Reddick v. Southern CT State Univ

Filing 21

ORDER: Defendant's 12 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Janet Bond Arterton on 5/12/2011. (Kretman, J.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
Curtis Reddick,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 3:10cv1118 (JBA)

v.
Southern Connecticut State University,
Defendant.

May 12, 2011

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Curtis Reddick sued Defendant Southern Connecticut State University
(“SCSU”) for disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2601, et seq., and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 46a-60(a). Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of subject–matter jurisdiction under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing
that each of Plaintiff’s claims is barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
I.

Background
Plaintiff alleges the following facts. Reddick suffers from chronic abdominal pain,

for which he takes medication and has taken medical leave from work to receive medical
care, treatment, and attention. (Compl. [Doc. # 1] ¶ 7.) In January 2007, he began work for
Defendant as a custodian. (Id. ¶ 11.) At some point in January 2009, he took medical leave
due to his chronic abdominal pain, and he returned to work on February 19, 2009. (Id.
¶¶ 13–14.) He also took leave from April 22 until May 1, 2009, because he was admitted to

the emergency room at Yale New Haven Hospital with abdominal pain. (Id. ¶¶ 16–22.) On
May 14, 2009, Defendant terminated his employment.
II.

Discussion
Defendant moves to dismiss this action in its entirety as barred by the Eleventh

Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that “[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State,” and which has been interpreted to extend to suits against
states and state agencies by their own citizens. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.
62, 72–73 (2000).
A.

First Count (ADA)

Although Plaintiff does not specify in his Complaint which title of the ADA he sues
under in the First Count, Defendant argues that because he claims employment
discrimination, his suit is necessarily brought under Title I of the ADA, “which prohibits the
States and other employers from ‘discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a
disability because of th[at] disability . . . in regard to . . . terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). The Supreme Court has held that Title I does not abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity for money damages because “[t]he legislative record of the ADA
. . . simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state
discrimination in employment against the disabled,” as is required for Congress to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and exercise its enforcement powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 368.
2

Plaintiff does not dispute that under Garrett, suits against state agencies brought
under Title I of the ADA are barred. He argues instead that his suit is brought under Title
II of the ADA, which prohibits disability discrimination in public services, guaranteeing that
“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Unlike
claims brought under Title I, claims for money damages under Title II of the ADA are not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006)
(“[I]insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for
conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state
sovereign immunity.” (Emphasis in original)). Defendant maintains that Title II is not
applicable to claims of employment discrimination.
The Second Circuit has not yet decided whether claims of discrimination in
employment are cognizable under Title II of the ADA. See, e.g., Olson v. New York, 315 F.
App’x 361, 364 (2d Cir. 2009). In Brown v. Connecticut, Judge Kravitz opined that Garrett
“appears to be a rough and informal dividing line; in the years before (and in the year
immediately after) Garrett, district courts in the Second Circuit tended to permit
employment discrimination claims under Title II to proceed.” No. 3:08cv1478(MRK), 2010
WL 2220580, *18 (D. Conn. May 27, 2010) (citing Winokur v. Office of Court Admin., 190
F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Simms v. City of New York, 160 F. Supp. 2d 398 (E.D.N.Y.
2002); Worthington v. City of New Haven, No. 94cv609, 1999 WL 958627 (D. Conn. Oct. 5,
1999); Magee v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 27 F. Supp. 2d 154 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Hernandez
v. City of Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 133 (D. Conn. 1997); Rome v. MTA/New York City
3

Transit, No. 97cv2945, 1997 WL 1048909 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1997); Graboski v. Guiliani, 937
F.Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Finley v. Giacobbe, 827 F.Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
Since Garrett,
many district courts in this Circuit have read the Garrett Court's citation to
Russello as an indication that it would not have permitted employment
discrimination claims to proceed under Title II. In so doing, many have
explicitly adopted the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit decision in Zimmerman
v. Oregon Department of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 1999), which
held that “Congress unambiguously expressed its intent for Title II not to
apply to employment.”1
Brown, 2010 WL 2220580 at * 19 (citing Fleming v. State Univ. of New York., 502 F.Supp.2d
324, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Cormier v. City of Meriden, No. 03cv1819(JBA), 2004 WL
2377079,* 4 (D.Conn. Sept. 30, 2004) (“[T]he Court is persuaded that the overall context of
Title II compels the conclusion that employment discrimination claims are not cognizable
under that provision.”); Syken v. New York Exec. Dep't, Div. of Hous. & Comm. Renewal, No.
02cv4673, 2003 WL 1787250 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.2, 2003) (“Title II does not apply to employment
discrimination claims.”); Sworn v. W. New York Children’s Psychiatric Ctr., 269 F.Supp.2d
152, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[P]laintiff should not be permitted to circumvent the holding of
Garrett, which immunizes states from employment discrimination claims brought pursuant
to Title I of the ADA, by commencing suit under Title II, a subchapter which lacks any of
the procedural protections afforded employers under Title I.”); Filush v. Town of Weston,

1

“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
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266 F. Supp .2d 322, 330 (D.Conn. 2003) (“Congress did not intend for Title II to apply to
employment.”)).
In Cormier, this Court concluded that “Title II does not include any definition
relevant to employers” 2004 WL 2377079 at * 4,2 and it remains persuaded that this is the
correct conclusion. Plaintiff’s claim is therefore construed as brought under Title I, and it
is dismissed as to its claim for money damages.
Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief under the ADA, citing the longstanding doctrine
established by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) that a state official
may be sued in his official capacity for prospective injunctive relief if the plaintiff alleges an
on–going violation of federal law. However, Plaintiff sues SCSU only, and a plaintiff seeking
prospective relief from the state “must name as defendant a state official rather than the state
or a state agency directly.” Wang v. Office of Professional Medical Conduct, New York, 354
F. App’x 459, 461 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Santiago v. New York St. Dep’t of Correctional
Services, 945 F.2d 25, 32 (2d Cir. 1991)). Thus, Plaintiff’s ADA claim for injunctive relief is
not exempted from Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity by Ex parte Young and is
dismissed.

2

Cormier notes that the definition of “qualified individual with a disability” under
Title II did not semantically encompass the workplace because “an employee does not
receive an entity’s services or benefits, nor participate in its programs or activities; an
employee of an entity is part of the structure that provides the services, benefits, programs
and activities.” Id.
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B.

Second Count (FMLA)

Plaintiff acknowledges that his FMLA “claim for monetary damages is precluded by
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity”3 (Mem. Opp’n [Doc. # 19–1] at 4) but urges that
his prayer for injunctive relief under the FMLA is not similarly barred, citing State Employees
Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2007). However, the
defendants in Rowland were state officers, not agencies. As discussed above, because
Plaintiff sues only SCSU, his request for injunctive relief under the FMLA is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment and is dismissed.
C.

Third Count (CFEPA)

Having dismissed Plaintiff's federal–law claims, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s CFEPA claim. “While the statute governing
supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, does not require dismissal of pendent state-law
claims where all of the federal claims have been dismissed,” Giordano v. City of New York,
274 F.3d 740, 754 (2d Cir. 2001) (collecting cases), the Second Circuit “has held, as a general
proposition, that ‘if [all] federal claims are dismissed before trial . . . , the state claims should
be dismissed as well,’” Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726(1966)) (alteration in Uzan).

3

The Second Circuit recognized in Hale v. Mann that Congress did not have the
authority to abrogate the sovereign immunity of states on claims arising under the relevant
FMLA provisions. 219 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2000).
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III.

Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendant’s [Doc. # 12] Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. The Clerk

is directed to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/
Janet Bond Arterton, U.S.D.J.
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 12th day of May, 2011.

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