Samuels v. Strange et al
Filing
58
ORDER granting 51 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to both counts of Plaintiff's complaint. The bench trial scheduled for October 16th to 18th, 2012, is cancelled. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants and to close this case.Signed by Judge William I. Garfinkel on 10/4/2012. (Smith, M.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
RALSTON SAMUELS,
:
Plaintiff,
:
vs.
:
DAVID N. STRANGE,
ROBERT W. HART,
JEFFREY C. JEANNOTTE, and
NEVILLE CAPELTON,
No. 3:08cv1872(WIG)
:
:
:
Defendants.
------------------------------------------------------X
RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Doc. # 51]
Plaintiff, Ralston Samuels, has brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Defendants Strange, Hart, Jeannotte, and Capelton, all of whom are employees of the
State of Connecticut, Department of Correction [“DOC”], alleging that Defendants violated his
rights under the First and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. More
specifically, he alleges that, while he was an inmate at the Osborne Correctional Center in
Somers, Connecticut, Officer Hart deliberately contacted Plaintiff’s genitals during a pat-down
search. After Plaintiff complained to Officer Hart’s supervisors, Plaintiff was charged with
possession of contraband, namely several slices of bread that he had taken from the mess hall.
He claims that Captain Capelton and Lieutenant Jeannotte further retaliated against him by
placing him in punitive segregation for a period of twenty-one days, even though the maximum
punishment for his offense was only ten days. He alleges that Defendant Strange, as Warden,
approved of this punishment. Plaintiff has sued all Defendants in both their individual and
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official capacities. As relief, he seeks compensatory and punitive monetary damages, plus
attorney’s fees. Now pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as
to all claims in Plaintiff’s complaint.
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., provides that “the court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” In considering a motion for summary judgment, this Court is
required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and to resolve
all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The Court's function is not to resolve disputed factual
issues but rather to determine if there exists a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 249. The party
seeking summary judgment bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact
exists. Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 1995). The substantive law
governing the case identifies those facts that are material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. A dispute regarding a material fact is
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Id.
Discussion
Defendants have raised five issues in their summary judgment motion:
(1) Plaintiff’s official capacity claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to
the United States Constitution;
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(2) Defendant Strange was not personally involved in the incidents giving rise to
Plaintiff’s complaint;
(3) Plaintiff’s claim that he was sexually groped does not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation;
(4) There is no merit to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim; and
(5) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants’ argument that his official capacity claims are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, nor does he oppose Defendant Strange’s dismissal based
upon his lack of personal involvement. Therefore, the Court grants partial summary judgment in
favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s official capacity claims and grants summary judgment in favor
of Defendant Strange as to all claims of Plaintiff’s complaint. The Court now turns to the
remaining issues presented by Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
I. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim
“The Eighth Amendment sets constitutional boundaries on the conditions of
imprisonment.” Boddie v. Schneider, 105 F.3d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1997). To set forth an Eighth
Amendment claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that (1) the alleged conduct/punishment is
objectively “sufficiently serious;” and (2) the prison official acted with a “sufficiently culpable
state of mind,” that is, he acted maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quotations in original); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992).
According to Plaintiff, on January 23, 2008, at approximately 11:15 a.m., as he was
exiting the mess hall, he was stopped by Officer Hart. When he was asked what he had in his
pocket, Plaintiff removed several slices of bread wrapped in plastic, handed them to the officer,
and started to walk away. As he was walking away, Officer Hart asked him where he was going
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and ordered him to face the wall to be pat-searched. Plaintiff states that he was pushed to the
wall and that Officer Hart started patting him down in a rough manner. During the search,
Plaintiff alleges that his pants were pulled down below his buttocks, and Officer Hart grabbed his
genitals for several seconds. Plaintiff got angry and told Officer Hart that he wanted to speak to a
Lieutenant. Officer Hart finished the search and told Plaintiff to leave. Plaintiff was swearing at
him and then proceeded to the front desk to make a complaint. (Wit. St. of Pl. to Conn. Dep’t of
Pub. Safety dtd. Feb. 26, 2008).
In Boddie, the Second Circuit acknowledged that allegations of sexual abuse of a prisoner
by a corrections officer may constitute serious harm cognizable under the Eighth Amendment’s
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 105 F.3d at 861. The Second Circuit held
that
[s]exual abuse may violate contemporary standards of decency and can cause
severe physical and psychological harm. For this reason, there can be no doubt
that severe or repetitive sexual abuse of an inmate by a prison officer can be
“objectively, sufficiently serious” enough to constitute an Eighth Amendment
violation. Moreover, like the rape of an inmate by another inmate, sexual abuse of
a prisoner by a corrections officer has no legitimate penological purpose, and is
“simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society.”
Id. (internal citations omitted). In Boddie, however, the Second Circuit did not hold, as a matter
of law, that all sexual contact violates the Eighth Amendment. Instead, it affirmed the district
court’s holding that, in that case, the plaintiff had failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
There, the plaintiff asserted
a small number of incidents in which he allegedly was verbally harassed, touched,
and pressed against without his consent. No single incident that he described was
severe enough to be “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Nor were the incidents
cumulatively egregious in the harm they inflicted. The isolated episodes of
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harassment and touching alleged by Boddie are despicable and, if true, they may
potentially be the basis of state tort actions. But they do not involve a harm of
federal constitutional proportions as defined by the Supreme Court.
Id. at 861 (internal citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has not defined what constitutes “objectively, sufficiently serious”
but the vast majority of courts to have addressed the issue have found that isolated instances of
inappropriate conduct by prison officials do not violate an inmate’s constitutional rights. See,
e.g., Washington v. Harris, 186 Fed. App’x 865, 866 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that inmate failed
to state Eighth Amendment claim where a prison guard “crept up behind [the prisoner inmate]
while he was working,” grabbed his genitals, kissed him on the mouth, and threatened to perform
oral sex on him); Jackson v. Madery, 158 Fed. App’x 656, 661 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
plaintiff’s allegations that a guard grabbed and rubbed his buttocks in a degrading manner during
a shakedown in the food area was insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation);
Hughes v. Smith, 237 Fed. App’x 756, 759 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that the inmate had not
alleged an Eighth Amendment violation where the correctional officer allegedly touched the
inmate’s testicles through his clothing during a single pat-down frisk); Young v. Brock, No. 10cv-01513, 2012 WL 385494, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 7, 2012) (holding that the plaintiff’s allegations
that he was subjected to unnecessary and unwelcomed sexual touching by a prison guard in the
course of a single pat-down search did not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment,
particularly where the plaintiff conceded that the pat-down had a penological purpose); Pantusco
v. Sorrell, No. 09-cv-3518, 2011 WL 2148392, at *7-8 (D.N.J. May 31, 2011) (holding that the
plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim failed because a single instance of groping during a routine
pat-down frisk did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment); Escobar v. Reid, 668 F. Supp.
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2d 1260, 1278, 1295–96 (D. Colo. 2009) (holding that a guard’s alleged suggestive, sexual
touching of an inmate did not state a constitutional violation); Williams v. Anderson, No. Civ. A.
03-3254, 2004 WL 2282927, at *4 (D. Kan. Sept. 7, 2004) (finding no Eighth Amendment
violation where a prison guard grabbed a pre-trial detainee’s buttocks, exposed his genitals to the
inmate plaintiff, and made crude sexual remarks).
Plaintiff asserts that the definition of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment must be assessed in light of contemporary standards of decency and societal
expectations. Relying on the case of Rodriguez v. McClenning, 399 F. Supp. 2d 228, 238
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), Plaintiff argues that, in the eight years since the Second Circuit decided Boddie,
contemporary standards of decency have so evolved as to condemn all sexual assaults of prison
inmates by prison employees. The district court in Rodriguez noted that, since the Boddie
decision in 1998, when fifteen states did not prohibit sexual contact between prison employees
and inmates, only four in 2005 failed to outlaw such behavior. Id. This trend, the court regarded,
as demonstrating a “national consensus that any assault of a prisoner by a prison employee
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. (emphasis added).
This Court finds that the holding of Rodriguez is inconsistent with Second Circuit
precedent, as well as the vast majority of relevant circuit and district court cases, including those
cited above. See also Harry v. Suarez, No. 10 Civ. 6756(NRB), 2012 WL 2589080, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2012) (noting that district courts in the Second Circuit have repeatedly held
that isolated instances of fondling and groping are not sufficient to sustain an Eighth Amendment
claim and finding that plaintiff’s claim that the correction officer groped his genitals, buttocks
and inner thighs for up to 53 seconds in the course of a frisk did not state an Eighth Amendment
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claim). Subsequent to the decision in Rodriguez, this District Court reiterated the holding of
Boddie, that “severe or repetitive sexual abuse of an inmate by a prison officer can be an
‘objectively, sufficiently serious’ violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Doe v. Barrett, No.
3:01cv519, 2006 WL 3741825, at *10 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2006) (emphasis added). And, other
district courts in this Circuit have found that not all sexual assaults of a prisoner by a guard or
corrections officer violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Garcia v. Watts, No. 08Civ. 7778,
2009 WL 2777085, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2009) (holding that two instances of improper
sexual contact, several inappropriate comments and an unauthorized cell search did not rise to
the level of cruel and unusual punishment to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim); McEachin v.
Bek, No. 06-cv-6453, 2012 WL 1113584, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2012) (holding that one
incident when plaintiff was sexually touched without his consent was not severe enough to state
an Eighth Amendment claim). Based upon a review of the case law from this Circuit, the Court
adheres to the standard set forth in Boddie and declines to follow the holding of Rodriguez.
Thus, even assuming that Plaintiff was groped by Defendant Hart exactly as Plaintiff
alleges,1 the Court finds as a matter of law that this single incident of groping during a pat-down
was not sufficiently serious to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Having determined
that the alleged conduct did not satisfy the objective prong of the two-part test for an Eighth
1
At the time of the alleged event, a video camera was monitoring the activities in that
vicinity. The videotape was reviewed by Captain Capelton, who described the footage of the
event as “inconclusive.” At some point thereafter, the videotape was lost, despite Defendants’
admission of the importance of maintaining a chain of custody of evidence. Plaintiff maintains
that Defendants should not be entitled to rely on the Captain’s self-serving characterization of the
videotape as “inconclusive.” For purposes of this ruling, the Court has construed the facts in
favor of Plaintiff and assumes that the videotape would have confirmed Plaintiff’s version of the
facts.
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Amendment violation, the Court need not consider the second subjective prong. Accordingly,
the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Claim I of Plaintiff’s
complaint.
II. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff’s second count is for retaliation by Defendants Lieutenant Jeannotte and Captain
Capelton after he filed a complaint against Officer Hart. Plaintiff states that, after he reported the
incident, Lieutenant Jeannotte told him that he would not be given a disciplinary report for taking
bread from the mess hall if he did not pursue a complaint against Officer Hart. (Pl.’s Sworn
Witness Statement). Captain Capelton also advised him not to pursue the complaint. Id. When
Plaintiff responded that he intended to pursue the matter, Lieutenant Jeannotte informed him that
he would see to it that Plaintiff was given a disciplinary report. Plaintiff was then given a “Class
B” contraband disciplinary report and was placed in the Restrictive Housing Unit. (Defs.’ Ex.
H). Twenty-one days after his placement in the Restrictive Housing Unit, Plaintiff was
transferred to another correctional institution, as he had requested. (Defs.’ L. Rule 52(a)(1) St. of
Undisputed Facts ¶ 32, Admitted by Pl.). The maximum sanction authorized for a Class B
offense is ten days in punitive segregation. See Code of Penal Discipline at 4 (1/1/2008).
Defendants maintain that Plaintiff was placed in restrictive housing [Administrative
Detention] on January 23, 2008, for his own safety, pending the investigation of his complaint
against Officer Hart. (Defs.’s Ex. K, DOC Restrictive Housing Unit Status Order). This fact is
confirmed by Plaintiff’s own written statement to the State Police:
Captain Capleton told me not to pursue a complaint because he was going to
transfer me to segregation pending an investigation which would be an
inconvenience for me. I told Captain Capleton that I wanted to be transferred out
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of Osborn. I went down to Captain Capleton’s office to make a complaint, after
which I was transferred to segregation which the Captain said was for my own
safety. Around 7:00 p.m., I received a “class B” ticket for contraband as a result
of me taking two slices of bread out of the cafeteria. I was in segregation for 21
days before I was finally transferred to Radgowski Correctional Center in
Montville. (Uncasville).
(Pl.’s Sworn Witness Statement dtd. 2/26/2008).
The Second Circuit has cautioned that “courts musts approach prisoner claims of
retaliation with skepticism and particular care.” Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir.
2001), overruled on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
Claims of retaliation also pose a threat of unwarranted judicial intrusion into matters of general
prison administration because “virtually any adverse action taken against a prisoner by a prison
official - even those otherwise not rising to the level of a constitutional violation - can be
characterized as a constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act.” Id. To state a claim for
retaliation, Plaintiff must show (1) that his actions were protected by the Constitution or federal
law; and (2) that his protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the alleged
retaliatory conduct. Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2000); Graham v.
Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996). To support a claim of retaliation, the allegedly
retaliatory conduct must deter a similarly situated inmate of ordinary resolve from exercising his
constitutional rights. It is not necessary that the plaintiff himself be deterred. See Gill v.
Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 381 (2d Cir. 2004).
Here, Plaintiff meets the first prong because his conduct, filing a complaint against a
corrections officer, is constitutionally protected activity. Graham, 89 F.3d at 80. As for the
second prong, Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that this protected
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activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the prison officials’ decision to place him in
restrictive housing or to keep him there for twenty-one days. To the contrary, Plaintiff admits that
he was told by Captain Capelton that he was going to be placed in restrictive housing for his own
safety pending an investigation. (Defs.’ Ex. K & Pl.’s Sworn Witness Statement dtd. 2/26/2008).
This is also the reason stated on the Restrictive Housing Unit Status Order (Defs.’ Ex. K). The
record further establishes that an investigation was in fact performed, resulting in a determination
that Officer Hart had not violated any criminal laws or other DOC policies. (Defs.’ Ex. K). The
record also provides undisputed evidence that Plaintiff remained in restrictive housing until he
was transferred to another correctional facility, as he requested. Id.
While Plaintiff is correct that the maximum punishment for a Class B offense is a
maximum of ten days in punitive segregation2 (Code of Penal Discipline ¶ 10 B. 4.), Plaintiff has
failed to provide any evidence to support his claim that his protected conduct was a substantial or
motivating factor in Captain Capelton’s placing him in restrictive housing or in keeping him
there for twenty-one days. See Dorsey v. Fisher, 468 Fed. App’x 25, 27 (2d Cir. 2012). To the
contrary, the only evidence in the record indicates that Plaintiff was placed in restrictive housing
as a protection. While the temporal proximity of allegedly retaliatory discipline to an inmate's
grievance can be circumstantial evidence of retaliation, see Gayle v. Gonyea, 313 F.3d 677, 683
(2d Cir. 2002), a retaliation claim will not survive summary judgment if proximity is the “sum
total of [plaintiff’s] proof.” Ziemba v. Thomas, 390 F. Supp. 2d 136, 154 (D. Conn. 2005)
(quoting Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1995)). Here, Plaintiff’s conclusory
2
Punitive segregation is a restrictive status imposed as punishment for violating the
Code of Penal Discipline. Alston v. Cahill, No. 3:07-CV-473, 2012 WL 3288923, at *1 (D.
Conn. Aug. 10, 2012).
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and speculative allegations that retaliation was a substantial or motivating factor in Defendants’
decision to keep him in restrictive housing is not enough to create a genuine issue of material
fact. See Cole v. Fischer, 416 Fed. App’x 111, 113 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming the grant of
summary judgment where the inmate did not present evidence that his constitutionally protected
conduct in filing a grievance was a substantial or motivating factor for the prison official’s
adverse action); Ziemba, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 155 (finding that the plaintiff had not met his burden
of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the corrections
officer’s retaliatory motive in transferring plaintiff). Accordingly, the Court finds that
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s second claim of retaliation.
Having found in favor of Defendants as to both of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court need not
address Defendants’ affirmative defense of qualified immunity.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. # 51] as to both counts of Plaintiff’s complaint. The bench trial scheduled for
October 16th to 18th, 2012, is cancelled. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the
Defendants and to close this case.
SO ORDERED, this
4th
day of October, 2012, at Bridgeport, Connecticut.
/s/ William I. Garfinkel
WILLIAM I. GARFINKEL
United States Magistrate Judge
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