Dunn v. Signorelli
Filing
66
ORDER granting 56 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 9/30/12. (Gillenwater, J)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
PATRICK T. DUNN,
Plaintiff,
V.
CAROLYN SIGNORELLI,
Defendant.
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Case No. 3:10-CV-1037(RNC)
RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff Patrick Dunn, an attorney licensed to
practice in Connecticut, brings this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against defendant Carolyn Signorelli, Chief Child
Protection Attorney ("CCPA") of the State of Connecticut,
seeking damages for an alleged violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment right to procedural due process.
The claim arises
out of the defendant's termination of the plaintiff's oneyear employment contract with the State.
The defendant has
moved for summary judgment contending that, on the
undisputed facts, there was no due process violation.
I
agree and therefore grant the motion.
I. Facts
The relevant facts, taken from the parties' Local Rule
56(a)(1) statements, are essentially undisputed.
The CCPA
is authorized to appoint and pay attorneys to represent
indigent persons in certain state judicial proceedings.
The
plaintiff applied for and was awarded a one-year contract to
represent indigent defendants in civil contempt and
paternity actions as an independent contractor for the
period July 1, 2009, to June 30, 2010.
The contract
included the following provision:
Termination of This Agreement – Either party may
terminate the Agreement to provide legal
representation for any reason by providing thirty
(30) days prior written notice to the other party.
In the course of the plaintiff's employment under the
contract, the defendant received complaints about his
performance from magistrate judges.
The plaintiff does not
deny that these complaints were received but states that
they were unfounded.
As a result of the complaints, the
defendant mailed the plaintiff a letter on January 5, 2010,
notifying him that his contract would be terminated in
thirty days.
Approximately six months later, the plaintiff
brought this suit.
II. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment may be granted when there is no
"genuine issue as to any material fact" and, based on the
undisputed facts, the movant is "entitled to judgment as a
matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
See D'Amico v. City
of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1998).
A genuine
issue of fact exists "if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986).
In opposing summary judgment, a party may not rely
on conclusory allegations or speculation but must instead
offer evidence supporting its version of events.
See
D'Amico, 132 F.3d at 149.
III. Discussion
To prevail on his due process claim, the plaintiff must
establish that he had a constitutionally protected property
interest in his position.
187, 196 (2d Cir. 2005).
See O'Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d
Such property interests are
“created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law.”
(1972).
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
In the employment context, property interests arise
when "the state is barred, whether by statute or contract,
from terminating (or not renewing) the employment
relationship without cause.”
Taravella v. Town of Wolcott,
599 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Ansell v.
D'Alesio, 485 F. Supp. 2d 80, 86 (D. Conn. 2007) ("[CCPA
contracts] do not constitute a valid property interest as
defined under Connecticut state law . . .[as] each contract
was for a one-year term only and nothing in the contracts
themselves said anything, explicitly or implicitly, about
entitlement to renewal at the end of the contractual
term.").
Thus, at will government employees generally have
no due process claim arising from the termination of their
employment.
Luck v. Mazzone, 52 F.3d 475, 477 (2d Cir.
1995); see also White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson, 991
F.2d 1049, 1062 (2d Cir. 1993) (“An interest that state law
permits to be terminated at the whim of another person is
not a property right that is protected by the Due Process
Clause.").
In this case, the terms of the contract expressly
provided that the defendant could terminate the agreement
for any reason by giving thirty days' written notice.
It is
undisputed that the defendant complied with this notice
provision.
Defendant contends that she is therefore
entitled to judgment on the due process claim as a matter of
law.
I agree.
The plaintiff argues that the requirement of good faith
and fair dealing prevented the defendant from terminating
the agreement based on the magistrate judges' complaints
without giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The Court previously dismissed a count in the complaint
alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing because there was no such breach given the
terms of the contract.
disturb that ruling.
(Doc. 49 at 5).
I see no reason to
The concept of good faith is
"[e]ssentially . . . a rule of construction designed to
fulfill the reasonable expectations of the contracting
parties as they presumably intended.
Verrastro v. Middlesex
Ins. Co., 207 Conn. 179, 190 (1988).
It "cannot be applied
to achieve a result contrary to the clearly expressed terms
of the contract, unless, possibly, those terms are contrary
to public policy."
Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., 193
Conn. 558, 567 (1984).
Accord Consol. Edison, Inc. v.
Northeast Utils., 426 F.3d 524, 529 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Good
faith . . . cannot be construed so broadly as effectively to
nullify other express terms of a contract, or to create
independent contractual rights.”).
In view of the
termination provision in the plaintiff's contract, the
requirement of good faith and fair dealing cannot be applied
to limit the parties' agreed upon termination rights.
See
Magnan, 193 Conn. At 571.1
1
Plaintiff invokes a provision of the Uniform Commercial
Code that imposes an obligation of good faith on contracting
parties, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-1-304. The UCC does not apply to
contracts for services. See § 42a-1-304. Even if it did, the
statutory obligation of good faith could not be relied on to
override the express terms of the contract giving each side a
right to terminate for any reason on thirty days' notice.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary
judgment [doc. 56] is hereby granted.
So ordered this 30th day of September 2012.
/s/ RNC
Robert N. Chatigny
United Stated District Judge
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