Palkimas v. Bella et al

Filing 20

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 18 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 7/6/2010. (Lynch, C.)

Palkimas v. Bella et al

Doc. 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT D I S T R I C T OF CONNECTICUT -------------------------------x R I C H A R D R. PALKIMAS, : : Plaintiff, : : v. : : K A T H Y BELLA, ANDREW WHELAN, : R O B E R T HALL, and : R I C K I GOLDSTEIN, : : Defendants. : -------------------------------x

C i v . No. 3:08CV1836(AWT)

R U L I N G ON MOTION TO DISMISS T h e plaintiff, Richard R. Palkimas, has brought this action p u r s u a n t to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against Kathy Bella ("Bella"), Andrew W h e l a n ("Whelan"), Robert Hall ("Hall"), and Ricki Goldstein ( " G o l d s t e i n " ) , claiming a violation of his constitutional right to privacy. The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss. For the

r e a s o n s set forth below, the motion is being granted in part and d e n i e d in part. I. F A C T U A L ALLEGATIONS T h e allegations set forth in the complaint are taken as true f o r purposes of the instant motion. O n December 2, 2005, Hall, a prosecuting attorney for the S t a t e of Connecticut, requested that Whelan, an employee of the S t a t e of Connecticut Department of Children and Families ("DCF"), w r i t e a letter containing confidential details about the plaintiff a n d his family to the Superior Court in Norwalk. Whelan caused Hall

B e l l a , another DCF employee, to transmit the letter to Hall.

Dockets.Justia.com

subsequently placed the document in an unsealed court file. O n July 26, 2006, Goldstein, another prosecuting attorney f o r the State of Connecticut, disclosed the document to a state c o u r t judge. As a result, the plaintiff's placement in an anger

m a n a g e m e n t program was terminated and he was prosecuted on charges o n which he would not otherwise have been prosecuted. II. L E G A L STANDARD A claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter j u r i s d i c t i o n under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) when the court lacks the s t a t u t o r y or constitutional power to adjudicate the claim. Nowak

v . Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182 (2d Cir. 1996). On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the party asserting subject m a t t e r jurisdiction "bears the burden of proving subject matter j u r i s d i c t i o n by a preponderance of the evidence." Aurechione v.

S c h o o l m a n Transp. Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005). When reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter j u r i s d i c t i o n , the court may consider evidence outside the p l e a d i n g s .1 See Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d

In this case, insofar as the court decides the motion on the ground of absolute immunity, which is properly brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the court declines to consider the material outside the pleadings that were submitted with the motion to dismiss. See Weissman v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 500 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (reviewing denial of motion to dismiss on absolute immunity grounds under Rule 12(b)(6)); Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 428 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting in prosecutorial immunity context that the "absolute immunity defense . . . on a motion to dismiss translates to failure to state a claim" (quoting Krohn v. United States,742 F.2d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 1984)); see also State Emps. Bargaining Agent v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 77 n.4 (2d Cir. 2007) 2

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Cir. 2000). With the exception of the above, the standards for dismissal u n d e r Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) are identical. See

L e r n e r v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2004). When d e c i d i n g a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must a c c e p t as true all factual allegations in the complaint and must d r a w inferences in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Although a complaint

" d o e s not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's o b l i g a t i o n to provide the `grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief' r e q u i r e s more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic r e c i t a t i o n of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(noting "legislative immunity is not a jurisdictional bar, but is rather a personal defense that may be asserted to challenge the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)"). Although the Motion to Dismiss was brought under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3), both parties treat the motion as being brought under both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (See Def.'s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Dismiss (Doc. No. 18-2) ("Def.'s Br."), at 30 ("Amended Complaint Fails to State a Claim"); Br. Opp'n Mot. Dismiss (Doc. No. 19) at 1.) Accordingly, the court will construe the motion as being brought under Rule 12(b)(6) as well as Rule 12(b)(1). See EEOC v. Plaza Operating Partners, Ltd., No. 03 Civ. 7680 LTS FM, 2004 WL 1803269, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2004) ("Having found that Defendant's motion to dismiss is predicated improperly on Rule 12(b)(1), the Court could construe the motion as one to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . ."); cf. Holowecki v. Fed. Express Corp., 440 F.3d 558, 565 (2d Cir. 2006) ("We construe the district court's ruling as a dismissal . . . under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) rather than . . . under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)."); Allied Irish Banks, P.L.C. v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 03 Civ. 3748(DAB), 2006 WL 278138, at *5 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2006) ("[T]he court construes . . . part of each Defendant's motion as a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss . . . not as a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss . . . ."). 3

(citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on a motion t o dismiss, the courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal c o n c l u s i o n couched as a factual allegation")). "Nor does a

c o m p l a i n t suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further f a c t u a l enhancement." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. While

1 9 3 7 , 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

" [ f ] a c t u a l allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief a b o v e the speculative level, on the assumption that all a l l e g a t i o n s in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)," T w o m b l y , 550 U.S. at 555 (2007) (citations omitted) (footnote o m i t t e d ) , the plaintiff is required to plead "only enough facts to s t a t e a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 570. "The function of a motion to dismiss is `merely to assess t h e legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of t h e evidence which might be offered in support thereof.'" Mytych Id. at

v . May Dept. Stores Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 130, 131 (D.Conn. 1999) ( q u o t i n g Ryder Energy Distribution v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, I n c . , 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984)). "The issue on a motion

t o dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will prevail, but whether t h e plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims." United States v. Yale New Haven Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 784,

7 8 6 (D.Conn. 1990) citing Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236.

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III.

DISCUSSION A. T h e Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

T h e defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine d e p r i v e s the court of subject matter jurisdiction over this case. The principle established by this doctrine is "that federal d i s t r i c t courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in s u b s t a n c e , appeals from state court judgments." Hoblock v. Albany However,

C n t y . Bd. of Elections, 422 F. 3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). t h e Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

d o e s not deprive a district court of subjectm a t t e r jurisdiction "simply because a party a t t e m p t s to litigate in federal court a matter p r e v i o u s l y litigated in state court. If a federal p l a i n t i f f `present[s] some independent claim, a l b e i t one that denies a legal conclusion that a s t a t e court has reached in a case to which he [or s h e ] was a party . . ., then there is jurisdiction a n d state law determines whether the defendant p r e v a i l s under principles of preclusion.'" I d . at 86 (first alteration in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil C o r p . v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005)). T h e Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies where four conditions a r e met: (1) the federal court plaintiff lost in state court; (2) t h e federal court plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the s t a t e court judgment; (3) the federal court plaintiff seeks the d i s t r i c t court's review and rejection of the state court judgment; a n d (4) the state court judgment was rendered before the district c o u r t proceedings commenced. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.

T h e defendants contend that "the sole claim the plaintiff r a i s e s . . . was considered in the underlying state proceedings."

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(Def.'s Br. 28.)

In support of their position, they cite Phifer

v . City of New York, 289 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 2002), which based i t s analysis on the Second Circuit law at the time that "at a m i n i m u m " a claim would be "barred under the Rooker-Feldman d o c t r i n e if it would be barred under the principles of preclusion." Phifer, 289 F.3d at 56 (quoting Moccio v. N.Y. State

O f f i c e of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir. 1996)). However, this analysis was subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court. See Hoblock, 422 U.S. at 85 (noting that the Supreme Court

c i t e d Moccio as an example of lower courts "wrongly constru[ing] t h e Rooker-Feldman doctrine to extend far beyond the contours of t h e Rooker and Feldman cases") (internal quotation marks omitted). Since Exxon Mobil and Hoblock were decided, it has been clear that " t h e applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine turns not on the s i m i l a r i t y between a party's state-court and federal court claims ( w h i c h is, generally speaking, the focus of ordinary preclusion l a w ) , but rather on the causal relationship between the statec o u r t judgment and the injury of which the party complains in f e d e r a l court." 2007). H o w e v e r , a plaintiff cannot "avoid Rooker-Feldman simply by c l e v e r pleading­ by alleging that actions taken pursuant to a c o u r t order violate his [or her] rights without ever challenging t h e court order itself." added). Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 88 (emphasis McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 97-98 (2d Cir.

Further, the Second Circuit has noted that it is

" e v i d e n t " that "a party is not complaining of an injury `caused

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by' a state judgment when the exact injury of which the party c o m p l a i n s in federal court existed prior in time to the statec o u r t proceedings." McKithen, 481 F.3d at 98. "A federal suit

c o m p l a i n s of injury from a state court judgment, even if it a p p e a r s to complain of a third-party's actions, when the third p a r t y ' s actions are produced by a state-court judgment and not s i m p l y ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it." H o b l o c k , 422 F.3d at 88. T h e plaintiff seeks money damages for an alleged violation o f his constitutional right to privacy, not a reversal of his s t a t e court conviction. Although the actions that violated his

r i g h t to privacy also may have led to his conviction, this is not a case where "a state court judgment cause[d] the challenged t h i r d - p a r t y action," but instead one where the challenged thirdp a r t y action helped to provide evidence that led to a state court judgment. Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 88. The exact injuries­ the

w r i t i n g of a letter and its publication in a court file­ were p r i o r to the state court judgment that it is argued bars the court f r o m hearing this case. In fact, the actions complained of Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman

a l l e g e d l y influenced that judgment.

d o e s not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction in this case. B. A b s o l u t e Immunity

T h e defendants argue that they are entitled to prosecutorial i m m u n i t y in this matter. The Supreme Court has held that "in

p r e s e n t i n g the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil

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suit for damages under § 1983." 4 3 1 (1976).

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,

"Imbler defined the scope of prosecutorial immunity

n o t by the identity of the actor, but by reference to the ` f u n c t i o n ' performed." Warney v. Monroe Cnty., 587 F.3d 113, 121 "[A]cts that are

( 2 d Cir. 2009)(citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430).

` i n t i m a t e l y associated with the judicial phase of the criminal p r o c e s s ' " are shielded by absolute immunity, while "`those aspects o f the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an a d m i n i s t r a t o r or investigative officer rather than that of an a d v o c a t e ' " are not. U . S . at 430-31). " T h u s , to establish immunity, the `ultimate question' is ` w h e t h e r the prosecutors have carried their burden of establishing t h a t they were functioning as "advocates" when they engaged in the c h a l l e n g e d conduct.'" Warney, 587 F.3d at 121 (quoting Doe v. "[A] defendant's Warney, 587 F.3d at 121 (quoting Imbler, 424

P h i l l i p s , 81 F.3d 1204, 1209 (2d Cir. 1996)).

m o t i v a t i o n in performing . . . advocative functions is irrelevant t o the applicability of absolute immunity." S u f f o l k , 356 F.3d 495, 502 (2d Cir. 2004). Bernard v. Cnty. of "A defendant engaged

i n advocative functions will be denied absolute immunity only if h e acts without any colorable claim of authority." ( i n t e r n a l quotation marks omitted). Id. at 504

Even conduct that is

" r e p r e h e n s i b l e . . . does not make the prosecutor amenable to a c i v i l suit for damages." Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 2 3 1 , 237 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). T h e court concludes that Hall and Goldstein were acting in

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their role as advocates by engaging in the conduct alleged in the A m e n d e d Complaint. The only allegation with respect to Goldstein

i s that she "intentionally and maliciously disclosed [the letter w r i t t e n by Whelan and filed with the court by Hall] to a state c o u r t judge for the purpose of inflicting injury upon the p l a i n t i f f by prejudicing the judge against the plaintiff and of c a u s i n g the judge to revoke the plaintiff's placement in an anger m a n a g e m e n t program authorized by Connecticut law." ¶ 10.) (Am. Compl.

Bringing evidence to the attention of the court in an

a t t e m p t to influence its decision is at the core of an advocate's role. See Shmueli, 424 F.3d at 237 ("A prosecutor is also

e n t i t l e d to absolute immunity despite allegations of his `knowing u s e of perjured testimony' and the `deliberate withholding of e x c u l p a t o r y information.'") (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.

3 4 ) ; Storck v. Suffolk Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 9 2 7 , 944 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[E]x parte communications [between a c o u n t y attorney prosecuting a neglect proceeding and a family c o u r t judge] regarding [a mother's] mental health relate to [the c o u n t y attorney's] prosecutorial functions in regard to the n e g l e c t petition and are therefore subject to absolute i m m u n i t y . . . ."). W i t h regard to Hall, the Amended Complaint alleges that he " e x p r e s s [ l y ] requested" that defendant Whelan write a letter " a d d r e s s e d to `Norwalk Superior Court'" and disclosed the letter t o "unauthorized court personnel" by "plac[ing the] document in an o p e n and unsealed public court file." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8,9.) This

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conduct is closer to marshaling evidence for submission to the c o u r t than an investigative officer's role in interviewing witnesses. As the Supreme Court has determined, "acts undertaken

b y a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial p r o c e e d i n g s or for trial, and which occur in the course of his [or h e r ] role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the p r o t e c t i o n s of absolute immunity." U . S . 259, 273 (1993). Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509

Prosecutors are protected so long as they

d o not step into "the detective's role in searching for the clues a n d corroboration that might give [a prosecutor] probable cause to r e c o m m e n d that a suspect be arrested." 2 Id. Acts protected as

p a r t of the advocate's role include filing documents with the c o u r t and preparing and retaining evidence to be presented at trial. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997) (noting

t h a t "preparation and filing of . . .charging documents" is "quite c l e a r [ l y ] . . . protected by absolute immunity," but holding that e x e c u t i n g those filed documents "under penalty of perjury" is " a c t i n g as a complaining witness rather than a lawyer"); Parkinson v . Cozzolino, 238 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he retention o f evidence, as a predicate to the presentation of evidence, is
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Comparison of this case to Buckley is helpful. The Court noted in Buckley that "the conduct of . . . prosecutors before they convened a . . . grand jury to investigate the crime" and before they had probable cause to arrest was investigative in character, because "[a] prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested." Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274. The Amended Complaint contains neither any explicit allegation nor any allegation that could support an inference that the prosecutors were acting without probable cause. 10

critical to the prosecutor's functions as an advocate, and is thus c o v e r e d by prosecutorial immunity."). T h e defendants also argue that because the letter written by W h e l a n and transmitted by Bella was requested by prosecutors and " v e r y clearly advocacy," the writing and transmission of the l e t t e r were likewise protected by prosecutorial immunity. (Def.'s B r . 22.) "Because absolute immunity is essential to safeguarding

t h e integrity of the judicial process, it extends to those p e r f o r m i n g functions closely associated with that process." v . City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 660 (2d Cir. 1995). This Hill

p r o t e c t i o n extends not only to prosecutors, but also to "persons w o r k i n g under their direction[] when they function as advocates f o r the state in circumstances `intimately associated with the j u d i c i a l phase of the criminal process.'" Bernard, 356 F.3d at

5 0 2 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430); see also Hill, 45 F.3d at 6 6 0 (finding non-prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity " b e c a u s e they acted as agents for the assistant district attorney"). However, the mere "express request" by prosecutors for i n f o r m a t i o n from employees of an entirely different state agency d o e s not suffice to make these employees agents of the prosecutors o r result in their work being under the prosecutors' direction. (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) Although Connecticut requires DCF workers to

p r o v i d e records to state prosecutors in certain situations, and in s o doing arguably act as their agents, this case does not present o n e of those situations. Connecticut General Statutes 17a-28(f)

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mandates disclosure by the DCF Commissioner or the Commissioner's d e s i g n e e of records to state's attorneys "for purposes of i n v e s t i g a t i n g or prosecuting an allegation of child abuse or neglect." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-28(f)(2) (emphasis added).

However, the Amended Complaint does not allege that the p r o s e c u t i o n in this case was for child abuse or neglect. Consequently, the court concludes that Bella and Whelan were not a c t i n g under the authority of the prosecutors and are not entitled t o their immunity. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is being

d e n i e d with respect to Bella and Whelan. 3

The only allegation in the Amended Complaint with respect to Bella is that she was "caused [by Whelan]" to transmit the letter [written by Whelan] to . . . Hall." (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) Although it is not apparent that this states a claim against her, the defendants have not raised this point. Instead, they make the general argument that the plaintiff has no viable legal theory and that his claim is subject to dismissal as a result. In addition, based on the papers that were submitted, the court can not reach the issue of qualified immunity. The plaintiff appears to contend the violation of his constitutional right to privacy is demonstrated by the defendants' violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 17a-28, but the Second Circuit has noted that "[a] violation of a constitutional right typically cannot turn on a transgression of state law." Taravella v. Town of Wolcott, 599 F.3d 129, 142 n.6 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1973) ("`The constitutional right to privacy is not to be equated with the statutory right accorded by' New York law.")). In addition, however, the plaintiff argues that the right to privacy extends to one's medical information. The Second Circuit has "interposed a `reasonable specificity' requirement on defining the contours of a constitutional right for qualified immunity purposes," Redd v. Wright, 597 F.3d 532, 536 (2d Cir. 2010), but this point was not raised by the defendants, so the plaintiff has not had an opportunity to address it. 12

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IV.

CONCLUSION F o r the reasons set forth above, the Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

N o . 18) is hereby GRANTED with respect to defendants Hall and G o l d s t e i n and DENIED with respect to defendants Bella and Whelan. I t is so ordered. S i g n e d this 6th day of July, 2010 at Hartford, Connecticut.

______/s/AWT________________ A l v i n W. Thompson U n i t e d States District Judge

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