Manchisi v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Filing
54
ORDER denying 40 Motion for Summary Judgment and Order Remanding Case to Superior Court. See Attached Memorandum of Decision. The Clerk is directed to terminate this case. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 4/13/12. (Hildebrand, J.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
DINO MANCHISI,
PLAINTIFF,
v.
LOCAL 295, INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
DEFENDANT.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.:
3:10-CV-758 (VLB)
APRIL 13, 2012
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND ORDER REMANDING THE CASE TO THE SUPERIOR COURT
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by the Defendant
union, Local 295, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“Local 295”).
The
Plaintiff, Dino Manchisi (“Manchisi”) brought this suit alleging negligent
misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.1 On May 17, 2010, this case was removed by the
Defendant from the Connecticut Superior Court in the Judicial District of
Ansonia/Milford to the District Court of Connecticut.
For the reasons stated
hereafter, the case is hereby remanded to Connecticut Superior Court.
I.
Factual Background
Manchisi was employed by DHL Express (“DHL”) for fifteen years as a
courier-driver, working in Wallingford, Connecticut. [Dkt. #48, Pl. Rule 56(a)(2)
Stmt. ¶ 1].
While employed by DHL, Manchisi was a member of Local 295,
1
These are the First, Third and Fourth Counts of the Complaint. The Second
Count is not well developed and does not appear to state an independent claim
that is distinct from these three causes of action. [See Dkt. #1, Compl., ¶¶9-12]
1
International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
Id. at ¶4.
Defendant Local 295
represented DHL employees in Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey. Id. at ¶5.
In October 2008, DHL notified its employees, including Manchisi, that its domestic
delivery service would be discontinued and the company would operate
exclusively as an international delivery business. Id. at ¶6. As a result of this
downsize, DHL informed its employees that it would be reducing its workforce
and consolidating work stations. Id. at ¶7.
On October 29, 2008, Manchisi received a notice from DHL titled
“Reduction in Local 295 Workforce” identifying him as “a driver who will be
affected by this layoff” and advising him about the general bidding process. [Dkt.
#47, Pl. Mem. in Opp. to SJ, Ex. 1, Ex. B].
received
another
notice
from
DHL,
On December 15, 2008, Manchisi
providing
finalized
instructions
for
participation in the bidding process. [Dkt. #47, Ex. 1, Ex. C]. The letter stated that
793 positions were available for bids, including 208 temporary positions, and 585
“future state” positions involving company projects in the New York Area. Id. The
letter noted that the “future state” positions may be subject to future layoffs
depending on the “retention and growth of DHL’s international business,” but
noted that reduction of the “future state” positions would only occur by “Master
Seniority.” Id. The letter further instructed that, “employees who obtain temporary
positions may not bid for ‘future state’ positions after the end of their temporary
assignment.”2 [Id. at p. 1, ¶2 (emphasis in original)]. Rather, the letter stated that,
2
“Future state” positions are “positions which the Company projects are needed
to support the continuing international business of DHL,” i.e.: they are permanent
positions. [Id. at p. 1, ¶2].
2
“[the temporary] position will end at some time in February, at which point you
will have the option of moving to the recall list or accepting severance.” [Id. at p.
1, ¶ 5].
Further, Manchisi alleges that following his receipt of the letters describing
the bid process, the Vice President of Local 295, Patrick Scheer (“Scheer”)
represented to him “that there was no chance that any of the two hundred and
eight temporary positions would become permanent. [Dkt. #48, Pl. Rule 56(a)(2)
Stmt. ¶11]. Manchisi alleges that he relied on these representations and elected
not to bid on the temporary positions. Id. at ¶15. Moreover, Manchisi concluded
that based on his seniority level and the number of available positions, he would
not be able to retain a permanent position. Id. at ¶13. Manchisi resigned from his
position at DHS by signing a waiver and release on January 9, 2009. Id. at ¶¶1718.
Manchisi
alleges
that
he
subsequently
learned,
contrary
to
the
representations of Scheer and the two Local 295 letters describing the bidding
process, that individuals who bid on and accepted temporary positions would be
eligible to bid on new permanent positions in February, 2009. Id. at ¶16.
II.
Standard of Review
“Summary judgment should be granted ‘if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.’” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of
proving that no factual issues exist. Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106
(2d Cir.2010). “In determining whether that burden has been met, the court is
3
required to resolve all ambiguities and credit all factual inferences that could be
drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Id.,
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). “If there is any evidence in the
record that could reasonably support a jury's verdict for the nonmoving party,
summary judgment must be denied.” Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Hapag Lloyd
Container Linie, GmbH, 446 F.3d 313, 315–16 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
“A party opposing summary judgment cannot defeat the motion by relying
on the allegations in his pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere
assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible. At the summary
judgment stage of the proceeding, Plaintiffs are required to present admissible
evidence in support of their allegations; allegations alone, without evidence to
back them up, are not sufficient.” Welch–Rubin v. Sandals Corp., No.3:03cv481,
2004 WL 2472280, at *1 (D.Conn. Oct. 20, 2004) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); Martinez v. State of Connecticut, No. 3:09cv1341(VLB), 2011
WL 4396704 at *6 (D. Conn. Sept. 21, 2011). Where there is no evidence upon
which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it
and upon whom the onus of proof is imposed, such as where the evidence
offered consists of conclusory assertions without further support in the record,
summary judgment may lie. Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearance Co., 604
F.3d 712 (2d Cir. 2010).
4
III.
Discussion
Defendant Local 295’s motion for summary judgment is predicated upon its
assertion that Manchisi’s state law claims of negligent misrepresentation, and
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress are essentially claims of
a breach of the duty of fair representation, and are therefore preempted by
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The issue of preemption is
critical to the question of subject matter jurisdiction, as federal preemption
warrants removal on the basis of a federal question only where a claim is
completely preempted by a federal statute.
“Under the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ federal subject matter jurisdiction
typically exists only ‘when the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint raises issues of
federal law,’ and not simply when federal preemption might be invoked as a
defense to liability.” Medical Center v. Teamsters Local 272, 642 F.3d 321, 327 (2d
Cir. 2011) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987)).
However, a corollary to well-pleaded complaint rule exists to allow removal on the
basis of federal preemption where Congress has “so completely pre-empt[ed] a
particular area [of law] that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims
is necessarily federal in character.” See Montefiore, 642 F.3d at 327 (quoting
Metro Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63-64). In such cases, “Congress has clearly
manifested an intent to make causes of action removable to federal court,” by
completely preempting a particular area of law, and “the federal courts must
honor that intent.” In re WTC Disaster Site, 414 F.3d 352, 372-73 (2d Cir. 2005).
Therefore, where the claims raised are not completely preempted so as to fall
5
within the corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal question
jurisdiction is lacking and removal is unwarranted. See Foy v. Pratt & Whitney
Group, 127 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1997) (remanding case to state court where plaintiffs’
state law claims were not preempted by §301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act).
Courts have an independent obligation, at any stage of litigation, to
determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, “even in the absence of a
challenge from any party.” See Arbaugh v. Y& H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)
(citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 506 U.S. 574, 583 (1999)). Accordingly,
prior to addressing the merits of the case on summary judgment, the Court will
address the question of preemption and the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Defendant Local 295 asserts that Manchisi’s claims of negligent
misrepresentation and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress
are a “poorly disguised” claim for a breach of the duty of fair representation,
which is preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”).
Section 301 of the LMRA states that:
“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be
brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.” 29 U.S.C. §1985(a).
6
The Second Circuit has held that the “‘complete pre-emption corollary to the wellpleaded complaint rule’ applies to claims under §301 of the LMRA,” such that “if
the state claims put forward by plaintiffs are preempted by §301 of the LMRA, ‘the
action may be properly removed to the federal courts, even when the plaintiff’s
complaint does not itself include a federal cause of action.’” Foy, 127 F.3d at 23233 (quoting Shafii v. British Airways PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1996).
The Supreme Court has instructed that, “[w]here the resolution of a statelaw claim depends on an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement,
the claim is pre-empted.” Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 260-62
(1994) (citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988).
This “pre-emption merely ensures that federal law will be the basis for
interpreting collective-bargaining agreements, and says nothing about the
substantive rights a State may provide to workers when adjudication of those
rights does not depend upon the interpretation of such agreements.” Lingle, 486
U.S. at 409. The Supreme Court has made clear that the pre-emptive effect of §301
has expanded in order to give the policies that animate the provision their proper
range, and has cautioned that “the bare fact that a collective-bargaining
agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not
require the claim to be extinguished.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124
(1994) (citing Allison Chalmers Corp v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210 (1985). As such,
the Supreme Court has stressed that “it is the legal character of a claim, as
‘independent’ of rights under the collective bargaining agreement (and not
whether a grievance arising from ‘precisely the same set of facts’ could be
7
pursued) that decides whether a state cause of action may go forward.” Lividas,
512 U.S. at 123-24 (internal citations omitted).
The question of preemption presented in the current case is nearly
identical to the question of preemption considered by the Second Circuit in Foy v.
Pratt & Whitney Group, 127 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1997). In Foy, the plaintiffs asserted
in state court claims of negligent misrepresentation predicated upon a statement
made by an employee of the defendant-corporation following an announced
consolidation of several production facilities purportedly assuring employees
that they would be given transfer opportunities before being subjected to a layoff.
After conducting a thorough analysis of the nature of the state law claims raised,
the Second Circuit reversed the district court and ordered the case to be
remanded to state court, concluding that “plaintiffs’ state law negligent
misrepresentation claims are not preempted by the LMRA because they rest on
independent state law rights that do not require interpretation of the CBA.”
The Second Circuit began its analysis by considering the elements of the
state law claim asserted, which are the same as those applicable to the current
case. As the Second Circuit correctly noted, the Connecticut Supreme Court has
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts as setting forth the governing
principles for a negligent misrepresentation cause of action, as:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or
employment . . . supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining
or communicating the information. Foy, 127 F.3d at 233
8
(citing Williams Ford Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co., 232
Conn. 559, 575, 657 A.2d 212 (1995)).
The Second Circuit then addressed the defendant’s contentions that two of the
elements, the falsity of the statement and justifiable reliance, necessitate an
interpretation of the CBA. Id. at 233-234. Specifically, the defendant identified two
provisions of the CBA, one mandating certain layoff procedures, and another
authorizing the defendant-corporation to offer an employee the option to transfer
to another job prior to a layoff upon the condition that such transfer not conflict
with the seniority rights of another employee. Id. at 234-235. The Second Circuit
concluded that the determination of the falsity of the representation made
addressed a definite transfer opportunity prior to a layoff, a circumstance “not
called for in the CBA and is outside of the ambit of that agreement.” Id. at 234.
Further, the Second Circuit noted that veracity of the statement is a fact-driven
analysis, “and will primarily concern what was or was not stated at the summer
1992 meeting.” Id. Regarding justifiable reliance, the Second Circuit held that the
provision authorizing pre-layoff transfers was “permissive and imposes no
obligation to make such transfers,” and therefore “[a]ssuming that the alleged
misrepresentation was made, interpretation of this provision would not be
necessary to resolve plaintiffs’ state law claims.” Id. at 235.
Here, Defendant Local 295 asserts in the “preliminary statement” to its
motion
for
summary
judgment
that
Manchisi’s
claims
of
negligent
misrepresentation are preempted by §301 of the LMRA, but fails to provide any
substantiation for this assertion in the body of its motion. Unlike the defendantcorporation in Foy, Local 295 has not identified any specific provisions of the
9
applicable collective bargaining agreement which require interpretation in order
to adjudicate Manchisi’s state law claims, beyond referring to the Effects
Bargaining Agreement (“EBA”) and the Collective Bargaining Agreement of 20042009 (“CBA”) as sources of “the Union’s duty to advise Manchisi about his
options with respect to DHL’s layoffs of the employees.” [Dkt. #53, Def.’s Reply
Br., p. 4]. The duty outlined in the EBA requires “[t]he Company agrees to
transmit detailed bid instructions to the Union membership, including the training
and licensing qualifications necessary to work at the JFK Gateway facility.” [Dkt.
#53, Attachment 1, Ex. A, ¶ 11]. This duty is confined to noticing the union
members only. It does not include a duty of accurate representation, and it only
applies to DHL. Similarly, the CBA contains no provisions regarding a duty of
accurate representation, despite Defendant’s claim to the contrary.
Acknowledging that Local 295 has failed to establish that evaluating any of
the elements of the asserted state law claims would require interpretation of the
collective-bargaining agreement, the Court finds that the claims asserted address
solely the representations made by DHL to Manchisi in its letters dated October
29, 2008 and December 15, 2008. Accordingly, consistent with the Second
Circuit’s thorough analysis in Foy, presenting circumstances strikingly similar to
the instant case, where Manchisi’s state law claims do not require interpretation
of the CBA, such claims are not preempted by §301 of the LMRA. See Foy, 127
F.3d at 232.
10
The Defendant fails to address entirely the question of preemption as it
pertains to Manchisi’s claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress constitute independent state law claims.
However, it is clear these
claims are governed neither by the EBA nor CBA, and thus also are similarly not
pre-empted.
Where Manchisi’s state law claims are not clearly preempted by a federal
statute, removal of such claims may not be predicated upon the existence of a
federal question. See Foy, 127 F.3d 229 (remanding case to state court where
plaintiffs’ state law claims were not preempted by §301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act); see also Montefiore, 642 F.3d at 327 (holding that removal to
federal court on the basis of preemption is ordinarily barred by the well-pleaded
complaint rule unless such preemption falls within the complete preemption
corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule).
In the absence of a federal question, removal jurisdiction may only be
sustained if none if the parties is a citizen of the State of Connecticut. See 28
U.S.C. §1441(b); see also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Products
Liability Litigation, 674 F.Supp. 2d 494, 507 n.80 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (recognizing that
28 U.S.C. §1441(b) prohibits “defendants that are citizens of the state where the
action is filed from removing to federal court on the basis of complete diversity
even though plaintiffs can file in federal court on the basis of diversity under
section 1332.”).
It is undisputed that Local 295 represents employees in multiple states.
Defendant Local 295 acknowledges that it “is the exclusive collective bargaining
11
representative for couriers employed by DHL in the Greater Metropolitan Area.”
[See e.g. Dkt. #40, Statement of Undisputed Facts, ¶ 1].
Plaintiff, Manchisi,
substantiates this assertion, reporting that Local 295 represents employees in
New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. [Dkt. #48, Pl. Rule 56(a)(2) Stmt. ¶ 5].
In United States Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 146-47
(1965), the Supreme Court addressed the applicability of diversity jurisdiction to
a case between a North Carolina corporation filed in North Carolina state court
against a union with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, but with
members in both Pennsylvania and North Carolina. The Supreme Court held that
the citizenship of unincorporated associations is a question properly answered
by the legislature and affirmed the decision of the Fourth Circuit’s direction that
the case be remanded to state court, reasoning that, as with unincorporated
associations, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of the
members of labor unions is controlling. See R.H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, 336 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1964).
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Bouligny, the Second Circuit
has held that for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, unincorporated
associations, such as a labor unions, are considered “to be citizens of each and
every state in which the association has members.” Baer v. United States Auto.
Ass’n, 503 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1974). “Any trend toward erosion of this rule creating
multiple state citizenship for unincorporated associations, see e.g. Mason v.
American Express Co. seems to have been abruptly halted by United States
Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc..”
Id. (citations omitted); see also Grupo
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Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 569 (2004) (holding that a
partnership, which is an unincorporated association, is a citizen in each state
where any of its partners is a citizen); Carmen v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S.
185, 195 (1990) (holding that citizenship of an association is the citizenship of all
its members).
Accordingly, where Defendant Local 295 acknowledges that it has
members in Connecticut, it is considered a citizen of Connecticut for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction and thus may not remove this case to federal court in the
absence of a federal question. 28 U.S.C. 1441(b).
IV.
Conclusion
Based on the aforementioned reasoning, where no federal question exists,
and as the Defendant Local 295 is considered a citizen of the State of Connecticut
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, removal jurisdiction may not exist pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. 1441(b). Therefore, the Court hereby remands this case to state court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______/s/__________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: April 13, 2012
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