Jordan v Masterson et al

Filing 75

RULING granting 43 Motion for Summary Judgment; terminating as moot 63 Recommended Ruling.; terminating as moot 68 Motion to Alter Judgment; terminating as moot 68 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by Judge Janet C. Hall on 4/18/2012. (Oliver, T.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
VICTOR L. JORDAN, SR.,
Plaintiff,

v.
JAMES MASTERSON, et al.
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:10-CV-1293 (JCH)

APRIL 18, 2012

RULING RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC.
NO. 43)
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Victor L. Jordan, currently incarcerated at the MacDougall-Walker

Correctional Center in Suffield, Connecticut, brings this action pro se against local and
federal law enforcement officials, alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional
rights to be free from the use of excessive force and to receive medical attention.
Defendants Lieutenant Patrick Deely, Sergeant Michael Ponzillo, Detective
Orlando Rivera, Detective David McKnight, Officer Timothy Brown, and Officer Brian
Distefano, all members of the Waterbury Police Department (“Waterbury defendants”),
now move for partial summary judgment.1 Defendants argue that they are entitled to
summary judgment as to Jordan’s claim for the denial of medical treatment, and that
defendants McKnight, Distefano, and Brown are entitled to summary judgment as to
Jordan’s claim of excessive force.

1

Defendants James Masterson, Gerald Pinto, and Robert Martin, members of the United States
Marshals Service Violent Crimes Fugitive Task Force, are not included in this Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.

1

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS2
On April 16, 2008, Deely, Ponzillo, Rivera, McKnight, Distefano, and Brown were

active members of the Waterbury Police Department, and Masterson, Pinto, and Martin
were Task Force Officers assigned to the United States Marshals Violent Crimes
Fugitive Task Force (“Task Force”). Jordan was wanted by several police departments
in Connecticut on outstanding felony warrants, and the Task Force was responsible for
apprehending him. In April 2008, Waterbury Police Officers and the Task Force learned
that Jordan was staying at 555 Congress Avenue in Waterbury, Connecticut (“Congress
Ave. premises”).
During the early morning hours of April 16, 2008, the Waterbury defendants and
the Task Force arrived at the Congress Ave. premises. Upon arrival at the Congress
Ave. premises, McKnight, Distefano, and Brown secured an outside perimeter around
the residence. Once the perimeter had been established, Keely, Ponzillo, and Rivera
entered the Congress Ave. premises with the Task Force members. Jordan only
alleges that excessive force was used against him in a bedroom inside the Congress
Ave. residence. McKnight, Distefano, and Brown never entered the Congress Ave.
residence.
Jordan was transported from the scene of the arrest to the Detective Bureau of
the Waterbury Police Department. McKnight claims that, after they arrived at the police
department, he wiped Jordan’s face with a wet towel taken from a medical kit to remove
blood stains. L.R. 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 14. In addition, Rivera alleges that he took cloth

2

Unless otherwise noted, the court relies on the undisputed facts set forth in the parties’ Local
Rule 56(a) Statements. Where a fact is disputed, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. In accordance with L.R. 56(a)(3), where a party denies a fact, but fails to provide a specific
citation to evidence in the record to support that denial, the court may deem the fact to be admitted.

2

gauze from a medical kit and applied the gauze to a laceration on the back of Jordan’s
head. L.R. 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶ 15. Jordan denies that any medical treatment was
administered to him at the police station. See L.R. 56(a)(2) Stmt. ¶¶ 14–15. On April
17, 2008 at 10:05 a.m., Jordan was admitted to St. Mary’s Hospital Emergency Room in
Waterbury, Connecticut, where he received treatment for injuries classified as
superficial. Presently, Jordan participates in strenuous physical workouts, including
lifting weights and floor exercises.
III.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 6, 2011, the court transferred this matter to Magistrate Judge Holly B.

Fitzsimmons. See Doc. No. 32 (now revoked). In doing so, the court mistakenly
concluded that all parties had consented to jurisdiction by a Magistrate Judge. In fact,
however, plaintiff, Victor L. Jordan, had not consented to jurisdiction by a Magistrate
Judge. See id.
Prior to the undersigned discovering this error, Magistrate Judge Fitzsimmons
issued a Ruling granting summary judgment on the defendants’ Motion now pending
before the court. See Doc. No. 58 (now vacated). On December 27, 2011, the court
revoked the Consent to Jurisdiction and vacated Magistrate Judge Fitzsimmons’s
Ruling. See Doc. Nos. 59–61. Then, the court referred the present Motion to
Magistrate Judge Fitzsimmons to issue a Recommended Ruling. See Doc. No. 62.
On December 27, 2011, Magistrate Judge Fitzsimmons issued a Recommended
Ruling granting summary judgment on the present Motion. See Doc. No. 63. In

3

response, Jordan filed a Motion to Amend/Correct Judgment,3 and an Objection to the
Recommended Ruling. The court has reviewed all of the papers that have been filed
with regard to the pending Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The court renders its
own opinion with regard to this Motion, without regard to Magistrate Judge
Fitzsimmons’s Recommended Ruling.
IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment “may properly be granted . . . only where there is

no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, and the facts as to which there is no such
issue warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.” In re Dana Corp., 574
F.3d 129, 151 (2d Cir. 2009). Thus, the role of a district court in considering such a
motion “is not to resolve disputed questions of fact but only to determine whether, as to
any material issue, a genuine factual dispute exists.” Id. In making this determination,
the trial court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the party
against whom summary judgment is sought. See Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp.,
582 F.3d 268, 274 (2d Cir. 2009).
“[T]he moving party bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to
summary judgment.” United Transp. Union v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 588 F.3d
805, 809 (2d Cir. 2009). Once the moving party has satisfied that burden, in order to
defeat the motion, “the party opposing summary judgment . . . must set forth ‘specific
facts’ demonstrating that there is ‘a genuine issue for trial.’” Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d
255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “A dispute about a ‘genuine
3

Jordan’s Motion to Amend/Correct Judgment appears to be identical to his Objection to the
Recommended Ruling. See Doc. Nos. 68, 69. At the time Jordan filed that Motion, no final judgment had
been issued. Accordingly, the court terminates Jordan’s Motion to Amend/Correct Judgment (Doc. No.
68) as moot, but looks to his Objection to the Recommended Ruling in deciding the present Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.

4

issue’ exists for summary judgment purposes where the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could decide in the non-movant’s favor.” Beyer v. County of Nassau,
524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 145 (2d
Cir. 2007)); see also Havey v. Homebound Mortg., Inc., 547 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir.
2008) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)) (stating that a
non-moving party must point to more than a mere “scintilla” of evidence in order to
defeat a motion for summary judgment).
V.

DISCUSSION
A.

Medical Treatment

The Waterbury defendants contend that they did not unconstitutionally deny
Jordan medical care because he did not suffer a serious medical need. The official
custodian of a pretrial detainee may be liable for violating the detainee’s due process
rights, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, where the official denies treatment
needed to remedy a serious medical condition, and does so because of his deliberate
indifference to that need. See Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996). This
standard encompasses both an objective and a subjective component. See Hathaway
v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994). First, the plaintiff’s physical condition must
be, in objective terms, sufficiently serious. See id. In addition, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the charged official acted with “a sufficiently capable state of mind.”
See id. An official acts with deliberate indifference where he “knows of and disregards
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,

5

and he must also draw that inference.” See id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837 (1994)).
In determining whether a medical need is sufficiently serious to warrant a
constitutional right to medical attention, the court is guided by the principles of the
Eighth Amendment. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The
standard for Eighth Amendment violations contemplates ‘a sense of urgency’ that may
result in ‘degeneration’ or ‘extreme pain.’”). Bruises and lacerations do not always
constitute serious medical needs. See, e.g., Dawes v. Coughlin, 1998 WL 513944, at
*1 (2d Cir. June 12, 1998) (finding that a 1.5 inch laceration on plaintiff’s elbow was not
sufficiently serious to give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim); Gaudreault v.
Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding plaintiff did not
display any “serious medical needs” where he received treatment for bruises and
abrasions, a sling for his left arm, and a patch for his injured eye). Where a bruise or
laceration becomes infected or fails to heal properly, however, a serious medical need
may exist. See Chance, 143 F.3d at 702 (“[I]f prison officials deliberately ignore the fact
that a prisoner has a five-inch gash on his cheek that is becoming infected, the failure to
provide appropriate treatment might well violate the Eighth Amendment.”).
Here, Jordan was treated for two scalp lacerations, each one centimeter in
length, and both of which were described as “clean” and “superficial” by the treating
physician. See Defs.’ Ex. L, Doc. No. 49 at 4. Using local anesthesia, the treating
physician inserted a total of five staples to treat Jordan’s two lacerations. See id. In
addition, Jordan was diagnosed with a lower lumbar back contusion, a right mandibular
contusion, and a scalp contusion. See id. The treating physician performed several

6

tests, including a chest exam, cardiovascular exam, CT scan, chest x-ray, abdominal xray, and pelvis x-ray, all of which returned as normal. See id. Jordan described his
pain as a zero on a scale of zero to ten. See id. at 10. Finally, Jordan does not point to
any evidence which would suggest that any of these injuries worsened after his hospital
visit, or that he sought further treatment from prison medical staff.
On the basis of this evidence, Jordan fails to set forth sufficient evidence to
satisfy the objective component of deliberate indifference by demonstrating a serious
medical need. None of Jordan’s reported injuries would allow a jury to infer that a
sense of urgency existed regarding Jordan’s medical condition, or that Jordan was in
extreme pain. In addition, Jordan does not assert any evidence that his injuries did not
heal properly, or that he required additional medical treatment. Finally, Jordan’s claim
that he suffered from a serious medical need is undercut by his test results, which all
returned as normal. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 2009 WL 5083401, at *7 (W.D.
La. Dec. 23, 2009) (“Nor had he alleged a serious medical need, as the test results
were negative for kidney problems.”). Consequently, summary judgment in favor of
defendants is granted as to Jordan’s claim regarding medical treatment.
B.

Excessive Force

Defendants also argue that summary judgment is proper as to Jordan’s
excessive force claim with regard to defendants McKnight, Distefano, and Brown
because there is no evidence that these three defendants were present in the bedroom
when Jordan alleges excessive force was used against him. See Mem. Supp. Mot. at

7

6–7. Jordan does not contest that McKnight, Brown, and Distefano did not enter the
Congress Ave. residence. L.R. 56(a)(2) Stmt. ¶ 10.4
Jordan brings his excessive force claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Doc.
No. 1. To recover money damages under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that each defendant was personally involved in the constitutional violation. See Wright
v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994).
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive force in effecting an
arrest. See Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2010). In addition, an officer
who is present, but does not participate in an arrest, may still be liable for failure to
intervene where other officers are using excessive force. See O’Neill v. Krzeminski,
839 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1988). Here, Jordan asserts that excessive force was used
against him only while he was in the bedroom of the Congress Ave. residence. See
Doc. No. 43, Ex. A at 45–62; L.R. 56(a)(2) Stmt. ¶ 11. In addition, Jordan does not
contest that McKnight, Distefano, and Brown were never present inside the Congress
Ave. residence. See L.R. 56(a)(2) Stmt. ¶ 10; see also Doc. No. 43, Ex. H at 3, Ex. I at
4, Ex. J at 3. Consequently, Jordan fails to present evidence to raise a material issue of
fact to support his claim that McKnight, Distefano, and Brown were either involved in the
use of excessive force against him, or that, despite the opportunity to do so, they failed
to intervene while others used excessive force against him. As a result, summary
judgment is granted as to McKnight, Distefano, and Brown with regard to Jordan’s
excessive force claim.

4

See supra n. 2.

8

VI.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 43) is granted. In addition, Jordan’s Motion to Amend/Correct
Judgment (Doc. No. 68) and Magistrate Judge Fitzsimmons’s Recommended Ruling
(Doc. No. 63) are terminated as moot. The Clerk is directed to terminate defendants
McKnight, Distefano, and Brown as parties in this case. The case will go forward on the
excessive force claim against the Task Force defendants and Waterbury defendants
Deely, Ponzillo, and Rivera.
SO ORDERED.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 18th day of April, 2012.

/s/ Janet C. Hall
Janet C. Hall
United States District Judge

9