial,”
This two-step process is
is
no
longer
mandatory.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120, 126-27
(2d Cir. 2012).
At
entitled
the
to
summary
judgment
qualified
stage,
immunity
defendants
where
“no
will
only
reasonable
be
jury,
looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to, and
drawing
could
all
inferences
conclude
that
it
most
was
favorable
to,
objectively
the
plaintiff[
unreasonable
for
],
the
defendant[s] to believe that [they were] acting in a fashion
that did not clearly violate an established federally protected
right.”
Farid
v.
Ellen,
593
F.3d
233,
244
(2d
Cir.
2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, a reasonable jury could conclude, based on record
evidence interpreted in the light most favorable to Mr. Pais,
that
Detective
Jackson
unexpectedly
punched
him
in
the
face
without provocation and fabricated a pretext to justify his act.
A
reasonable
jury
could
further
conclude,
based
on
record
evidence interpreted in the light most favorable to Mr. Pais,
that
Detectives
Jackson
and
Hayes
subsequently
concealed
his
resulting injury, needlessly prolonged his detention, and denied
him
access
to
necessary
medical
11
attention.
Given
these
circumstances,
objectively
a
reasonable
unreasonable
jury
for
could
Detectives
conclude
Jackson
that
was
Hayes
and
it
to
believe that their conduct did not clearly violate Mr. Pais’
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Mickle v. Morin, 297
F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir. 2002) (explaining that a reasonable jury
could credit the plaintiff’s version of the pertinent facts and
conclude that a police officer’s use of force “without warning
or
provocation”
Amendment
and
was
that
excessive
“no
in
violation
reasonable
of
police
the
Fourth
officer
could
objectively have believed otherwise”); Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d
845,
856
pretrial
(2d
Cir.
1996)
(recognizing
that
the
denial
of
a
detainee’s
needs
for
care
can
constitute
a
Fourteenth
bar,
to
Amendment
the
extent
medical
violation).
it
seeks
Accordingly,
summary
judgment
the
on
motion
qualified
immunity grounds, is denied.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (doc. #33) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART.
Specifically, the motion is granted insofar as
it seeks summary judgment with respect to: (1) the Section 1983
claim against the City of Waterbury (Fourth Cause of Action);
(2) the claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution and false
imprisonment against the defendants Hayes and Jackson (included
in the Second and Third Causes of Action); (3) the Fifth
12
at
Amendment claim against the defendants Hayes and Jackson; (4)
the unreasonable use of force and assault and battery claims
against the defendant Hayes (included in the First, Second, and
Third Causes of Action); (5) the claim seeking statutory
indemnification pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 7-465
and § 7-101a (Fifth Cause of Action); (6) the failure to
intercede claim against the defendant Hayes relating to the
defendant Jackson’s alleged use of excessive force (included in
the First Cause of Action); and (7) the conspiracy claims
against the defendants Hayes and Jackson (included in the First
Cause of Action).
This case will proceed as to the following claims:
(1)
the unreasonable use of force and assault and battery
claims against the defendant Jackson (included in the
First, Second, and Third Causes of Action);
(2)
the claims against the defendants Hayes and Jackson
that the plaintiff’s prolonged detention and denial of
medical care violated his rights under the U.S.
Constitution and the Connecticut Constitution
(included in the First and Third Causes of Action);
(3)
the intentional infliction of emotional distress
13
claims against the defendants Hayes and Jackson
(included in the Second Cause of Action).
SO ORDERED this
4th
day of June, 2013.
____/s/ DJS______________________________
DOMINIC J. SQUATRITO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
14
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