Thompson v. Reeve et al

Filing 29

ORDER: Ruling on Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 26 ). Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 3/4/2013. (Gallagher, Robyn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
------------------------------x
MEL THOMPSON,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
SUSAN C. REEVE,
:
MICHELLE T. ANGERS,
:
ALAN GANNUSCIO,
:
CARL CICCHETTI,
:
CHUCK DELLAROCCO,
:
CHASE T. ROGERS, in her
:
administrative capacity as
:
head of Connecticut Judicial :
Branch, WILLIAM J. LAVERY, in :
his official capacity as
:
Chief Court Administrator of :
Connecticut Judicial Branch, :
BARBARA M. QUINN, in her
:
official capacity as Chief
:
Court Administrator of
:
Connecticut Judicial Branch, :
and PAUL HARTAN,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:
------------------------------x

Civil No. 3:11CV31(AWT)

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
The plaintiff, Mel Thompson, asserts fifteen claims, each
arising out of actions taken by the defendants, in their capacity
as Connecticut State employees, relating to the administration of
a case in Connecticut Superior Court in which the plaintiff was a
defendant.

The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint on

the grounds that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
under the Eleventh Amendment, and the motion to dismiss is being
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granted.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In April 2007, the plaintiff was sued in Connecticut

Superior Court for breach of contract and on other claims.

See

Martin Mendoza v. Mel Thompson, Doc. No. UWY CV07 5011712 (Conn.
Super. Ct.).

The plaintiff filed a counterclaim, in which he

also alleged breach of contract.

The Superior Court bifurcated

the trial under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-205, which resulted in the
plaintiff was not being allowed to present evidence relevant to
his counterclaim in the trial of the breach of contract claim
against him.

Thompson claims this evidence was central to his

defense to the breach of contract claim against him.

The

plaintiff also claims that during the course of the litigation he
was denied access to the state's electronic filing system, under
Conn. Prac. Book § 4-4, because of his pro se status and that
this was especially prejudicial because opposing counsel failed
to send him copies of filings made electronically.

Finally, the

plaintiff claims that, unlike his opponent's counsel, who is a
licensed Connecticut attorney, he was unable to issue subpoenas
under Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-143 and 52-148e without first
obtaining the Superior Court's permission and that "said subpoena
was limited to only court hearings and not depositions or the
discovery process in general."

(Am. Comp'l ¶ 41.)

The plaintiff was granted an extension of time within which

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to file an appeal from an order issuing a prejudgment remedy.
The plaintiff alleges that there was a 40 day delay in notifying
him that he was missing the Court Reporters Acknowledgment form.
He called and left a voice mail message complaining about the
delay but did not receive a response.

His appeal was dismissed

as having been filed late.
The plaintiff filed a second appeal.

On July 31, 2010, the

plaintiff was notified that his appeal would be dismissed if he
did not submit a completed Court Reporters Acknowledgment form.
On August 10, 2010, the plaintiff submitted a Court Reporters
Acknowledgment form.

The plaintiff's appeal was dismissed on

August 23, 2010 because the Court Reporters Acknowledgment form
was not fully completed.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) when the court lacks
the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the claim.
See Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187
(2d Cir. 1996).

On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the party

asserting subject matter jurisdiction "bears the buren of proving
subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence."
Aurechione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d
Cir. 2005).

When reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, the court may consider evidence

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outside the pleadings.

See

Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d

110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).
Otherwise, the standards for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) are identical.

See Lerner v. Fleet Bank,

N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2004).

When deciding a motion

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all
factual allegations in the complaint and must draw inferences in
a light most favorable to the plaintiff.
U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

Although a complaint “does not need

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 550, 555 (2007), citing Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)(on a motion to dismiss, courts “are not
bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation”).

“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked

assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”

Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

“Factual allegations must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,
on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).”
omitted).

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations

However, the plaintiff must plead “only enough facts

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to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
at 570.

Id.

“The function of a motion to dismiss is ‘merely to

assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the
weight of the evidence which might be offered in support
thereof.’”

Mytych v. May Dept. Store Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 130,

131 (D. Conn. 1999), quoting Ryder Energy Distribution v. Merrill
Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984).

“The

issue on a motion to dismiss is not whether the plaintiff will
prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence
to support his claims.”

United States v. Yale New Haven Hosp.,

727 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Conn. 1990) (citing Scheuer, 416 U.S.
at 232).
In its review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, the court may consider “only the facts alleged in the
pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by
reference in the pleadings and matters of which judicial notice
may be taken.”

Samuels v. Air Transport Local 504, 992 F.2d 12,

15 (2d Cir. 1993).
When considering the sufficiency of the allegations in a pro
se complaint, the court applies “less stringent standards than
[those applied to] formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Branham v. Meachum,
77 F.3d 626, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1996).

Furthermore, the court

should interpret the plaintiff’s complaint “to raise the

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strongest arguments [it] suggest[s].”

Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d

787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994).
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The defendants argue that the court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

"Rooker-

Feldman directs federal courts to abstain from considering claims
when four requirements are met: (1) the plaintiff lost in state
court, (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the
state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff invites district court
review of that judgment, and (4) the state court judgment was
entered before the plaintiff's federal suit commenced."
McKitchen v. Brown (McKitchen II), 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir.
2010).

Rooker-Feldman occupies a "narrow ground."

Skinner v.

Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011)."'If a federal plaintiff
present[s] [an] independent claim,' it is not an impediment to
the exercise of federal jurisdiction that the 'same or a related
question' was earlier aired between the parties in state court.'"
Id. (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S.
294, 292-93 (2005)) (alterations in original).

Therefore, while

"a state-court decision is not reviewable by lower federal
courts, . . . a statute or rule governing the decision may be
challenged in a federal action."

Id. at 1298.

The plaintiff's amended complaint contains fifteen counts

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that can be divided into two broad categories: (1) those
challenging the constitutionality of provisions of the
Connecticut General Statutes and sections of the Connecticut
Practice Book that were applied during the course of the trial
(counts seven through fifteen); and (2) those challenging the
constitutionality of actions taken by clerk's office staff in the
Superior Court in dismissing the two appeals the plaintiff took
to challenge the trial court's judgment (counts one through six).
While the claims in the first category raise factual and
legal issues that are the same or related to issues raised before
the state court, each count presents a claim that is independent
of those decided by the state court.

Rather than seeking an

appeal of determinations made by the state court, the plaintiff
is challenging as unconstitutional the statutes or rules that
governed those decisions.

Therefore, Rooker-Feldman does not

operate as a bar this court's jurisdiction over counts seven
through fifteen.

See Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298

(2011) ("[A] state-court decision is not reviewwable by lower
federal courts, but a statute or rule governing the decision may
be challenged in a federal action.")
In the counts in the second category, the plaintiff asks
this court to declare that the decisions by the defendants
dismissing his appeals were unconstitutional (declaratory relief)
and to require that the appeals be reinstated (injunctive

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relief).

These counts directly challenge the decisions made by

the Connecticut Superior Court to dismiss the plaintiff's
appeals.

Therefore, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over counts one
through six.
B.

The Eleventh Amendment

As to the remaining counts, the defendants argue that the
court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment because the plaintiff seeks solely retrospective
relief.

The court agrees.

The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State."

U.S. Const. amend. XI.

"[T]he

Supreme Court has consistently held that the federal courts lack
jurisdiction not only over suits against a state brought by
citizens of other states, as the literal language of the
Amendment provides, but also over suits against such states
brought by their own citizens."

Dwyer v. Regan, 777 F.2d 825,

835 (2d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
The landmark case of Ex parte Young, created an
exception to this general principle by asserting that a
suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action in enforcing state law is not one
against the State.
The theory of Young was that an
unconstitutional statute is void, and therefore does not
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"impart
to
[the
official]
any
immunity
from
responsibility to the supreme authority of the United
States."
Young also held that the Eleventh Amendment
does not prevent federal courts from granting prospective
relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law.
We have refused to extend the reasoning of Young,
however, to claims for retrospective relief.
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (quoting Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908)) (internal citations omitted)
(alterations in original).

The Supreme Court has distinguished

between prospective relief and retrospective relief because while
"[r]emedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law
are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the
supremacy of that law . . . compensatory or deterrence interests
are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh
Amendment."

Id.

The plaintiff has sued each of the defendants in their
official capacities seeking purely retrospective relief.

In each

count of his amended complaint, the plaintiff states that he is
seeking relief in the form of a declaratory judgment.

(See Am.

Comp'l for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 387, 388, 404,
405, 421, 422, 437, 438, 439, 454, 455, 456, 471, 472, 473, 488,
489, 490, 509, 510, 528, 529).

These counts allege that the

plaintiff's rights were violated during the administration of the
Connecticut Superior Court case.

It is clear in each paragraph

that the plaintiff is asserting a claim that his rights were
violated in the context of the case in Superior Court, rather

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than a claim that there is a continuing violation of law that the
request for declaratory relief is designed to address.

(See,

e.g., ¶ 387 ("The plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-205 is unconstitutional in that it lacks
any policy, procedure or test that would dictate when and if
Superior Court Judge Kevin Dubay could have bifurcated a trial in
the case of Martin Mendoza v. Mel Thompson."(emphasis added))).
The plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief precluding
enforcement of the judgment against him in the Superior Court
case are even more explicitly retrospective relief aimed at
addressing alleged violations caused by the state employees
during the administration of his case.

(See ¶¶ 389, 406, 423,

440, 457, 474, 491, 511, 530.)
IV.

CONCLUSION
Because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 26) is hereby GRANTED.
The Clerk shall close this case.
It is so ordered.
Dated this 4th day of March 2013, at Hartford, Connecticut.

/s/AWT
Alvin W. Thompson
United States District Judge

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