Buxbaum v. St. Vincent's Health Services, Inc. et al
Filing
69
ORDER denying 55 Motion to Compel as set forth in the attached Ruling. Signed by Judge Holly B. Fitzsimmons on 10/16/2012. (Garcia, M.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
BARRY BUXBAUM
:
:
:
v.
:
:
ST. VINCENT‟S HEALTH SERVICES,:
INC., ST. VINCENT‟S MEDICAL
:
CENTER, INC. AND ST. VINCENT‟S:
SPECIAL NEEDS CENTER, INC.
:
CIV. NO. 3:11CV117 (WWE)
RULING REGARDING PLAINTIFF‟S MOTION TO COMPEL [DOC. # 55]
On September 27 and October 11, 2012, the Court held
telephone status conferences to address plaintiff‟s pending
motion to compel. [doc. # 55]. Much progress was made by the
parties in narrowing the issues first brought before the Court.
The Court will now address the following three items, which
remain unresolved: the examination of Luisa Sierra‟s
workstation, the production of the CFC contract, and the
production of the defendants‟ financial statements. For the
reasons that follow, the plaintiff‟s motion to compel production
of these three categories is DENIED. In all other respects, the
motion to compel is DENIED as MOOT.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets
forth the scope and limitations of permissible discovery.
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any
party.
For good cause, the court may order discovery of any
matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.
Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Information
that is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence is considered relevant for the purposes of
discovery.
See Daval Steel Prods. v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F.2d
1357, 1367 (2d Cir. 1991); Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co., 122 F.R.D. 447, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
With regard to the discovery of electronically stored
information, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a
party to “produce and permit the party making the request ... to
inspect, copy, test, or sample any ... electronically stored
information.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(a). This right to information
however, is counterbalanced by a responding party's
confidentiality or privacy interests. Notes of Advisory
Committee on 2006 Amendments. “A party is therefore not entitled
to „a routine right of direct access to a party's electronic
information system, although such access might be justified in
some circumstances.‟” Genworth Financial Wealth Management, Inc.
v. McMullan, 267 F.R.D. 443 (D. Conn. 2010) (quoting Notes of
Advisory Committee on 2006 Amendments).
Luisa Sierra workstation
Luisa Sierra was plaintiff‟s secretary while plaintiff
worked at St. Vincent‟s. Plaintiff seeks to compel a copy of the
contents of Ms. Sierra‟s computer workstation prior to October
16, 2009, the date plaintiff resigned. Plaintiff argues that
Sierra‟s workstation is relevant to show that Sierra managed
plaintiff‟s computer files and folders. Defendants counter that
Sierra‟s workstation is irrelevant to plaintiff‟s age
discrimination and defamation claims, especially in light of the
fact that plaintiff is not claiming Sierra was responsible for
the pornographic materials found on Buxbaum‟s computer, which
ultimately led to Buxbaum‟s resignation.
Plaintiff has failed to assert any legitimate basis to
justify a wholesale examination of Sierra‟s workstation. There
is simply no nexus between Sierra‟s work station and the
pornographic files located on Buxbaum‟s computer. See Genworth
Financial Wealth, 267 F.R.D. 443 (requiring a nexus between
plaintiff‟s claims and its need to obtain a mirror image of the
defendant‟s computer‟s hard drive).
The argument that the
contents of Sierra‟s computer are necessary to show that Sierra
managed Buxbaum‟s files and folders is unavailing; this
information would be found on Buxbaum‟s computer, not Sierra‟s.
It is hardly surprising and not persuasive that searches of
Buxbaum‟s work station returned over 1000 hits with Sierra‟s
name, and four files1 that were authored and/or transferred by
Sierra. Considering the fact that plaintiff has had an
opportunity to depose Sierra and inquire of the work she did for
Buxbaum, the burden and privacy interests of the defendants, the
length of time that has elapsed since Buxbaum‟s resignation, and
the lack of any showing that an examination of Sierra‟s
workstation would lead to the discovery of otherwise unavailable
admissible information, plaintiff‟s motion is DENIED.
CFC Contract
Plaintiff seeks to compel defendants to produce the
contract between defendants and CFC, the third-party service
provider who serviced, maintained, and managed the computers
during the time that defendants accused plaintiff of accessing
or downloading pornographic materials. [doc. # 55-5 at 6, RFP #
7]. Defendants argue that the information is confidential and
proprietary and not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible information. [Id.]. The contract
requested is simply not relevant to the age discrimination and
defamation claims in this case, which will focus on what
defendants believed at the time that they learned of the
pornographic materials on plaintiff‟s computer and confronted
him with that information. As such, the motion to compel is
DENIED.
1
Notably, the files authored or transferred by Sierra were not the
pornographic images found on Buxbaum‟s computer.
Financial Statements
Plaintiff seeks to compel defendants to produce financial
information, such as financial statements, budget information,
and limits relating to salaries, compensation and bonuses,
arguing that such information could “reveal whether the reason
given for Mr. Buxbaum‟s forced resignation was pretextual”.
[doc. # 55-4 at 16].
Defendants argue that the information is
confidential and proprietary and not reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible information. [doc. # 60 at
23]. Aside from presenting a what-if scenario, plaintiff has
made no showing to suggest that the defendants‟ financial
situation contributed to the defendants‟ decision to confront
plaintiff about the pornographic materials found on his computer
and offer him the opportunity to resign.
The Court finds that
the information sought is not relevant to plaintiff‟s age
discrimination and defamation claims on this record, and as such
the motion to compel is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, plaintiff‟s motion to compel [doc. # 55] on
the three remaining items is DENIED. This is not a Recommended
Ruling. This is a discovery ruling or order which is reviewable
pursuant to the “clearly erroneous” statutory standard of
review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); and D.
Conn. L. Civ. R. 72.2. As such, it is an order of the Court
unless reversed or modified by the district judge upon motion
timely made.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport this 16th day of October 2012.
_____________/s/__________
HOLLY B. FITZSIMMONS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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