Ensign Yachts, Inc v. Arrigoni et al
ORDER granting in part and denying in part Lloyds' 432 Motion for Attorney Fees; granting in part and denying in part Lloyds' 464 Supplemental Motion for Attorney Fees; denying as moot Lloyds' 475 Motion to Amend/Correct Order on Motion for Prejudgment Remedy. See the attached memorandum of decision. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 9/24/12. (Ives, D)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
ENSIGN YACHTS, INC.,
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS OF :
LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY NOS. :
R704230/112 AND R704390/010,
Third Party Plaintiff,
James M. Ross,
Third Party Defendant
September 24, 2012
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES BY LLOYDS OF LONDON [Dkt.
This case involves the transit of a 2008 Cigarette Super Yacht owned by
Plaintiff Ensign Yachts, Inc. (“Ensign”) from New Jersey to Florida in December
2007 by Defendant Jon Arrigoni (“Arrigoni”). Ensign, through its president,
James Ross (“Ross”), brought this action for damages against Arrigoni and
Arrigoni’s insurer Lloyds of London (“Lloyds”) for damage incurred during the
yacht’s transit when it became dislodged from Arrigoni’s trailer and struck the
roadway. Ensign brought numerous claims against Arrigoni and Lloyds,
including breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, bad faith, negligence, violations of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance
Practices Act, loss of sale, and violation of the Carmack Amendment to the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 49 U.S.C. 14706, et seq., several of which the
Court dismissed on March 11, 2010. See Ensign Yachts, Inc. v. Arrigoni, No.
3:09–cv–209 (VLB), 2010 WL 918107 (D. Conn. Mar. 11, 2010). During the course
of discovery and before the Court dismissed Lloyds from the case, Lloyds and
Arrigoni discovered evidence of fraud on the parts of Ensign and Ross relating to
the supposed contract of sale for the yacht to a third party. Lloyds filed a third
party complaint against Ensign on July 7, 2010 alleging that Ensign and Ross had
committed fraud by presenting a false contract for sale of the yacht for $1.2M with
a supposed buyer in the French West Indies who had subsequently canceled the
sale upon the transit accident. [Dkt. No. 158, Lloyds Third Party Complaint] The
Court dismissed Lloyds as a defendant on July 15, 2011. [Dkt. No. 319, Memo. of
The case was tried before a jury, which heard the Carmack Amendment
claim and claims of fraud against Ensign and Ross. The jury returned a verdict
for Ensign on its Carmack Amendment claim and a verdict for Defendant Arrigoni
and Third Party Plaintiff Lloyds as to their fraud claims. [Dkt. 421, Jury Verdict
Form] The jury awarded compensatory damages of $1,997.50 and $13,683.92 to
Arrigoni and Lloyds respectively, plus punitive damages; the Court entered
judgment in these amounts January 3, 2012. [Id.; Dkt. 449, Amended Judgment]
Arrigoni and Lloyds moved for Prejudgment Remedy, upon which motions a
hearing was held on February 8, 2012. [Dkt. Nos. 450, 441, 465] Lloyds has now
moved for costs, punitive damages and attorneys’ fees.
“The general rule in our legal system is that each party must pay its own
attorney’s fees and expenses.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662,
1671 (2010). “[T]he prevailing party is not entitled to collect from the loser.”
Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Va. Dep’t of Health and Human
Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001). “Under this American Rule, we follow a
general practice of not awarding fees to a prevailing party absent explicit
statutory authority.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Connecticut
law also, “[a]bsent contractual or statutory authorization, there can be no
recovery, either as costs or damages for counsel fees by a party opponent from
his opponent.” O’Leary v. Industrial Park Corp., 211 Conn. 648, 651 (Conn. 1989)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Maris v. McGrath, 269
Conn. 834, 835 (Conn. 2004) (attorneys’ fees to the prevailing are barred “except
as provided by statute or in certain defined exceptional circumstances”); Plikus
v. Plikus, 26 Conn. App. 174, 180 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991) (“[a]bsent statutory or
contractual authority, attorney’s fees are not recoverable”).
There are several exceptions to the American Rule. Under both federal and
Connecticut law, “[t]he [American] rule does not apply . . . where the other party
or his attorney has acted in bad faith. This is what is known as the bad faith
exception to the American rule.” Maris, 269 Conn. at 835-36 (affirming an award
of attorneys’ fees to the defendant based on plaintiff’s dishonest testimony). See
also ACMAT Corp. v. Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 576, 582 (Conn.
2007) (exception to the American Rule “permits a court to award attorney's fees
to the prevailing party on the basis of bad faith conduct of the other party or the
other party's attorney”). More specifically, “a court may assess attorneys’ fees . .
. when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.” Aleyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421
U.S. 240, 258 (1975) (setting out exceptions to Rule). A finding of bad faith in the
Second Circuit requires “clear evidence that the claims are entirely without color
and made for reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes.”
Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). “A claim is colorable, for the purpose of the bad faith
exception, when it has some legal and factual support, considered in light of the
reasonable beliefs of the individual making the claim.” Id.
Lloyds requests attorney’s fees and litigation expenses for the entirety of
this action, arguing that Ensign’s claims have been “largely premised on fraud
throughout the life of this case” such that the bad faith exception to the American
Rule should apply and the Court should award Lloyds full fees. [Dkt. 433, Lloyds
Mot. for Attys’ Fees at 2; Dkts. 432,464] The Court declines to award attorney’s
fees and costs for the entirety of the litigation to Lloyds based on the bad faith
exception to the American Rule. Although Lloyds prevailed in its fraud claims
against Ensign and Ross, Ensign raised in this action a colorable Carmack claim
– on which claim Ensign won at trial, a colorable question of law at the summary
judgment stage regarding whether it was a third party beneficiary to the
insurance policies issue by Lloyds to Arrigoni, and a colorable negligence claim.
These claims were not brought in and their litigation did not constitute bad faith,
nor was their prosecution vexatious, wanton, or for oppressive reasons;
conversely, these claims had legal and factual support at the time the action
commenced. Legal bills incurred as a result of these claims are not the result of
the fraud claims in this action. The Court declines to impose what amounts to
sanctions against Ensign and Ross in light of the existence of colorable legal
claims. Lloyds’ request for attorney’s fees and/or costs for the entirety of the
action is therefore DENIED.
A second exception to the American Rule occurs under Connecticut law,
where a court may award attorneys’ fees as a component of punitive damages.
O’Leary, 211 Conn. at 651; Plikus, 26 Conn. App. at 180. Punitive damages, in
turn, may be awarded upon a showing of fraud. O’Leary, 211 Conn. at 651;
Plikus, 26 Conn. App. at 181. “Punitive or exemplary damages in a fraud case
include attorney's fees.” Wedig v. Brinster, 1 Conn. App. 123, 134 (Conn. App. Ct.
1983). The longstanding rule in Connecticut is that common law punitive
damages are limited to a party’s litigation expenses less taxable costs. Berry v.
Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 826 (Conn. 1992) (declining to abandon this “well
established rule governing punitive damages”). See also Elio v. Pacesetter
Adjustment Co., No. CV075002799S, 2009 WL 3839300, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Oct. 21, 2009) (awarding attorneys’ fees as a portion of punitive damages on a
fraudulent misrepresentation claim). “Litigation expenses may include not only
reasonable attorney's fees, but also any other nontaxable disbursements
reasonably necessary to prosecuting the action.” Berry, 223 Conn. at 832.
Notably, applicants for attorneys’ fees have the burden of proof to establish
entitlement to the award. See Smith v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 471 (Conn. 2004)
(“[The Connecticut Supreme Court] ha[s] long  held that there is an ‘undisputed
requirement that the reasonableness of attorney's fees and costs must be proven
by an appropriate evidentiary showing’”); Lavoie v. Hoffman of Hartford, Inc.,
2006 WL 829657, at *1 (Conn. Super. Mar. 15, 2006) (noting also that “a request for
attorneys fees should not result in a further major litigation”). “Even though a
court may employ its own general knowledge in assessing the reasonableness of
a claim for attorney's fees, we also have emphasized that no award for an
attorney's fee may be made when the evidence is insufficient.” Smith, 267 Conn.
at 472 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Lastly, an applicant for
attorneys’ fees “should exercise ‘billing judgment’ with respect to hours worked
and should maintain billing time records in a manner that will enable a reviewing
court to identify distinct claims.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
Here, the jury awarded punitive damages to Arrigoni and Lloyds on their
fraud claims against Ensign and Ross. Thus, the Court GRANTS to Lloyds and
against Ensign and Ross, jointly and severally, punitive damages in the amount
of the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending and prosecuting the fraud
claims in this action, the total amount of which the Court will detail below.
“To determine reasonable attorneys' fees, the Second Circuit has
historically implemented the lodestar method of examining the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”
Silver v. Law Offices Howard Lee Schiff, P.C., No.3:09cv912(PCD), 2010 WL
5140851, at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). This test is consistent with Connecticut law: “the initial estimate of a
reasonable attorney's fee is properly calculated by multiplying the number of
hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.... The
courts may then adjust this lodestar calculation by other factors.” Land Group,
Inc. v. Palmieri, 123 Conn. App. 84, 98 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010) (citation omitted).
Recently, though, “the [Second Circuit] determined that ‘[t]he meaning of the
term ‘lodestar’ has shifted over time, and its value as a metaphor has deteriorated
to the point of unhelpfulness.’” Id. (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 182 (2d Cir. 2008)). “In
place of the lodestar method, the court used the ‘presumptively reasonable fee’
The Second Circuit has noted that “[w]hile the Arbor Hill panel indicated its
preference for abandonment of the term ‘lodestar’ altogether, the approach
adopted in that case is nonetheless a derivative of the lodestar method.”
McDaniel v. Cnty. of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 417 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010). In Arbor
Hill, the Second Circuit instructed that:
[T]he better course – and the one most consistent with
attorney's fees jurisprudence – is for the district court,
in exercising its considerable discretion, to bear in mind
all of the case-specific variables that we and other
courts have identified as relevant to the reasonableness
of attorney's fees in setting a reasonable hourly rate.
The reasonable hourly rate is the rate a paying client
would be willing to pay. In determining what rate a
paying client would be willing to pay, the district court
should consider, among others, the Johnson factors; it
should also bear in mind that a reasonable, paying client
wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the
case effectively. The district court should also consider
that such an individual might be able to negotiate with
his or her attorneys, using their desire to obtain the
reputational benefits that might accrue from being
associated with the case. The district court should then
use that reasonable hourly rate to calculate what can
properly be termed the “presumptively reasonable fee.”
Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190.
Consequently, courts have described the “presumptively reasonable fee”
analysis as a “process” that is “really a four-step one, as the court must: ‘(1)
determine the reasonable hourly rate; (2) determine the number of hours
reasonably expended; (3) multiply the two to calculate the presumptively
reasonable fee; and (4) make any appropriate adjustments to arrive at the final fee
award.’” Vereen v. Siegler, No.3:07CV1898, 2011 WL 2457534, at *1 (D. Conn.
June 16, 2011) (quoting Adorno v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
685 F. Supp. 2d 507, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
Here, Lloyds seeks $92,166.25 for 335.15 hours at $275 per partner hour,
detailed in its Motion for Attorney’s Fees [Dkts. 432, 433-1] and Supplemental
Motion for Attorney’s Fees [Dkt. 464].
Reasonable Hourly Rate
In Arbor Hill, the Second Circuit indicated the relevant factors in
determining the reasonable hourly rate were articulated in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974):
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions; (3) the level of skill required
to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion
of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the
case; (5) the attorney's customary hourly rate; (6)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
(8) the amount involved in the case and the results
obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of
the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11)
the nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.
Reasonable hourly rates “are in line with those prevailing in the community
for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and
reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). “[C]urrent rates, rather
than historical rates, should be applied in order to compensate for the delay in
payment.” LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 764 (2d Cir. 1998). “The
determination of a prevailing rate requires a ‘case-specific inquiry into the
prevailing market rates for counsel of similar experience and skill to the fee
applicant's counsel.’” M.K. ex rel. K. v. Sergi, 578 F. Supp. 2d 425, 427 (D. Conn.
2008) (quoting Farbotko v. Clinton Cnty. of New York, 433 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir.
Lloyds has requested a rate of $275 per hour, which has remained constant
throughout this litigation. This rate is consistent with the rates awarded to
general civil litigation attorneys in this district. See Bridgeport and Port Jefferson
Steamboat Co. v. Bridgeport Port Authority, No. 3:03–CV–599 CFD, 2011 WL
721582, at * 5-6 (D. Conn. Feb. 22, 2011) (finding $325-$425 per hour to be
reasonable for partners in a case involving federal constitutional issues, the River
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1884, and various state law causes of action,
including violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act; $225-$275 to be
reasonable for associates; and $100 to be reasonable for summer associates and
paralegals); Vereen, 2011 WL 2457534, at *3 (finding $400 per hour to be
reasonable for a partner in a civil rights action, and $250 to be reasonable for
associates); Cumulus Broadcasting v. Okesson, Civ. No. 3:10CV315 (JCH), 2012
WL 3822019 (D. Conn. Sept. 4, 2012) (finding $375-$425 per partner hour to be
reasonable in an action for enforcement of provisions of an employment
contract); Drummond American LLC v. Share Corp., No. 3:08CV1665 (MRK), 2010
WL 2574096 (D. Conn. Apr. 9, 2010) (approving $245-$330 per partner hour in an
action involving a breach of a covenant not to compete). Therefore, the Court
approves Lloyds’ requested hourly rate of $275 as it is in line with prevailing
Reasonableness of time spent
“The task of determining a fair fee requires a conscientious and detailed
inquiry into the validity of the representations that a certain number of hours
were usefully and reasonably expended.” Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131,
134 (2d Cir. 1994). Id. Lloyds has submitted detailed and itemized statements of
fees, broken down by time spent on the fraud claims. Billing records for Lloyds
show a total of 335.15 hours of work. [Dkt. Nos. 433-1, 464]
It does not appear after a review of Lloyds’ fee records that they, on the
whole, include excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours. For
example, attorney D. Lincoln Woodard for Lloyds billed 2.3 hours to draft Lloyds’
nine page third-party complaint against Ross detailing Ross’s alleged fraud
throughout the course of the litigation. See [Dkt. No. 158, Third Party Complaint].
Woodard billed 15.3 hours researching, drafting, revising, and finalizing Lloyds’
objection to Ensign’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to fraud, a Local 56(a)(2)
Statement, and an Affidavit, comprising a total of 19 pages plus 112 pages of
exhibits. [Dkt. No. 433-1, p. 37; Dkt. Nos. 261, 262, 263, Lloyds’ Objection to
Ensign’s MSJ] The Court finds these hours to be reasonable.
However, upon careful review of Lloyds’ detailed billing statements and
Ensign’s and Ross’s objections to certain entries, the Court must reduce the total
number of hours to be compensated in the form of punitive damages. Ensign and
Ross have objected to certain of the costs detailed in Lloyds’ Supplemental
Motion for Attorney’s Fees, including those addressing corrections in judgment
entered by the Court and Ensign’s and Ross’s motion for a new trial. [Dkt. No.
471, Ensign/Ross Obj. to Supp. Mot. for Attys’ Fees] Because certain of these
entries do not clearly relate to the fraud claims, or the entry is such that the Court
cannot determine what portion of the total time claimed related to the fraud claim,
the Court declines to award fees for those entries. For example, Lloyds has
submitted claims for reimbursement for “Receipt and review of court order
denying the plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial; Correspondence to company re:
same; Revisions to PJR papers and joint objection.” [Dkt. 464, Lloyds Supp. Mot.
for Attys’ Fees] Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial does not directly relate to the
fraud claims. Thus, the Court will revise downward the total fees sought in
Lloyds’ Supplemental Motion for Attorney’s Fees.
Likewise, the Court declines to award fees for certain entries in Lloyds’
Motion for Attorney’s Fees [Dkt. Nos. 432, 433-1] for the same reasons. For
example, Lloyds has submitted reimbursement for 1.5 hours based upon the
following billing entry:
Receipt and review of Memorandum and multiple
affidavits and new email information from plaintiff;
Memo re: cross points for Ross at dismissal hearing;
Correspondences to company re: new developments;
Correspondence to St. Barts’ counsel.
[Dkt. 433-1, p. 29] Although correspondence with counsel in St. Bart’s is related
to the fraud claims in this action, it is impossible for the Court to determine
whether receipt and review of “Memorandum and multiple affidavits and new
email information from plaintiff” is related at all to the fraud. Therefore, all entries
containing such deficiencies have been deleted or revised downward for
inclusion in the total fee calculation.
In sum, the Court reduces the total number of attorney hours to be
compensated from 335.15 to 315.25, totaling $86,693.75 in attorney’s fees to be
awarded as punitive damages.
Expenses as a component of punitive damages
As noted above, “[l]itigation expenses may include not only reasonable
attorney's fees, but also any other nontaxable disbursements reasonably
necessary to prosecuting the action.” Berry, 223 Conn. at 832. Lloyds has
included a schedule of litigation expenses it contends are attributable to the fraud
claims in this action, totaling $1,069.88 and including expenses for international
telephone calls, mileage to the international deposition of a fraud witness, meals
while on travel for this deposition, postage, FedEx shipments, parking, and
copying fees. [Dkt. 433-1, Summary of Invoices re: Fraud Claims] As these
expenses stemmed directly from litigation of the fraud claims, they are properly
included in an award of punitive damages. Consequently, the Court awards to
Lloyds $1,069.88 for compensation of these expenses as part of the jury’s award
of punitive damages.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) governs costs awarded to a
prevailing party and provides in relevant part: “Costs Other Than Attorney's Fees.
Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs-other than attorney's fees--should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Costs are
defined statutorily and include: fees of the clerk and marshal, fees for printed or
electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case, fees
and disbursements for printing and witnesses, fees for exemplification and the
costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily
obtained for use in the case, docket fees, compensation of court appointed
experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses and costs of
special interpretation services. 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See also Taniguchi v. Kan
Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2001 (2012) (“We have held that § 1920
defines the term ‘costs’ as used in Rule 54(d). . . In so doing, we rejected the view
that the discretion granted by Rule 54(d) is a separate source of power to tax as
costs expenses not enumerated in § 1920.”) (internal exclamation marks and
citations omitted). “A prevailing party is one that has ‘succeeded on any
significant issue in litigation which achieved some of the benefit the party sought
in bringing suit,’ such that the party is able to ‘point to a resolution of the dispute
which changes the legal relationship between itself and the [adversary].’”
MacLeod v. Procter & Gamble Disability Ben. Plan, 460 F. Supp. 2d 340, 350 (D.
Conn. 2006) (MRK) (citing Kerin v. USPS, 218 F.3d 185, 189 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2000)
(internal citations omitted). “For a plaintiff to be considered a ‘prevailing party,’
... he need not have succeeded on ‘the central issue’ in the case, ..., and need not
have ‘obtain[ed] the primary relief sought’ ....” Bristol Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 85, 93 (D. Conn. 2000) (JCH) (awarding costs to party for
success on CUTPA claim despite failure of antitrust claims) (citing LeBlanc–
Sternberg, 143 F.3d at 757).
As Lloyds prevailed in its fraud claim against Ensign and Ross it is thus a
“prevailing party” under Rule 54(d)(1) and entitled to statutory costs. Lloyds has
provided a Bill of Costs, including deposition expenses for the depositions of
James Ross, Tim Gallagher, Skip Braver, Chris Switzer, Philip Melillo, Roger
Boober, Arrigoni, and Philippe Brun, the cost of service of its third party
complaint, copying costs, and docket fees. [Dkt. No. 433-3, Bill of Costs] The
Court thus awards Lloyds costs arising from the fraud claims.
The Court, however, declines to award Lloyds costs for copying as listed in
line E of Lloyds’ Bill of Costs, Exhibit C, Docket no. 433-3, as Lloyds has claimed
“All Copying Costs” and not just those attributable to the fraud claims. [Dkt. No.
433-3, Exhibit C] Likewise, the Court declines to award costs for the depositions
of Skip Braver, Philip Melillo, Tim Gallagher, Arrigoni, Roger Boober and Chris
Switzer as their involvement in this action either did not stem from the fraud
claims, Lloyds did not purport to use their testimony at trial to support the fraud
claims, or Lloyds has failed to identify if or what portion of the depositions
related to the fraud claims. As an example, the Joint Trial Memorandum filed by
Arrigoni and Lloyds on August 15, 2011 lists Philip Melillo as having relevant
deposition testimony regarding “communications with Jon Arrigoni, Lloyds of
London, Penobscot Group, Inc., damages sustained to the vessel, monies loaned
to Ensign Yachts, Inc., losses sustained by the plaintiff, et cetera.” [Dkt. 342, Trial
Memo by Arrigoni and Lloyds, p.22] He was also listed to offer testimony
regarding his handling of the Plaintiff’s claim for
damage to the vessel in question on behalf of the
Plaintiff, including (but not limited to): his background
and friendship with James Ross; the date he was
retained to investigate the claim; the timeline of said
claim; authentication of any claims diary he may have
kept pertaining to the claim; the persons with whom the
witness communicated regarding said claim;
authentication of communications he sent pertaining to
the claim; the dates, medium, sequence and substance
of those communications; the substance of the claim
itself; the circumstances of the loan he extended to
James Ross to fund the repairs on the vessel; and any
statements made by James Ross and/or Ensign Yachts,
Inc. pertaining to the vessel and/or the claim.
Furthermore, the same Trial Memo lists Tim Gallagher as a witness able to testify
to he will testify including but not limited to the following: “damages sustained by
the 2008 Model Year, 55’ Cigarette Super Yacht (H.I.N. CSS US510E708) and his
photographs.” [Id. at p. 23] Neither of these witnesses is listed as having
information supportive of the fraud claims in this action.
Thus, the Court grants costs to Lloyds in the amount of $4,265.79 for the
costs stemming from the fraud claims.
The Court hereby GRANTS to Lloyds punitive damages in the amount of
$87,763.63 (representing $86,693.75 for attorneys’ fees and $1,069.88 for
litigation expenses), plus costs in the amount of $4,265.79 pursuant to F.R.C.P.
54(d)(1), in addition to the $13,683.92 in actual damages awarded by the jury.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: September 24, 2012
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