Parris v. Pappas et al

Filing 113

ORDER granting 72 Motion for Attorney Fees; granting 80 Motion for Attorney Fees in the amount of $87,392.50. Signed by Judge Holly B. Fitzsimmons on 1/4/12. (Esposito, A.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
DONNA PARRIS

v.
CHARLES PAPPAS,
ROBIN DELANEY,
ANNA LEXIS, LLC, and
NORMANDIES PARK, LLC

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CIV. NO. 3:10CV1128 (WWE)

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Plaintiff seeks a total of $109,927.50 in attorneys’ fees
as a prevailing party under the Federal Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§3613(c)(2) and Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn.
Gen. Stat. §42-110g(d)1.

Defendants do not dispute that

plaintiff is a prevailing party. Rather, they dispute the
reasonableness of the fees claimed.
For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s motions for
attorneys’ fees are GRANTED in the amount of $87,392.50. [Doc.
#72, 80].
Standard
“The district court retains discretion to determine . . .
what constitutes a reasonable fee.”

Millea v. Metro-North R.

Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting LeBlanc–Sternberg
1

The Court found a mathematical error. The total fee sought
by plaintiff is $109,927.50 rather than $109,942.50.
1

v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 758 (2d Cir. 1998)).

Both our Circuit

Court “and the Supreme Court have held that the lodestar—the
product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of
hours required by the case—creates a ‘presumptively reasonable
fee.’” Id. (Citing Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood
Assoc. v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008); see
also Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, ––– U.S. –––, 130 S. Ct.
1662, 1673 (2010)). The lodestar method of calculating fee, while
not conclusive, is presumptively reasonable absent extraordinary
circumstances.

Id.; Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1674.

“[C]ompliance

with the Supreme Court's directive that fee award calculations be
objective and reviewable,’ implies the district court should at
least provide the number of

hours and hourly rate it used to

produce the lodestar figure.”

Id. 658 F.3d at 166-67 (citing

Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1674).

In Perdue, the Court rejected the

use of the twelve Johnson2 factors as a method for calculating
attorney’s fees, stating that the method “gave very little actual

2

The Johnson factors are (1) the time and labor required;
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the
preclusion of employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of
the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
(10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length
of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards
in similar cases. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430, n. 3
(1983).
2

guidance to the district courts”. 130 S. Ct. at 1672 (citations
omitted).
Requested Attorneys’ Fees
Attorney

Hours

Greg Kirschner
Timothy Bennett-Smyth

Rate

26

$275

$ 7,150

315

$200

$63,000

Michael Coolican

86.6

$375

$32,475

Ben Krowicki

12.7

$575

$ 7,302.50

TOTAL

$ 109,927.50

Plaintiff’s ‘Presumptively Reasonable’ Fee
“[T]he process is really a four-step one, as the court must:
(1) determine the reasonable hourly rate; (2) determine the
number of hours reasonably expended; (3) multiply the two to
calculate the presumptively reasonable fee; and (4) make any
appropriate adjustments to arrive at the final fee award.” Adorno
v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 685 F. Supp. 2d
507, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
1.

Reasonable Hourly Rate

“[A] ‘reasonable’ fee is a fee that is sufficient to induce
a capable attorney to undertake the representation of a
meritorious civil rights case.”

Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1672.

Reasonable hourly rates “are in line with those prevailing in the
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

3

comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). There is a rebuttable presumption that
the reasonable hourly rate is one based on prevailing fees in the
district where the case was litigated. See Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d
at 191-193. A reasonable hourly rate is “the rate a paying client
would be willing to pay.” Id. at 190. “[C]urrent rates, rather
than historical rates, should be applied in order to compensate
for the delay in payment.” LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143
F.3d 748, 764 (2d Cir. 1998).
In support of her request for attorneys’ fees, plaintiff
submitted the declarations of Attorney Greg Kirschner, Legal
Director of The Connecticut Fair Housing Center, Inc. (“CFHC”)
dated May 17 and June 14, 2011 and the declaration of Attorney
Ben Krowicki, Partner at Bingham McCutchen, LLP, (“Bingham”)
dated May 17, 2011, along with the attorneys’ contemporaneous
billing records. [Doc. #72-2; 72-3; 80-1].
The Connecticut Fair Housing Center, Inc.
Plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys’ fees for CFHC
attorneys Greg Kirschner and Timothy Bennett-Smith. [Doc. #72-2].
Attorney Kirschner graduated from law school in 1999 and
serves as legal director for CFHC.

Id. At ¶¶4-7. CFHC’s billable

rate for Attorney Kirschner is $275 per hour. Id. at 25.

The

Court finds that $275 per hour is a reasonable rate for an
attorney with more than eleven years of legal experience, some of

4

which as legal director of the CFHC. See Flemming v. Goodwill
Mortgage Svc. LLC, Civ. Action No. 3:07CV00803-AWT, Doc. #174 at
3 (D. Conn. May 23, 2011) (awarding $325 per hour to CFHC
attorney with 10 years experience). Defendants seek a reduction
in Attorney Kirschner’s billable rate to $225 per hour.

The

Court has reviewed the cases cited by defendants and declines to
reduce Attorney Kirschner’s rate. Pappas v. Watson Wyatt & Co.,
No. 3:04CV302 (EBB), 2008 WL 45385, at *5 (2008 case awarding
$225 per hour to two attorneys who graduated law school in 2000);
Bridgeport and Port Jefferson Steamboat Co. v. Bridgeport Port
Authority, No. 3:03CV599 CFD, 2011 WL 721582, at *6 (D. Conn.
Feb. 22, 2011) (awarding $225 per hour to attorneys with four to
six years of experience).
Attorney Bennett-Smyth graduated from law school in 2007.
Id. at ¶¶8-11. CFHC’s billable rate for Attorney Bennett-Smyth is
$200 per hour with four years of experience. Id. at ¶8.
Defendants request that Attorney Bennett-Smyth’s hourly rate be
reduced to $150 per hour. The Court finds that $200 per hour is a
reasonable rate for an attorney with four years of legal
experience, some as staff counsel with the CFHC. Bridgeport and
Port Jefferson Steamboat Co., No. 3:03CV599 CFD, 2011 WL 721582,
at *6 (awarding $225 per hour to attorneys with four to six years
of experience).

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Bingham McCutchen, LLP
Plaintiff seeks an award of attorneys’ fees for Bingham
McCutchen attorneys Ben Krowicki and Michael J. Coolican.
Bingham McCutchen seeks an award discounted from its normal
billing rates based on the nature of the case and the firm’s
commitment to public interest litigation. [Doc. #72-3 ¶8].
Attorney Michael J. Coolican graduated from law school in
2006.

Id.

Bingham’s standard rate for Attorney Coolican is $500

per hour, but in this matter, Bingham adjusted its rate to $375
per hour. Id.

The Court finds that $225 per hour is a reasonable

rate for an attorney with five years of legal experience in the
context of plaintiff’s civil rights litigation.

Bridgeport and

Port Jefferson Steamboat Co., No. 3:03CV599 CFD, 2011 WL 721582,
at *6 (awarding $225 per hour to attorneys with four to six years
of experience); Pappas v. Watson Wyatt & Co., No. 3:04CV302
(EBB), 2008 WL 45385, at *5 (2008 case awarding $225 per hour to
two attorneys who graduated law school in 2000).
Attorney Ben Krowicki graduated from law school in 1981. Id.
¶12.

Bingham’s standard rate for Attorney Krowicki is $710 per

hour but, in this matter, Bingham adjusted its rate to $575 per
hour. Id. ¶12. Mindful of the Second Circuit's admonition that
attorney's fees be awarded with an “eye to moderation,” New York
State Ass’n. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1139
(2d Cir. 1983), the court finds that $400 an hour is a reasonable

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hourly fee for Attorney Krowicki as a supervising attorney
reviewing the work of a less experienced associate in his firm.
Attorney Krowicki is a partner in a national firm and this Court
does not believe that a reasonable client in Ms. Parris’ position
would be willing to pay the hourly rate billed by Bingham, even
at the highly discounted rate of $575 per hour. While the Court
realizes, based on his prior appearances in this Court, that
Attorney Krowicki possesses considerable skill and experience,
the Court is mindful of the rates awarded other experienced
plaintiff’s civil rights attorneys acting as lead counsel in the
District of Connecticut.

See Vereen v. Siegler, Civ. No.

3:07CV1898 (HBF), 2011 WL 2457534, at *2-3 (D. Conn. June 16,
2011) (awarding $400 per hour to Attorney John Williams who has
over 43 years experience as a plaintiff’s civil rights lawyer).
Reasonable hourly rates “are in line with those prevailing in the
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably
comparable skill, experience and reputation.”
465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). C.f.

Blum v. Stenson,

Muhammed v. Martoccio, 06-cv-1137

(WWE), 2010 WL 3718560 (D. Conn. Sept. 13, 2010) (awarding $500
per hour for plaintiff’s trial attorney John Williams “with
substantial experience in litigating criminal and civil cases,
where plaintiff’s fee application was unopposed); Vereen, 2011 WL
2457534, at *2-3 (the Court considered cases in this district
awarding attorneys fees to Attorney John Williams and other

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plaintiff’s civil rights attorneys before awarding $400 per hour
to Attorney Williams);

Bridgeport and Port Jefferson Steamboat

Co., No. 3:03CV599 CFD, 2011 WL 721582, at *6 (awarding $425 per
hour to attorneys with thirty to forty-three years of
experience); Pappas, 2008 WL 45385, at *5 (awarding hourly rate
of $400 to Stamford employment discrimination attorney with 18
years experience in 2008).
2.

Reasonable Number of Hours

The Court must next determine the number of hours for which
fees will be awarded. In that regard, the Court has carefully
scrutinized the time records submitted to insure that the time
was “usefully and reasonably expended,” see Lunday v. City of
Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994), and to eliminate hours
that appear excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. See
Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir. 1998).
There is no question that plaintiff’s counsel was successful
in this case.

The time records attached to plaintiff’s motion

are sufficiently specific with respect to the nature of the work
performed.
The Connecticut Fair Housing Center
The CFHC is seeking 26 hours for Attorney Kirschner’s time
and 315 hours for Attorney Bennett-Smyth’s time. CFHC does not
seek to recover 32.1 hours of Attorney Kirschner’s time and 6.1
hours of Attorney Bennett-Smyth’s time which involved time spent

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on the Department of Consumer Protection complaint.3
State Court Eviction
Defendants seek to exclude time spent by Attorneys Kirschner
(9.6 hours) and Bennett-Smyth (55.70 hours) on the state court
eviction proceedings.

See [Doc. 77 at 12-15]. The Court agrees

that time spent on the state court eviction proceeding and the
Department of Consumer Protection complaint should be disallowed.
However, the Court disagrees with some of the time entries
defendants seek to exclude.

The Court has also disallowed other

time entries not identified by defendants that are attributed to
the state court eviction proceeding and/or the Department of
Consumer Protection that were not excluded by the CFHC or
defendants.

Finally, defendants’ request to disallow and/or

reduce Attorney Kirschner’s time for drafting the post-hearing
briefs is denied. The Court finds that the time requested is
reasonable.
After careful review, the Court excludes a total of 1.1
hours for Attorney Kirschner and a total of 35.1

hours for

Attorney Bennett-Smyth.4

3

The CFHC does not seek to recover 5.7 hours billed by other
employees of the CFHC, including legal interns, volunteer
attorneys and other non-lawyer staff. [Doc. #72-2 ¶27].
4

The following time entries are excluded as attributed to
work performed on the state court eviction proceeding and/or the
Department of Consumer Protection. Attorney Kirschner entries #
1057 (.6 hours) and 1653 (.5 hours) totaling 1.1 hours. Attorney
Bennett-Smyth entries #95 (.7 hours), 102 (.6 hours), 107 (.7
9

Bingham McCutchen
Bingham McCutchen personnel expended over 160 hours on the
representation of Ms. Parris but seek to recover fees for
approximately 100 hours of their time. Attorney Krowicki states
that the firm seeks no recovery for the time spent by Bingham
attorneys in reviewing and analyzing the pleadings and procedural
history of the case, in revising work product and attending
meetings, conference calls, and court proceedings, for clerical
or organizational tasks and all work conducted by paralegals and
other non-attorney staff.

He further states that he

“substantially reduced that time devoted to many tasks to reflect
the training and attorney development aspects of this engagement,
but also in an effort to be conservative in this fee request.”
[Doc. #72-3 ¶6].

Attorney Coolican spent 105.2 hours, but in

light of the reductions discussed above, Bingham only seeks to
recover fees associated with 86.9 hours of his time. [Doc. #72-3
¶11].

Attorney Krowicki spent 47.5 hours, but in light of the

reductions discussed above, Bingham only seeks to recover fees
associated with 12.7 hours of his time.

[Doc. #72-3 ¶11].

hours), 147 (2.9 hours), 242 (.4 hours), 432 (.5 hours), 628 (.2
hours), 893 (.7 hours), 943 (1 hours), 986 (2.7 hours), 1055 (3.5
hours), 1387 (.4 hours), 1631, (3.5 hours), 1656 (.4 hours), 1997
(.3 hours), 2078, (2.5 hours), 2156, (3.5 hours), 2186 (4 hours),
2444 (2 hours), 2719 (3.2 hours), 3540 (.3 hours), 4521 (1.1
hours) totaling 35.1 hours.
10

Pro Bono Representation
Defendants argue that no fees should be awarded to the law
firm Bingham McCutchen because their representation of plaintiff
was undertaken on a pro bono basis; thus, “a reasonable, paying
client” would expect to pay nothing. [Doc. #77 at 7].

Defendants

cite no authority for this proposition. Our circuit court takes a
contrary position.
Our decision today in no way suggests that
attorneys from non-profit organizations or
attorneys from private law firms engaged in
pro bono work are excluded from the usual
approach to determining attorneys' fees. The
reasonableness of a fee award does not depend
on whether the attorney works at a private
law firm or a public interest organization,
nor is the award necessarily limited because
the attorney has agreed to undertake the case
for a reduced fee compared to the customary
market rate . . . All we are holding is that
in calculating the reasonable hourly rate for
particular legal services, a district court
should consider all relevant circumstances in
concluding what a reasonable client would
expect to pay.
Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 182, n.2.

Moreover, defendants’ reliance

on Pappas v. Watson Wyatt & Company, No. 3:04CV304(EBB), 2008 WL
45385, at *4 in support of their argument is misplaced.

The

Pappas court specifically quoted the language from Arbor Hill
that is quoted above.

The award of counsel fees under fee-

shifting statutes encourages private enforcement of statutes
directed at the elimination of discriminatory practices.
White, 530 F.2d 1113, 1118 (2d Cir. 1976).

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Fort v.

See Hairston v. R &

R Apartments, 510 F.2d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1975) (awarding fees
to pro bono counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 361(c), the Fair Housing
Act's fee shifting provisions) (“When free legal services are
provided there may be no direct barrier to the courtroom door,
but if no fees are awarded, the burden of the costs is placed on
the organization providing the services, and it correspondingly
may decline to bring such suits and decide to concentrate its
limited resources elsewhere, thereby curtailing the forceful
application of the [Fair Housing] Act that Congress sought. Thus,
the denial of fees in this situation indirectly cripples the
enforcement scheme designed by Congress.”); City of Riverside v.
Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580, (1986) (“Congress intended that
statutory fee awards be adequate to attract competent counsel,
but not produce windfalls to attorneys.” (internal quotations and
citations omitted)). Accordingly, defendants’ request is denied
on this basis.
Multiple Attorneys
Defendants also contend that all of the fees billed by
Attorneys Krowicki and Coolican are duplicative arguing that it
is unreasonable to have four lawyers work on a damages hearing
where, as here, the issues are not complicated.

However,

defendants point to no specific time entries to support their
claim that duplicative work was performed.

The Court has

carefully reviewed the time records of all four attorneys and

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disagrees.

At the damages hearing, ten witnesses testified.

Attorney Coolican cross examined four witnesses: Attorney
Lonardo, Lynette Swanson, Robin Delaney, and Charles Pappas.

The

time spent preparing for cross examination of defendants’
witnesses is clearly not duplicative.

The Court has carefully

reviewed the other time records of Attorneys Krowicki and
Coolican and does not find them to be either duplicative or
excessive.5

As set forth above, Bingham McCutchen reduced their

hours from 160 to 100 hours with a careful eye to remove billing

5

As set forth in the Affidavit of Attorney Krowicki, Bingham
McCutchin conducted a variety of tasks in connection with its
representation of Ms. Parris.
Specifically, Bingham attorneys: cross
examined the bulk of the defendants’
witnesses and prepared and presented
evidentiary challenges to their proposed
exhibits; drafted and filed Ms. Parris’ prehearing submission, motion for disclosure in
furtherance of a prejudgment remedy, motion
in limine to limit the scope of the hearing
in damages, and motion for an order
precluding the dissipation of the defendants’
assets; lead settlement negotiations with
opposing counsel; researched and analyzed the
scope of hearing in damages following the
enty of default, the availability of punitive
damages awards following default, and the
suitability of attorneys’ fee awards in fair
housing actions; and in furtherance of crossexamination, conducted factual investigations
concerning Department of Public Health
inspections at the defendants’ properties and
the history of malpractice suits and
grievance proceedings against defendants’
former counsel.
[Doc. #72-3 ¶5].
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for reviewing and analyzing the pleadings and procedural history,
clerical or organizational tasks, multiple billing and
“substantially reduced time devoted to many tasks to reflect the
training and attorney development aspects of this engagement, but
also in an effort to be conservative in this fee request.” [Doc.
#72-3 ¶6].

Finally, defendants cite no authority to support

their argument that because they were represented by one
attorney, plaintiff should not be permitted to recover fees for
her representation by four attorneys. See Allende v. Unitech
Design, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 4256 (AJP), 2011 WL 891445 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar, 15, 2011); Bridgeport and Port Jefferson Steamboat Co., No.
3:03CV599 CFD, 2011 WL 721582 (awarding fees to twelve attorneys
plus summer interns, paralegals and a librarian); Pappas, 2008 WL
45385, at *8 (awarding fees to five attorneys, law clerks and
paralegals). Accordingly, the Court finds no further reduction of
Bingham McCutchen’s billable hours is warranted.
5.

Presumptively Reasonable Fee

Attorney

Hours

Rate

24.9

$275

$ 6,847.50

279.9

$200

$55,980.00

Michael Coolican

86.6

$225

$19,485.00

Ben Krowicki

12.7

$400

$ 5,080.00

Greg Kirschner
Timothy Bennett-Smyth

TOTAL

$

14

87,392.50

4.

Reasonable Adjusted Fee
Having determined the presumptively reasonable fee, the

final step in the fee determination is to inquire whether an
upward or downward adjustment is required. The Supreme Court has
held that “‘the most critical factor’ in determining the
reasonableness of a fee award ‘is the degree of success
obtained.’” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) (quoting
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436).

The Court finds an across-the-board

reduction is not warranted as plaintiff prevailed on all claims,
her motion for preliminary injunction was granted and she was
awarded substantial compensatory and punitive damages.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’
Fees [Doc. #72] and Second Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [Doc. #80]
are GRANTED in the amount of $87,392.50.
This is not a recommended ruling.

This is a discovery

ruling and order which is reviewable pursuant to the "clearly
erroneous" statutory standard of review.

28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(e) and 72(a); and Rule 2 of
the Local Rules for United States Magistrate Judges.

As such, it

is an order of the Court unless reversed or modified by the

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district judge upon motion timely made.

ENTERED at Bridgeport, this 4th day of January 2012.

__/s/_________________________
HOLLY B. FITZSIMMONS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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