Smalls v. Corrections

Filing 37

ORDER granting 26 the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. See attached. Signed by Judge Donna F. Martinez on 3/8/12. (Constantine, A.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
STEPHEN A. SMALLS,
Plaintiff,
V.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,
Defendant.

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CASE NO. 3:10CV962(DFM)

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The plaintiff, Stephen Smalls, alleges that the defendant, the
State

of

Connecticut

Department

of

Correction

("DOC"),

discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq.

Pending before the court is the defendant's motion

for summary judgment.1

(Doc. #26.)

For the reasons that follow,

the defendant's motion is granted.
I.

Facts2

1

The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. #23.)
2

The facts are taken from the defendant's Local Rule 56(a)1
Statement filed May 25, 2011. (Doc. #26-2.) Local Rule 56(a)1
requires the party moving for summary judgment to file a statement
setting forth "each material fact as to which the moving party
contends there is no genuine issue to be tried." The opposing party
is to file a Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement indicating whether the
material facts set forth in the moving party's Local Rule 56(a)1
Statement are admitted or denied. Each admission or denial must
include a citation to an affidavit or other admissible evidence.
The court granted the plaintiff multiple extensions of time in
which to file a response to the defendant's summary judgment
motion.
(Doc. ##28, 30, 32, 34.) In January 2012, when the
plaintiff did not file an opposition to the defendant's motion, the

The following facts are undisputed.
The

plaintiff,

an

African-American

male,

corrections officer for DOC from 1994 until 2008.
56(a)1 Stmt. ¶1.)
twice.

worked

as

a

(Def's Local R.

He was disciplined several times, then fired

(Def's Local R. 56(a)1 Stmt. ¶5.)

Each time he was fired,

the plaintiff was reinstated with a "Last Chance Agreement."

The

first time, on April 6, 2005, the DOC terminated the plaintiff for
violating the DOC's sick leave policy.
Stmt.

¶¶10-11.)

The

termination

(Def's Local R. 56(a)1

letter

explained

that

the

plaintiff was fired because of his "chronic failure to follow
procedures" regarding sick leave and exhaustion of time.
#26-4, Pl's Dep. Ex. 11.)

(Doc.

The letter said that the plaintiff

previously had "been disciplined several times for failure to
follow procedures, [most recently] on March 11, 2004 [when he]
received a five day suspension.

Even after that . . . , [he] did

not conform [his] behavior and it can no longer be tolerated by the
Department."

(Id.)

On January 4, 2006, the plaintiff and his

union negotiated a Last Chance Agreement with the DOC.

(Id.)

Under this agreement, the plaintiff was reinstated and the period

court, in an abundance of caution, issued a "Notice" that set forth
the procedural background of the case and stated that the
defendant's motion was "ripe for decision."
(Doc. #35.)
Notwithstanding all this, the plaintiff did not file an opposition
to the defendant's motion or a Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement. As a
result, the material facts set forth in the defendant's Local Rule
56(a)1 Statement - to the extent they are supported by the evidence
in the record - are deemed admitted pursuant to D. Conn. L. Civ. R.
56(a)1.
2

between his dismissal and reinstatement was treated as a suspension
without pay.

(Doc. #26-4, Pl's Dep. Ex. 12.)

The plaintiff

acknowledged in the agreement that the DOC had "just cause" to
dismiss him.

(Id.)

violation

the

of

dismissal."

He further acknowledged that any future

DOC's

leave

policy

"shall

result

in

his

(Id.)

Two years later, the plaintiff was fired again.

He had

breached the Last Chance Agreement by violating the DOC's sick
leave policy.

His termination was effective February 6, 2008.

(Pl's Dep. Ex. 9; Callahan Aff. ¶9.)

On April 29, 2008, the

plaintiff entered into a second stipulated agreement with the DOC
and again was reinstated.
Dep. at 75-76.)

Before he could return to work, however, he had to

take a drug test.
77.)

(Def's Local R. 56(a)1 Stmt. ¶15; Pl's

(Def's Local R. 56(a)1 Stmt. ¶17; Pl's Dep. at

On May 2, 2008, the plaintiff's urinalysis was positive for

marijuana. (Def's Local R. 56(a)1 Stmt. ¶¶19-20.) A positive drug
test violates the DOC's rules regarding employee conduct. (Def's
Local R. 56(a)1 Stmt. ¶23.) Administrative Directive 2.17 provides
in relevant part that each DOC employee shall "comply with all
federal and state laws, regulations and/or statutes, Department and
Unit Directives and lawful instructions/orders." It also prohibits
"unprofessional or illegal behavior, both on and off duty that
could in

any

Correction."

manner

reflect

negatively on the

Department of

The DOC terminated the plaintiff for the third and

3

final time after he failed the drug test.

(Def's Local R. 56(a)1

Stmt. ¶27; Pl's Dep. Ex. 10; Compl. ¶15.)
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
An issue of fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of
the

suit

under

the

governing

law,"

and

is

"genuine"

if

"a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
based on it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). "The moving party bears the burden of showing that [it] is
entitled to summary judgment."

Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53,

69 (2d Cir. 2005). The nonmoving party, in order to defeat summary
judgment, must come forward with evidence that would be sufficient
to support a jury verdict in his favor.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

In moving for summary judgment against a party who will bear the
ultimate burden of proof at trial, the movant "need not prove a
negative,"

but

"need

only

point

to

an

absence

of

proof

on

plaintiff's part, and, at that point, plaintiff must 'designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"
Parker v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 260 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir.
2001) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)).
The court "construe[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that

4

party's favor."
2010).

Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.

"Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a

rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is
no 'genuine issue for trial'" and summary judgment should follow.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986).
Title VII Claim
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discharge any
individual . . . because of . . . race . . . ."
§

2000e–2(a)(1).

Claims

that

a

plaintiff

was

42 U.S.C.

terminated in

violation of this provision are evaluated under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework.

See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this burden-shifting framework,
a plaintiff asserting racial discrimination bears the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). In
order to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he belonged to a protected
class; (2) he was qualified for the position he held; (3) he
suffered

an

adverse

employment

action;

and

(4)

the

adverse

employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discriminatory intent.

Mario v. P & C Food Markets,

Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 767 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 803).

5

A plaintiff may raise an inference of discrimination for
purposes of the prima facie case by "showing that the employer
treated plaintiff less favorably than a similarly situated employee
outside his protected group."

Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316

F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A plaintiff must be similarly situated "in all material respects to
the individuals with whom [he] seeks to compare [him]self with."
Id. (quoting Graham v. LIRR, 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000)).
"Ordinarily, the question whether two employees are similarly
situated is a question of fact for the jury," id., but "a court can
properly

grant

summary

judgment

where

it

is

clear

that

no

reasonable jury could find the similarly situated prong met."
Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 n. 2 (2d
Cir. 2001).
"If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption
of discrimination is created and the burden of production shifts to
the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action or termination."

Farias

v. Instructional Systems, Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 2001).
"If the defendant bears its burden of production, the presumption
drops out of the analysis . . . ."

Id.

The burden shifts back to

the plaintiff to "come forward with evidence that the defendant's
proffered, non-discriminatory reason is a mere pretext for actual
discrimination."

Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d

6

Cir. 2000).

"A reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for

discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was false,
and that the discrimination was the real reason." St. Mary's Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993); see also Leibowitz v.
Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 504 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[P]laintiff
carries the ultimate burden of persuasion and must produce evidence
such that a rational finder of fact could conclude that the adverse
action taken against [him] was more likely than not a product of
discriminatory animus.").

Therefore, at the summary judgment

stage, a plaintiff "must produce not simply some evidence, but
sufficient

evidence

to

support

a

rational

finding

that

the

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the [defendant]
were false, and that more likely than not [discrimination] was the
real reason for the [employment action]."

Weinstock v. Columbia

Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotations marks
and citations omitted).
III. Discussion
The defendant contends that the plaintiff has failed to
establish a prima facie case because the circumstances surrounding
his

termination

discrimination.

do

not

permit

an

inference

of

racial

The plaintiff seeks to raise an inference of

discrimination by showing that he was treated differently than a
similarly situated individual outside his protected class.

"To be

similarly situated, the individuals with whom [the plaintiff]

7

attempts to compare [himself] must be similarly situated in all
material respects." Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d
60, 64 (2d Cir. 1997).

The circumstances of the plaintiff and the

comparators need not be identical, but they must be reasonably
close. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2000).
The plaintiff points to Corrections Officer Yaskolka,3 who is
white, as a comparator. (Compl. ¶17.) According to the plaintiff,
Yaskolka had a positive drug test but was not terminated.

The

defendant argues that the plaintiff has not adequately established
disparate

treatment because

his

proposed

"similarly

employee is materially distinct from the plaintiff.
agrees.

The court

Unlike the plaintiff, Yaskolka did not have a last chance

agreement, much less two of them.
¶81.)

situated"

(Def's Local R. 56(a)1 Stmt.

Moreover, Yaskolka claimed to be drug dependent and was

under a physician's care.

(Def's Local R. 56(a)1 Stmt. ¶80.)

The

same cannot be said of the plaintiff, who makes no such claims.
(Callahan Aff. ¶24.)

The court concludes that Yaskolka is not

similarly situated to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff has not
met the fourth element of the prima facie case.
Even assuming the plaintiff has satisfied his burden of
presenting a prima facie case, he fails to carry his burden of
proving that the defendant's proffered rationale for discharging
him was pretextual.

3

According to the defendant, the plaintiff was

The name appears as "Yascosca" in the plaintiff's complaint.
8

fired because he failed a drug test after he had been terminated
twice and reinstated twice. (Def's Local R. 56(a)1 Stmt. ¶27;
Callahan Aff. ¶23.)

Under these circumstances, the DOC did not

consider giving him back his job a third time.
56(a)1 Stmt. ¶79.)

(Def's Local R.

"A plaintiff may show pretext by demonstrating

weaknesses and inconsistencies in the employer's stated reason for
its action."

Fusaro v. Murphy, No. 3:08CV1234(RNC), 2011 WL

4572028, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2011).

Here, the plaintiff has

not offered any evidence "to permit a rational finder of fact to
infer that the employer's proffered reason is pretext for an
impermissible motivation."

Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d

141, 150 (2d Cir. 2000).

Because the plaintiff has failed to

"carry the burden of persuasion that the proffered reason is a
pretext," Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d
Cir. 2006), the court grants the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
IV.

Conclusion
For these reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment

(doc. #26) is granted.
SO ORDERED at Hartford, Connecticut this 8th day of March,
2012.
_______/s/_______________________
Donna F. Martinez
United States Magistrate Judge

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