Fortmann v. Starkowski

Filing 73

ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion 46 for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Defendant's Motion 50 for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to close the case. Signed by Judge Janet Bond Arterton on 07/31/2013. (Flagg, K.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
BERNHARD FORTMANN, by his Conservator
JAMES M. RUBINO,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 3:10CV1562 (JBA)

v.
MICHAEL P. STARKOWSKI, COMMISSIONER,
CONNECTICUT DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVS.
Defendant.

July 31, 2013

RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Bernhard Fortmann filed suit against Connecticut’s Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from DSS’s decision to deny
him eligibility for Medicaid on the basis of his wife’s resources. In September 2011, this
Court granted Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. (Ruling on Objections to
Rec. Ruling [Doc. # 41] at 11.) Both parties now move for summary judgment,
representing that there are no factual disputes and that the issue of whether Plaintiff is
entitled to an eligibility determination without consideration of his wife’s resources as a
“community spouse” is purely a question of law. Mr. Fortmann passed away on June 4,
2012 at the age of ninety-eight, and his Conservator, James Rubino, has been substituted
as Plaintiff in this action. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion [Doc. # 50] is
GRANTED and Plaintiff’s cross-motion [Doc. # 46] is DENIED.
I.

Factual Summary
Until his death, Mr. Fortmann lived at Smith House Health Care in Stamford,

Connecticut. On March 11, 2009, his conservator James Rubino applied on his behalf to
DSS for help with paying his expenses under the Medicaid program. Plaintiff meets the

statutory definition of “institutionalized spouse,” and Mrs. Fortmann meets the definition
of “community spouse” as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(h). DSS denied his application
because it determined that the combined total of both Mr. and Mrs. Fortmann’s non–
exempt assets was in excess of the “Community Spouse Protected Amount” of
$109,560.00, which is the maximum amount allowed by DSS policy. Plaintiff appealed the
denial of the March 11, 2009 Application, and an administrative hearing was held on
April 1, 2010. The final decision upholding the denial of Mr. Fortmann’s eligibility for
benefits due to excess assets held by Mrs. Fortmann (the “community spouse”) was issued
on August 9, 2010.
Plaintiff, through his conservator James Rubino, re–applied for Medicaid
assistance on December 8, 2010. In connection with this new application, Attorney
Rubino filed a separate written “assignment” of Plaintiff’s support rights. (Ex. E to Pl.’s
Loc. R. 56(a)1 Stmt. [Doc. # 47].) Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s assignment is
invalid under Connecticut law because it does not meet the requirements for assignment
set out in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-285., and thus renders Plaintiff ineligible for the
Medicaid medical benefits he seeks.
II.

Statutory Provisions at Issue
Medicaid is a joint state and federal program for funding the cost of medical care

for “needy persons,” and participating states must develop plans “‘containing reasonable
standards . . . for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance’ within
boundaries set by the Medicaid statute and the Secretary of Health and Human Services.”
Wisconsin Dep’t of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 479 (2002) (quoting
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36–37 (1981)).

2

A. Federal Statutory Provisions
Section 1396a of the Federal Medicaid Statute, entitled “State Plans for Medical
Assistance,” requires that a state plan for medical assistance must “provide for mandatory
assignment of rights of payment for medical support and other medical care owed to
recipients, in accordance with section 1396k of this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1)(45).
Section 1396k provides,
(a) For the purpose of assisting in the collection of medical support
payments and other payments for medical care owed to recipients of
medical assistance under the State plan approved under this subchapter, a
State plan for medical assistance shall—
(1) provide that, as a condition of eligibility for medical assistance under
the State plan to an individual who has the legal capacity to execute an
assignment for himself, the individual is required—
(A) to assign the State any rights, of the individual or of any other person
who is eligible for medical assistance under this subchapter and on whose
behalf the individual has the legal authority to execute an assignment of
such rights, to support (specified as support for the purpose of medical
care by a court or administrative order) and to payment for medical care
from any third party.
42 U.S.C. § 1396k.
The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 (“MCCA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5,
was enacted in response to two separate “unintended consequences” of the original
Federal Medicaid plan, as Congress found that “[m]any community spouses were left
destitute by the drain on the couple’s assets necessary to qualify the institutionalized
spouse for Medicaid,” and “[c]onversely, couples with ample means could qualify for
assistance when their assets were held solely in the community spouse’s name.” Wisconsin
Dep’t of Health & Family Servs., 534 U.S. at 480. In enacting the MCCA, “Congress
sought to protect community spouses from ‘pauperization’ while preventing financially
3

secure couples from obtaining Medicaid assistance,” and “[t]o achieve this aim, Congress
installed a set of intricate and interlocking requirements with which States must comply
in allocating a couple’s income and resources.” Id.
Thus, the MCCA addresses the conditions under which a community spouse’s
assets may factor into an institutionalized spouse’s initial Medicaid eligibility
determination, and provides that “all the resources held by either the institutionalized
spouse, community spouse, or both, shall be considered to be available to the
institutionalized spouse” as part of the eligibility determination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r5(c)(2). Section 1396r-5 “supersedes other provisions” that are inconsistent with its
provisions, and provides detailed rules for treatment of income between the community
spouse and institutionalized spouse at the time of the institutionalized spouse’s
institutionalization. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c).
Section 1396r-5 also contemplates the situation in which an institutionalized
spouse has “assigned” his or her support rights to the State, and in such situations, the
institutionalized spouse shall not be deemed ineligible “by reason of resources” of the
community spouse:
(3) Assignment of support rights
The institutionalized spouse shall not be ineligible by reason of resources
determined under paragraph (2) to be available for the cost of care
where—
(A) the institutionalized spouse has assigned to the State any rights to
support from the community spouse;
(B) the institutionalized spouse lacks the ability to execute an assignment
due to physical or mental impairment but the State has the right to
bring a support proceeding against a community spouse without such
assignment; or

4

(C) the State determines that denial of eligibility would work an undue
hardship.
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(3).
B. Connecticut’s Institutionalized Spouse Assignment Statute
Connecticut General Statute section 17b-285 sets out the operative assignment of
support rights contemplated under § 1396r-5(c)(3), i.e., the “Assignment of spousal
support of an institutionalized person or person in need of institutional care”:
Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, an institutionalized
person or person in need of institutional care who applies for Medicaid
may assign to the Commissioner of Social Services the right of support
derived from the assets of the community spouse of such person but only
if (1) the assets of the institutionalized person or person in need of
institutional care do not exceed the Medicaid program asset limit; and (2)
the institutionalized person or person in need of institutional care cannot
locate the community spouse; or the community spouse is unable to
provide information regarding his or her own assets. If such assignment is
made or if the institutionalized person or person in need of institutional
care lacks the ability to execute such an assignment due to physical or
mental impairment, the commissioner may seek recovery of any medical
assistance paid on behalf of the institutionalized person or person in need
of institutional care up to the amount of the community spouse’s assets
that are in excess of the community spouse protected amount as of the
initial month of Medicaid eligibility.
C. Agency Interpretations of Assignment of Support Rights
The Center for Medicaid and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) discusses “assigned
support rights” for purposes of determining Medicaid eligibility and directs a state agency
to “assess your own state laws to determine what laws give rise to support rights.” (Ex. C12 to Def.’s 56(a)1 Stmt. [Doc. # 50-1] § 3261.) CMS defines “assigned support rights” as
allowing a state to “go against community spouses for reimbursement of some or all of
the medical care provided to institutional spouses.” (Id.)

5

In 1994, the HCFA, which is now CMS, Regional Administrator for Region IV
wrote a letter to the North Carolina Medicaid Director, indicating that the informal
opinion of HCFA was that the assignment of support rights under the § 1396r-5(c)
“should not be interpreted as a means to avoid the obligation of applying the spousal
impoverishment provisions of the law but rather as an exception.” (Ex. C–10 to Def.’s
56(a)1 Stmt.) The letter continues:
These support rights are not defined in section 1924 [1396r-5(c)(3)] since
the rights of an institutionalized spouse to receive support from the
community spouse are governed by state law. This exception should only
be applied when the right to a specified amount of support in the form of
income or resources, or both, due to an institutionalized spouse from a
community spouse has been determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Since these general support statutes are governed by state law,
the applicability of this exception will be predicated on state law.
(Id. at 1–2 (emphasis added).)
Discussion1

III.

Defendant advances three arguments in support of his motion for summary
judgment: first, that § 1396r-5(c) supercedes the general assignments provisions of
§§ 1396a(a)(1)(45) and 1396k; second, that under the Second Circuit’s ruling in Morenz,
assignability is a question of state law; and third, that Plaintiff’s Complaint contains no
preemption claims, and in any event, neither §§ 1396a(a)(1)(45) nor 1396k provide for
private rights of action. Defendant also maintains that if the Court were to consider
1

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When considering a motion for
summary judgment, the Court may consider depositions, documents, affidavits,
interrogatory answers, and other exhibits in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
6

Plaintiff’s conflict preemption argument, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-285 does not, in fact,
conflict with any of the federal statutory provisions.
Plaintiff’s cross–motion argues that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-285 as amended in the
wake of Morenz is invalid under the rules of conflict preemption because Defendant
cannot comply with the mandate of §§ 1396a(a)(1)(45) and 1396k and with the
requirements of § 17b-285; that Plaintiff must prevail under the Second Circuit’s decision
in Morenz v. Wilson-Coker, 415 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2005), recognizing the right of the
institutionalized spouse to receive Medicaid under the doctrine of spousal refusal; and
that Plaintiff has other grounds for relief, such as the general assignment of support rights
statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-215. Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees for the adjudication
of this matter.
A. Morenz Decisions
The two Morenz decisions are the only federal court decisions to address the issue
of the doctrine of spousal refusal and the assignability of support rights under the federal
Medicaid and Connecticut statutory regimes, and thus were a central focus of the parties’
arguments. See Morenz v. Wilson–Coker (“Morenz I”), 321 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. Conn.
2004); Morenz v. Wilson-Coker (“Morenz II”), 415 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2005). At oral
argument, both counsel agreed that the Connecticut Legislature had amended its
assignment rights statute for institutionalized persons following, and in response to, the
Second Circuit’s Morenz decision. As such, the Court has carefully considered the
reasoning in the district and Second Circuit decisions pertaining to the assignment of
support rights and the doctrine of spousal refusal in relation to the legislative amendment
of § 17b-285.

7

1. District Court Ruling
Morenz bears strong similarity to this case: like Mr. Fortmann, Mr. Morenz, the
institutionalized spouse, purported to assign his support rights to the state of
Connecticut, and his wife, the community spouse, was clear that she was refusing to pay
for his medical expenses, although their combined assets exceeded the statutory
Community Spouse Resource Allowance (“CSRA”) ceiling. However, at the time of
Morenz I, the operative provision of the Connecticut General Statutes, § 17b-285, was
different than the current version, and provided:
An institutionalized person or person in need of institutional care who
applies for Medicaid shall assign to the Commissioner of Social Services
the right of support derived from the assets of the spouse of such person,
provided the spouse of such person is unwilling or unable to provide the
information necessary to determine eligibility for Medicaid. If such
applicant lacks the ability to execute an assignment due to physical or
mental impairment, the commissioner may bring a support proceeding
against such applicant’s spouse without such assignment.
Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17b-285 (2005) (emphasis added).2
The district court noted that “states choosing to adopt Medicaid have ‘significant
discretion to design [Medicaid] programs’ as long as those programs are ‘consistent with
federal law,’” Morenz I, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 402 (citing A.K. v. Division of Medical
Assistance, 350 N.J. Super. 175, 179 (2002)), and that “states can implement Medicaid as
they see fit as long as state laws and regulations do not conflict with their federal
counterparts.” Id. Considering the State Medicaid Manual, and the spousal refusal
provision of 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(c)(3), the court reasoned that, “in order for Wilson–Coker

2

The significant change in the language is that today’s provision states that an
institutionalized person “may assign . . . but only if,” while the version of the statute at the
time of Mr. Morenz’s assignment stated that an institutionalized person “in need of
institutional care . . . shall assign.”
8

to avoid this federal statute and the DHHS regulations, she must show that Connecticut
law places limits on the permissible assignment of rights, either broadly or with reference
to the Morenzes’ particular situation.” Id. at 403.
Applying Connecticut’s principles of

statutory

interpretation

requiring

examination of the plain meaning of the statutory language, the district court concluded
that Conn. Gen. Stat. 17b-285 permitted Mr. Morenz to assign his support rights in the
manner that he had. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that under the
operative statutory language, “[t]he Connecticut statute and the DSS regulation describe
circumstances in which an institutionalized spouse ‘shall’ assign or ‘must’ assign rights to
the DSS, but neither limits the circumstances under which an institutionalized spouse
‘may’ assign such rights,” i.e., the circumstances under which Mr. Morenz had chosen to
assign his support rights to the state. Id. 3 Concluding that Connecticut’s statute did not
place limits on the permissible assignment of rights, and that Mr. Morenz had executed a
valid assignment under § 17b-285, the District Court granted summary judgment to the
Morenzes. Id.
The court also recognized that:
Wilson–Coker understandably bemoans the “pay and chase” system this
situation creates, under which the State must expend scarce resources
pursuing funding from community spouses whose resources exceed the
Medicaid threshold. Paying and chasing wastes funds set aside for those in
need, and embroils the community spouse in litigation with the State. Still,
it is axiomatic that the obligation of the court is to “take statutes as we find
3

Morenz I also noted that “[e]lsewhere in Connecticut General Statutes, Title 17b,
when the Connecticut legislature has seen fit to strictly limit the application of state law to
particular circumstances, it has used the phrase “only if.” Id. (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. §
17b–271 (“An agreement with the Commissioner of Social Services under section 17b–
267 may be terminated . . . (2) by the Commissioner of Social Services . . . only if he finds .
. . .”)). Id. at 403. As discussed supra, the legislature amended § 17b-285 to include this
“only if” language.
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them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by legislative history and statutory
purpose.” . . . In the absence of ambiguity in either the federal or state
statutes, I have no alternative but to grant summary judgment in favor of
the Morenzes.
Id. at 407.
2. Second Circuit Decision
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
the Morenzes, confirming that Mr. Morenz had made a valid assignment under the
former § 17b-285. The court noted that the provisions of the former § 17b-285 “could not
be less ambiguous,” 415 F.3d at 234, and in rejecting the defendant State of Connecticut’s
interpretation of its statute, the court reasoned, “[b]y using the word ‘shall,’ the statute
constitutes a mandate to institutionalized Medicaid applicants whose spouses have not
provided information, but it does not by its terms limit the circumstances under which an
institutionalized applicant may assign support rights.” 415 F.3d at 236 (emphasis in
original).
Though Morenz II construed an earlier version of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-285,
nothing in the Second Circuit’s opinion suggests that greater state limitations on
permissible assignments of rights would conflict with federal law. Indeed, the court noted,
“[a]lthough federal law prohibits a community spouse’s assets from preventing an
institutionalized spouse from becoming eligible for Medicaid when all support rights are
assigned to the State, whether a particular assignment of support rights is valid for
purposes of § 1396r-5(c)(3)(A) is a question of state law.” Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
B. Conflict Preemption
Conflict pre-emption, which Plaintiff maintains is dispositive of both summary
judgment motions, “occurs when compliance with both state and federal law is
10

impossible, or when the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objective[s] of Congress,” United States v. Locke, 529
U.S. 89, 109 (2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). State law is in
“irreconcilable conflict” with federal law, and hence preempted by federal law, when
compliance with the state statute would frustrate the purposes of the federal scheme.
Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, 542 F.3d 341, 351 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Rice v.
Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)).
In analyzing Plaintiff’s claim of conflict preemption, the Court presumes that the
state law is constitutional. Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at Local Level, Inc.,
430 U.S. 259, 272 (1977). Where, as with Medicaid, “coordinate state and federal efforts
exist within a complementary administrative framework, and in the pursuit of common
purposes, the case for federal pre–emption [is] a less persuasive one.” New York State
Dep’t of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973); see also Pharm. Research &
Mfrs. Of Am. v. Meadows, 304 F.3d 1197, 1206 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Medicaid is one of
several cooperative state-federal program covered by the Social Security Act, and the
Supreme Court has suggested that preemption for these types of programs may be
difficult to establish.”).
In ruling on the Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, this Court focused
on the general Medicaid provisions §§ 1396a(a)(1)(45) and 1396k, and concluded at that
initial stage that there appeared to be a likelihood of success on the merits on the issue of
irreconcilable demands of both the federal general assignability provisions and the
Connecticut statutes limiting assignments of support rights of institutionalized persons,
and that the balance of hardships weighed in favor of maintaining the status quo to
permit Mr. Fortmann to remain in his nursing home. Mr. Fortmann is now deceased and
11

a fuller record and more fulsome briefing of the conflict preemption issue and the Morenz
decisions have been provided. Based on this developed record, and the thoughtful
analyses of counsel in briefing and at oral argument, the Court concludes that the
requirements of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-285 do not conflict with the federal Medicaid
provisions of § 1396r-5 that “supercede any other provision of this title . . . which is
inconsistent with them” for the following reasons.
Morenz II explained how the generalized assignment requirement under § 1396k
interfaced with the more specific spousal assignment provision, 1396r-5(c)(3), noting that
“whether a particular assignment of support rights is valid for purposes of § 1396r5(c)(3)(A) is a question of state law,” 415 F.3d at 235, and that
[i]t is this fact that enables the two requirements of support rights
assignments to be comfortably consistent. The first—the federal
requirement that such an assignment be made under § 1396k(a)(1)(A)—
can be read as mandating no more than that the institutionalized spouse
make what, on its face, would seem to be a valid assignment. The second—
one of three conditions precluding state denial of eligibility in § 1396r5(c)(3)—presupposes an assignment that is valid under state law.
Id. at 235 n.4 (emphasis in original). Applying Morenz II’s interpretation of
§ 1396k(a)(1)(A) as “mandating no more than that the institutionalized spouse make . . . a
valid assignment” and conclusion that MCCA’s § 1396r-5(c)(3) presupposes the existence
of valid assignments under state law, the Court looks to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-285 for
the definition of what constitutes a valid assignment for an institutionalized spouse under
Connecticut law. Using this approach, it is evident that these statutory provisions can coexist as written, and that section 17b-285, even as amended in the wake of the Morenz
decisions, does not “stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes” of the federal Medicaid provisions. Locke, 529 U.S. at 109. In effect, the

12

definition of assignment of spousal support rights for institutionalized persons provided
in § 17b-285 fills the gaps left by sections 1396k and 1396r-5.
The State Medicaid Manual (“SMM”) of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (“SMS”), relied upon in both Morenz I and II, provides support for this
conclusion. The manual’s directives are “official interpretations of the law and
regulations, and, as such, are binding on Medicaid State agencies.” (SMM, Ex. C-11 to
Def.’s 56(a)1 Stmt. at B.1.) The SMM describes “assigned support rights”:
[A] reasonable definition is: An assignment of a support right allowing
you to go against community spouses for reimbursement of some or all of
the medical care provided to institutional spouses. You must assess your
own State laws to determine what laws give rise to support rights and the
amount of medical costs community spouses are asked to cover and
whether you are limited to seeking support in the amount community
spouses’ resources exceed spousal allowances.
(SMM § 3261 (emphasis added).)
The SMM was characterized by the Second Circuit as “precisely the kind of
informal interpretation that warrants some significant measure of deference,” Morenz II,
415 F.3d at 235, and the CMS is considered to be “a highly expert agency” in cases
involving Medicare or Medicaid, Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 260 (2d Cir.
2009) (citing Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2008) (“CMS’s
interpretation is entitled to a great deal of persuasive weight.”)); see also Cmty. Health Ctr.
v. Wilson-Coker, 311 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2002) (“As the Supreme Court recently noted,
even relatively informal HCFA (now CMS) interpretations, such as letters from regional
administrators, ‘warrant[ ] respectful consideration’ due to the complexity of the statute
and the considerable expertise of the administering agency.” (quoting Wis. Dep’t of
Health & Fam. Servs., 534 U.S. at 479)).

13

The fact that the SMM directs states to “assess their own State laws” in order to
determine what conditions must be met to effectuate support rights assignments logically
implies that it is anticipated, and thus permissible, for a state to impose limitations on the
assignments of support rights in the institutionalized spouse context. In light of the
Second Circuit’s recognition in Morenz II that “the two requirements of support rights
assignments [are] comfortably consistent,” 415 F.3d at 235 n.4, the SMM’s instructions
on assigned support rights, and the “presumption of constitutionality to which every duly
enacted state and federal law is entitled,” Lockport, 430 U.S. at 272, particularly in the
context of Medicaid’s “cooperative federalism,” Wisconsin Dep’t of Health & Fam. Servs.,
534 U.S. at 495, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s position that § 17b-285 is preempted by
federal law.4
C. Whether Plaintiff Has Made a Valid Assignment Under Connecticut
Law
Having concluded that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-285 is not preempted by federal
law, the Court next must consider whether Plaintiff made a valid assignment of his
spousal support rights to the state under the applicable state law for assignment of spousal
support rights for institutionalized persons, i.e., § 17b-285, such that he should be
deemed eligible for Medicaid. As amended in the wake of the Morenz opinions, § 17b-285
establishes two requirements that must be met for an assignment to be valid: “an
institutionalized person . . . may assign . . . to the Commissioner of Social Services the

4

In light of the Court’s conclusion that § 17b-285 is not preempted, the Court
does not address Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff lacks a private cause of action to
assert his preemption argument (see Def’s Mem. Supp. [Doc. # 50–2] at 14–28).
14

right of support derived from the assets of the community spouse of such person but only
if”:
(1) the assets of the institutionalized person or person in need of
institutional care do not exceed the Medicaid program asset limit; and (2)
the institutionalized person or person in need of institutional care cannot
locate the community spouse; or the community spouse is unable to
provide information regarding his or her own assets.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-285 (emphasis added). Here, the second prong has not been
satisfied by Plaintiff, as the record is undisputed that Mrs. Fortmann’s location in New
Jersey is known and that she is able to provide information on her assets. Thus, Plaintiff
has not made a valid assignment under the operative Connecticut statute.
Plaintiff argues that even if the Court finds his assignment to be invalid under
§17b-285, he was entitled to assign his rights under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-215,
Connecticut’s general assignment of support rights statute. Section 46b-215, “Relatives
Obliged to Furnish Support,” states:
(a) (1) The Superior Court or a family support magistrate may make and
enforce orders for payment of support against any person who neglects
or refuses to furnish necessary support to such person’s spouse or a
child under the age of eighteen or as otherwise provided in this
subsection, according to such person’s ability to furnish such support,
notwithstanding the provisions of section 46b-37. If such child is
unmarried and a full-time high school student, such support shall
continue according to the parents’ respective abilities, if such child is
in need of support, until such child completes the twelfth grade or
attains the age of nineteen, whichever occurs first.
Plaintiff asserts that the limitation on assignments in §17b-285 does not apply to support
rights under § 46b-215, and thus, the State is authorized to commence support
proceedings against Mrs. Fortmann under § 46b-215, such that he should not be deemed
ineligible for Medicaid coverage.
15

The Court determined in its preliminary injunction ruling that Connecticut’s
general assignment of support rights provision § 46b-215 would not apply here because
the principle governing statutory interpretation requires, where possible, the application
of the more specific statute.5 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-215 does not bear on the
circumstances of this case, where Plaintiff only sought to exclude from his eligibility
determination for Medicaid consideration of Mrs. Fortmann’s resources. Such
circumstances are addressed by § 17b-285. Therefore, § 46b-215 is inapplicable here, and
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied on this ground.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-

285 is not preempted by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(45) or 1396k, given that § 1396r-5(c)(3)
contemplates that a state will provide its own definitions for the assignment of spousal
support rights in the institutionalized spouse context. See Morenz II, 415 F.3d at 235.
Because Plaintiff’s assignment of spousal support rights was invalid under § 17b-285,
Defendant’s motion [Doc. # 50] for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s
motion [Doc. # 46] is DENIED. The Clerk is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Janet Bond Arterton, U.S.D.J.

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 31st day of July, 2013.

5

Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that this issue has already been addressed and ruled
upon by the Court, but notes that he “briefly” raised the § 46b-215 issue again “in order to
preserve issues for the record.” (Pl.’s Mem. Supp. [Doc. # 48] at 4.)
16