Vega v. Rell et al

Filing 270

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 217 Motion for Summary Judgment. See the attached Memorandum of Decision. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants as to Counts 2, 3, 18, 19, 20, 23, and 30. Counts 4, 10, 13, 14, 15, and 21 will proceed to trial. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 12/4/13. (Ives, D)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JOE BURGOS VEGA,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOV. JODI RELL, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3:09-cv-737 (VLB)

December 4, 2013

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Doc. # 217]; RULING
DISMISSING ADDITIONAL CLAIMS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Currently pending before the Court is the Defendants’ [217] Motion for
Summary Judgment in which they argue that summary judgment should be
granted on four grounds: 1) the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as
to each of Plaintiff’s religious expression claims, 2) the Plaintiff has failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies as to his claim of unsanitary cell conditions
in May 2008, and 3) the Defendant is not entitled to monetary damages under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). On May 24, 2013
the Plaintiff responded with his Objection in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [Dkt. 223]. In that filing, the Plaintiff argues that the
Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as to his twentieth cause of
action regarding his being housed in an unsanitary cell in segregation because
he was prevented from filing the appropriate forms and therefore should be
excused from the exhaustion requirement, that he is entitled to monetary
damages under RLUIPA, that the Defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity, and admitting that prison officials did not regularly and unjustifiably
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interfere with the Plaintiff’s legal mail. For the following reasons, the Defendants’
motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only where there are no

issues of material fact in dispute and the moving party is therefore entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); In re Dana Corp., 574 F.3d 129,
151 (2d Cir. 2009). The moving party may satisfy his burden “by showing–that is
pointing out to the district court–that there is an absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party’s case.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105
(2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Once
the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d
255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). He must present such evidence as would allow a jury to
find in his favor in order to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Graham v.
Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000). Merely verifying the allegations
of the complaint in an affidavit, however, is insufficient to oppose a motion for
summary judgment. Zigmund v. Foster, 106 F. Supp. 2d 352, 356 (D. Conn. 2000)
(citing cases).
When reviewing the record, the court resolves all ambiguities and draws all
permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary
judgment is sought. Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 274 (2d
Cir. 2009). If there is any evidence in the record on a material issue from which a
reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, summary
2

judgment is inappropriate. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight
Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004). However, the existence of a mere
“scintilla” of evidence supporting the plaintiff’s position is insufficient to defeat a
motion for summary judgment. Harvey v. Homebound Mortgage, Inc., 547 F.3d
158, 163 (2d Cir. 2008).
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The procedural history of this case is lengthy and its recitation

unnecessary for purposes of this motion. Therefore, only the relevant facts are
included below as they relate to each specific legal ground asserted in the
subject motion. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that attached to the
Plaintiff’s Objection to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is his
certificate from the Professional Career Development Institute for completion of
paralegal studies. [Doc. 223 at 57]. Furthermore, the Plaintiff includes an official
student transcript evincing his graduation from the program with a 99% grade
average, specialty in civil litigation on July 13, 2001. [Id. at 58]. The Court also
takes judicial notice of the Plaintiff’s litigation experience, consisting of four
cases filed in this district, including one which was tried before the Honorable
Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez from April 23, 2013 through April 25, 2013
[Dkt. No. 4-cv-1215(DFM)] and involved many of the same or similar legal issues
raised by this instant case, in which Plaintiff was represented by counsel.
Consequently, the Court finds no grounds to continue to liberally construe his
pleadings, a construction traditionally afforded pro se parties pursuant to Boykin
v. KeyCorp., 521 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
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89, 94 (2007)). See Cusamano v. Sobek, 604 F.Supp.2d 416, 445 (N.D.N.Y. 2009)
(internal citations omitted) (noting that there are circumstances where a
particularly litigious inmate who is quite familiar with pleadings and legal jargon
should not be afforded the usual liberty of pleading).
III.

DISCUSSION
Of the Plaintiff’s original 32-Count Amended Complaint [Dkt. 51], thirteen

claims remain and several are the subject of the Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Defendants have moved for summary judgment on three grounds and the
Plaintiff has filed a brief in opposition. Each issue raised by the Defendants is
discussed separately below. The Court also raises issues of legal sufficiency
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
a. COUNT 20
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires an inmate to exhaust
“administrative remedies as are available” before bringing an “action . . . with
respect to prison conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Supreme Court has held
that this provision requires an inmate to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing any type of action in federal court, regardless of whether the inmate may
obtain the specific relief he desires through the administrative process.
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). Inmates must properly exhaust their
administrative remedies. This requirement includes complying with all
procedural requirements, including filing deadlines, so that the inmate’s issue is
reviewed on the merits. See id. at 90, 94-95.
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In support of their motion for summary judgment with respect to Mr. Vega’s
Count 20, which alleges that Plaintiff experienced unsanitary cell conditions while
housed in the Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU,” a segregation unit) in May 2008,
the Defendants have provided the affidavit of Correctional Counselor Rachel
Boland. Counselor Boland states that she is the Administrative Remedies
Coordinator (“ARC”) at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution and that, in
that capacity, she maintains the files for all inmate grievances. [Dkt. 217-3,
Boland Aff. ¶¶ 2, 3]. Boland has affirmed that she thoroughly reviewed all
grievances filed by inmate Vega and, “although there are many grievances
dealing with religion, food, and other items, such as headwear, there are no
grievance [sic.] filed by inmate Vega in the time period immediately following his
placement in segregation in September 2006 or with regard to cell #6 in May
2008.” [Id. at ¶4]. Boland has further attested that she has “reviewed all the
grievance logs and the grievances and Inmate Vega did not file any grievance at
any time concerning the alleged unsanitary condition of his cell in Segregation,
as plaintiff has alleged in the lawsuit, alleging that there was feces smeared on
the wall, and the toilet did not flush.” [Id. at ¶5]. She concludes that this is the
type of complaint that could and should be raised in the formal grievance process
but was not raised by the Plaintiff. [Id. at ¶6].
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment as to Count 20, the
plaintiff does not contend that he is not required to have exhausted his
administrative remedies. Rather, he states that he did not exhaust the available
remedies because, although he requested “inmate requests, line grievances,

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etc.,” to notify officials of the conditions in cell 6, corrections officers working at
RHU “refused to furnish [him] with the needed and requested documents”
necessary to grieve his cell conditions from May 8 to May 17, 2008. [Dkt. 223-5, p.
12; dkt. 223-2, Vega Declaration, p. 8 ¶33]. On the contrary, Vega did file a
disciplinary appeal on May 9, 2008 during his stay in cell 6 on a form which
allowed him to grieve the cell condition. [See Dkt. 51, Amended Compl. at ¶¶43738; dkt. 223-2, Vega Declaration, p.9 ¶34]. Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues that he
should be excused from the administrative grievance process because he made
passing mention of the allegedly deplorable cell conditions in one line of the
disciplinary appeal he filed on May 9, 2008 while in cell 6 of the restricted housing
unit. Id. Specifically, the evidence that Mr. Vega has presented in conjunction
with his opposition to the motion for summary judgment does not support his
contentions that he was unable to exhaust the administrative remedies available
to him. The disciplinary appeal form Mr. Vega submitted in response to his
allegedly faulty disciplinary hearing contains three categories of complaint
among which an inmate may choose to denote the nature of his complaint: a
Grievance, a Health Services Review, or an Appeal. [Dkt. 223-3, 5/9/08
Disciplinary Appeal, p.72]. Section 1 of this Inmate Administrative Remedy Form
appears, in relevant part, as follows, complete with boxes an inmate may check
depending on the type of complaint he wishes to make:
A. ___ I am filing a Grievance.
B. ___ I am requesting a Health services Review …
C. ___ I am filing an Appeal of a: (select one below)
___ Disciplinary Action
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___ Special Management Decision
___ Publication Review Committee Decision
___ Security Risk Group Designation …
[Id.]. Although Mr. Vega could plainly have checked the “Grievance” box on this
form, he did not do so. Instead, he chose to indicate that he was filing an Appeal
of a Disciplinary Action. [Id.]. Mr. Vega’s completion of this Form also indicates
that it was indeed provided to Mr. Vega and not withheld by MacDougall-Walker’s
officers as Mr. Vega contends.
Further, although Mr. Vega relayed multiple complaints of due process and
other violations allegedly perpetrated during his disciplinary hearing on the Form
– contained in 27 lines of text – he included only the following statement couched
among his due process claims as to his cell conditions: “Right now I’m in a cell
with feasy [sic] on the walls [illegible] and a toilet that doesn’t flush and a very
dirty cell.” [Dkt. 223-3, 5/9/08 Disciplinary Appeal, p.72]. This passing mention of
the cell condition together with his failure to check the “I am filing a Grievance”
line clearly indicate that Mr. Vega did not grieve the cell condition, but rather
mentioned the cell condition as a consequence of the disciplinary action he was
appealing.
Mr. Vega’s appeal was denied on June 2, 2008 (after his release from the
RHU) by letter from District Administrator Wayne Choinski, who concluded that
the Hearing Officer’s finding as to disciplinary action was reasonable and that no
serious due process failure occurred in the disposition of Mr. Vega’s disciplinary
report. The letter does not contain any mention of or any determination as to
Vega’s alleged grievance regarding the unsanitary conditions of RHU cell 6. [Dkt.
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223-3, 6/2/08 Disciplinary Appeal Denial, p.74]. Indeed, the Department of
Correction’s Code of Penal Discipline describes the procedure for appealing a
disciplinary action (as Mr. Vega did), in relevant part, as follows:
An inmate may appeal a disciplinary action by completing the
Disciplinary Hearing Appeal form CN 9507. Each unit shall
provide Disciplinary Hearing Appeal forms, and a mail box
clearly marked “Disciplinary Appeals”, for inmates to submit a
disciplinary appeal. The Disciplinary Coordinator shall remove
and immediately forward all appeals, along with any other
appropriate documents used in the adjudication of the
Disciplinary Report, to the Unit Administrator at the facility
where the disciplinary report was adjudicated, who shall not
delegate the authority to respond to disciplinary appeals.
Disciplinary action resulting from a guilty plea shall not be
subject to an appeal. The appeal must be submitted within 15
days of the receipt of the Disciplinary Process Summary by
the inmate. The appropriate Unit Administrator shall respond
to any appeal within 30 business days of the receipt of the
appeal.
The appellate authority may alter disciplinary action in any
way that serves the State’s correctional objectives. The action
of the Unit Administrator shall be final and not subject to
further appeal.
St. of Conn. Dep’t of Corr., 9.5, Code of Penal Discipline #39 (March 5, 2003).
Nothing in the Code indicates that a prisoner may file a general grievance as part
of an appeal of a disciplinary hearing, as Mr. Vega claims to have done with
regard to cell 6.
Lastly, although Section 3 of the Inmate Administrative Remedy Form
clearly indicates that a grievance “must be filed within 30 days of the occurrence
or discovery of the cause of the grievance,” there is no indication that Mr. Vega
filed or attempted to file a grievance after his release from RHU on May 17, 2008,

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well before his thirty day filing window would have expired. [Dkt. 223-3, 5/9/08
Disciplinary Appeal, p.72].
In sum, no evidence in the record indicates that Mr. Vega’s complaints as
to cell 6’s unsanitary conditions were filed as a grievance or reviewed on the
merits, and nothing in the record indicates that the Plaintiff attempted to file a
grievance after his release from the RHU even if the grievance forms were
withheld from him during his stay in RHU. Further, the Plaintiff does not allege
that any specific correction officers withheld or refused to provide a grievance
form to him; indeed, aside from Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that he asked for
grievance forms and correctional officers refused to provide them during his RHU
stay, the Plaintiff has failed to allege any specifics as to his alleged requests.
Thus, the Plaintiff has not shown that administrative remedies were not, in fact,
available to him. See Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 2004)
(“Depending on the inmate's explanation for the alleged failure to exhaust, the
court must ask whether administrative remedies were in fact ‘available’ to the
prisoner.”). Moreover, Vega did have a form on which he could have grieved the
cell condition. Finally, Plaintiff’s appeal of his disciplinary action did not address
this claim on the merits, which is a substantial goal of the prisoner administrative
exhaustion requirement under the PSLRA. See, e.g., Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.
516, 524-25 (2002) (“Beyond doubt, Congress enacted [42 U.S.C.] § 1997e(a) to
reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits; to this purpose,
Congress afforded corrections officials time and opportunity to address
complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case. In some

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instances, corrective action taken in response to an inmate's grievance might
improve prison administration and satisfy the inmate, thereby obviating the need
for litigation. In other instances, the internal review might filter out some
frivolous claims. And for cases ultimately brought to court, adjudication could be
facilitated by an administrative record that clarifies the contours of the
controversy.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court
concludes that the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with
regard to Count 20, the alleged unsanitary conditions of RHU cell 6. Defendants’
motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Count 20.
b. COUNT 3
Count 3 presents similar claims as Count 20. Vega alleges in Count 3 that
he was forbidden from cleaning his “assigned cell(s)” even though the
Defendants knew of the “biohazardous and deplorable condition(s) of the
prison(s) and cell(s).” [Dkt. 51, Amended Compl. at ¶ 536]. The Plaintiff does not
specify whether this Count refers to RHU cell #6 or to the cell he shared with
Fermin Rodriguez. As discussed previously, the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies with regard to RHU cell #6. As to the cell he shared with
inmate Rodriguez, the record indicates that Vega was indeed furnished with the
necessary grievance forms, initiated grievance procedures, and later abandoned
the grievance process after reaching a concession with facility officials.
On April 13, 2006, Mr. Vega filed an Inmate Grievance Form A, Level 1 in
which he grieved the sanitary condition of the cell which he shared with inmate
Fermin Rodriguez. [Pl. Ex. F, Doc 223-3 at 69]. The bottom of the form indicates
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that the dispute was resolved with a compromise; Mr. Vega would be supplied
with “a small amount of cleaning materials to last 1 week to be re-filled on a
weekly basis – as long as inmate Vega is housed with inmate Fermin Rodriguez,”
who apparently caused the allegedly unsanitary conditions. [Id.]. On May 17,
2006 a Grievance Routing Slip of unknown authorship indicates the Plaintiff met
with the unit administrator regarding the sanitation of his cell raised in the
Grievance Form A. [Id. at 70]. The Slip indicates that a compromise was reached
whereby the Plaintiff was “willing to stay with inmate Rodriguez, which benefits
the DOC because he would have problems with other inmates” and that Vega
would be allowed “[a] small amount of cleaning materials for one week to be refilled on a weekly basis, to be allowed in cell for as long as inmate Vega is housed
with [inmate] Rodriguez.” Id. This compromise was also reported in the “official
use only” section of Plaintiff’s Grievance Form A, in which the disposition of the
grievance was noted. [Dkt. 223-3, p. 69]. The report states that “Inmate Vega also
is a tierman, [with] access to cleaning materials.” [Id.]. Neither party submitted
any documentation of the Plaintiff’s pursuit of further administrative remedies
related to cell sanitation regarding Vega’s and Rodriguez’s shared cell or RHU
cell 6.
There is no indication that the Plaintiff availed himself of any further
available administrative remedies as to the conditions in his cell with Fermin
Rodriguez. On the contrary, Vega reached an amicable solution as to the
conditions of his non-RHU cell – the Plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to be
housed with other inmates with whom he would have had problems but their cells

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might have been cleaner, or remain housed with an inmate with whom Mr. Vega
did not have problems and be afforded extra cleaning materials – and
consequently did not need to follow the administrative process because his
complaint was resolved. Plaintiff does not allege that this compromise was later
retracted. Further, Mr. Vega has not alleged that he has filed grievances as to the
unsanitary conditions in any other cell he has occupied.
In light of the Plaintiff’s amicable resolution of the above claim, the Court
dismisses Count 3 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which provides that, in cases in
which a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the case at
any time if the court determines that … (B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). Mr. Vega is proceeding in forma pauperis in this action. As this
Court can grant no relief for Count 3, which the Plaintiff resolved by way of a
compromise with prison officials prior to the commencement of this action, the
Court concludes that Count 3 is frivolous and fails to state a legal claim. Count 3
must thus be DISMISSED.
c. MONETARY DAMAGES UNDER THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT
The Defendants argue that monetary damages are not recoverable from
defendants in either their individual or official capacities for violations of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). The Plaintiff
responds that the Defendants have misinterpreted the plain language of the Act

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and that he is, in fact, entitled to monetary damages against the Defendants in
their individual capacities.
Under the RLUIPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the state has imposed
a substantial burden on the exercise of his religion; however, the state may
overcome a RLUIPA claim by demonstrating that the challenged policy or action
furthered a compelling governmental interest and was the least restrictive means
of furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Under the First Amendment,
on the other hand, the law is less generous to plaintiff prisoners; a generally
applicable policy will not be held to violate a plaintiff's right to free exercise of
religion if that policy “is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Although the Second Circuit has not addressed the issue, district courts
within this circuit have held that damages claims for violations of RLUIPA are not
cognizable against individuals in either a defendant’s official or individual
capacity. See, e.g., Singh v. Goord, No. 05 Civ. 9680, 2010 WL 1903997, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2010) (RLUIPA does not allow recovery of damages in official or
individual capacity), aff’d sub nom. Singh v. Lynch, 460 Fed. App’x 45 (2d Cir.
2012); El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 261 (D.
Conn. 2008) (RLUIPA does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity); Bock v.
Gold, No. 05-CV-151, 2008 WL 345890, at *1 (D. Vt. Feb. 7, 2008) (RLUIPA does not
allow recovery for damages in individual or official capacity).

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The courts in so holding rely on the fact that Congress enacted RLUIPA
pursuant to its spending power. Such legislation is like a contract in which the
state agrees to comply with certain conditions in exchange for federal funds. As
individual state actors are not the recipients of the funds, damages cannot be
sought from the individuals. See Pugh v. Goord, 571 F. Supp. 2d 477, 507
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). With regard to official capacity claims, the courts have
determined that the language of RLUIPA is not sufficiently unequivocal to
abrogate the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. See El Badrawi, 579 F.
Supp. 2d at 261.
This Court agrees with the reasoning of the other courts in this circuit and
finds that monetary damages may not be awarded under RLUIPA. The Plaintiff
has set forth his claim for monetary damages in section XXXVII of his Amended
Complaint (Dkt. No. 51), including as to his claims for violations of RLUIPA. To
the extent the Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, all claims against individuals
and entities for violations of the Plaintiff’s practice of his faith pursuant to
RLUIPA are dismissed as not cognizable under that statute. The Plaintiff’s
remaining RLUIPA claims are extant to the extent that they do not seek monetary
damages.
d. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity in this
case because “the plaintiff’s claimed ‘religious rituals’ are entirely vague and
unclear” and because “the law is wholly unclear and entirely unsettled.” [Dkt.
217-1, Ds’ MSJ, p.16]. The Defendants also argue that all claims for monetary
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damages should be dismissed because the Defendants are protected by qualified
immunity. The Plaintiff concedes this point, but responds that qualified immunity
is not a defense to his claims for injunctive relief. [Dkt. 223-5, P’s Opp., p. 33].
Furthermore, he argues that the Defendants’ actions deprived him of the right to
freely practice his religious faith. The Court interprets the Plaintiff’s response to
mean that he seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order enjoining the
Defendants from depriving him of the right to freely practice his religious faith in
the manner in which the remaining clams in his complaint allege they have.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for damages caused by the performance of discretionary official
functions if their conduct does not violate a plaintiff’s clearly established right of
which a reasonable person would have been aware. See Zellner v. Summerlin,
494 F.3d 344, 367 (2d Cir. 2007). The constitutional right at issue “must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right,” although the exact issue need not have been previously
decided. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Prison officials
performing tasks entrusted to their discretion typically “are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396
(1982); see also Hanrahan v. Doling, 331 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2003). In ascertaining
whether the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must look
“to both ‘the clarity of the law establishing the right allegedly violated’ as well as

15

‘whether a reasonable person, acting under the circumstances then confronting a
defendant, would have understood’ that his actions were unlawful.” Hanrahan,
331 F.3d at 98 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460, 466 (2d Cir.
2001)).
Balanced against the desire “to shield officials responsibly attempting to
perform their public duties in good faith from having to explain their actions to
the satisfaction of a jury” is the need “to hold responsible public officials
exercising their power in a wholly unjustified manner.” Duamutef v. Hollins, 297
F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2002). Summary judgment for defendants on grounds of
qualified immunity is therefore appropriate “only ‘if the court finds that the
asserted rights were not clearly established, or if the evidence is such that, even
when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[ ] and with all
permissible inferences drawn in [his] favor, no rational jury could fail to conclude
that it was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe that they were
acting in a fashion that did not violate a clearly established right.’ ” Williams v.
Greifinger, 97 F.3d 699, 703 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting In re State Police Litig., 88 F.3d
111, 123 (2d Cir.1996)).
The Second Circuit has held that there is a clearly established rule that a
prisoner has a right to a diet consistent with his or her religious scruples, Kahane
v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Bass v. Coughlin, 976 F.2d 98, 99
(2d Cir. 1992) (“The principle [Kahane ] established was not placed in any
reasonable doubt by intervening Supreme Court rulings[.]”), and this circuit has
also held it well established that a prisoner’s free exercise right to participate in

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religious services is not extinguished by his or her confinement in special
housing or keeplock, see Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 993 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1993).
Furthermore, this Circuit has explained that the finding of a clearly established
rule is not to be so narrowly applied as to provide qualified immunity unless the
courts have ruled in favor of a prisoner under precisely the same factual
circumstance. See Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2d Cir. 2003). To the
contrary, this Circuit has explained that “prior cases make it sufficiently clear that
absent a legitimate penological justification . . . prison officials’ conduct in
denying [the plaintiff] a feast imbued with religious import was unlawful.” Id.
To evaluate whether a right is clearly established, the court must determine
whether it would be clear to a reasonable correctional official that his conduct in
these circumstances was unlawful. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
The analysis focuses on cases from the Supreme Court and Second Circuit. See
Williams v. Greifinger, 97 F.3d 699, 706 (2d Cir. 1996). The Second Circuit has
held that the appropriate point of inquiry is not whether DOC officials correctly
followed the advice of religious counselors but rather whether Mr. Vega’s beliefs
are sincerely held. See Ford. V. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597-98 (2d Cir. 2003)
(vacating and remanding summary judgment on prisoner’s claim of a violation of
his free exercise rights). The Ford court further clarified that, while the opinions
of ecclesiastical experts are informative, “the proper inquiry [is] always whether
[the plaintiff’s] belief was sincerely held and in his own scheme of things
religious.” Id. at 598 (internal citations and emphasis omitted).

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In this case, Mr. Vega has asserted in his complaint that the Defendants
violated his constitutional rights by the prison’s administration of the holiday
food package program, as alleged in Count 2, identification of commissary items
as “Halal,” as alleged in Count 14, continued serving of non-Kosher, non-halal
cheese on the common fare menu, as alleged in Count 15, and failure to clean
rugs used for prayer, as alleged in Count 21. “[P]rior cases make it sufficiently
clear that absent a legitimate penological justification . . . prison officials’ conduct
in denying [a plaintiff] a feast imbued with religious import was unlawful.” Id.
However, the appropriate point of inquiry is not whether DOC officials correctly
followed the advice of religious counselors in determining whether a practice is
prescribed by an inmate’s religion, but rather whether the inmate’s beliefs are
sincerely held. See Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597-98 (2d Cir. 2003), (citing
Frazze v. Illinios Department of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 929 (1989))
(vacating and remanding summary judgment on prisoner’s claim of a violation of
his 1st Amend. rights via refusal to serve religious feast in high-security area).
The Plaintiff objects to the Defendants’ qualified immunity argument on the
grounds that he is entitled to a clean rug and space in which to practice his
religion. He asserts that “qualified immunity is not a defense to Mr. Vega’s claims
for injunctive relief.” [Dkt. 223-5, p. 33].
In viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to Mr. Vega
and with all permissible inferences drawn in his favor, there is no question that
Mr. Vega is a devout Muslim and that his beliefs are sincerely held. Furthermore,
contrary to the Defendants’ argument, he has clearly asserted his religious rituals

18

– the mandate for religiously sanctioned foods and the need to pray on a clean
rug – and this Court would be remiss to interpret existing case law recognizing a
right to pray in clean conditions and eat a diet consistent with his scripture more
narrowly than simply that. Therefore, there are clearly established rights
asserted in this case. The Defendants have not presented any evidence of a
compelling interest which prevents them from accommodating Mr. Vega’s
religious observance nor have they presented any evidence that they reasonably
accommodated him. With respect to the Plaintiff’s claims in Counts 15 and 21,
the Court declines to find qualified immunity and DENIES the Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment.
However, there is no recognized right to the purchase of holiday food
packages, as the Plaintiff claims in Count 2. Inmates have no constitutional right
to purchase items from the prison commissary. See Mitchell v. City of New York,
No. 10 Civ. 4121(PKC), 2011 WL 1899718, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2011) (dismissing
claims regarding commissary pricing and selection); Davis v. Shaw, No. 08 Civ.
364(NRB), 2009 WL 1490609, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2009) (any claims regarding
prison commissary do not rise to level of constitutional violation because
inmates have no constitutional right to use prison commissary); Torres v. Droun,
No. 01 Civ. 1844(DJS)(TPS), 2004 WL 721729, at *7 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2004) (no
constitutional right to purchase items from prison commissary or outside vendor
where it did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship). Mr. Vega does
not assert that his inability to purchase this item constitutes a substantial burden
in the sense that they prevent him from practicing his religion. Prison officials

19

are not required to provide every product which an inmate may want, but not
need, in its commissary. Deprivation is an inherent and unavoidable
consequence of incarceration. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). After
considering all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court
DISMISSES Count 2 for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
The Court declines to award qualified immunity to the Defendants on the
Plaintiff’s remaining religious exercise claims.
e. COUNT 18
Plaintiff alleges in Count 18 that the Defendants intercepted and opened an
April 19, 2008 letter which he addressed and dispatched to his mother which led
to the issuance of a disciplinary report charging Plaintiff with conspiracy to
convey contraband. Plaintiff alleges that the opening of this letter violated his
First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and his rights under the
RLUIPA. Under the strictures of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim upon which this Court may grant relief.
While a prisoner has a right to be present when his legal mail is opened,
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 574-76 (1974), an isolated incident of mail
tampering is usually insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See
Morgan v. Montanye, 516 F.2d 1367, 1371 (2d Cir.1975); Washington v. James, 782
F.2d 1134, 1139 (2d Cir. 1986). Rather, the inmate must show that prison officials
“regularly and unjustifiably interfered with the incoming legal mail.” Cancel v.

20

Goord, No. 00 CIV 2042 LMM., 2001 WL 303713, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2001)
(citing Washington, 782 F.2d at 1139).
In Washington, the Second Circuit determined that as few as two incidents
of mail tampering could constitute an actionable violation (1) if the incidents
suggested an ongoing practice of censorship unjustified by a substantial
government interest, or (2) if the tampering unjustifiably chilled the prisoner’s
right of access to the courts or impaired the legal representation received. 782
F.2d at 1139. Following Washington, district courts have generally required
specific allegations of invidious intent or of actual harm where the incidents of
tampering are few and thus the implication of an actionable violation is not
obvious on its face. See, e.g., Cancel, 2001 WL 303713, at *6 (dismissing claim
where only two incidents of tampering alleged and no other indications of a
continuing practice); John v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corrections, 183 F.Supp.2d 619, 629
(S.D.N.Y.2002) (requiring plaintiff to allege facts that show defendants acted with
invidious intent and plaintiff was harmed by the interference); Hudson, No. 99
CIV. 12339(LAP), 2000 WL 1838324, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2000) (holding same);
Johnson v. Morton, No. 95 Civ. 949, 1996 WL 518078, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1996)
(noting that “[c]ourts have consistently applied Morgan [ v. Montanye ] to dismiss
suits by inmates alleging unconstitutional opening of their legal mail without any
showing of damages”); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (holding
that inmate must establish actual injury, rather than “theoretical deficiency” with
legal library or legal assistance program to state constitutional claim for
interference with access to courts).

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Furthermore, section 18-81-31(a) of the Regulations of the Connecticut
State Agencies provides that “all outgoing general correspondence shall be
subject to being read at the direction of the Unit Administrator . . . for either a
specific inmate(s) or on a random basis if the Commissioner or Unit
Administrator has reason to believe that such reading is generally necessary to
further the substantial interests of security, order or rehabilitation.” This section
further provides that outgoing correspondence may be “restricted, confiscated,
returned to the inmate, retained for further investigation, referred for disciplinary
proceedings or forwarded to law enforcement officials” if a review demonstrates
that the correspondence contains or concerns, among other things, “[t]he
transport of contraband in or out of the facility.”
The Plaintiff claims only that one letter was tampered with on one
occasion. He does not allege an ongoing practice of mail tampering by DOC
officials or, indeed, even more than one instance. Plaintiff has thus admitted that
there was no ongoing practice of mail interference. Furthermore, the Plaintiff
does not allege that his mother is an attorney or that by opening and reinterpreting the contents that he was unjustifiably censored or that his right to
access of the courts was chilled. Indeed, the contents of the letter are not legal in
nature, and Connecticut law provides that outgoing inmate correspondence may
be reviewed. In fact, the letter asked his mother to purchase consumer items and
to send one item to him in subversion of a prison directive or privilege, as
discussed further below. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the

22

Court DISMISSES Count 18 for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.
f. COUNT 19
Plaintiff alleges in Count 19 that the Defendants erroneously issued him a
disciplinary report for conspiracy to convey contraband – a claim he contends is
undefined – based on a faulty reading of his April 19, 2008 letter to his mother,
thus violating his rights. Plaintiff’s main contention supporting his claim is that
no evidence supported a finding that he was guilty of conspiracy to convey
contraband. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
as the record amply demonstrates that the evidence supported a finding of guilty.
This claim must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
In the three page letter to the Plaintiff’s mother, the Plaintiff requests that
his mother “[p]urchase 1 pound of oil,” that she “try to get 16 plastic bottles of 1
oz, empty. That’s so we can fill them and pass out the donation.” The letter
further requests that she contact the Imam of the Islamic Center from which
Plaintiff desired that she acquire the oil to inform the Imam “that he must mail the
oil [to the prison] as a donation from the Islamic Center.” [Dkt. 217-3, 4/19/08
Letter, pp. 15-18]. Plaintiff also included a prison authorization form regarding a
wrist watch with his letter and requested that his mother “[t]ry to get a watch that
is similar to the watch I had. And try to get a Guess watch. Do not have the store
send the receipt with the watch. You take the receipt. O.K.” [Id.]. The November
1, 2006 authorization form Plaintiff included states:

23

This inmate sent his watch to a store to be repaired with the
approval of Capt. Frey. This watch should be returned directly
from the jewelry store. In addition Capt. Frey has requested
[illegible] informed upon the arrival of the watch in order to
make arrangements for it to be inspected for contraband.
Attached is a photo of the watch that was sent out.
[Dkt. 217-3, 11/1/06 Authorization, p. 26]. Section 18-81-51(c) of the Regulations
of the Connecticut State Agencies, applicable to the Department of Corrections,
defines “contraband” as “any property that is not authorized by the
Commissioner of Correction.” Clearly, the letter indicates that the Plaintiff
sought to misrepresent the new watch which he did not have permission to have
sent into the prison facility as the repaired watch which he did have permission to
have sent into the prison facility. As Mr. Vega solicited the aid of his mother to
do so, he attempted to conspire with his mother to transmit contraband, that is,
goods or merchandise whose importation or possession is not permitted, into the
prison facility.
On April 21, 2008, Plaintiff was issued a Disciplinary Report for
“Contraband (conspiracy to convey)” based on the letter’s request that Plaintiff’s
mother purchase unauthorized oils to send to the prison, and his request that his
mother send him a new watch when he was authorized only to send an old watch
out for repair. [Dkt. 217-3, 4/21/08 Disc. Report, pp. 7-8]. The Report concludes:
The body of his letter clearly states for his mother to purchase
a new watch and send it in as if the watch was a repair and
returned. This and the request for his mother to purchase Oil
and have it sent in as a donation is a clear attempt to Convey
Contraband into this Correctional Institution in violation of AD
9.5.
[Id.].
24

Officials have the right to establish rules and regulations for the orderly
administration of prison facilities. Indeed, the Second Circuit has noted that “[i]t
is well established that challenges to prison policies are evaluated under a
‘reasonableness test less restrictive than ordinarily applied to alleged
infringements of fundamental constitutional rights’ so as to account for the
unique considerations relevant to orderly prison administration.” Zargary v. City
of New York, 412 F. App'x 339, 341 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)). Indeed, the “central objective of prison
administration [is] safeguarding institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 547 (1979). “[M]aintaining institutional security and preserving internal order
and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the
retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees.”
Bell, 441 U.S. at 546. “Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system.” Id. at 545-46. “The limitations on
the exercise of [a prisoner’s] constitutional rights arise both from the fact of
incarceration and from valid penological objectives-including deterrence of
crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security.” O'Lone, 482 U.S. at
348. The Supreme Court has recently noted that “[p]olicies designed to keep
contraband out of jails and prisons have been upheld in cases decided since” its
ruling in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Florence v. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1516 (2012).

25

Here, there is ample evidence supporting a guilty finding by prison officials
that Mr. Vega’s letter controverted the policy against contraband. Mr. Vega’s
letter clearly requests that his mother purchase and mail to the institution items
not approved by the prison; no evidence in the record indicates that Mr. Vega was
authorized to receive a donation of oil, and the watch authorization form indicates
that Mr. Vega was authorized only to receive back directly from a jewelry store a
watch sent for repairs, not a new watch altogether. Thus, his letter constitutes a
patent subversion of the permission given to him by prison officials in violation
of prison policy, which impairs the prison’s inherent authority to secure the
facility by controlling what comes in and out.
The Plaintiff has failed to establish that no evidence existed to find him
guilty of attempting to convey contraband. Conversely, the record indicates a
patent violation. Consequently, Count 19 is DISMISSED.
g. COUNT 15 AS IT RELATES TO THE 13TH AMENDMENT
Plaintiff claims in Count 15 that the Defendants continued to serve him
non-Halal cheese after they had learned it was not Halal. Although the Court
declines to dismiss the bulk of this claim, which will proceed to trial, Plaintiff’s
claim that this issue constitutes a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment is
untenable and must be dismissed. The Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution abolished slavery in this Country. No fact or allegation in the
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint or in the record in this case supports a finding that
the Thirteenth Amendment has been violated by the Defendants’ alleged
provision of non-Halal cheese, nor can the Court conceive of any possible
26

manner in which this claim could constitute a Thirteenth Amendment violation.
The Court therefore dismisses Count 15 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)
and (ii) only as it relates to the Thirteenth Amendment.
h. COUNTS 4, 23, AND 30
The Plaintiff alleges in Count 4 that his rights were violated when he was
not permitted to purchase Islamic religious items, including a digital Quran,
Islamic educational compact discs, perfumed incense, leather socks, Halalcertified lotions and toiletry items, a Qiblah compass, “Azhan Five daily Essential
Prayers,” and an Islamic male silver ring. [Dkt. 51, Am. Compl. ¶ 537]. Although
Plaintiff includes the latter six categories of items in this Count, the Amended
Complaint is devoid of any facts as to Vega’s attempt to procure these items. In
contrast, paragraph 385 of the Amended Complaint indicates that the Plaintiff
filed a grievance on January 16, 2008 regarding denial of his request to purchase
Islamic cds, which was denied and which denial Vega appealed. Paragraph 423
indicates that the Plaintiff filed a grievance on May 8, 2008 regarding the denial of
his request to purchase a digital Quran. There is no indication in the Amended
Complaint that Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies as to any item
listed in Count 4 other than the Islamic cds and the digital Quran. As discussed
previously, the Plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing
a claim in federal court. Here, Plaintiff neither indicates that he has exhausted his
administrative remedies as to the bulk of these items nor includes any specific
facts in his Amended Complaint regarding his deprivation of them. Therefore,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which this Court may grant relief and Count
27

4 must be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as to all items
except the Islamic cds and the digital Quran.
Plaintiff alleges in Count 23 that the Defendants retaliatorily “logged
inaccurate and/or unreliable information in the Plaintiff’s prison records denying
him fairness in making determination(s) about the Plaintiff.” [Dkt. 51, Am. Compl.
¶556]. In this Count the Plaintiff purports to incorporate each of the prior 555
paragraphs of his 244 page Amended Complaint. Count 23 does not specify what
inaccurate information was logged, when it was logged, by whom it was logged,
or how the erroneous information has harmed him, and Plaintiff refers to no
specific incidents enumerated elsewhere in his Amended Complaint. This claim
is entirely vague and the Court is at a loss to ascertain to what set of facts this
claim pertains. Plaintiff also does not indicate whether he has contested the
inclusion of allegedly erroneous information in his file, thereby demonstrating
that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. Section 18-81-20(g) of the
Regulations of the Connecticut State Agencies allows an inmate to contest the
content of personal data records and to propose amendment of his records; there
is no indication that Mr. Vega has done so.
Because this claim is entirely vague and lacking in factual support, and
because the Plaintiff has not indicated that he has exhausted his administrative
remedies in attempting to correct any erroneous information in his records, or
has even alleged that he has a right to correct such information, this claim must
be DISMISSED for lack of basis in law or fact, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). The Court can discern no basis upon which it may grant

28

relief for such a vague and unspecific claim as this, and can additionally not
conclude that this claim is not frivolous.
Count 30 must be dismissed for similar reasons. This Count alleges that
the Defendants “systematically banned the freedom of expression in Rap Music
(i.e. unedited Rap Music) without any legitimate reason(s),” thereby depriving the
Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. [Dkt. 51, Am. Comp. ¶ 563]. As with Count
23, the Plaintiff does not specify the factual basis upon which this claim rests or
whether the Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies. Nor does he
allege that other types of music are not censored, or the manner in or frequency
with which unedited rap music is banned. Indeed, this claim relates to no facts
contained in the Plaintiff’s 244 page complaint.
Moreover, even if Plaintiff has appropriately exhausted his administrative
remedies, as discussed previously, prison officials may establish rules and
regulations for the orderly administration of prison facilities, with the central
goals of safeguarding institutional security and preserving internal order and
discipline. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). A limitation on inmates’
freedom to purchase and listen to uncensored rap music – which notoriously and
often contains antiauthoritarian, violent, and inflammatory lyrics – in a
combustible setting where inmates are housed in close quarters can hardly be
deemed an unreasonable intrusion on inmates’ constitutional rights. Instead,
lack of access to inflammatory music with the potential to fuel animosity furthers
valid penological objectives.

29

The Court thus DISMISSES Count 30 for failure to state a claim on which
relief may be granted, and for arguable frivolity, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). See Betts v. McCaughtry, 827 F. Supp. 1400, 1405 (W.D.
Wis. 1993) aff'd, 19 F.3d 21 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that regulation banning
inflammatory rap music in prison furthered the “plausible, legitimate purpose” to
“prevent materials that present a risk of violence,” and holding that regulation
was not racially discriminatory because impact on African-Americans was
questionable); Roque v. Warden, Connecticut Corr. Inst., Somers, 181 Conn. 85,
99 (1980) (activity and literature likely to bring about eventual confrontation of
prisoners and prison staff – here, writings “fraught with instigation to concerted
activity in opposition to the system of government and authority under which the
inmates were living” – “cannot be Countenanced in the prison setting”).
i. STATE LAW CLAIMS
Most of Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action contain allegations that the
Defendants have violated the Plaintiff’s rights under the Connecticut state
constitution and state statutes. With regard to Counts 13 and 21, however, the
Plaintiff has failed to identify a specific state statute or state constitutional
provision allegedly violated by the Defendants. Absent identification of a state
statute or constitutional provision providing rights under the facts asserted in
the Amended Complaint in excess of those provided under the enumerated
federal Constitutional provisions or federal statutes, the Court dismisses the
state claims in the foregoing Counts as lacking a cognizable legal basis and for

30

failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Vega also purports to bring claims for violations of Conn. Gen. Stats. §§ 53517 (Fraudulent sale of kosher meat, meat products and other food) and 53-347a
(Prohibited acts relative to stamps, labels, trademarks, service marks, collective
marks and certification marks) in Count 14. These statutes are criminal statutes
prescribing criminal penalties. Mr. Vega is not a prosecuting authority; thus he
may not bring claims under these criminal statutes. Claims under these two
statutes in Count 14 are thus DISMISSED.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ [217] Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Summary judgment is
GRANTED in favor of Defendants as to Count 20 for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust
his administrative remedies. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of
Defendants on all claims for monetary relief under the RLUIPA, as monetary
damages are not cognizable under that statute. Counts 2 (purchase of holiday
food packages), 3 (unsanitary conditions of shared cell), 18 (mail tampering), 19
(issuance of disciplinary report for conspiracy to convey contraband), 23
(inaccurate information in prison records), and 30 (uncensored rap music) are
DISMISSED in their entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Count 15 is DISMISSED
only as it relates to the Thirteenth Amendment. Count 4 is DISMISSED as to all
items except the Islamic cds and the digital Quran. The state law claims in
Counts 13 and 21 are DISMISSED. The state law claims for violations of Conn.

31

Gen. Stats. §§ 53-517 and 53-347a in Count 14 are DISMISSED. The Court DENIES
Defendants’ request for qualified immunity as to Counts 15 and 21.
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants as to
Counts 2, 3, 18, 19, 20, 23, and 30.
The following Counts are the sole remaining Counts in this action:


Count 4 (as to Islamic cds and digital Quran only), alleging violations of the
First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the RLUIPA, and violations
of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571b;



Count 10, alleging violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments and the RLUIPA, and violations of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571b;



Count 13, alleging violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments and the RLUIPA;



Count 14, alleging violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments and the RLUIPA, and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-571b;



Count 15, alleging violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments and the RLUIPA; and



Count 21, alleging violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments and the RLUIPA.

Accordingly, all evidence which a party has proposed to offer which is relevant
only to a claim which is no longer extant is irrelevant. The parties are directed to
examine all proposed witnesses and exhibits and to withdraw those which are no
longer relevant.

32

IT IS SO ORDERED.

________/s/______________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge

Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: December 4, 2013

33