Jones v. Lantz et al

Filing 86

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 77 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. See the attached Memorandum of Decision. Since summary judgment has been granted as to the claims against Wright, Gilbert, Little, Saylor, Williams, Massop, Prouty and Overstreet, the Clerk is directed to terminate these defendants from this action. This case will proceed as to defendants Wilbur, Hill, Savoie, Torangeau, St. John, Sterling and Siwicki. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 5/31/11. (Engel, J.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

WILLIAM T. JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
THERESA C. LANTZ, et al.,
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3:09-cv-747 (VLB)

May 31, 2011

RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Doc. #77]
The plaintiff, William T. Jones, currently incarcerated at Garner
Correctional Institution in Newtown, Connecticut, commenced this civil rights
action pro se. He asserts two claims of use of excessive force, one claim of
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and a supplemental state law
claim for battery. The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. For
the reasons that follow, the defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to the claims of
deliberate indifference against defendants Wright, Gilbert, Little, Saylor, Williams,
Massop, Prouty and Overstreet, and DENIED as to the claims of deliberate
indifference against defendants Wilbur, Hill and Savoie and the claims of
excessive force against defendants Torangeau, St. John, Sterling and Siwicki.
I. Standard of Review
In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to
establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is
therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.;
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). The moving party may

satisfy this burden “by showing – that is pointing out to the district court – that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Once the moving party meets
this burden, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and present such
evidence as would allow a jury to find in his favor in order to defeat the motion
for summary judgment. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.
2000).
When reviewing the record, the court resolves all ambiguities and draws all
permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary
judgment is sought. Patterson v. County of Oneida, NY, 375 F.3d 206, 218 (2d Cir.
2004). If there is any evidence in the record on a material issue from which a
reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, summary
judgment is inappropriate. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight
Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004). However, “‘[t]he mere of existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the [plaintiff’s] position will be insufficient;
there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
[plaintiff].’” Dawson v. County of Westchester, 373 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 2004)
(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252)).

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II. Facts1
At all times relevant to the incidents underlying this action, the plaintiff was
confined at Northern Correctional Institution in Somers, Connecticut. In the
morning of May 10, 2006, the plaintiff attended a disciplinary hearing. The
hearing was held in a special disciplinary hearing room containing a table and
several chairs. Two of the walls are clear, enabling the Unit Control Officer to see
into the room. The mechanism used to open the door to the hearing room is in a
remote location.
Defendants Tourangeau, St. John and Sterling were present at the hearing.
When the plaintiff was found guilty of the disciplinary infraction, he became
angry. The plaintiff was ordered to return to his cell. The plaintiff, accompanied
by defendants Tourangeau and St. John, walked toward the door and faced it,
waiting for the door to be opened. The plaintiff did not stand quietly waiting for
the door to open; rather he was agitated. Defendant St. John ordered the plaintiff
to be quiet. The plaintiff turned toward defendant St. John. In response,
defendant St. John secured the plaintiff’s back against the door. Defendant
Tourangeau turned the plaintiff around so he was facing the door. While the
plaintiff was being secured, the hearing room door opened. It is not clear from
the videotape whether the plaintiff walked out of the room or if the plaintiff and
defendants Tourangeau and St. John all tumbled out of the room and onto the

1

The facts are taken from the Local Rule 56(a) Statements filed by the
parties along with the attached exhibits.
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tier. Other correctional staff responded to assist in securing the plaintiff.
The plaintiff was taken to the medical unit where he was examined by
defendant Nurse Wilbur.2 Defendant Wilbur examined the plaintiff’s injuries and
applied a band-aid to a laceration on his left wrist. The plaintiff complained that
his right wrist hurt, but no specific treatment was provided. The plaintiff was
escorted to the restrictive housing unit where defendant Nurse Savoie inspected
his in-cell restraints. The plaintiff told defendant Savoie that he thought his right
wrist was broken. Defendant Savoie noted swelling of the right wrist or hand.
Defendant Savoie provided ice for the swelling and said she would check on his
condition later.
Defendants Little, Saylor, Williams, Massop and Prouty were correctional
staff assigned to the restrictive housing unit on May 10, 2006. Defendant Prouty
checked on the plaintiff periodically. Defendant Prouty called the medical unit on
the plaintiff’s behalf. Defendant Overstreet, a mental health staff member, toured
the restrictive housing unit. Defendant Nurse Hill3 inspected the plaintiff’s
restraints at approximately 8:00 p.m. on May 10, 2006. The plaintiff slept during
the third shift and did not request any medical treatment.
Defendant Nurse Gilbert inspected the plaintiff’s restraints on May 11, 2006.
Defendant Dr. Wright examined the plaintiff on May 11, 2006, and ordered x-rays

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The plaintiff incorrectly identified this defendant in his amended
complaint as Wilburt.
3

The plaintiff incorrectly named defendant Hill as Hill Sessa.
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of the plaintiff’s right hand. He did not order that the plaintiff’s restraints be
removed. The x-ray revealed a comminuted fracture of the right radius, the most
commonly broken bone in the arm. Treatment for a fractured radius may include
rest, elevation, cold compresses, splinting, casting, a shoulder sling and pain
medication. If the bone is not properly aligned, surgery may be required.
The plaintiff was brought to the emergency room of an outside hospital
where a cast and ace bandage were applied to restrict movement and assist in
the healing process. When he returned to Northern Correctional Institution, the
plaintiff was housed in the infirmary to enable medical staff to monitor his
recovery. The plaintiff removed bandages and failed to take his medication. The
plaintiff states that he removed only the ace bandage, not the cast. Medical
records indicate that he plaintiff removed both. Subsequent x-rays revealed that
the fracture was not healing properly. On June 6, 2006, the plaintiff underwent a
surgical procedure to insert a metal plate at the site of the fracture.
The plaintiff’s stitches were removed on June 23, 2006. On that day, the
plaintiff requested a shower. Defendant Siwicki and other correctional officers
entered the plaintiff’s cell and explained the medical restraint protocol that would
be used to escort him to the shower. The plaintiff refused to be restrained. The
plaintiff states that correctional staff wanted to use hard restraints instead of the
soft restraints required by the medical protocol. The defendants state that they
were complying with the medical protocol. The plaintiff became angry and began
shouting.
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Defendant Siwicki states that he observed the plaintiff spit at another
correctional officer in the cell. The plaintiff denies spitting. Correctional staff
immediately began stabilizing the plaintiff face down on his bunk. During this
process, the plaintiff’s head hit the cell wall. A spit guard was applied and the
plaintiff was taken to the medical unit for assessment of his injuries. Dr.
Blanchette approved in-cell restraint status so long as soft restraints were used
on the plaintiff’s right wrist. The plaintiff was secured in soft restraints and
escorted to the restrictive housing unit.
III. Discussion
The remaining defendants in this action are Darrol Little, Brian Siwicki,
Melvin Saylor, Yolanda Sterling, Dr. Carson Wright, Mark Tourangeau, Cynthia R.
Gilbert, Barbara Savoie, Paul Wilbur, Nancy Hill, Dorothy Overstreet, Ellen St.
John, Williams, Massop and Scott Prouty. The plaintiff brings two excessive
force claims and a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. He
contends that defendants Tourangeau, St. John and Sterling are involved in the
May 10, 2006 excessive force claim and defendant Siwicki used excessive force
on June 23, 2006. He further contends that defendants Little, Saylor, Wright,
Gilbert, Savoie, Wilbur, Hill, Overstreet, Williams, Massop and Prouty were
deliberately indifferent to his broken wrist.
A.

Use of Excessive Force on May 10, 2006

The use of excessive force against an inmate may constitute cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, even if the inmate
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does not suffer a serious injury. Wilkins v. Gaddy, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1175,
1176 (2010) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992)). The Court’s inquiry
must focus not on whether the inmate sustained a certain level of injury, but
“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,
or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Id. at 1178 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Although the extent of the injury is not the focus of
the inquiry, it can provide information regarding the amount of force used.
Unless the use of force is “repugnant to the conscience of mankind,” a de
minimis use of force will not be cognizable under the Eighth Amendment. Id.
An Eighth Amendment claim has two components, one objective, the other
subjective. The objective component focuses on the harm done by the defendant
in light of contemporary standards of decency. The subjective component
involves the defendant’s motive. The plaintiff must show that the defendant “had
the necessary level of culpability, shown by actions characterized by wantonness
in light of the particular circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct.”
Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 268 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Whenever the defendants use force maliciously and
sadistically, however, they always violate contemporary standards of decency
regardless of the injury suffered. See id. at 269.
Factors relevant to whether the force used was necessary under the
circumstances “or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the
unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it
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occur” include the extent of the injury suffered, “the need for application of force,
the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat
‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to
temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (quoting
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)).
In addition, prison officials “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in
the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are
needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). This deference applies both
to actions taken in response to prison unrest or confrontations with inmates and
to preventative measures taken to reduce such incidents. See Whitley, 475 U.S.
at 322.
As a result of the May 10, 2006 use of force, the plaintiff suffered a broken
wrist. Defendants Tourangeau and St. John were directly involved in the use of
force and defendant Sterling failed to intercede to prevent the use of excessive
force.
The defendants argue that the force used was de minimis and that they
merely reacted to a disruptive inmate. In response, the plaintiff concedes that he
was speaking but denies acting in a threatening or disruptive manner. He also
cites later actions by defendants Tourangeau and St. John to demonstrate a
wanton state of mind. Although the defendants have provided videotapes of the
incidents, the tapes do not include an audio component and it is difficult to
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determine from the angle of the camera whether the plaintiff was threatening
defendant St. John and whether he walked out of the hearing room or fell out with
defendants Tourangeau and St. John. The Court cannot make credibility
determinations on a motion for summary judgment. Thus, the Court cannot
determine which version of the incident is accurate and whether the force used
was reasonable. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment is therefore
denied as to the first excessive force claim.
B.

Use of Excessive Force on June 23, 2006

The defendants move for summary judgment as to this claim on two
grounds. First, they argue that the plaintiff did not exhaust his institutional
remedies with regard to the June 23, 2006 incident. Second, they contend that
defendant Siwicki’s actions do not constitute use of excessive force.
1.

Exhaustion of Institutional Remedies

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires an inmate
to exhaust “administrative remedies as are available” before bringing an “action .
. . with respect to prison conditions.” The Supreme Court has held that this
provision requires an inmate to exhaust administrative remedies before filing any
type of action in federal court, regardless of whether the inmate may obtain the
specific relief he desires through the administrative process. Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006). Inmates must properly exhaust their administrative
remedies. This requirement includes complying with all procedural requirements,
including filing deadlines, so the inmate’s issue is reviewed on the merits. See
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id. at 90, 94-95.
The administrative directive in effect at the time of the incident provided
that the inmate grievance process could be used to address individual employee
actions and matters relating to conditions of care and supervision. See Defs.’
Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement, Attachment B, Administrative Directive 9.6, § 6(A),
effective March 5, 2003. The grievance procedures would encompass the
plaintiff’s claim of use of excessive force.
Directive 9.6, Section 9, requires that the inmate attempt to resolve the
matter informally before filing a grievance. If this process is unsuccessful, or the
inmate has not received a response to his attempt at informal resolution, Section
10 allows him to proceed to the next step and file a grievance. Section 10(G)
requires that the grievance be filed within thirty days of the occurrence giving
rise to the grievance. Section 16 provides that an inmate may file a Level 2
Grievance if he does not receive a timely response to the Level 1 grievance.
Section 12 provides that all grievances, regardless of the level, must be placed in
the Grievance Box to be collected by the Grievance Coordinator.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants have
provided the affidavit of Counselor/Grievance Coordinator Scott Petersen.
Counselor Petersen states that he searched all grievances filed at Northern
Correctional Institution in 2006 and was unable to locate any grievance filed by
the plaintiff regarding this incident. In opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiff has submitted copies of notes he received from Counselor
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Petersen in response to his inquiries whether Counselor Petersen had placed the
plaintiff’s grievances in the collection box. Although the plaintiff did not submit
copies of the grievances, the dates on the notes correspond with the dates that
the plaintiff states he submitted a grievance regarding this incident at the various
levels.
As the plaintiff had no control of the grievance forms after he gave them to
Counselor Petersen, the Court finds that the plaintiff did all he could to file a
grievance and that in effect he exhausted his institutional remedies with regard to
this incident.
2.

Use of Force

The defendants argue that defendant Siwicki subdued the plaintiff after
observing the plaintiff spit at another officer. They deny that defendant Siwicki
deliberately hit the plaintiff’s head against the wall. The plaintiff denies spitting at
anyone. He states that he objected to use of hard restraints and contends that
defendant Siwicki used excessive force because the plaintiff threatened to file an
institutional grievance. Use of force could be justified if the plaintiff spit at a
correctional officer. However, the affidavits of the parties dispute whether this
occurred. As the Court cannot determine credibility on a motion for summary
judgment, the motion is denied as to the second excessive force claim as well.
C.

Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need

The plaintiff contends that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to
his broken wrist because he had to wait thirty hours before he was seen by a
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doctor and sent for x-rays. He alleges that his complaints that his wrist was
broken were ignored.
Deliberate indifference by prison officials to a prisoner’s serious medical
need constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To state such a claim,
the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating sufficiently harmful acts or
omissions and intent to either deny or unreasonably delay access to needed
medical care or the wanton infliction of unnecessary pain by prison personnel.
Id. at 104-06.
Because mere negligence will not support a section 1983 claim, not all
lapses in prison medical care constitute a constitutional violation. Smith v.
Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2003). In addition, inmates are not entitled to
the medical treatment of their choice. See Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 215
(2d Cir. 1986). Mere disagreement with prison officials about what constitutes
appropriate care does not state a claim cognizable under the Eighth Amendment.
“So long as the treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer
a different treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.”
Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998). The conduct complained
of must “shock the conscience” or constitute a “barbarous act.” McCloud v.
Delaney, 677 F. Supp. 230, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). In addition, the fact that a prison
official did not alleviate a significant risk that he should have but did not perceive
does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
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838 (1994).
There are both subjective and objective components to the deliberate
indifference standard. Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied sub nom. Foote v. Hathaway, 513 U.S. 1154 (1995). Objectively, the
alleged deprivation must be “sufficiently serious.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
298 (1991). The condition must produce death, degeneration or extreme pain.
Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996). Subjectively, the defendant
must have been actually aware of a substantial risk that the inmate would suffer
serious harm as a result of his actions or inactions. Salahuddin v. Goord, 467
F.3d 263, 279-80 (2d Cir. 2006).
The Second Circuit has identified several factors that are highly relevant to
the inquiry into the seriousness of a medical condition. For example, a medical
condition significantly affecting the inmate’s daily activities or causing chronic
and significant pain or the existence of an injury a reasonable doctor would find
important constitutes a serious medical need. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143
F.3d 698, 702 (2d. Cir. 1998). In addition, where the denial of treatment causes the
plaintiff to suffer a permanent loss or life-long handicap, the medical need is
considered serious. See Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2000).
1.

Medical Staff

Defendants Wright, Gilbert, Savoie, Wilbur and Hill are members of the
medical staff.
The Court cannot determine as a matter of law whether the plaintiff’s
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fractured wrist and the delay in treating it constitutes an objectively serious
medical need. The plaintiff alleges that the fracture caused him significant pain
and a doctor would find a fracture important. Other courts considering the
question have reached different conclusions. Compare Sutherland v. Allison, No.
10-11673, 2011 WL 412632, at *4 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2011) (fractured arm that
requires surgery and subsequent hospital stay is an objectively serious medical
need); Andrews v. Hanks, 50 Fed. Appx. 766, 769 (7th Cir. 2002) (allegation of
broken wrist states serious medical need) with Haley v. Feinerman, 168 Fed.
Appx. 113, 117 (7th Cir. 2006) (four month delay in operating on inmate to repair
broken arm did not constitute deliberate indifference to serious medical need).
For purposes of deciding this motion, the Court assumes that the plaintiff
satisfies the objective component of the deliberate indifference test.
Defendant Wilbur treated the plaintiff in the medical unit immediately
following the incident. The videotape reveals that the plaintiff repeatedly told
defendant Wilbur that his right wrist was painful and he thought there was
something wrong. Although defendant Wilbur put a band-aid on a laceration on
the plaintiff’s left arm, he concedes that he did not treat the right wrist.
Defendant Hill answered the call from custodial staff. She waited until the
evening, when she checked on the plaintiff’s restraints, to address his complaints
that his wrist was broken. The parties disagree whether defendant Hill entered
the cell and checked the plaintiff’s arm or merely looked in the cell window.
Defendant Savoie checked the plaintiff’s restraints when he was placed in
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in-cell restraints. The plaintiff told her that his wrist was injured and that he was
unable to make a fist. Defendant Savoie noted that the plaintiff’s right hand was
swollen and ordered ice. She told him that she would return to check on him
later in the day. She never returned.
Defendants Wilbur, Hill and Savoie all knew that the plaintiff thought his
right wrist was broken and that he was in pain. Defendant Wilbur did not examine
the wrist. Defendant Savoie understood the plaintiff’s concerns and failed to
return to check on the wrist after ice had been applied. It is unclear whether
defendant Hill examined the wrist at all. As medical professionals, these
defendants should have appreciated the pain and possibility that the plaintiff had
a broken wrist. There are genuine issues of material fact as to whether these
defendants understood the substantial risk that the plaintiff would suffer serious
harm as a result of their inactions. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is denied as to defendants Wilbur, Hill and Savoie.
Defendant Gilbert saw the plaintiff on May 11, 2006, and referred him to Dr.
Wright for treatment. Defendant Wright could not determine whether the plaintiff
suffered from a sprain or fracture and ordered x-rays. When the x-rays revealed a
fracture, he sent the plaintiff to an outside hospital for a cast. Defendants Gilbert
and Wright were not indifferent to the plaintiff’s injury. They took immediate
action.
The plaintiff argues that defendants Gilbert and Wright also should have
ordered that hard restraints not be used on his right wrist while it was being
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evaluated. Neither defendant knew whether the plaintiff’s wrist was broken until
after the x-rays were reviewed. The Court concludes that their failure to preclude
use of hard restraints before that time constitutes, at most, negligence and is not
cognizable under section 1983. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
granted as to the claims against defendants Wright and Gilbert.
2.

Custody Staff

Defendants Little, Saylor, Williams, Massop and Prouty were on duty in the
restrictive housing unit on May 10, 2006. Defendant Overstreet, a social worker,
toured the restrictive housing unit. These defendants were not medical
professionals.
The plaintiff contends that he told each of these defendants that his wrist
was broken and that he needed medical treatment. The defendants have
provided affidavits stating that they were not aware that the plaintiff’s wrist was
broken until sometime after it was treated and that the plaintiff did not ask them
to contact the medical unit. Their responses to the plaintiff’s requests for
admission, however, disturbingly contradict the statements in the affidavits.
Nevertheless, even if these defendants were aware that the plaintiff thought
his wrist was broken and wanted medical treatment, they were not trained
medical professionals. All were aware that defendant Savoie had checked the
plaintiff when he arrived in the unit, observed swelling, provided ice for his hand
in response to his complaints of pain and assumption that his wrist was broken,
and stated that she would return to check on his condition. In addition,
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defendant Prouty contacted the medical unit in response to the plaintiff’s
complaints of pain and request for treatment.
It is well accepted in this Circuit that prison officials may reasonably rely
on the opinions of medical staff. See Rodriguez v. McGinnis, No. 98-CV-6031CJS,
2004 WL 1145911, at *18 (W.D.N.Y. May 18, 2004) (citing cases). In light of the law
and the fact that these defendants were aware that the plaintiff had been seen by
defendant Savoie, the Court concludes that the plaintiff has not demonstrated a
genuine issue of material fact regarding the subjective prong of the deliberate
indifference test. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to
the claims against defendants Little, Saylor, Williams, Massop, Prouty and
Overstreet.
D.

Qualified Immunity

The defendants involved in the excessive force claims and the custodial
staff involved in the deliberate indifference claim also argue that they are
protected by qualified immunity. The Court has granted the defendants’ motion
to dismiss the deliberate indifference claim as to the custodial staff. Thus, the
Court will consider this argument only as it applies to the excessive force claims.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from
liability for damages caused by the performance of discretionary official
functions if their conduct does not violate a clearly established right of which a
reasonable person would have been aware. See Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d
344, 367 (2d Cir. 2007).
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When considering a claim of qualified immunity, the Court considers two
questions: first, whether, construing the facts in favor of the non-moving party,
there is a violation of a constitutionally protected right; and second, whether,
considering the facts of the case before it, that right was clearly established at
the time of the incident. Qualified immunity is warranted unless the state
official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right. See Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808, 813, 815-16 (2009) (setting forth qualified
immunity test and holding that a court need not consider the questions in any
particular order). To evaluate whether a right is clearly established, the Court
must determine whether it would be clear to a reasonable correctional official that
his conduct in these circumstances was unlawful. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 202 (2001). The analysis focuses on cases from the Supreme Court and
Second Circuit. See Williams v. Greifinger, 97 F.3d 699, 706 (2d Cir. 1996).
An inmate’s right to be free from the use of excessive force was “clearly
established” at the time of the alleged incident. See, e.g., Hudson, 503 U.S. at
9-10. The duty to protect inmates from harm also was clearly established. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994). Whether the defendants could
reasonably have believed that their actions were warranted depends on the
resolution of the issues of fact identified above. Thus, the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is denied on this ground.
E.

Supplemental State Law Claim

The plaintiff includes a supplemental state law claim for battery. The
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defendants argue that, because summary judgment should be granted in their
favor on all other claims, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the battery claim. The Court has denied the defendants’ motion
with regard to several claims. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is
denied as to the state law claim.
IV. Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing reasoning, the defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. #77] is GRANTED as to the claims against defendants Wright,
Gilbert, Little, Saylor, Williams, Massop, Prouty and Overstreet. The motion is
DENIED in all other respects.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge

Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: May 31, 2011.

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