Hailey v. Corrections et al
Filing
16
ORDER granting 12 Motion to Dismiss. See attached Memorandum of Decision. The Clerk is directed to terminate the case. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 12/14/11. (Hildebrand, J.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
WAYNE HAILEY,
Plaintiff,
:
:
:
v.
:
:
STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
:
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION;
:
FORMER ACTING COMMISSIONER :
AND DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BRIAN:
MURPHY IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;:
COMMISSIONER LEO C. ARNONE
:
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
:
CAPTAIN CARLOS BURGOS IN HIS :
INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL
:
CAPACITY; AND CAPTAIN DEBRA
:
SYNOTT IN HER INDIVIDUAL AND
:
OFFICIAL CAPACITY,
:
Defendants.
:
CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:10-cv-1787 (VLB)
December 14, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
[Dkt. #12]
Plaintiff, a former corrections officer of the State of Connecticut
Department of Correction [“DOC”] brings this action under 28 U.S.C. §2201, 42
U.S.C. §1981, and 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the DOC, Deputy Commissioner Brian
Murphy, Commissioner Leo Arnone, Captain Carlos Burgos, and Captain Debra
Synott seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive
damages, attorney’s fees and costs, and reinstatement to his position as a
Corrections Officer. Currently pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss the
Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, 12(b)(5) for
insufficient service of process, and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
I.
Factual Background
The following facts are taken from the Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff was
hired by the DOC as a corrections officer in April 2008. [Dkt. #1, Compl. ¶2].
Plaintiff contends that he remained in good standing with the DOC from April 25,
2008 until August 2008. [Id. at ¶3]. After Plaintiff received a poor evaluation dated
August 4, 2008 through September 3, 2008, Plaintiff claims that he was subjected
to harassment and discriminatory conduct on account of his race and color by
Defendants Synott and Burgos.
Plaintiff submitted an incident report on October 20, 2008 to explain the
issues that caused him to receive the poor evaluation. Plaintiff contends that after
the evaluation was signed by management, a third party, Lieutenant Meeker,
added negative information to the incident report as a result of a conversation he
had with Defendant Synott. [Dkt. #1, Compl. ¶10]. Plaintiff’s October 20, 2008
incident report raised what he reasonably believed to be incidents of employment
discrimination. [Id. at ¶12]. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he was severely
harassed by Defendant Synott, including being subjected to an accusation that
he “put his foot up on the job, and that this act showed complacency.” [Id. at
¶¶11, 13]. Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Synott asked Plaintiff where he
saw himself in the future, and informed him that she did not envision him
continuing to work in his position as a corrections officer in the future. [Id. at
¶14].
As further evidence of harassment, Plaintiff claims that on October 3, 2008,
Officer Cuevas, while touring the unit, informed Plaintiff that he noticed for the
second time that Plaintiff had his feet up on the job, and that if it happened again
Plaintiff would be escorted off the job. On the same occasion, Officer Cuevas
instructed Plaintiff to stand for lieutenants entering the unit. [Dkt. #1, Compl.
¶¶15-16]. After these incidents, Plaintiff felt that his position as a corrections
officer was in jeopardy. [Id. at ¶17].
On October 7, 2008, Plaintiff was called to Captain Easton’s office. Captain
Easton had been informed about Plaintiff’s evaluation, and suggested that
Plaintiff go through the proper chain of command to speak with Defendant
Synnot to mitigate any conflict. [Dkt. #1, Compl. ¶18]. On October 13, 2008,
Plaintiff called the Lieutenant’s office to request a meeting with Defendant
Synnot, and was granted permission to speak with her. Upon arrival at Defendant
Synnot’s office, Synnot informed him that Defendant Burgos would be present
during the conversation. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Burgos then criticized
Plaintiff for coming to speak to Defendant Synnot without following the chain of
command. [Id. at ¶19]. After Plaintiff informed Defendant Burgos that he had
followed the chain of command and obtained permission from the Lieutenant’s
office to speak with Defendant Synnot, Plaintiff claims that Captain Synnot stated
to Plaintiff that it was her opinion that her character was being unjustifiably
slandered throughout the department. [Id. at ¶¶20-21]. Plaintiff further alleges that
Defendant Synnot and Defendant Burgos questioned Plaintiff regarding his
relationships with others in the Department of Corrections, and who he had
spoken to about Defendant Synnot. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Synnot
informed Plaintiff that she was aware that Plaintiff had an uncle who worked in
the New Haven Correctional Center. [Id. at ¶22]. Defendant Burgos then stated,
almost yelling, at Plaintiff, “I don’t care who you know. You can know a warden,
you can be related to a commissioner, I don’t care. I will do paperwork,” and
threatened to walk Plaintiff out of the facility. Plaintiff was then dismissed from
the office to return to his unit. [Id. at ¶23].
Plaintiff contends that as a result of these incidents he feared that he would
lose his job, he feared for his safety, and that he is not aware of any white
corrections officers treated in a similarly hostile and intimidating manner.[Dkt. #1,
Compl. ¶24]. Plaintiff contacted his union representative James Outlaw to
discuss what he believed to be discriminatory treatment at his work and to obtain
information regarding the filing of a civil rights complaint . [Id. at ¶¶24-25].
Plaintiff contends that immediately following his conversation with his union
representative, Defendants Synott and Burgos moved to have Plaintiff terminated
from his job. [Id.]
Plaintiff was terminated from his employment with the DOC on December 9,
2008. [Dkt. #1, Compl. ¶3]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Synott and Burgos
subjected him to harassment and discrimination, and ultimately colluded to seek
Plaintiff’s termination on the basis of his expressed interest in pursuing a civil
rights complaint. [Dkt. #1, Compl. ¶¶29-30]. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants Synott and Burgos made statements critical of the Plaintiff in incident
reports dated October 15, 2008 and October 16, 2008. [Dkt. #1, Compl. ¶8].
Plaintiff argues that the incidents discussed in the incident reports allegedly
occurred on September 18, 19 and 26, 2008 but were not documented in incident
reports until after Defendant Synott learned of Plaintiff’s intention to file an
Affirmative Action complaint alleging that he had been subjected to
discriminatory treatment in the workplace. [Id. at ¶9]. Plaintiff notes that
Defendant Synnott’s October 15, 2008 incident report specifically referenced
Officer Outlaw’s pending Affirmative Action Complaint. [Id. at ¶26]. Plaintiff
contends that white corrections officers who did not file civil rights complaints
were not terminated from their positions within the DOC. [Id. at ¶47].
II.
Standard of Review
The standards of review for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim are
“substantively identical.” Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 128 (2d. Cir.
2003). However, on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the party invoking
the Court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that subject
matter jurisdiction exists, whereas the movant bears the burden of proof on a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. In deciding both types of motions, the
Court “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw
inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In
re AIG Advisor Group Sec. Litig., 309 Fed. App’x. 495, 497 (2d Cir. 2009). “To
survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
III.
Discussion
A. Deficiencies in Service of Process
The Court finds the Plaintiff’s flagrant deficiencies of service of process
necessitate the dismissal of his claims against the Defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P
4(m) requires a plaintiff to serve his complaint on the defendants within 120 days
after the complaint is filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Although the Court may extend
the time for service upon a showing of good cause by the plaintiff, in the absence
of good cause, the Court may deny such extensions and dismiss the action. See
Harper v. City of New York, 424 Fed.Appx. 36, 39 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[w]e have
interpreted the Rule to give courts both the discretion to grant extensions of the
period of service even where no good cause has been shown and, in the absence
of good cause, to deny such extensions—that is, a court ‘may grant an extension
. . . but it is not required to do so.’ ”) (citing Zapata v. City of New York, 502 F.3d
192, 197 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Gerena v. Korb, 617 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2010)
(affirming the dismissal of a case where the plaintiff served a defendant well
outside the 120 day time period required by Rule 4(m) and the plaintiff had neither
sought nor received an extension of time to serve a defendant); Bogle-Assegai v.
Connecticut, 470 F.3d 498, 508-509(2d Cir. 2006) (affirming a district court’s
dismissal for failure to timely effect service of process under Rule 4(m) where the
plaintiff “made no effort to show good cause for her failure and never requested
an extension of time”). Plaintiff did not request an extension of time to serve the
Defendants, nor has Plaintiff even attempted to demonstrate good cause for his
failure to do so. Accordingly, all of the Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants
are dismissed.
The Court further notes that Plaintiff has failed to serve Defendants Burgos
and Synott in their individual capacities. Connecticut law requires that “an
individual who is an officer or employee of the State but is not sued as such,”
must be served by leaving the summons and complaint with the defendant or at
his usual place of abode. Bogle-Assegai, 470 F.3d at 507 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat.
§52-57(a)). Plaintiff’s only response to Defendants’ assertion in their Motion to
Dismiss that Defendants Burgos and Synott have not been served in their
individual capacities was to comment that “the Plaintiff states that on information
and belief, the individual defendants had agreed to waive personal service of the
Writ, Summons and Complaint,” absent any evidence or supporting affidavit.
Therefore, due to the Plaintiff’s flagrant deficiencies of service of process and
failure to demonstrate of good cause, the Court dismisses all of the Plaintiff’s
claims against the Defendants.
Lastly, the Court notes that even if the Court were to exercise its discretion
to overlook the deficiencies in service of process, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
would be granted on other grounds. First, Plaintiff’s claim for money damages
against the Defendants in their official capacity must be dismissed as barred by
the Eleventh Amendment. See Respass v. Murphy, No.3:10-cv-318, 2010 WL
2232674, at *2 (D. Conn. June 2, 2010) (finding that §1983 claims for damages
against defendants in their official capacities barred by the Eleventh Amendment
which protects state from suits for monetary relief and also protects state
officials sued in their official capacity) (citations omitted); Will v. Michigan Dep’t
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her
official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather against the official’s
office”).
Second, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to be reinstated to his position as
a corrections officer, such claim is denied, as reinstatement to an employment
position as compensation for past instances of allegedly discriminatory conduct
is not considered prospective equitable relief pursuant to Ex Parte Young. AA v.
Board of Educ., 196 F.Supp.2d 259, 267 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
Third, although Plaintiff’s claim for prospective injunctive relief against the
Defendants’ “de facto policy of failing to equally enforce or administer discipline
relative to internal DOC Administrative Directive 2.17,” [Dkt. #1, Compl. ¶61],
raises on ongoing violation as required by the Ex Parte Young doctrine, Plaintiff’s
complaint includes no allegations of discriminatory animus as required to sustain
a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1981. See Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d
206 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that “a plaintiff pursuing a claimed violation of §1981
or denial of equal protection under §1983 must show that the discrimination was
intentional.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed for failure to “state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009).
Fourth, Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief, seeking “a declaration of his
rights and remedies,” [Dkt. #1, Compl. ¶50], is completely improper as declaratory
judgment cannot be used “solely to adjudicate [a defendant’s] past conduct.”
Simso v. State of Connecticut, No. 3:06-CV-301(PCD), 2006 WL 3422194, at *8
(D.Conn Nov. 28. 2006).
IV.
Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing reasoning, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants must be dismissed due to
Plaintiff’s service of the complaint upon the Defendants 177 days following the
filing of the complaint, nearly sixty days after the 120 day period required by Fed.
R. Civ. P. (4)(m), without any demonstration of good cause or a motion for
extension of time. Additionally, Plaintiff failed to serve Defendants Synott and
Burgos in their individual capacities as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. §52-57(a).
Lastly, the Court notes that even absent such deficiencies in service of process,
Plaintiff’s claims would be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and under Fed.
R. Civ P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: December 14, 2011.
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