Davis et al v. Mara et al
Filing
110
ORDER granting Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 96 ). Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 9/7/2011. (Gallagher, Robyn)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
-----------------------------------X
REGINA MOORE and MICHAEL AYERS,
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
v.
: Civil No. 3:08CV1946(AWT)
:
LESLEY MARA, LISA FLOWERS-MURPHY
:
BRETT RAYFORD, JEANNETTE PEREZ,
:
JEANNE GAVEY, PATRICIA COLONGHI,
:
LINDA UNKELBACH, KAREN FOWLER,
:
GREG HADLEY, LAURA BURROWS and
:
THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
:
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
:
FAMILIES/CONNECTICUT JUVENILE
:
TRAINING SCHOOL
:
:
Defendants.
:
-----------------------------------x
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The plaintiffs, Regina Moore (“Moore”) and Michael Ayers
(“Ayers”), brought this action setting forth claims of racial
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), racial discrimination
and retaliation in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment
Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60 et seq. (“CFEPA”),
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The
defendants have moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s
remaining claims: (1) Moore’s § 1983 race discrimination claims
against Patricia Colonghi (“Colonghi”), Linda Unkelbach
1
(“Unkelbach”) and Karen Fowler (“Fowler”) for conduct occurring
on or after July 20, 2001; and (2) Ayers’s § 1983 race
discrimination claims against Jeannette Perez (“Perez”) for
conduct occurring during or after July 2001.
For the reasons set
forth below, the motion is being granted.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs are both African American employees of the
Connecticut Department for Children and Families (“DCF”).
A. Regina Moore
Moore began working for DCF in 1998.
She alleges that the
following series of incidents constitute adverse employment
actions and, in the aggregate, created a hostile work
environment.
1. Colonghi
On May 14, 2002, Moore took down pictures of a co-worker’s
children from the windows of a shared office space.
She
explained that she had done so because “when she saw Sara’s kids
faces, she saw white faces.”
human resources department.
Colonghi referred the matter to the
The human resources department
conducted an investigation that resulted in Moore receiving a
written letter reminding her not to touch any of her co-workers
personal belongings.
Moore’s co-worker was not reprimanded for
hanging personal pictures in a shared work space.
On July 17, 2002, Moore became upset when she arrived at
2
work and discovered that she would need to cover an additional
building because of a staff shortage.
Moore confronted several
other nurses in an effort to determine who had changed her shift
assignment without first discussing the situation with her.
Several co-workers present at the time filed workplace violence
complaints with the human resources department expressing
concerns that Moore’s behavior was hostile.
As a result,
Colonghi informed Moore that she was being placed on
administrative leave and was required to submit to an Independent
Medical Examination prior to returning to work.
In August 2002, an opening appeared for a temporary position
as a Nurse Supervisor.
Moore did not apply for this position.
Unkelbach, a Caucasian nurse with less seniority than Moore, was
given the position.
In September 2002, Moore requested that her schedule be
changed by moving her to the second shift.
Under the union
contract, nurses who worked a shift without a supervisor were
entitled to “in charge” pay.1
Shortly thereafter a full time
Nurse Supervisor, Phina Kwentoh, was placed on duty during the
evening shift.
As a result, Moore no longer received “in charge”
pay.
1
There is a genuine issue of fact as to whether a nurse had
to be without a supervisor for the entire shift to receive in
charge pay, or whether not having a supervisor for some portion
of the shift was sufficient. The resolution of this issue is
immaterial for purposes of the instant motion.
3
In 2007, Moore’s assignment was changed twice - once without
notice after she returned from vacation and once when a schedule
change had been planned in advance.
2.
Unkelbach and Fowler
On September 11, 2008, Moore attended a meeting designed as
an open discussion allowing nurses to provide input regarding
nursing assignments.
While Moore took advantage of this
opportunity to express her opinions, she feels that Fowler failed
to accord those opinions proper weight.
In September 2008 Moore volunteered to work with Unkelbach
and Fowler on a new basic health training initiative.
While both
Unkelbach and Fowler required youth to sign a log after
participating in the health training, Moore failed to do so.
Fowler sent Moore an e-mail requesting that she have youth sign
the log in the future.
Moore expressed her opinion that it was
unnecessary for youth to sign the form.
Fowler explained that
she wanted the youth to sign the form to encourage their
engagement and accountability in the process as well as to ensure
that the agency was in compliance with applicable rules.
B. Michael Ayers
On or about November 2, 2001, Ayers injured himself during
the forcible restraint of a youth.
July 29, 2002.
Ayers returned to work on
Ayers was approved for light-duty status for a
period of 90 days.
At the end of 90 days Ayers was told that he
4
had to produce a doctor’s note indicating he could return to full
time status and that otherwise he would not be permitted to work.
Ayers produced a doctor’s note requesting that he be
exempted from working overtime.
Perez told Ayers that his
request to return to work was denied because of a DCF policy
requiring employees in Ayers’s position be available to work
overtime.
In the past, employees in Ayers’s position had been
able to extend their light-duty status beyond the 90-day period.
C.
Prior Lawsuits
On July 20, 2004, the plaintiffs and several others filed an
action in this court, Davis et al v. Children & Families et al,
3:04-cv-01203 (SRU) (“Davis I”), against, among others, Colonghi
and Perez,2 setting forth claims of race discrimination in
violation of Title VII and CFEPA, violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
The case was dismissed
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as to Colonghi and Perez.
On March 29, 2007, the plaintiffs and others filed another
action in this court, Davis et al v. Mara et al, 3:07-cv-00493
(JBA) (“Davis II”) against, among others, Perez, setting forth
claims of violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2
The case was dismissed
While Perez was a named defendant in Davis I, the complaint
contained no claim by Ayers against Perez.
5
on November 21, 2008 because of insufficiency of service of
process and lack of personal jurisdiction.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the
court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact
to be tried and that the facts as to which there is no such issue
warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.
R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Fed.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d
1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994).
Rule 56(c) “mandates the entry of
summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must
respect the province of the jury.
try issues of fact.
The court, therefore, may not
See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire
Comm’rs, 834 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1987); Heyman v. Commerce &
Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (2d Cir. 1975).
It is
well-established that “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing
of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from
the facts are jury functions, not those of the judge.”
477 U.S. at 255.
Anderson,
Thus, the trial court’s task is “carefully
6
limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of
material fact to be tried, not to deciding them.
Its duty, in
short, is confined . . . to issue-finding; it does not extend to
issue-resolution.”
Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224.
Summary judgment is inappropriate only if the issue to be
resolved is both genuine and related to a material fact.
Therefore, the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment.
An issue is “genuine
. . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248
(internal quotation marks omitted).
A material fact is one that
would “affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Id.
As the Court observed in Anderson: “[T]he materiality
determination rests on the substantive law, [and] it is the
substantive law’s identification of which facts are critical and
which facts are irrelevant that governs.”
Id.
Thus, only those
facts that must be decided in order to resolve a claim or defense
will prevent summary judgment from being granted.
When
confronted with an asserted factual dispute, the court must
examine the elements of the claims and defenses at issue on the
motion to determine whether a resolution of that dispute could
affect the disposition of any of those claims or defenses.
Immaterial or minor facts will not prevent summary judgment.
7
See
Howard v. Gleason Corp., 901 F.2d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1990).
When reviewing the evidence on a motion for summary
judgment, the court must “assess the record in the light most
favorable to the non-movant and . . . draw all reasonable
inferences in its favor.”
Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d
33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 177 (2d Cir. 1990)).
Because
credibility is not an issue on summary judgment, the nonmovant’s
evidence must be accepted as true for purposes of the motion.
Nonetheless, the inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant must
be supported by the evidence.
“[M]ere speculation and conjecture
is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”
Stern
v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 315 (2d Cir. 1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Western World Ins.
Co. v. Stack Oil, Inc., 922 F.2d 118, 121 (2d. Cir. 1990)).
Moreover, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the [nonmovant’s] position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which [a] jury could reasonably find for the
[nonmovant].”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Finally, the nonmoving party cannot simply rest on the
allegations in its pleadings since the essence of summary
judgment is to go beyond the pleadings to determine if a genuine
issue of material fact exists.
324.
See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
“Although the moving party bears the initial burden of
8
establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact,”
Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 41, if the movant demonstrates an absence
of such issues, a limited burden of production shifts to the
nonmovant, who must “demonstrate more than some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts, . . . [and] must come forward
with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.”
Aslanidis v. United States Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067,
1072 (2d Cir. 1993)(quotation marks, citations and emphasis
omitted). Furthermore, “unsupported allegations do not create a
material issue of fact.”
Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 41.
If the
nonmovant fails to meet this burden, summary judgment should be
granted.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Ayers’s § 1983 Claims Against Perez
The defendants argue that Ayers’s § 1983 claims against
Perez are barred by the statute of limitations.
The court
agrees.
Connecticut General Statutes § 52-577 provides that “No
action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three
years from the date of the act . . . complained of.”
Stat. § 52-577.
Conn. Gen.
This three-year statute of limitations applies
to actions brought under § 1983.
F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994).
See Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25
Connecticut General Statutes § 52-
592 provides that:
9
If any action, commenced within the time limited by
law, has failed one or more times to be tried on its
merits because of insufficient service or return of the
writ due to unavoidable accident or the default or
neglect of the officer to whom it was committed, or
because the action has been dismissed for want of
jurisdiction, or the action has been otherwise avoided
or defeated by the death of a party or for any matter
of form . . . the plaintiff . . . may commence a new
action . . . for the same cause at any time within one
year after the determination of the original action or
after the reversal of the judgment.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-592(a).
The tolling provisions of § 52-592
“shall apply . . . to any action between the same parties . . .
for the same cause of action or subject of action brought . . .
to the United States circuit or district court for the district
of Connecticut which has been dismissed without trial upon its
merits or because of lack of jurisdiction in such court.”
Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 52-592(d).
Here, Ayers’s § 1983 claims against Perez are barred by the
three year statute of limitations in § 52-577.
The events
underlying Ayers’s claims against Perez occurred in 2003.
instant action was commenced on December 23, 2008.
The
Therefore, to
maintain this action, Ayers must show that it comes within the
scope of § 52-592.
Ayers was a plaintiff in two prior actions
pursuant to § 1983.
The first suit, Davis I, was commenced on
July 20, 2004 and was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, failure
to prosecute and failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Judgment was entered in Davis
I on January 3, 2006.
On January 9, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a
10
motion to reopen, which was denied on June 28, 2006.
The second
suit, Davis II, was filed on March 29, 2007 and was dismissed on
November 21, 2008 for insufficiency of service of process and
lack of personal jurisdiction.
Consequently, Connecticut General
Statutes § 52-592 operates to toll the statute of limitations
only with respect to any party who was named as a defendant in
Ayers’s § 1983 claims in all three actions.
As Ayers concedes, he did not name Perez as a defendant in
Davis I.
(See Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 17.)
Ayers notes that Perez
was named as a defendant by other plaintiffs in Davis I, and that
he made several factual assertions regarding Perez in that case
as well.
Ayers argues that, “[t]he fact that [he] failed to
specifically name Perez in Davis I should not preclude his claims
against her in the subsequent lawsuits based on any surprise or
lack of knowledge of the suit.”
(Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 20.)
However, even if Perez was aware of the complaint and Ayers’s
factual allegations against her, she could have assumed that
Ayers had omitted naming her as a defendant by choice.
“The
statute of limitations was enacted precisely to prevent the
bringing of stale claims and to protect defendants from the fear
of unexpected litigation.”
Afrika v. Selsky, 750 F. Supp. 595,
599 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
Because Ayers never commenced an action against Perez within
the original three-year statute of limitations period, he cannot
11
use § 52-592 to maintain this suit.
See Zipoli v. Conn. Dep’t
Pub. Safety, No. 3:99CV58(AHN), 1999 WL 608833, at *3 (D. Conn.
July 29, 1999).
Ayers argues that the doctrine of equitable tolling should
be used to preserve his claims against Perez.
“Equitable tolling
allows courts to extend the statute of limitations beyond the
time of expiration as necessary to avoid inequitable
consequences.”
1996).
Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir.
For equitable tolling to be applicable the plaintiff must
have “‘acted with reasonable diligence during the time period
[he] seeks to have tolled,’” and must “prove[] that the
circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should
apply.”
Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth., 333
F.3d 74, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Chapman v. ChoiceCare Long
Island Term Disability Plan, 288 F.3d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 2002).
Ayers argues that the omission of Perez from Davis II was
due solely to a lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiffs’
attorney.
However, “lack of due diligence on the part of
plaintiff’s attorney is insufficient to justify application of an
equitable toll.”
South v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 28 F.3d 9, 12 (2d
Cir. 1994); cf. Link v. Wabash RR Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34
(1962) (dismissing action for failure to prosecute because
“Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative
in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the
12
acts or omissions of this freely selected agent.”)
Because neither § 52-592 nor the doctrine of equitable
tolling apply, summary judgment is being granted with respect to
the claims against Perez.
B.
Moore’s § 1983 Claims Against Colonghi, Unkelbach and
Fowler
1.
Colonghi
The defendants argue that Moore’s § 1983 claims against
Colonghi are also barred by the three-year statute of
limitations.
It is undisputed that Moore named Colonghi as a
defendant in Davis I, which was timely commenced on July 20,
2004.
Judgment was entered in Davis I on January 3, 2006, and a
motion to reopen was denied on June 28, 2006.
Davis II was
commenced on March 29, 2007, within one year of June 28, 2006.
However, as Moore concedes, Colonghi was not named as a defendant
in Davis II.
(See Mem. Opp. Summ. J. at 21-22.)
The current
action was filed on December 23, 2008, more than a year after the
motion to reopen was denied in Davis I.
Because Moore failed to
bring an action against Colonghi within one year of the final
determination of Davis I, she cannot use Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 52-592(a) to maintain this suit.
Moore argues that the doctrine of equitable tolling should
be used to preserve her claim against Colonghi.
As with Ayers’s
claims against Perez, Moore argues that it was through no fault
of her own, but due to the lack of diligence on the part of the
13
plaintiffs’ attorney, that Colonghi was not named as a defendant
in Davis II.
However, as discussed above, a lack of due
diligence on the part of the plaintiffs’ attorney is insufficient
to justify application of the doctrine of equitable tolling.
Because neither § 52-592 nor the doctrine of equitable
tolling apply, summary judgment is being granted with respect to
the claim against Colonghi.
2.
Unkelbach
Moore alleges that she has been subjected by Unkelbach both
to disparate treatment and a hostile work environment.
Race
discrimination in employment may be actionable under § 1983 and
brought by a person who is a Title VII plaintiff “so long as the
§ 1983 claim is based on a distinct violation of a constitutional
right,” such as a claim for denial of equal protection.
Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004).
“Most of the core substantive standards that apply to claims of
discriminatory conduct in violation of Title VII are also
applicable to claims of discrimination in employment in violation
of . . . the Equal Protection Clause [under § 1983].”
Id.
However, “a § 1983 claim, unlike a Title VII claim, can be
brought against individuals,” Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140,
149 (2d Cir. 2006), and “a plaintiff pursuing a claimed . . .
denial of equal protection under § 1983 must show that the
discrimination was intentional.”
14
Patterson, 375 F.3d at 226.
While Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 103) appears to focus on a
hostile work environment, Moore cites the legal standard for
disparate treatment.
Therefore both theories are discussed.
To establish a prima facie case of Title VII disparate
treatment, the plaintiff must show “1) that [she] belonged to a
protected class; 2) that [she] was qualified for the position
[she] held; 3) that [she] suffered an adverse employment action;
and 4) that the adverse employment action occurred under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory
intent.”
Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir. 2004).
An “adverse employment action” is one which is “‘more
disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of
job responsibilities.’” Examples of materially adverse
employment actions include “‘termination of employment,
a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a
less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits,
significantly diminished material responsibilities, or
other indices . . . unique to a particular situation.’”
Id. (quoting Galabya v. New York City Bd. Of Educ., 202 F.3d 636,
640 (2d Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
“We speak of material adversity because we believe it is
important to separate significant from trivial harms.
Title VII,
we have said, does not set forth ‘a general civility code for the
American workplace.’” Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)) (emphasis in
original).
15
The record does not contain evidence of an adverse
employment action taken by Unkelbach against the plaintiff.
The
record shows that in September 2008, Unkelbach and Fowler both
ignored Moore’s opinion that the youth should not be required to
sign health training logs.
Failure to conform DCF procedures to
Moore’s opinion of what they should be falls far short of the
material adversity needed to establish a prima facie case of
Title VII disparate treatment.
Because there is no evidence that
could support a finding of an adverse employment action, no
genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to Moore’s
disparate treatment claim.
Moore also alleges that Unkelbach subjected her to a hostile
work environment.
A hostile work environment claim requires a showing [1]
that the harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and
create an abusive working environment,” and [2] that a
specific basis exists for imputing the objectionable
conduct to the employer. The plaintiff must show that
the
workplace
was
so
severely
permeated
with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that
the terms and conditions of her employment were thereby
altered.
Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting
Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 1997))
(citations omitted).
“This test has objective and subjective elements: the
misconduct shown must be ‘severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment,’ and the victim
16
must also subjectively perceive that environment to be abusive.”
Id. at 374 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
21 (1993)).
Generally, “incidents must be more than ‘episodic;
they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be
deemed pervasive.’” Id. (quoting Perry, 115 F.3d at 149).
“To
determine whether the threshold has been reached, courts examine
the case-specific circumstances in their totality and evaluate
the severity, frequency, and degree of the abuse.”
Id.
Finally,
when considering the circumstances it is “important . . . to
exclude from consideration personnel decisions that lack a
linkage or correlation to the claimed ground of discrimination.
Otherwise, the federal courts will become a court of personnel
appeals.”
Id. at 377.
The record shows Unkelbach ignored Moore’s opinion regarding
a requirement that youth sign health training logs.
Also, Moore
testified that Unkelbach said “I don’t give a ‘shit’ about you.”
Finally, Moore testified that Unkelbach said that Moore cannot
prove her charges of discrimination.
These incidents, taken as a
whole, are not objectively severe or pervasive so as to have
altered the terms of Moore’s employment.
“Everyone can be
characterized by sex, race, ethnicity, or (real or perceived)
disability; and many bosses are harsh, unjust, and rude.”
Id.
Unkelbach may have been rude or unjust in her treatment of Moore,
but that alone will not constitute a hostile work environment.
17
Moreover, each of these incidents is facially neutral
regarding race.
Facially neutral incidents may be included, of course,
among the “totality of the circumstances” that courts
consider in any hostile work environment claim, so long
as a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that they
were, in fact, based on [race]. But this requires some
circumstantial or other basis for inferring that
incidents sex-neutral on their face were in fact
discriminatory.
Id. at 378.
Nothing in the record, other than Moore’s speculation
regarding Unkelbach’s motive, indicates that any of Unkelbach’s
actions were motivated by discriminatory intent.
Even
Unkelbach’s statement to Moore, “I don’t give a ‘shit’ about
you,” is indicative of dislike rather than discrimination.
Cf.
id. (“Alfano makes much of Brown’s admission at trial that he
disliked Alfano personally, but there is no indication that he
disliked her because she was a woman.”).
Because the evidence
proffered by the plaintiff could not support a conclusion that
there was the level of severe or pervasive harassment necessary
to establish a hostile work environment, no genuine issue of
material fact exists with respect to Moore’s hostile work
environment claim.
Therefore, summary judgment is being granted with respect to
Moore’s disparate treatment and hostile work environment claims
against Unkelbach.
18
3. Fowler
Moore alleges that she has been subjected to both disparate
treatment and a hostile work environment.
The evidence offered
by the plaintiff shows that Fowler decided to require that youth
sign the health information logs despite Moore telling her it was
unnecessary, and that Fowler ignored Moore’s input at a September
11, 2008 meeting held to discuss nursing assignments.
Under the
legal standard discussed above, this evidence is not sufficient
to support a finding of an adverse employment action, so there is
no genuine issue of material fact with respect to Moore’s
disparate treatment claim.
Regarding the hostile work environment claim, there is no
evidence that Fowler did anything beyond occasionally disagreeing
with Moore on work related issues.
Under the legal standard
discussed above, that is not sufficient to support a finding of a
hostile work environment.
Therefore, summary judgment is being granted with respect to
Moore’s disparate treatment and hostile work environment claims
against Fowler.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 96) is hereby GRANTED.
The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close this
case.
19
It is so ordered.
Signed this 7th day of September, 2011 at Hartford,
Connecticut.
/s/AWT
Alvin W. Thompson
United States District Judge
20
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