Smith v. AFSCME Council 4 et al

Filing 215

RULING AND ORDER re: Doc. #190 plaintiff's objection to Doc. #188 Order. 8 Pages. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 8/12/11. (Nichols, J.)

0UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
WANDA SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
AFSCME COUNCIL 4, ET AL.,
Defendants

:
:
:
: CASE NO. 3:08CV1735(RNC)
:
:
:

RULING AND ORDER
Pending before the court is the plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration (doc. #190) of the court's May 13, 2011 Ruling on
Discovery Motions (doc. #188).1

Specifically, the plaintiff

requests that the court reconsider its decisions to extend
discovery deadlines and to award reasonable attorney's fees to
the defendants.
is denied.

For the reasons set forth below, reconsideration

Even if the court were to reconsider, it would adhere

to its prior ruling.
I.

Background

The complaint was filed on November 17, 2008.

(Doc. #1.)

Discovery was scheduled to be completed in six months, by May 19,
2009.

(Doc. #2.)

There were a number of early filings,

including a motion to dismiss.

(Doc. #28.)

1

On June 18, 2009,

The court construes the plaintiff's "Objection to Discovery
Ruling" (doc. #190) as a request for reconsideration.
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all parties requested that they be permitted to defer discovery
until after a ruling on motions to dismiss.

(Doc. #54.)

Judge

Chatigny conferred with counsel and granted the request.

(Doc.

#56.)

The parties filed their 26(f) report on April 28, 2011.

(Doc. #86.)

They requested an additional year for fact

discovery, proposing that "all fact discovery . . . will be
completed (not propounded) by April 30, 2011."

Id.

In

accordance with their request, Judge Chatigny issued the
scheduling order setting April 30, 2010 as the discovery
deadline.

(Doc. #88)

A year later, on April 25, 2011, five days before all
discovery was to be completed, plaintiff asked for "30 days
through and including May 31, 2011" to complete her discovery.
(Doc. #183.)
Discovery had not gone smoothly.

The plaintiff was late in

responding to discovery (see doc. #188 at 5) which prompted
motion practice.

In a November 2010 Motion to Compel, doc. #142,

defendant argued that plaintiff had not yet complied with its
June 2010 discovery requests.

Doc. #143.

Magistrate Judge

Martinez granted in part the defendant’s motion and gave the
plaintiff until February 22, 2011 to supplement her discovery
responses.

(Doc. #154.)

In setting that deadline, the court

gave the plaintiff more time to respond than she had requested.
2

(Doc. #188 at 5 n.3.)

The plaintiff did not comply with the

deadline, necessitating even more motion practice.
169, 171.)

(Docs. ##

By the time of oral argument on the additional

motions on April 28, 2011, plaintiff still had not provided
responses to June 2010 discovery.

The court gave the plaintiff

until May 31, 2011 (the new deadline plaintiff had requested in
doc. #183) to provide her responses.

(Doc. #188.)

Because the

defendants needed some time to review the plaintiff’s late
production before completing the plaintiff’s deposition, the
court permitted defendants an additional three weeks, until June
22, 2011, to conclude the plaintiff’s deposition.
further discovery was permitted.

(Id.)

No

(Id.)

The plaintiff was responsible for other discovery delays.
She did not adequately disclose evidence regarding her damages,
leading to more motion practice (docs. 114 and 134) and a court
order requiring a supplemental damage analysis.

(Doc. #154.)

The court specified items to be included in the supplemental
damage analysis.
order.

(Id.)

The plaintiff did not comply with the

(Doc. #188 at 4.)

Both defendants filed motions to

preclude the supplemental damages analysis as noncompliant.
(Docs. ##162 and 172.)

The plaintiff responded to only one of

the motions, arguing that the defendant did not need the missing
information.

(Doc. #176.)

Finally, at oral argument on the
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motions to preclude, the plaintiff made concessions supplying the
missing information.

(Doc. #188 at 3-4.)

The court awarded

defendants their attorney fees in connection with these latter
motions.2

(Doc. #188 at 4.)

Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration of the court’s
orders on the discovery deadline and to award attorney fees.
II.

Standard of Review

The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration "is
strict, and reconsideration generally will be denied unless the
moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the
court overlooked -— matters, in other words, that might
reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the
court."

Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d

Cir.1995) (citations omitted).

A "motion to reconsider should

not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate
an issue already decided."

Id.

"The major grounds justifying

2

The court said: "The defendants’ requests for attorney’s
fees are granted. To comply with the court’s January 31, 2011
order, the plaintiff’s attorney had only to notify the defendants
that she intended to rely exclusively on plaintiff’s own
testimony and that there were no witnesses, evidence or medical
records to disclose. Instead, she submitted a noncompliant
statement of damages and then compounded the matter by failing to
respond to one defendant’s motion and responding evasively to the
other defendant’s motion. Even when oral argument was scheduled,
she did not provide any clarification or detail. All of this
resulted in unnecessary wasted time and attention by the court
and the defendants (not to mention the plaintiff herself.)"
(Doc. #188 at 4.)
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reconsideration are 'an intervening change of controlling law,
the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear
error or prevent manifest injustice.'"

Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd.

v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.1992) (citing
18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478, at 790 (1981)).
II.

Discussion
A. Extension of Discovery Deadlines

The plaintiff first requests that the court reconsider its
decision to grant her motion extending the discovery deadline to
complete discovery, but not to permit additional time to propound
new discovery.

In support of her argument, she asserts that this

was her first request for an extension and that it was reasonable
in light of delays at the beginning of the case.

She also argues

that it was unfair for the court to grant the defendants 3 weeks
beyond the plaintiff's deadline to finish her deposition. She
believes the court has shown her disfavor.
These arguments attempt to relitigate issues that were
previously addressed in the parties' briefs and at oral argument.
(See Transcript at 15-19, 27-32.)
not warranted.

Therefore, reconsideration is

See Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 953 (2d

Cir. 1964) ("where litigants have once battled for the court's

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decision, they should neither be required, nor without good
reason permitted, to battle for it again").
Moreover, even if the court were to reconsider, it would
reach the same conclusion.

Judge Chatigny issued the discovery

schedule requested by the parties.
for fact discovery.

He gave them a generous year

His scheduling order was explicit that all

discovery was to be concluded, not simply propounded, by the
discovery deadline.

The plaintiff now maintains she intended to

take depositions, but as of the date of her motion--five days
before the conclusion of discovery--she had not noticed
depositions.

Her argument that the court permitted the

defendants three additional weeks to finish plaintiff’s
deposition is a hollow one, as it was she who prolonged the
completion of her deposition by failing to disclose necessary
evidence to the defendants.

The court has carefully reviewed the

record, as it did the first time considering these requests, and
does not reach a different conclusion.
B.

Award of Attorneys Fees and Costs

The plaintiff also requests that the court reconsider its
award of the defendants' reasonable attorneys fees (docs. ##162
and 172) to be paid by the plaintiff's attorney.

She contends

that her discovery responses complied with the court's order and
that the defendants should have been able to deduce from her
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earlier deposition testimony that she had no documents or
witnesses to support her damages claims.

She argues, therefore,

that the defendants' motions were unnecessary and that the
defendants were responsible for the resources expended in filing
them.
Again, these arguments attempt to relitigate issues that
were previously litigated at oral argument and expressly
considered in the court's ruling.
23.)

(See Transcript at 9-11, 17-

Consequently, reconsideration is not warranted.

See Zdanok

v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1964).
If the court were to reconsider its ruling, it would adhere
to its prior ruling.

Even assuming, as the plaintiff suggests,

that the defendants could have gleaned from her deposition
testimony a sense of the damages evidence she intended to offer,
the plaintiff does not dispute that she failed to comply with the
detailed requirements of the court's order.

In fact, it took two

oral arguments and multiple motions to elicit the required
information from the plaintiff's attorney.

"[D]iscovery orders

are meant to be followed," Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Ozak Trading
Inc., 58 F.3d 849, 853 (2d Cir. 1995), and "[a] party who flouts
such orders does so at his peril," Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin
Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988).

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For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED at Hartford, Connecticut this 12th day of August,
2011.
_________/s/__________________
Donna F. Martinez
United States Magistrate Judge

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