Leniart v. Bundy et al

Filing 294

RULING denying #267 Motion for New Trial Pursuant to FRCP 59 and 60(b)(2). Signed by Judge Holly B. Fitzsimmons on 3/30/17. (Esposito, A.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
GEORGE M. LENIART
v.
WILLIAM BUNDY, et al.

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CIV. NO. 3:09CV9(HBF)

RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO FRCP 59
AND 60(b)(2) [DOC. #267]
Plaintiff George M. Leniart (“plaintiff”) brought this
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging that
defendants1 violated his constitutional rights by conducting
warrantless searches of his residence and unlawfully arresting
him on two separate occasions. See Doc. #35, Amended Complaint.2
A jury trial was held on February 10 through 13, 2015, on the
following claims: (1) unreasonable search on October 5, 2006,
against defendants Bransford, Hoagland, Blanchette and Bundy;
and (2) unreasonable search and seizure on September 25, 2007,
against defendant Ellison. On February 13, 2015, the jury
rendered a verdict in favor of all defendants and against
plaintiff. [Doc. #256]. On March 19, 2015, plaintiff filed a
Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
William Bundy, Wilfred J. Blanchette, III, Michael Hoagland,
“Ellison”, and Larry Bransford (hereinafter collectively
referred to as the “defendants”).
1

Plaintiff withdrew his false arrest claim against defendant
Hoagland on the first day of trial. [Doc. #251].
2

1

Procedure 59 and 60(b)(2), along with a Memorandum in Support.
[Doc. ## 267, 268]. On April 4, 2016, defendants filed a
Memorandum in Opposition to plaintiff’s motion [Doc. #288], to
which plaintiff filed a Reply on May 2, 2016 [Doc. #291]. For
the reasons articulated below, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s
Motion for New Trial. [Doc. #267].3
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Because motions for a new trial are disfavored in this

Circuit the standard for granting such a motion is strict; that
is, newly discovered evidence must be of a sort that could, if
believed, change the verdict.” United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d
353, 364 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Chang v. City of Albany, 150
F.R.D. 456, 460 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (“Motions for a new trial based
upon the post-trial discovery of new evidence are generally
disfavored.” (citation omitted)). “Absent a showing of prejudice
[resulting from the missing evidence], the jury’s verdict should
not be disturbed.” Mazzei v. Money Store, 656 F. App’x 558, 560
(2d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted) (alterations in original);
see also Ladenburg Thalmann & Co. v. Modern Cont’l Const.
Holding Co., 408 F. App’x 401, 405 (2d Cir. 2010) (“A motion for
a new trial ordinarily should not be granted unless the trial
court is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously
As will be further discussed, the briefing on plaintiff’s
Motion for New Trial was held in abeyance pending the potential
forensic examination of the micro-cassette tape.
3

2

erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of
justice.” (citation omitted)).
“The decision whether to grant a new trial under Rule 59 is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Alston v.
Pafumi, No. 3:09CV01978(VAB), 2016 WL 7191550, at *1 (D. Conn.
Dec. 12, 2016) (quoting Claudio v. Mattituck-Cutchogue Union
Free Sch. Dist., 955 F. Supp. 2d 118, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)). This
discretion, however, is “limited by a number of well-established
prerequisites.” Chang, 150 F.R.D. at 460 (citation omitted).
Indeed, “the party seeking relief from judgment has an onerous
standard to meet, being required to show that: (1) the newly
discovered evidence was of facts that existed at the time of
trial or other dispositive proceeding; (2) the movant was
justifiably ignorant of them despite due diligence; (3) the
evidence is admissible and of such importance that it probably
would have changed the outcome; and (4) the evidence is not
merely cumulative or impeaching.” Lorusso v. Borer, No.
3:03CV504(MRK), 2006 WL 473729, at *12 (D. Conn. Feb. 28, 2006)
(emphasis in original) (alterations omitted), aff’d, 260 F.
App’x 355 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Chang, 150 F.R.D. at 460 (“A
party must show that (1) the evidence was discovered since the
trial; (2) the movant used due diligence in attempting to find
the evidence; (3) the evidence is material; (4) the evidence is
not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (5) the evidence is
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such that it will probably produce a different result upon a new
trial.” (collecting cases)).4
II.

BACKGROUND
The Court presumes familiarity with the factual background

of this matter, particularly that relating to the 2007 search
and seizure of the micro-cassette tape, which is set forth at
length in the Court’s Ruling denying plaintiff’s Renewed Motion
for Judgment as a Matter of Law. See Doc. #293 at 4-15.
Nevertheless, the Court briefly addresses the relevant
background leading to the current motion for new trial.
On September 25, 2007, parole officer Ellison seized a
micro-cassette tape and recorder in connection with the
investigation of parole violations allegedly committed by
plaintiff. Following that seizure, Ellison directed that the
micro-cassette tape be delivered to the Connecticut State Lab
for a forensic examination. Plaintiff testified about the
alleged significance of this micro-cassette tape and its
seizure. Specifically, plaintiff testified that the micro-

Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to Rules 59 and 60(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules share the same
standard for granting relief on the basis of newly discovered
evidence. See Patel v. Lutheran Med. Ctr., Inc., 775 F. Supp.
592, 596 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Whether moving on the basis of
presentation of new evidence under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)(2),
the standard for ‘newly discovered evidence’ is the same.”
(citation omitted)).
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cassette contained recorded conversations between him and
Connecticut State Police Detectives Blanchette and Hoagland, in
which the detectives threatened to frame plaintiff with the
murder of April Pennington, of which plaintiff was ultimately
convicted. See Doc. #266-2, Trial Transcript (hereinafter
“Tr.”), at 73:2-165; see also id. at 75:13-77:7. Plaintiff also
testified that just prior to the September 2007 search, he
informed parole officer Bransford, then supervising plaintiff’s
supervised release, that plaintiff was in possession of this
surreptitious recording, that plaintiff played a portion of the
recording for parole officer Bransford, and that he denied
parole officer Bransford’s request to take possession of the
tape. See id. Plaintiff therefore contends that the 2007 search
of his residence was not to investigate plaintiff’s alleged
parole violations, but rather to confiscate evidence of
plaintiff’s conversations with Detectives Blanchette and
Hoagland.
The issue of the whereabouts of the micro-cassette was
first raised on January 11, 2011, when plaintiff, then
proceeding pro se, filed a motion to compel production of, inter
alia, “the CD or CDs that were produced from the micro-cassettes

References to pages of the trial transcript relate to the Bates
number on the lower right hand corner of each page of the
transcript, reflected at docket entry number 266-2.
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taken on 9/25/07[.]” Doc. #75 at 1.6 In opposition to this
motion, defendants’ counsel responded, in pertinent part, that
the micro-cassettes had “already been returned to plaintiff or
his prior counsel[.]” Doc. #77 at 2; see also Doc. #77-1 at ¶5
(January 19, 2011, Affidavit of Defendants’ Counsel re:
Discovery: “[O]n December 13, 2010, I sent a copy of the CD made
from the one micro-cassette sent to the CSP [abbreviation for
Connecticut State Police] lab, to plaintiff’s warden, so
plaintiff could listen to the recording.”); id. at ¶6 (“The CSP
defendants have no other micro-cassette tapes, other than the
one transcribed to CD and given to plaintiff’s warden for
plaintiff to listen.”); id. at ¶9 (“I have also checked with the
state police, and they have no other micro-cassettes.”); id. at
¶10 (“I am advised by parole officers that if there were other
micro-cassette tapes, they were returned to plaintiff’s prior
counsel of record, Attorney Koch. The parole division does not
have any such tapes as described by plaintiff and there are no
reports concerning what was on the tapes.”). The chain of
custody documents for the micro-cassette and recorder, however,
reflect that on January 13, 2011, the Connecticut State Police
provided the recorder and tape to parole officer Bransford, who

The Connecticut State Lab created a CD copy of the microcassette tape, but only of side “A”. See Pl. Exs. 36, 39.
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then delivered these items to the Attorney General’s Office on
January 26, 2011 See Doc. #268-7.
Plaintiff filed a reply brief on February 24, 2011,
contending: “The September 25, 2007, illegal warrantless search
and unlawful entry by CSP and parole agents was independent of
the remand, as it did not form the basis for the initial remand
order, and plaintiff in no way challenges the remand just
imply’s that the remand was based on fabricated and misleading
information used as subterfuge to recover the micro-cassette
recordings.” Doc. #81 at 2 (sic).7 On February 28, 2011, Judge
Thomas P. Smith denied plaintiff’s motion to compel on the
grounds that plaintiff failed to present any argument as to how
the micro-cassette was relevant to this action, and that
defendants had returned the micro-cassette to plaintiff’s
attorney and had provided plaintiff with a copy of the recording
in their possession. See Doc. #82 at 9.
On August 10, 2012, plaintiff was appointed counsel. [Doc.
#123]. Thereafter, on April 26, 2013, plaintiff, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Reopen Discovery, along with a
memorandum in support. [Doc. ##183, 184]. In pertinent part,
plaintiff sought “disclosure of all items seized in the
At trial, testimony of several witnesses confirmed that the
Connecticut State Police did not enter plaintiff’s home during
the September 25, 2007, search, but instead were outside of
plaintiff’s residence to assist with the execution of the remand
order.
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September 25, 2007 search of [plaintiff’s] home, including the
microcassette recorder and tape, and all home surveillance
tapes, that were seized on that date, but have never been
returned to plaintiff.” Doc. #184 at 4. Plaintiff made this
request to clarify and protect the record regarding the
whereabouts of certain items seized on September 25, 2007, from
plaintiff’s home. Defendants filed a response in opposition to
this motion, in which defendants represented that they “do not
have” the items sought, and again reiterated that the items were
returned to plaintiff’s prior counsel of record. See Doc. #190
at 9.
While the motion to reopen discovery was pending, on June
3, 2013, plaintiff filed a motion for clarification of the
record, stating that plaintiff had since “learned additional
information highlighting a significant ambiguity concerning the
whereabouts of ... a microcassette recorder and tape.” Doc. #196
at 1-2. Accordingly, plaintiff requested a hearing to “clarify
and establish the chain of custody and location of these
important items.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff made the motion after
learning that on February 8, 2011, the Attorney General’s Office
offered to produce the recorder and tape to state appellate
counsel for plaintiff. See id. at 4. Plaintiff’s motion
concluded that it was “inconceivable ... that defendants have
not maintained either (1) the microcassette recorder and tape in
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the condition in which they were seized on September 25, 2007,
or (2) chain-of-custody or evidence-flow sheets tracking their
exact whereabouts.” Id. at 5. On July 16, 2013, the Court issued
a ruling denying plaintiff’s motion for clarification and
granting in part plaintiff’s motion to reopen discovery. [Doc.
#201]. As to plaintiff’s request seeking the production of items
seized during the September 25, 2007, search of plaintiff’s
home, including the subject micro-cassette recorder and tape,
the Court denied plaintiff’s motion as to this request because
“this exact request was denied by Judge Smith in 2001[,]” and
“[p]laintiff ha[d] pointed to no changed circumstances to compel
a different conclusion.” Doc. #201 at 3. The Court denied the
motion for clarification in light of the “defendants’
representation that the tape is no longer in the State’s
possession[.]” Id. at 4. Instead, the Court ordered that
defendants “provide plaintiff with an affidavit from [Parole]
Officer Bransford, attesting that all items seized in the
September 25, 2007 search of plaintiff’s home, including the
microcassette recorder and tapes were returned to Leniart’s
lawyer.” Id. In compliance with this order, on July 17, 2013,
defendants filed the affidavit of parole officer Bransford,
which stated, in pertinent part, that all of items seized were
returned to plaintiff’s then-attorney, there was no evidence
flow sheet or chain of custody forms, and that none of the items
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seized was then in the State’s possession. See Doc. #202 at ¶¶57.
In February 2015, during the jury trial of this case, the
existence and whereabouts of the micro-cassette were raised
during the cross examination of parole officer Bransford.8 See
Tr. 324:14-18; 343:8-23; 345:8-22. On February 13, 2015, the
jury rendered a verdict in favor of all defendants and against
plaintiff. [Doc. #256]. On March 2, 2015, in connection with
plaintiff’s then-pending state court habeas proceedings, an
Assistant Attorney General delivered the micro-cassette tape and
recorder to the state court, along with a chain of custody
report reflecting that the Attorney General’s Office had been in
possession of these items since January 26, 2011. See Doc. #2681, Doc. #268-2.
On March 19, 2015, plaintiff filed the motion for new trial
based on the discovery of the micro-cassette recorder and tape,
and chain of custody report. Thereafter, the Court held a series
of telephonic conferences while the tape was undergoing forensic
examination in connection with the state habeas proceeding. The
Court held plaintiff’s motion in abeyance during this time.

Bransford did not testify at trial that he returned the recorder
and micro-cassette to Leniart’s then-counsel. He recalled
returning “some items” but not specifically the laptop, and said
that the lawyer signed a receipt. Asked about the tape, he said,
“I assume the tape was in there ...” but did not specifically
recall receiving the tape or returning it.
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10

Pursuant to the Court’s order, and following a granted extension
of time, on April 4, 2016, defendants filed a memorandum in
opposition to plaintiff’s motion for new trial. [Doc. #288].
Plaintiff filed a reply on May 2, 2016. [Doc. #291].
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff moves the Court for a new trial on the basis of
newly discovered evidence, namely the micro-cassette tape and
recorder, and chain of custody report, which were produced to
plaintiff shortly after judgment entered in this matter. See
Doc. ##267, 268. Plaintiff contends that the absence of the
micro-cassette tape at trial put him “at a critical
disadvantage” as it essentially undermined plaintiff’s theory
that the 2007 search of his residence was a pretext to seize the
micro-cassette tape, which allegedly contained recordings of the
Connecticut State Police threatening to frame plaintiff for
murder. See Doc. #268 at 10-11. More specifically, plaintiff
contends: “Defendants thus used the tape’s absence as a sword to
gut Leniart’s credibility on the central issue in this case. And
by burying the tape before trial, they also shielded themselves
from contradiction regarding the contents of the tape, their
motives for conducting the search, and their handling of this
critical evidence.” Doc. #268 at 11. Accordingly, plaintiff
contends that the “[d]efendants’ use of the tape as both a sword

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and shield was highly prejudical to Leniart’s case and, for this
reason alone, compels a new trial.” Id.
Defendants oppose plaintiff’s motion on the following
grounds: (1) the motion is moot because the tape has been
tested, and it is identical to the CD produced to plaintiff
during discovery; (2) the micro-cassette tape is not newly
discovered evidence; (3) offering the micro-cassette tape would
not have changed the outcome of the trial; (4) the microcassette tape is cumulative evidence; (5) a harmless error
analysis requires the Court to deny plaintiff’s motion; (6)
plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphries; and (7)
plaintiff’s claims are barred by qualified immunity. See
generally Doc. #288.
In reply, plaintiff reiterates that the micro-cassette
tape, recorder and chain of custody report (hereinafter referred
to as the “evidence”) “are highly probative of the
circumstances, including defendants’ states of mind, surrounding
the 2007 search and seizure, and constitute game-changing
circumstantial evidence defendants previously hid from Leniart,
this Court, and the Jury.” Doc. #291. In furtherance of this
contention, plaintiff submits: (1) that plaintiff’s expert
should be allowed to complete an examination of the tape; (2)
the absence of the tape was pivotal at trial; (3) the evidence
is newly discovered and would change the outcome; (4) the
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evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; (5) the error
is not harmless; (6) Heck does not apply; and (7) the defendants
are not entitled to qualified immunity. See generally Doc. #291.
The parties initially dispute whether the evidence is
“newly discovered.” However, the Court need not reach that issue
as plaintiff has failed to establish that the evidence would
probably produce a different result upon a new trial,
particularly where, as here, the resolution of this matter
largely depended on the jury’s credibility assessments of the
witnesses. “In considering the effect newly discovered evidence
might have on the outcome of a trial, the proper inquiry is
whether the evidence makes a prima facie showing that a
different result should have been reached.” Chang, 150 F.R.D. at
461 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff
must make “[m]ore than a showing of the potential significance
of the new evidence ... to justify the granting of a new trial
after judgment has become final.” Id. (citation omitted)
(alterations added).
As an initial matter, the Court notes that the jury
returned a verdict in favor of each defendant against plaintiff.
In short, plaintiff did not prevail on a single issue before the
jury. The micro-cassette tape at issue here primarily impacts
the jury’s verdict as to plaintiff’s claims against defendant
Ellison for the 2007 search of plaintiff’s residence and seizure
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of the micro-cassette tape. Plaintiff offered only his testimony
in support of this claim. Plaintiff’s primary contention is that
the absence of the evidence greatly undermined plaintiff’s
theory of the case with respect to the 2007 search – namely that
the 2007 search of the audio tape was orchestrated by
the defendants, not based on a reasonable suspicion
linking it to alleged parole violations, but in order
to confiscate and bury this exculpatory evidence.
Ellison, however, testified that his only motive for
searching Leniart’s home was to investigate suspected
parole violations. When defendants bolstered that
testimony by introducing Bransford’s testimony that he
had returned the microcassette tape to Leniart’s prior
counsel, they planted a question in the jury’s mind
that was fatal to Leniart’s case: why, if this tape is
so crucial to Leniart’s case, and if it is in his
possession, did he not play it in open court?
Doc. #268 at 11. This contention, however does not entirely
comport with the evidence offered at trial.
First, plaintiff fails to point to a scintilla of evidence
suggesting that defendant Ellison personally knew of the
contents of the micro-cassette tape. Because plaintiff’s claim
as to the 2007 search is only against defendant Ellison, then it
was only his state of mind to have been considered in
determining whether his actions were reasonably related to a
reasonable suspicion that a violation of parole had been or was
being committed. Although plaintiff allegedly told defendant
Bransford about the contents of the micro-cassette tape, there
was no testimony elicited that Bransford ever told Ellison about
the existence or contents of that tape. Because Ellison
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admittedly searched plaintiff’s residence in 2007 and seized the
laptop bag, in which the micro-cassette tape was later
discovered, plaintiff’s theory of the 2007 search is greatly
undermined by the lack of proof that Ellison knew of the microcassette tape’s existence or alleged contents, as described by
Leniart.
Second, the resolution of this matter largely turned on the
jury’s credibility assessments of the witnesses. Plaintiff
appears to admit as much in his briefing: “Defendants thus used
the tape’s absence as a sword to gut Leniart’s credibility on
the central issue in this case.” Doc. #268 at 11; see also Doc.
#291 at 7 (“Having been repeatedly misled about and blocked from
the tape and related evidence by defendants before the trial,
however, Leniart was in no position at the trial to rebut this
dispositive, highly prejudicial, and entirely false testimony by
Bransford.”). Although when considering a motion for new trial
the Court “may weigh the evidence and the credibility of
witnesses and need not view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner[,]” Second Circuit precedent
“counsels that trial judges must exercise their ability to weigh
credibility with caution and great restraint, as a judge should
rarely disturb a jury’s evaluation of a witness’s credibility,
and may not freely substitute his or her assessment of the
credibility of witnesses for that of the jury simply because the
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judge disagrees with the jury.” Raedle v. Credit Agricole
Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). In that regard, “where the
resolution of the issues depended on an assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses, it is proper for the court to
refrain from setting aside the verdict and granting a new
trial.” Id. (citation and alterations omitted).
Here, it was not just the absence of the micro-cassette
tape which informed the jury’s credibility assessments of
plaintiff and defendant Bransford. As noted above, the only
testimony provided in support of plaintiff’s claims was his own.
In sharp contrast, defendants offered the testimony of several
parole and police officers, each of whose testimony was largely
consistent with the others, and contradicted much of that
provided by plaintiff. Additionally, the jury heard evidence of
plaintiff’s multiple felony convictions, and that he was then
serving a life term of imprisonment for murder.
As to the credibility and testimony of parole officer
Bransford, although the Court views critically the substance of
his testimony in light of this newly available evidence, the
Court “is also not persuaded that the outcome of this trial
would have been any different had [parole officer Bransford]
told the truth about [the custody of the micro-cassette tape],”
Lorusso, 2006 WL 473729, at *14, in light of the other evidence
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received supporting Ellison’s reasonable suspicion that
plaintiff had violated the conditions of his special parole. See
generally Doc. #293, Ruling on Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law (discussing the evidence supporting
a reasonable juror’s finding in favor of defendant Ellison as to
the 2007 search). Moreover, as will be discussed below, the
forensic examination of the micro-cassette tape did not reveal
the surreptitious recording described by plaintiff.
As to the contention that the evidence could have been used
to contradict the testimony of defendant Bransford, at best it
impeaches it “and consequently cannot support a new trial
motion.” Chang, 150 F.R.D. at 461 (citation omitted). Even if
consistent with plaintiff’s testimony, the Court is skeptical
that the evidence would have changed the outcome at a new trial
as to the 2007 search. Although consistent evidence may have
raised questions about Bransford’s credibility,9 the defendants
also produced the testimony of several other parole officers
involved in the 2007 search. Additionally, plaintiff fails to
deal with the fact that his claim for the 2007 search was made
only against defendant Ellison. Accordingly, to the extent the
evidence might undermine the testimony of Bransford, there is no

Bransford was asked obliquely at trial about Leniart’s claim
that Leniart told Bransford about the recording and he denied
it. Tr. 343:8-11.
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indication that it would have impugned the credibility of
Ellison or any of the other testifying parole officers.
Third, as referenced above, when examined, the microcassette tape did not contain the threats described by
plaintiff. Although plaintiff requests that his expert retained
in connection with the state court habeas matter be permitted to
continue his examination of the tape prior to adjudication of
this motion, the Court is not persuaded that expert testimony as
to the tape’s contents, or lack thereof, would produce a
different result upon a new trial. Presumably, plaintiff would
offer the testimony of this expert to further expound upon the
contents of his original report identifying “two areas of
concern,” and potentially about whether the micro-cassette tape
was an altered copy of the original. See Doc. #291 at 3-4. If
plaintiff were to offer such testimony, then undoubtedly
defendants would proffer a rebuttal expert in addition to the
other ample evidence already admitted which undermined
plaintiff’s claims with respect to the 2007 search. On balance,
the Court is not persuaded that the addition of likely
conflicting expert testimony about the condition of the tape
would change the result upon a new trial, particularly as the
claim is only made against defendant Ellison.
Last, plaintiff contends that “[r]egardless of the contents
of the tape, the new evidence establishes that defendants
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repeatedly and under oath misrepresented the whereabouts of the
tape, broke the seal that the lab had affixed to protect the
evidence, and damaged the recorder so that it could no longer be
used, would compel a different verdict.” Doc. #291 at 7. Again,
although the Court does not take lightly the allegation that
defendant Bransford perjured himself and submitted a false
affidavit, plaintiff’s argument incorrectly attributes this
malfeasance to all of the “defendants,” when in fact, it appears
that any alleged misconduct can only be attributed to Bransford.
This is significant as plaintiff’s claim with respect to the
2007 search was made solely against defendant Ellison, who has
not been directly or indirectly implicated in any wrongdoing.
Simply, plaintiff has not met his onerous burden of
establishing that the new evidence would have changed the
outcome of this case – a case in which the jury found against
plaintiff on every claim against each defendant.
In light of this finding, the Court need not reach the
parties’ other remaining arguments.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons articulated above, the Court

DENIES plaintiff’s Motion for a New Trial. [Doc. #267].
This is not a Recommended Ruling.

The parties consented to

proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on April 23,
2013 [Doc. #44], with appeal to the Court of Appeals.
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Fed. R.

Civ. P. 73(b)-(c).
ENTERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 30th day of March,
2017.
____/s/__________________
HOLLY B. FITZSIMMONS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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