Nelson v. City of Stamford et al

Filing 233

ORDER denying 229 Motion for Reconsideration ; denying 230 Motion for Default Entry 55(a). See attached Memorandum of Decision. The Court reminds the Parties that the Joint Trial Memorandum is due by 11/26/12 and Jury Selection will take place on 1/8/12. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 8/3/12. (Hildebrand, J.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

PATRICIA NELSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF STAMFORD, et al.
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:09-cv-1690 (VLB)
August 3, 2012

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION [Dkt. #229]
Plaintiff, Patricia Nelson, files this motion for reconsideration pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) on the basis of a supervening change in law, arguing that
intervening law, namely the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Florence v. Board
of Chosen Freeholders of the Cnty of Burlington, 132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012),
articulated a broader definition of the term “strip search” than the Court applied
in its decision on summary judgment. Mrs. Nelson contends that under this
broader definition, the search to which she was subjected constitutes a strip
search.
On January 25, 2012, the Court granted in part and denied in part
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. [Dkt. #185]. The Court denied the
motion for summary judgment as to Mrs. Nelson’s claim of an unconstitutional
strip search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, finding that “a material factual
dispute exists regarding the reasonability of the search of Mrs. Nelson conducted
by the Defendants.” In analyzing this claim, the Court applied the four-factor test
set forth by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), considering

“the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it [was] conducted, the
justification for initiating it, and the place in which it [was] conducted.” 441 U.S. at
559. In analyzing the scope of the intrusion, the Court relied upon the Second
Circuit’s statement that “[t]he term ‘strip search’ is used generally to describe
any inspection of the naked body.” Kelsey v. County of Scoharie, 567 F.3d 54 (2d
Cir. 2009). Applying this definition, the Court concluded that although Mrs.
Nelson’s breasts were exposed when her shirt and brassiere were removed, the
search did not constitute a strip search. However, the Court denied the
Defendants’ Motion for Summary judgment, finding that “[a] reasonable jury
could conceivably find that the removal of Mrs. Nelson’s shirt and brassiere by a
female officer and the touching of Mrs. Nelson’s buttocks underneath her pants
by a male officer, despite the Defendants’ interest in removing dangerous items
from Mrs. Nelson to ensure her safety constituted an unreasonable search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.” [Dkt. #185, Memorandum of Decision on
Summary Judgment, p. 54] (emphasis added).
Mrs. Nelson’s motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), contending that
Florence constitutes a supervening change in law requiring the Court’s judgment
to be set aside is unavailing. In particular, Mrs. Nelson seeks to rely on Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(1) construing the Supreme Court’s decision in Florence as a
supervening change in law rendering this Court’s decision on summary judgment
a “mistake,” curiously asking the court to enter judgment for the Defendant. Mrs.
Nelson relies on Thompson v. County of Franklin , 127 F.Supp.2d 145, 160
(N.D.N.Y 2000) as an example of relief from judgment on the basis of an

intervening change in law. This reliance is misplaced. Thompson acknowledged
that “in evaluating whether a given case has resulted in a change in the
controlling law, it is necessary to examine the claimed change in law to
‘determine what effect, if any, [it] has on the law to be applied in this case.”
Thompson, 127 F.Supp.2d at 152 (citing Richman v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc.,
988 F.Supp. 753, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
The Thompson Court found that relief from judgment was warranted where
a Supreme Court decision articulated a new standard for determining whether a
particular group “falls within the meaning of a dependent Indian community, as
that phrase is used in 18 U.S.C. §1151(b).” Id. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Florence, however, plainly has no effect on the law to be applied in this case in
light of the fact that Mrs. Nelson was held in a single-person cell in the Stamford
Police Department, as the decision addressed the constitutionality of strip
searches occurring in the general population of a detention facility and the Court
explicitly noted that “[t]his case does not require the Court to rule on the types of
searches that would be reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee
will be held without assignment to the general jail population and without
substantial contact with other detainees.” Florence, 132 S.Ct. at 1522.
Secondly, the Supreme Court in Florence specifically recognized that Bell
v. Wolfish sets forth the appropriate framework for analyzing Fourth Amendment
challenges to the reasonability of bodily searches. Id. at 1516. Accordingly,
Florence cannot be said to be an intervening change in law rendering this Court’s
prior judgment a “mistake” for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).

Nor can Mrs. Nelson rely on Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b)(6), the catch-all
exception for relief from a judgment “for any other reason that justifies relief.”
Rule 60(b)(6) “confers broad discretion on the trial court to grant relief when
appropriate to accomplish justice.” Matarese v. LeFevre, 801 F.2d 98, 106 (2d Cir.
1986). The Second Circuit has “warned, however, that a Rule 60 motion ‘may not
be used as a substitute for appeal,’ and that a claim based on legal error alone is
‘inadequate.’” United Airlines, Inc. v. Brien, 588 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2009)(citing
Matarese, 801 F.2d at 107). “A mere change in decisional law does not constitute
an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ for the purposes of Rule 60(b)(6).” Marrero
Pichardo v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2004). Even “[a] circuit court’s
announcement of a new rule of federal law, like a Supreme Court pronouncement,
is similarly insufficient without more to justify Rule 60(b)(6) relief.” Batts v. TowMotor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 748 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1995).
In fact, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 is entirely inapplicable, as a denial of summary
judgment is not a final judgment.
To the extent that Mrs. Nelson seeks a reconsideration of the Court’s
decision on summary judgment on the basis of an intervening change in law,
however, for the aforementioned reasons, Florence did not alter the standard of
law to be applied to this case and would have had no effect on this Court’s
decision on summary judgment, and therefore Mrs. Nelson’s motion for
reconsideration must be denied. Mrs. Nelson’s claims surviving summary
judgment, including her claim of an unreasonable search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment will proceed to trial to be resolved by a jury.

Lastly, Mrs. Nelson’s motion for default entry against the Defendants
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) is misguided. The pro se Plaintiff has yet again
misconstrued the law. Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiff has cited
absolutely no authority supporting her motion for default entry. Default may be
entered where a party “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(a). It can hardly be said that the Defendants have failed to plead or otherwise
defend this case where they have Answered the operative complaint [Dkt. #128,
Answer to Amended Complaint], and filed a motion for summary judgment [Dkt.
#144, Motion for Summary Judgment Against Patricia Nelson], and thus are
actively litigating this case. Accordingly, Mrs. Nelson’s motion for default entry is
DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______/s/__________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge

Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: August 3, 2012