Melvin v. Miller et al

Filing 241

ORDER REOPENING CASE. Please see attached Ruling and Order. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 3/29/16. (Samuels, J) Modified on 3/30/2016 to add as an opinion.(Glynn, T.).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
MARTIN MELVIN,

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Plaintiff,
v.
MILLER, ET AL.,
Defendants.

Case No. 3:09-CV-01612 (RNC)

RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff Martin Melvin, proceeding pro se, has filed a
Second Amended Motion for an Extension of Time (ECF No. 216),
which the Court has construed as a motion under Rule 60(b) for
relief from this Court’s order of June 16, 2014 (ECF No. 205)
dismissing his case for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 41(b).

Defendants have objected to reopening

the case, and Mr. Melvin has replied.

For reasons that follow,

the case will be reopened.
I. Background
Mr. Melvin, a Connecticut inmate, filed this lawsuit in
2009 claiming that officials at Northern Correctional Institution
and New Haven Correctional Center had violated the First, Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments by using excessive force against him,
ignoring his medical needs and preventing him from filing inmate
grievances.

On April 7, 2014, the Court set the final pretrial

conference for July 31, 2014 and jury selection for August 12,

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2014.

The Court directed notice to Mr. Melvin by a mailing sent

to the APT Foundation in Bridgeport, Connecticut, his address of
record.1

On April 21, the mailing was returned as undeliverable.

The next day, the Court learned that Mr. Melvin had been
discharged from the Bridgeport facility without apprising the
Court of his change in address, as was his responsibility under
Local Rule 83.1(c)(2).

Further attempts to reach him failed.

Accordingly, on May 13 the Court entered an order directing Mr.
Melvin to provide the Clerk with a current address on or before
June 13, 2014.

The order stated that if Mr. Melvin did not

comply, his case would be dismissed without prejudice for failure
to prosecute.

The deadline passed without word from Mr. Melvin,

and on June 16 the Court dismissed his case.
On June 24, Mr. Melvin contacted the Clerk’s Office by
telephone and stated he had received none of the Court's recent
orders.

Mr. Melvin followed this call with a number of motions

stating he had failed to alert the Court to his change of address
because of a severe illness and seeking extensions of time so he
might obtain medical records supporting his contention.

See ECF

Nos. 207, 211, 212, 214, 215, 216, 219, 220, 221 & 223.
Based on the parties’ submissions, it appears that Mr. Melvin
became seriously ill on or about March 12, 2014.

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Medical records

Mr. Melvin had been released to supervised custody on
February 3, 2014.
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indicate he was suffering from influenza and pneumonia, with a
fever in excess of 104 degrees and dangerously low blood
pressure.

ECF No. 238, at 38–39.

Mr. Melvin left the APT

Foundation on March 13 and was in the hospital on March 14.

He

states that before leaving the Foundation, he left a change of
address form with the outgoing mail.
Mr. Melvin remained in the hospital until his discharge on
March 28.

He appears to have returned for treatment in late May,

a consequence, he says, of a pneumonia relapse.

Mr. Melvin

states that he contacted the Clerk’s Office by telephone in April
but, still somewhat impaired by his illness, failed to realize
the Court had never received his change of address form.
Defendants do not dispute Mr. Melvin's account.

They do,

however, produce records showing that Mr. Melvin absconded from
special parole on April 23, 2014.

The same records indicate he

was returned to Department of Correction custody on June 13,
2014, some ten days before he first contacted the Court about the
dismissal of his case.

ECF No. 231, at 12.

Defendants provide

no further detail about Mr. Melvin’s absconding from custody or
his whereabouts between March 28, when he was released from the
hospital, and April 23, when he absconded.
II. Discussion
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), a court may
in its discretion relieve a party from judgment on a showing of

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"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."2

The

term "excusable neglect" embraces "inadvertence, carelessness,
and mistake, and may be found where a party’s failure to comply
with filing deadlines is attributable to negligence."

Fetik v.

New York Law Sch., No. 97 Civ. 7746 (DLC), 1999 WL 459805, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Pro

se litigants "have been held to lower standards in establishing
excusable neglect," but no party may obtain relief under the Rule
absent "highly convincing evidence" showing the judgment should
be vacated.

Major v. Coughlin, No. 94 Civ. 7572, 1997 WL 391121,

at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1997).

Whether to relieve a party from

judgment is "at bottom an equitable [determination]," one that
takes account of the reason for the party's neglect, the length
of the delay it caused, and any prejudice to the non-movant.
Fetik, 1999 WL 459805, at *4.
The Court concludes that Mr. Melvin should be relieved from
the order dismissing his case for failure to prosecute.

It is

unnecessary to decide whether Mr. Melvin's representations
concerning the change of address form and telephone call to the
Clerk, in combination with his pro se status, provide sufficient
support for a finding of excusable neglect.

See Sacco v. Matter,

154 F.R.D. 35, 37 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) ("While it is clear that

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The movant must seek relief within one year of entry of
judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), and Mr. Melvin has done so in
this case.
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plaintiff has neglected his responsibility to keep the district
court apprised of his current address, as well as his duty to
keep himself apprised of the state of his action, his status as a
pro se prisoner gives the court broad discretion to overlook
these breaches.").

What sets Mr. Melvin’s case apart is his

severe illness at the pertinent time.

It is undisputed that Mr.

Melvin went directly to the hospital after leaving the APT
Foundation, remained in the hospital for two weeks and never
fully recovered before relapsing in May.

His failure to attend

to his lawsuit in such circumstances is excusable.

See United

States v. Burnette, No. 98 Civ. 6756 (CPS), 2007 WL 201164, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2007) ("A defendant’s severe illness at the
time of the default may be sufficient for a finding of excusable
neglect under Rule 60(b)(1)." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Fetik, 1999 WL 459805, at *4 ("A court may consider a
movant’s severe illness when deciding whether an instance of
neglect is excusable.").
Defendants have not demonstrated they will suffer serious
prejudice if the case is reopened.

Their primary argument

against reopening rests on Mr. Melvin’s apparent escape from
custody on April 23, 2014.

This conduct, they submit, was both

unlawful and the reason Mr. Melvin abandoned his case.

Thus,

they argue, relieving him from the dismissal would "reward" him
for absconding.

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The Court is sensitive to defendants’ concern and agrees
that no litigant should benefit from breaking the law.

But in

this case the Court's inability to contact Mr. Melvin was due to
his illness and hospitalization, not his decision to abscond from
custody.

By April 23, 2014, the day Mr. Melvin absconded, three

mailings had been returned to the Clerk's Office as
undeliverable, and the Court had learned that he had left the APT
Foundation without leaving a forwarding address.

It is possible

that if Mr. Melvin had not left custody in late April, he would
have avoided dismissal.

But that is far from certain, and the

Court cannot ignore the undisputed fact that Mr. Melvin's failure
to attend to his lawsuit was in the first instance due to his
severe illness.
The strong policy favoring the resolution of cases on their
merits, and the solicitude generally owed pro se litigants,
counsel against holding Mr. Melvin to the Court’s dismissal.
is plainly keen to litigate this action.

He

See, e.g., ECF Nos.

211, 212, 214 & 216 (a series of lengthy motions seeking relief
from judgment); Styles v. Goord, 431 Fed. Appx. 31, 32 (2d Cir.
2011) (holding that the district court erred in denying Rule
60(b) relief to a pro se plaintiff whose case was dismissed for
failure to prosecute, largely because "the record show[ed] that
[plaintiff] was intent on prosecuting the case").

In the absence

of significant prejudice to the defendants, the balance of

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interests tips in favoring of reopening.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the motion for relief under Rule 60(b) is
hereby granted.

The Clerk is directed to reopen the case.

So ordered this 29th day of March 2016.

/s/ RNC
Robert N. Chatigny
United States District Judge

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