Edwards v. Social Security Admin

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER granting 15 Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner; denying 16 Motion to Affirm the Decision of the Commissioner. Signed by Judge Mark R. Kravitz on 8/10/2011. (Falcone, K.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

BONNIE R. EDWARDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Defendant.

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No. 3:10cv1017 (MRK)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On July 1, 2010, Plaintiff Bonnie R. Edwards filed a Complaint [doc. # 1] pursuant to the
Social Security Act ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Ms. Edwards formerly worked as a financial
assistant for Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut. She has a number of physical and
mental ailments and has not worked since December 2002. She seeks review by this Court of a
final decision of Defendant Michael J. Astrue, the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration ("the Commissioner"), denying her application for Social Security Disability
Insurance and Supplemental Security Income Benefits.
There are two motions currently pending in this action. The first is Ms. Edwards's Motion
for Order Reversing Decision [doc. # 15]. In support of that motion, Ms. Edwards argues that the
Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ's") finding that Ms. Edwards was not disabled during the
period between January 1, 2003 and November 23, 2009 was not supported by substantial
evidence and was contrary to the applicable legal standards. Specifically, she alleges that the
ALJ (1) failed to apply the correct legal standard, (2) improperly relied on "phoned-in" testimony
from the medical expert, (3) failed to assess impairments in combination, (4) made an
unsupported and illogical residual functional capacity assessment, (5) made baseless credibility
1

findings, and (6) failed to develop the administrative record. See Mem. in Support of Pl.'s Mot. to
Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner [doc. # 15-1].
The second is the Commissioner's Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision of the
Commissioner [doc. # 16]. In support of this latter motion, the Commissioner argues that the
Court should dismiss Ms. Edwards's case because the ALJ's decision was supported by
substantial evidence and evinced no legal error. Specifically, the Commissioner argues that (1)
substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination, (2) the ALJ considered the combined
effects of Ms. Edwards's impairments, (3) the ALJ properly assessed Ms. Edwards's credibility,
(4) the ALJ properly developed the record, (5) the ALJ properly found that Ms. Edwards could
perform other work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy, (6) the ALJ
properly assessed plainitff's substance abuse, and (7) the ALJ properly allowed the medical
expert to testify by telephone. See Def.'s Mem. in Support of the Mot. for an Order Affirming the
Decision of the Commissioner [doc. # 16-1].
For the reasons set forth in more detail below, remand is warranted on the basis that Ms.
Edwards had no notice that the medical expert would be testifying telephonically and that this
testimony occurred over Ms. Edwards's objection. The Court therefore GRANTS Ms. Edwards's
Motion for Order Reversing Decision [doc. # 15] to the extent it seeks to remand this case for a
de novo hearing and DENIES the Commissioner's Motion for an Order Affirming the Decision
of the Commissioner [doc. # 16].

I.
The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the factual and procedural background of
this case and will therefore only briefly describe the facts relevant to this opinion.

2

Ms. Edwards has a history of substance abuse and numerous mental and physical
ailments. In December 2002, Ms. Edwards's employment as a financial assistant for Yale
University ended. See Administrative R. at 69-70. Ms. Edwards filed an application with the
Social Security Administration on April 17, 2006 alleging an onset of disability as of January 1,
2003. See id. at 224-26. This application was denied on August 3, 2006. See id. at 139-41, 14245. Ms. Edwards requested reconsideration, which was denied on January 12, 2007. See id. at
148-50. On February 1, 2007, Ms. Edwards requested a hearing. See id. at 151-52.
On December 17, 2007, ALJ Ronald J. Thomas presided over Ms. Edwards's
administrative hearing, in which there was no expert medical testimony. On January 25, 2008,
ALJ Thomas issued a partially favorable decision, finding Ms. Edwards disabled as of July 1,
2007. See id. at 113-32. Ms. Edwards sought an appeal, and on January 15, 2009 the Appeals
Council vacated the January 25, 2008 decision in its entirety and remanded the case. See id. at
135-38. In its remand order, the Appeals Council required, among other things, ALJ Thomas to
obtain testimony from a medical expert. See id. at 137.
A second hearing was held on June 24, 2009 before ALJ Thomas. See id. at 60-107. The
ALJ's hearing notice of June 9, 2009 failed to inform Ms. Edwards that the medical expert would
not be physically present at the hearing and instead would testify by telephone. See id. at 43-47.
When Ms. Edwards learned at the hearing that the medical expert's testimony would be made by
telephone, she objected on the basis that there had been no notice of telephonic testimony and
that it was her right to cross-examine the witness in person. See id. at 64. The ALJ noted the
objection but did not rule on it. See id. Two days after the hearing, Ms. Edwards wrote to the
ALJ to request a supplemental hearing so that the medical expert could be questioned in person.
See id. at 385-86. Ms. Edwards argued that she had no notice that the medical expert's testimony

3

would be telephonic and that the Social Security Administration's regulations do not provide for
such testimony. See id.
On November 23, 2009, ALJ Thomas found that Ms. Edwards had the following severe
impairments: "opioid dependence; cocaine dependence; alcohol dependence; and post traumatic
stress disorder, major depression, and bipolar disorder." Id. at 13. After finding (1) that Ms.
Edwards would not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) and 416.920(d) and (2) that she would
have the residual functional capacity to perform work subject to some non-exertional limitations
if she ceased her substance abuse, ALJ Thomas denied Ms. Edwards's application. See id. at 1027. ALJ Thomas's second decision was based in part on the medical expert's telephonic
testimony: ALJ Thomas twice noted that the medical expert testified "persuasively." Id. at 23,
24; see also id. at 13 (noting the medical expert's opinions regarding Ms. Edwards's substance
abuse); id. at 15 ("[T]he Administrative Law Judge finds persuasive [the medical expert's]
opinion that the severity of the claimant's impairments meets the medical criteria for Listing
12.09 substance abuse disorder.").
Ms. Edwards raised the potential legal error of the medical expert's telephonic testimony
in her submission to the Appeals Council, see id. at 387-90, but the Appeals Council denied her
appeal without addressing this concern, see id. at 1-3. After thus exhausting her administrative
remedies, Ms. Edwards seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision.
II.
This Court's authority to review the Commissioner's decision denying Ms. Edwards's
application for Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income Benefits,
as embodied in the ALJ's written decision, is limited. The Court may only set aside the
Commissioner's decision if it resulted from legal error or if the Commissioner's factual findings
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were not supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127-28
(2d Cir. 2008).
Questions of legal error provide an independent basis for judicial review:
Although factual findings by the Commissioner are "binding" when "supported by
substantial evidence," "[w]here an error of law has been made that might have
affected the disposition of the case, this court cannot fulfill its statutory and
constitutional duty to review the decision of the administrative agency by simply
deferring to the factual findings of the ALJ. Failure to apply the correct legal
standards is grounds for reversal."
Pollard v. Halter, 377 F.3d 183, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Townley v. Heckler, 748 F.2d
109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984)) (alteration in original).
"Substantial evidence" is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but "more than a
mere scintilla"—it is the amount of evidence that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The substantial evidence standard is a "fairly deferential
standard." Gonzalez ex rel. Guzman v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 360 F.
App'x 240, 242 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (citing Clark v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 143 F.3d
115, 118 (2d Cir. 1998)). In other words, absent an error of law, this Court must uphold the
Commissioner's determination if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if this Court would
have ruled differently on its own. "'[T]o determine whether the findings are supported by
substantial evidence, the reviewing court is required to examine the entire record, including
contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn.'" Brown v.
Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Monguer v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d
Cir. 1983) (per curiam)).
It was Ms. Edwards's burden to demonstrate to the Commissioner that she was unable to
work from January 1, 2003 through November 23, 2009 because she had a disability, defined as
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a "medically determinable physical or mental impairment [or combination of impairments]
which c[ould] be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In order to prevail,
then, Ms. Edwards had to show that her impairment or combination of impairments was "of such
severity that [s]he [was] not only unable to do [her] previous work but c[ould not], considering
[her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exist[ed] in the national economy." Id. § 423(d)(2)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)
(requiring that impairment must "significantly limit[] . . . physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities" in order to be considered "severe").
The Commissioner must apply a familiar five-step analysis to determine whether or not
an applicant for Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income Benefits
is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The Second Circuit has
described that five-step analysis as follows:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner] next considers
whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" which significantly limits his
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such
an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the
claimant has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the
claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him disabled
without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work
experience . . . . Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the
fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the
residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is
unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then determines whether
there is other work which the claimant could perform.
Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467
(2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam)) (alterations in original).

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Through the fourth step of the analysis, "the claimant carries the burdens of production
and persuasion, but if the analysis proceeds to the fifth step, there is a limited shift in the burden
of proof and the Commissioner is obligated to demonstrate that jobs exist in the national or local
economies that the claimant can perform," given what is known as her "residual functional
capacity." Gonzalez, 360 Fed. App'x at 243. "Residual functional capacity" is what a person is
still capable of doing despite limitations resulting from her physical and mental impairments. See
20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a).
When applying that five-step analysis, the ALJ must take four different categories of
evidence into consideration. The Commissioner must consider, to the extent that such evidence is
in the record, "'(1) the objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses or medical opinions based on such
facts; (3) subjective evidence of pain or disability testified to by the claimant or others; and (4)
the claimant's educational background, age, and work experience.'" Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59,
62 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Monguer, 22 F.2d at 1037). Furthermore, the ALJ must keep in mind
in applying the five-step analysis that "eligibility for benefits is to be determined in light of the
fact that the Social Security Act is a remedial statute, to be broadly construed and liberally
applied." Bastien v. Califano, 572 F.2d 908, 912 (2d Cir. 1978) (quotation marks omitted); see
Vargas v. Sullivan, 898 F.2d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1990).
III.
The ALJ found—and the Commissioner does not dispute—that Ms. Edwards has not
engaged in any substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2003 and that Ms. Edwards has had a
number of severe impairments. See Rosa, 168 F.3d at 77. Ms. Edwards does not argue that she
has ever suffered from any impairment that is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations or that
meets or medically equals a listed impairment. See id. Ms. Edwards does not argue that,

7

assuming the ALJ's determinations regarding her residual functional capacity are correct, there
are no jobs she could perform that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. See id.
Thus, the question before this Court is whether the ALJ erred in determining that, if she
stopped her substance abuse, Ms. Edwards would have had the residual functional capacity to
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with some nonexertional limitations
between January 1, 2003 and November 23, 2009. As noted above, Ms. Edwards has raised six
challenges to the ALJ's findings. As the Court decides that the lack of notice of the telephonic
testimony and that ALJ Thomas's possible reliance on the medical expert's improper telephonic
testimony constitutes legal error, remand is warranted. There is no need to address Ms.
Edwards's other claims.
IV.
The Social Security Administration's regulation at issue provides in relevant part that "the
administrative law judge determines whether [the] appearance . . . of any other individual who is
to appear at the hearing will be made in person or by video teleconferencing" and sets forth the
requirements for when video teleconferencing testimony is admissible. 20 C.F.R. § 404.936(c).
This regulation includes an internal reference to another regulation, which provides in relevant
part that witnesses "may appear at a hearing in person, or, when the conditions in § 404.936(c)
exist, by video teleconferencing." 20 C.F.R. § 404.950. The Administration's regulations also
provide that the claimant will "be told if [the] appearance . . . of any other party or witness is
scheduled to be made by video teleconferencing rather than in person." 20 C.F.R. § 404.938(b).
The notice of hearing must indicate “that the scheduled place for the hearing is a
teleconferencing site and explain what it means to appear at [the] hearing by video

8

teleconferencing.” Id. The notice must further provide plaintiff with directions on how to object
and request an in-person hearing. See id.
The Social Security Administration undertook the significant process of notice-andcomment rulemaking before the above regulations were approved. See Video Teleconferencing
Appearances Before Administrative Law Judges of the Social Security Administration, 68 Fed.
Reg. 69003 (Dec. 11 2003) (codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929, 404.938, 404.950, 416.1429,
416.1436, 416.1438, 416.1450). Furthermore, the Social Security Administration conducted
hearings utilizing video teleconferencing in Iowa and those tests were successful—but no tests
were conducted with telephonic testimony. See id. at 69004.
During the notice-and-comment rulemaking process, the Administration observed that its
reasons for allowing testimony by video teleconferencing include the ability to provide more
timely hearings, savings in ALJ travel time, faster case processing, and higher ratio of hearings
held to hearings scheduled. Id. While all of these factors might be similarly served by allowing
witnesses to testify by telephone, the two forms of testimony are not considered to be equivalent.
If there is a problem with the video teleconferencing equipment before or during a hearing, the
witness may not simply call in: rather, the entire hearing must be rescheduled. Id. at 69006.
Further, the Social Security Administration has proposed, but not passed, a regulation
that would allow telephonic testimony at administrative hearings. It is noteworthy that in 2007,
the Association of Administrative Law Judges was highly critical of these proposed regulations:
We have strongly opposed the introduction of telephone hearings (proposed rules
20 CFR §§ 404.936(c), 416.1436(c)). A telephone hearing does not provide for
the due process required for a constitutional hearing, the hearing required by the
Social Security Act, or the procedure provided for by the Administrative
Procedure Act. A telephone hearing adversely affects the ability of the
administrative law judge to ascertain the identity of the participants and to
determine the credibility of either the claimant or the witnesses because their
demeanor cannot [be] observed by the judge. A telephone hearing adversely
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affects the opportunity of the claimant to observe the judge and what is actually
going on in the hearing, including undermining the claimant's ability to
effectively cross-examine the testimony of expert witnesses. 1 . . . This type of
hearing is contrary to the long standing culture and tradition of the American legal
system in general and Social Security disability process in particular.
Comments of the Association of Administrative Law Judges Regarding Social Security
Administration Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, http://www.aalj.org/pdf/08d003.pdf (last visited
August 10, 2011). Not only does this separate rulemaking procedure demonstrate that the
Administration considered telephonic testimony and video conference testimony to be distinct, it
highlights the ALJs' concerns that the benefits of telephonic testimony do not outweigh its
potential drawbacks.
Expanding on the regulations, the Social Security Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law
Manual ("HALLEX") states that ALJs may obtain expert medical or vocational testimony in
three ways. Specifically, it provides that "[t]he preferred method for obtaining [medical expert]
or [vocational expert] opinion is through in-person testimony or testimony taken via telephone or
video teleconference at a hearing." HALLEX § I-2-5-30, 1994 WL 637367 (Sept. 28, 2005).
Where, as here, the statute is silent or ambiguous, courts must defer to a reasonable
construction by the agency charged with the statute's implementation. "Such legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984). Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has not reached the issue, other circuits
and Second Circuit district courts have found that HALLEX polices are not regulations and
therefore not deserving of controlling weight. See, e.g., Bunnell v. Bamhart, 336 F.3d 1112, 1115
1

Although the Association of Administration Law Judges' observation that a telephonic hearing
undermines the claimant's ability to cross-examine expert witnesses appears to assume that the
claimant is appearing by telephone, the reasoning applies equally to the situation where the
medical expert is providing only telephonic testimony.
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(9th Cir. 2003); Martinez v. Astrue, No. 07cv699 (SRU), 2009 WL 840661, at *2 n.1 (D. Conn.
Mar. 30, 2009). An administrative agency is required to follow its own internal policies when
they accord with or are more demanding than the statute or its regulations. See Newton v. Apfel,
209 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that, despite not being binding, the Social Security
Administration should follow HALLEX policies when individual rights are affected, even when
the policies are more "rigorous than would otherwise be required"); McCoy v. Barnhart, 309 F.
Supp. 2d 1281, 1284 (D. Kansas 2004) (noting that when "the HALLEX simply restates an
administrative regulation, it is enforceable"). However, where HALLEX policies authorize
procedures not addressed in the regulations or statute, they do not have the force of law. See
McCoy, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1284.
As an initial matter, the Court observes that the Commissioner committed legal error by
not providing Ms. Edwards with notice that the medical expert would be testifying by telephone.
Although there is no regulation that specifically requires such notice, in large part because there
is no regulation that discusses telephonic testimony, the Court extrapolates such a requirement
from the regulation requiring notice in the event that a witness will not be appearing in person.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.938(b) (The claimant will "be told if [the] appearance . . . of any other party
or witness is scheduled to be made by video teleconferencing rather than in person."); cf. Rice v.
Astrue, No. 5:09CV00093 JTR, 2010 WL 3417803, at *7 n.7 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 26, 2010) (finding
that claimant had actual notice that the ALJ would take medical expert testimony by telephone,
which undermined claimant's argument that he was not given regulation-required notice).
Turning next to the question of the telephonic testimony itself, both parties agree that the
Social Security Administration's regulations do not explicitly authorize or preclude telephonic
testimony from a party, fact witness, or expert. Ms. Edwards asserts that because the governing

11

regulations do not specifically authorize telephonic testimony, the HALLEX provision approving
telephonic testimony by a medical expert is contrary to the regulations. See Mem. in Support of
Pl.'s Mot. to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner [doc. # 15-1] at 30. The Commissioner,
unsurprisingly, counters that because the regulation does not state that personal and video
teleconference appearances are the only two ways by which a witness may provide testimony,
the HALLEX provision governs and the ALJ did not violate the regulation by allowing the
medical expert to testify by telephone. See Def.'s Mem. in Support of the Mot. for an Order
Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner [doc. # 16-1] at 30-31.
The separate rulemaking procedures for different forms of testimony favor Ms. Edwards's
argument, in that the varied processes imply that the Social Security Administration views the
methods of providing testimony—in-person, video teleconferencing, and telephonic testimony—
as distinct. Similarly, the fact that the proposed rules for telephonic testimony have not been
approved bolsters Ms. Edwards's claim that HALLEX improperly expanded the methods by
which testimony may be offered.
The few courts that have addressed this issue have usually found the inclusion of such
telephonic evidence to be legal error. 2 See Ainsworth, No. 09-cv-286-SM, 2010 WL 2521432
(D.N.H. June 17, 2010); Porter v. Barnhart, No. C05-5166FDB, slip op. (W.D. Wash. Mar. 3,
2006) (recommended ruling) (Porter I); Porter v. Barnhart, No. C05-5166FDB, slip op. (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 11, 2006) (Porter II); cf. Hepp v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding that

2

Many courts have acknowledged situations in which an ALJ allowed expert medical testimony
by telephone, but those courts did not consider whether that practice is consistent with the
governing regulations. See, e.g., Todman v. Astrue, No. 07 Civ. 10473 (JSR), 2009 WL 874222,
at *4, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009). At least one magistrate judge has determined that the
telephonic testimony of a vocational expert was error, albeit harmless error. See Palaschak v.
Astrue, No. 08-CV-1172 (GLS), 2009 WL 6315324 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2009) (recommended
ruling).
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claimant's constitutional due process rights were not violated by the ALJ's admission of a
medical expert's telephonic testimony, though alluding to concerns the a telephonic crossexamination would "violate agency regulations"); Rice, 2010 WL 3417803, at *7 (finding that
claimant had not "presented his arguments with sufficient specificity to allow the Court to make
a determination of whether the ALJ's use of the medical expert, including the taking of testimony
by telephone, was erroneous"); but see Goodwin v. Astrue, No. 10-cv-233-PB, 2011 WL
1630927, at *11 (D.N.H. Apr. 11, 2011) (finding that claimant's objection to the use of
telephonic medical expert testimony would not succeed).
The Ainsworth v. Astrue court determined that, regardless of "whether the practice of
accepting expert testimony by telephone is or is not authorized by the governing regulations,
remand is required." Ainsworth, 2010 WL 2521432, at *4. In reaching this conclusion, the court
found significant the facts that (1) insofar as the transcript includes many gaps due to the call
being inaudible, the Commissioner arguably failed to provide a copy of a transcript on the
record, see id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dandeneau v. Heckler, 607 F. Supp. 583, 584 (D. Me.
1985)); (2) the practice of accepting critical testimony by telephone is not "universally
applauded," see id.; and (3) to the extent it was error to admit the medical expert's telephonic
testimony, the error was not harmless because the court relied heavily on the expert's opinion,
see id. at *3.
In Porter v. Barnhart, Magistrate Judge J. Kelley Arnold went farther in finding that
allowing telephonic testimony from a medical expert violated the Social Security
Administration's regulations:
[t]he plain and natural meaning of this regulation does not support the
administration[']s use of telephone appearances in its administrative hearings. In
other words, the regulation limits witness appearance and testimony to personal
appearances and videoconferences. The specificity used in allowing
13

videoconferences supports the finding that telephone conferences are not an
acceptable media to facilitate an appearance by a witness at an administrative
hearing.
Porter I, slip op. at 3.
District Court Judge Franklin D. Burgess agreed. See Porter II, slip op. at 3 ("[T]he
natural and plain meaning of the regulations in question establishes that there are only two
methods by which a witness may appear at Social Security hearings, and a disability claimant is
entitled to notice of which method will be used."). While the magistrate judge did not discuss
HALLEX's relevance, Judge Burgess noted that "the HALLEX is not binding. While there may
be practical reasons that support taking a witness's testimony by telephone, . . . those reasons
have not resulted in an express provision being placed in the regulations." Id.
It appears that the use of telephonic testimony by medical experts is on the rise across the
nation. Well over half of the instances in which a federal court notes that a medical expert
testified by telephone in a Social Security benefits case have occurred in the last three years.
Given the growing use of medical expert telephonic testimony in Social Security Administrative
hearings—which likely serves efficiency purposes and may not often disadvantage claimants—
this Court will not go so far as to rule that all medical expert testimony in such hearings must be
either in person or by video teleconference. However, ALJs must provide claimants with notice
that a witness will be testifying telephonically, and absent a new rule, medical experts should not
be allowed to testify telephonically over a claimant's timely objection. If the Commissioner
wishes to receive Chevron deference when it allows such telephonic testimony without notice or
over claimants' objections, the Social Security Administration must create a rule through the
approved notice-and-comment process.

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V.
The Commissioner argues that, should this Court find that medical expert testimony
should have been given either in person or by video teleconference, the Court should find the
error to be harmless, as Ms. Edwards has not shown how such error resulted in prejudice. In
response, Ms. Edwards directs the Court to the two aforementioned Porter cases, but neither one
addresses the question of whether the error was harmless.
"[R]eversal and remand are [not] required each and every time an administrative agency
assigns a wrong reason for its action; rather, it requires reversal and remand only where there is a
significant chance that but for the error, the agency might have reached a different result."
N.L.R.B. v. Am. Geri-Care, Inc., 697 F.2d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 1982) (emphasis in original). "[W]here
application of the correct legal principles to the record could lead to only one conclusion, there is
no need to require agency reconsideration." Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987);
see Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 504 (2d Cir. 1998).
Ms. Edwards was harmed by the lack of notice that the medical expert would be
testifying by telephone. Ms. Edwards did not learn that the medical expert would be offering
only telephonic testimony until she arrived at the administrative hearing. Had she been able to
object to this form of testimony earlier, the ALJ might have been more willing to sustain her
objection, and the medical expert might have appeared in person or by video teleconference. It is
possible that Ms. Edwards's cross-examination may have been more effective or that the ALJ
may have found the medical expert's testimony to be less persuasive.
Furthermore, this Court cannot find that the telephonic testimony of the medical expert,
taken over Ms. Edwards's objection, was harmless. It is widely recognized that "confrontation is
essential to fairness." Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (finding that the placement of a
screen between a defendant and alleged child sexual assault victim in a criminal trial violates the
15

Confrontation Clause). While the Confrontation Clause itself does not apply to Ms. Edwards's
situation, the Supreme Court's statements regarding the importance of face-to-face interactions
are relevant. See id. at 1019-20 ("[T]he right to face-to-face confrontation serves much the same
purpose as a less explicit component of the Confrontation Clause that we have had more frequent
occasion to discuss [—] the right to cross-examine the accuser; both 'ensur[e] the integrity of the
fact-finding process.'" (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987)) (third alteration in
original)). Not only is face-to-face confrontation essential to fairness, it is essential to the
appearance of fairness. "Telephonic testimony conveys the impression that the hearing is
perfunctory and not an important stage in the Social Security disability process." Comments of
the Association of Administrative Law Judges Regarding Social Security Administration Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, http://www.aalj.org/pdf/08d003.pdf (last visited August 10, 2011).
Cross-examination is a vital aspect of a Social Security administrative hearing, and
medical expert testimony is critical. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) ("A party is entitled . . . to conduct
such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts."). The
Supreme Court of the United States has often stressed the usefulness of cross-examination as a
tool for evaluating a witness's credibility. See, e.g., Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 87 (2000)
(maintaining that "[c]ross-examination is the criminal trial's primary means of contesting the
credibility of any witness"); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 124 (1999) (stating that crossexamination is the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth" (quotation
marks omitted)). Cross-examination is not nearly as effective when the questioner cannot adjust
his or her questions based on the appearance and demeanor of the witness.
At least once during the hearing the medical expert "cut out," see Administrative R. at 66,
and during Ms. Edwards's cross, the medical expert stated that he was "having a little difficulty

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hearing" Ms. Edwards's counsel, id. at 91. Such interruptions may have impeded the flow of the
cross-examination in a way that would not have occurred in person or by video teleconference.
Although Ms. Edwards did have an opportunity to cross-examine the medical expert and elicit
some admissions, see Palaschak, 2009 WL 6315324, at *12 (finding that telephonic testimony of
vocational expert was harmless error in part because claimant was able to cross-examine the
witness extensively), it is impossible for this Court to determine, based on the record before it,
whether Ms. Edwards was able to conduct the cross-examination she intended when she believed
the medical expert would be appearing in person.
ALJ Thomas often found that the medical expert testified "persuasively," Administrative
R. at 15, 23, 24, but the ALJ's ability to evaluate the medical expert's credibility may have been
impaired by the medium. Given that the Appeals Council's remand order specifically required
ALJ Thomas to obtain testimony from a medical expert, see id. at 137, and that the ALJ reached
a different decision based in part on the testimony of the medical expert, the Court cannot
conclude that the ALJ would have reached the same decision had the medical expert instead
testified in person or by video teleconference.
It also bears noting that the transcript of the medical expert testimony contains many
gaps, shown in the record as "[INAUDIBLE]." See id. at 65, 89, 90, 96, 97, 106. While some of
these gaps are inconsequential, others make it difficult to understand what the medical expert
was saying. As in Ainsworth, the Commissioner arguably has not "met his obligation to provide a
copy of the 'transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision
complained of are based.'" Ainsworth, 2010 WL 2521432, at *4 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). As
the Ainsworth court explained,
The circumstances presented in this case, viewed as a whole, counsel strongly in
favor of remanding the matter so: (1) the ALJ can obtain the required expert
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medical testimony in an appropriate manner; (2) a complete record of that
testimony can be prepared for use on appeal; and (3) the bases of those critical
expert medical opinions will be discernible.
Id. at *4. This Court agrees with the Ainsworth court that a remand is necessary.
VI.
As remand is warranted on the basis that the medical expert testified telephonically, there
is no need to reach the merits of Ms. Edwards's other claims. The Court nonetheless reminds the
ALJ in any future Social Security administrative hearing to review the briefs in this case and to
develop the administrative record as necessary, assess alleged impairments in combination,
acknowledge the treating physician rule and give it proper deference, apply the correct legal
standard, and adequately explain his or her credibility findings.
Ms. Edwards's Motion for Order Reversing Decision [doc. # 15] is GRANTED to the
extent it seeks to remand this case for a de novo hearing, and the Commissioner's Motion for an
Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner [doc. # 16] is DENIED. The Clerk of Court
shall enter judgment in accordance with this Order and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut: August 10, 2011.

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Mark R. Kravitz
United States District Judge