Buxbaum v. St. Vincent's Health Services, Inc. et al

Filing 99

ORDER denying as moot 76 Defendants' Motion to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff; denying as moot 79 Plaintiff's Cross-Motion to Compel Depositions of Susan Davis and Pamela Tarulli; denying as moot 84 Defendants' Motion for Protect ive Order; and granting in part and denying in part 82 Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Third Party Computer Science Corporation's Response to Subpoena Duces Tecum, as set forth in the attached Discovery Ruling. The parties' letters dated December 18 and 19, 2012 will be docketed by the Clerk. Signed by Judge Holly B. Fitzsimmons on 01/07/2013. (Katz, Samantha)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
BARRY BUXBAUM

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v.
ST. VINCENT’S HEALTH
SERVICES, INC., ET AL

CIV. NO. 3:12CV117 (WWE)

DISCOVERY RULING
Plaintiff brings this age discrimination case against
defendants, St. Vincent’s Health Services, Inc., St. Vincent’s
Medical Center, Inc., and St. Vincent’s Special Needs Services,
Inc., pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1969, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. [Sec. Am. Compl., Doc. #31].
Plaintiff alleges that until October 16, 2009, he had been an
executive for nearly 30 years with defendant, St. Vincent’s
Special Needs Center, and its predecessors.

[Id. at ¶13].

Plaintiff was allegedly discharged and/or forced to resign
because pornographic and sexually explicit materials were found
on his computer system. [Id. at ¶28].

Following his discharge,

plaintiff alleges that defendant, St. Vincent’s Health Services,
hired his replacement who has “questionable qualifications” and
is younger than plaintiff.

[Id. at ¶ 32].

Plaintiff alleges

that the basis for his discharge and/or forced resignation is
pretext. [Id. at ¶33].

1

A discovery conference was held on December 17, 2012, to
resolve outstanding discovery motions and other discovery
disputes, including: defendants’ motion to compel deposition of
plaintiff [Doc. #76]; plaintiff’s cross-motion to compel
depositions of Susan Davis and Pamela Tarulli [Doc. #79];
plaintiff’s motion to compel third-party Computer Science
Corporation’s response to subpoena duces tecum [Doc. #82]; and
defendants’ motion for protective order and sanctions [Doc.
#84].1

The parties submitted an agenda in advance of the case

management conference held on December 17, 2012. A follow-up
telephone status conference was held on January 3, 2013.
1.

Issue 1 of Discovery Agenda: Defendants’ Motion to Compel
Deposition of Plaintiff [Doc. #76] and Scheduling Deposition
of Plaintiff’s Wife
At the case management conference, the plaintiff indicated

no objection to defendants’ taking the deposition of plaintiff’s
wife prior to the deposition of plaintiff.

The parties shall

agree on a date certain for the deposition of plaintiff’s wife.
Should the parties fail to agree, they are directed to contact
chambers to resolve the scheduling of this deposition.
Defendants filed a motion to compel the deposition of
1 Defendants reported to the Court that the parties resolved the

issues underlying the motion for protective order and sanctions
[Doc. #84]. The parties also reported that the deposition of
third-party witness Kevin Conway had been set on an agreed date.
Accordingly, based upon the representations of the parties,
defendants’ motion for protective order and sanctions [Doc. #84]
is DENIED as moot.
2

plaintiff [Doc. #76].

During the follow up status conference,

the plaintiff offered dates for the plaintiff’s deposition:
January 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25, 2013.

Defendants’ counsel

represented that she would confirm a date with her clients for
plaintiff’s deposition by the end of the day on January 3, 2013.
The parties shall report back to the court via email, by January
11, 2013, as to the confirmed date for plaintiff’s deposition.
Accordingly, in light of the parties’ representations at
the case management and follow up status conferences,
defendants’ motion to compel the deposition of plaintiff [Doc.
#76] is DENIED as moot.
2.

Issue 2 of Discovery Agenda: Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion to
Compel Depositions of Susan Davis and Pamela Tarulli [Doc.
#79]
At the case management and status conferences, the parties

discussed scheduling Susan Davis and Pamela Tarulli’s
depositions.
Services.

Davis is CEO of defendant, St. Vincent’s Health

Tarulli is a non-party witness who resides out of

state, and is the former Vice President of Human Resources for
defendant, St. Vincent’s Health Services.

Plaintiff filed a

cross-motion to compel the depositions of Davis and Tarulli.
For the reasons that follow, the cross-motion to compel [Doc.
#79] is DENIED as moot.
The parties agree to conduct the deposition of Davis on
January 18, 2013.

3

The parties raised issues with both the date and location
of Tarulli’s deposition.

Defendants’ counsel indicated at the

case management conference that Tarulli lives in Pennsylvania,
but works in Suffern, New York. Defendants requested that
plaintiff conduct the deposition near Tarulli’s place of work.
The parties proposed conducting Tarulli’s deposition in
Stamford, Connecticut.

Following the case management

conference, the Court received correspondence from the
defendants stating that Tarulli works in Port Jervis, New York,
and suffers from a heart condition which prevents her from
traveling long distances.

According to the defendants, Tarulli

would not be able to sit for a deposition in Stamford,
Connecticut. At the follow up status conference, plaintiff
reported that he subpoenaed Tarulli to appear for a deposition
in Stamford, Connecticut on January 14, 2013.

Plaintiff now

agrees to conduct the deposition of Tarulli in Port Jervis, New
York.

Defendants furthermore agree to produce Tarulli for the

deposition on January 14, 2013.
Tarulli shall appear for deposition on January 14, 2013, in
Port Jervis, New York, unless good cause is shown why she cannot
appear that day.

Defendants are furth directed to provide

plaintiff with a letter from Tarulli’s physician verifying her
health condition(s).
Accordingly, in light of the representations of the

4

parties, plaintiff’s cross-motion to compel [Doc. #79] is denied
as moot.
3.

Issue 3: Motion to Compel Computer Science Corporation’s
Responses to Subpoena Duces Tecum [Doc. #82]
a. Background
Non-party Computer Science Corporation (“CSC”) is a third

party vendor that was running defendants’ day-to-day IT and
computer operations. On November 7, 2012, plaintiff served CSC
with a subpoena duces tecum seeking documents in advance of the
deposition of CSC employee, Kevin Conway. The parties report
that CSC has agreed to produce all documents requested by
plaintiff’s subpoena, except for certain emails between
defendants’ in-house counsel and CSC regarding efforts to
preserve electronic data and the discovery of pornographic
materials on plaintiff’s computer. Defendants have provided the
documents at issue for an in camera review along with a
privilege log describing the nature of the documents.

At issue

are twenty one (21) emails, which defendants argue are protected
by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product
doctrine.
b. Legal Standard
The

attorney-client

privilege

protects

confidential

communications between client and counsel made for the purpose
of obtaining or providing legal assistance. United States v.

5

Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1996).
The Court construes the privilege narrowly because it renders
relevant

information

undiscoverable;

we

apply

it

“only

where

necessary to achieve its purpose.” Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 403 (1976); see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399
F.3d 527, 531 (2d Cir. 2005). The burden of establishing the
applicability of the privilege rests with the party invoking it.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2000);
United

States

v.

Int'l

Bhd.

of

Teamsters,

Chauffeurs,

Warehousemen and Helpers of Am., AFL-CIO, 119 F.3d 210, 214 (2d
Cir. 1997).
The Court uses a three-pronged standard for determining the
legitimacy
invoking

of

an

the

attorney-client

attorney-client

privilege

privilege

claim.

must

A

show

party
(1)

a

communication between client and counsel that (2) was intended
to be and was in fact kept confidential, and (3) was made for
the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice. In re County
of

Erie,

473

F.3d

413,

419

(2d

Research, Inc., 73 F.3d at 473.
privilege
privilege.

must

establish

Constr.

Prods.

Cir.

2007);

Constr.

Prods.

Again, the party asserting the

the

essential

Research,

Inc.,

elements
73

F.3d

of
at

the
473

(citing United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1499 (2d Cir.
1995)).
Moreover, “[t]he common interest rule extends the attorney

6

client

privilege

to

privileged

communications

revealed

to

a

third party who shares a common legal goal with the party in
possession of the original privilege.

The parties need not be

actively involved in litigation; they must, however, demonstrate
cooperation in formulating a common legal strategy.

The rule

does not encompass a joint business strategy that merely happens
to include as one of its elements a concern about litigation.”
TIFD

III-E,

Inc.

v.

U.S.,

223

F.R.D.

47,

50

(D.Conn.

2005)

(internal citations omitted); see also U.S. v. Kovel, 296 F.2d
918,

922

(2d

Cir.

1961)

(“the

attorney-client

privilege

can

attach to reports of third parties made at the request of the
attorney or the client where the purpose of the report was to
put in useable form information obtained from the client.”).
“[C]ourts

have

extended

the

attorney-client

privilege

to

communications made to investigators who have provided necessary
assistance to attorneys[…]”

Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc.,

271 F.R.D. 58, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (string citation omitted).
The standard in such circumstances is “whether the third-party
agent is supervised directly by an attorney and whether the
communications were intended to remain confidential.”

Id. at 72

(string citation omitted).
The work product protection, set forth in Federal Rule of
Civil

Procedure

26(b)(3)(A),

provides

that,

“[o]rdinarily,

a

party may not discover documents and tangible things that are

7

prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party or its representative (including the other party's
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent).”
“The

work-product

rule

shields

from

disclosure

materials

prepared ‘in anticipation of litigation’ by a party, or the
party's representative, absent a showing of substantial need.”
Adlman, 68 F.3d at 1501 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3)). “The
purpose of the doctrine is to establish a zone of privacy for
strategic

litigation

planning

and

to

prevent

one

party

from

piggybacking on the adversary's preparation.” Id. (citing see
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 2170,
45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) (“At its core, the work-product doctrine
shelters

the

mental

processes

of

the

attorney,

providing

a

privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his
client's case.”); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516, 67 S.Ct.
385, 396, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring) (work
product rule intended to insure that one side does not “perform
its

functions

...

on

wits

borrowed

from

the

adversary”);

Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, Chap. 5 at 1 (Tent.
Draft No. 6 1993) (“the doctrine seeks to preserve a zone of
privacy
opposing

in

which

a

counsel”)).

lawyer

can

However,

work

free

“documents

from

intrusion

prepared

in

by
the

ordinary course of business, or that otherwise would have been
prepared absent the prospect of litigation, do not receive work

8

product protection.”

Gucci, Am., Inc., 271 F.R.D. at 74 (citing

see U.S. v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998); see also
William a. Gross Constr. Assoc., Inc. v. Am. Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co.,
262 F.R.D. 354, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
As articulated in QBE Ins. Corp. v. Interstate Fire &
Safety Equip. Co., Inc., No. 3:07cv1883(SRU), 2011 WL 692982, at
*2

(D. Conn. Feb. 18, 2011),
In determining whether the work-product doctrine
applies, a court must undertake a two-step
analysis. First, it must decide whether the
sought “documents and tangible things” were
“prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or its
representative.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3)(A). The
party asserting work-product protection bears the
burden of proof on that step. If the party
asserting work-product protection meets its
burden, then the court moves to the second step
of analysis, which examines whether the evidence
is nonetheless discoverable. That requires the
party seeking discovery to show that the
documents and other tangible things are otherwise
discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1) and that the
party “cannot, without undue hardship, obtain
their substantial equivalent by other means.” Id.
c. Discussion
After in camera review, and a careful consideration of the

case law and CSC’s role as defendants’ “manager of day-to-day IT
and computer operations”, the Court finds as follows.
i. Six (6) Emails Dated October 29, 2009
Defendants assert an attorney-client and work product
privilege for six (6) emails dated October 29, 2009 between

9

Pamela Miller, Esq., St. Vincent’s Health Services’ in-house
counsel and director of risk management/legal services, and
Andrew Struzik, an employee of CSC acting as St. Vincent’s
Medical Center Site Manager. These documents relate to
preservation of plaintiff’s and Robert Trojanowski’s computers
and home folders. The Court finds that these documents do not
satisfy the third requirement of the attorney-client test, in
that they were not made for the purpose of obtaining or
providing legal advice.

Rather, the communications pertain to

factual explanations of the preservation of plaintiff’s and
Trojanowski’s computers. See, e.g., Urban Box Office Network,
Inc. v. Interfase Managers, L.P., No. 01 Civ. 8854(LTS)(THK),
2006 WL 1004472, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 17, 2006) (“[T]he
[attorney-client] privilege does not protect the client’s
knowledge of relevant facts, whether or not they were learned
from his counsel, or facts learned by the attorney from
independent sources.”) (citing Baptiste v. Cushman & Wakefield,
Inc., No. 03 Civ. 2102(RCC)(THK), 2004 WL 330235, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2004)).
Moreover, the Court finds that the work product privilege
does not shield the discovery of these emails. These
communications do not convey legal analysis, opinions, or mental
processes. Simply, defendants have failed to show that such
emails were prepared in anticipation of litigation, and not

10

generated “in the ordinary course of business, or [] otherwise
would have been prepared absent the prospect of litigation.”
Gucci, Am., Inc.., 271 F.R.D. at 74 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, defendants are to produce these emails to
plaintiff by January 8, 2013.
ii. Emails Dated October 26, 2009 re: Alerting Staff to `
Trojanowski’s Departure and Modifying Email Directories
Defendants assert an attorney-client privilege for two
emails dated October 26, 2009.

The first email is time stamped

12:08 P.M. and is from Miller to Tarulli and Deborah Peck, St.
Vincent’s Medical Center’s Human Resources Director.

The second

email is time stamped 2:57 P.M. and is from Tarulli to Miller
and Peck. John Glecker, St. Vincent’s Health Services’ CFO, is
copied on the email.

The Court finds that these documents do

not satisfy the third requirement of the attorney-client test,
in that they were not made for the purpose of obtaining or
providing legal advice.
Defendants also assert an attorney-client and work product
privilege for another dated October 26, 2009.

This email is

time stamped 2:57 P.M., and is from Tarulli forwarding her prior
email to Thornquist and Struzik.

Miller and Glecker are both

copied on this email. For the same reasons stated above, this
email does not satisfy the third requirement of the attorneyclient test.

Not only is the email not directly between counsel

11

and client, it was not made for the purpose of obtaining or
providing legal advice.

“A document is not privileged merely

because it was sent or received between an attorney and the
client.

The document must contain confidential communication

relating to legal advice.”

Sokol v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 07 Civ.

8442(SHS)(KNF), 2008 WL 3166662, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2008)
(quoting Dep’t of Econ Dev. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 139 F.R.D.
295, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).

The Court also finds that this email

is not shielded by work product protection as it does not convey
any substantive information.
Accordingly, defendants shall provide defendants with
copies of these three (3) emails by January 8, 2013.
iii. Emails Dated October 26, 2009 re: Access to Plaintiff
and Trojanowski Computers
Defendants assert an attorney-client and work product
privilege for three emails dated October 26, 2009.

The first

email is time stamped 3:08 P.M., and is from Thornquist to
Tarulli and Struzik.
email.

Miller and Glecker are copied on this

The second email is time stamped 3:10 P.M., and is from

Miller to Thornquist, Tarulli, and Struzik.

Glecker and John

Newman, Esq., St. Vincent’s Medical Center’s general counsel,
are copied on this email.

The third email is time stamped 3:43

P.M., and is from Tarulli to Miller, Thornquist, and Struzik.
Glecker and Newman are also copied on this email. By and large,

12

these emails do not satisfy the attorney-client test as the
communications do not appear to have been made to obtain, or
convey, legal advice.

These emails also are not shielded by

work product protection, as they do not convey legal analysis,
opinions, or mental processes. Simply, defendants have failed to
show that such emails were prepared in anticipation of
litigation, and not generated “in the ordinary course of
business, or [] otherwise would have been prepared absent the
prospect of litigation.”

Gucci, Am., Inc.., 271 F.R.D. at 74

(citations omitted).
Accordingly, defendants shall provide defendants with
copies of these three (3) emails by January 8, 2013.
iv. Emails Dated October 26, 2009 re: Modifying Email
Directories
Defendants again assert an attorney-client and work product
privilege for three emails dated October 26, 2009.

The first

email is time stamped 4:30 P.M., and is from Struzik to Miller.
Thornquist, Newman, Gleckler and Tarulli are copied on the
email.

The second email is time stamped 4:31 P.M., and is from

Tarulli to Struzik and Miller. Thornquist, Newman and Gleckler
are copied on this email.

The final email is time stamped 4:39

P.M. and is from Thornquist to Struzik and Miller. Newman,
Gleckler and Tarulli are copied on this email.
These emails again do not satisfy the third prong of the

13

attorney client test in that the communications were not made
for the purposes of obtaining or receiving legal advice.
Rather, the emails simply relay facts concerning the
modification of email directories.
privileged.

As such, they are not

See, e.g., Urban Box Office Network, 2006 WL

1004472, at *2, supra.
Additionally, the subject emails are not shielded by work
product protection.

The emails do not convey legal analysis or

opinions. Simply, defendants have failed to show that such
emails were prepared in anticipation of litigation, and not
generated “in the ordinary course of business, or [] otherwise
would have been prepared absent the prospect of litigation.”
Gucci, Am., Inc.., 271 F.R.D. at 74 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, defendants shall provide defendants with
copies of these three (3) emails by January 8, 2013.
v. Five (5) Emails Dated November 10, 20092
Defendants next assert an attorney-client and work product
privilege for five (5) emails dated November 10, 2009 concerning
a litigation hold on plaintiff and Trojanowski’s email and
documents.
The first two (2) of these emails are between Miller and

2 The privilege log indicates that there are five (5) emails

dated November 10, 2009. However, a review of the documents
indicate that two of these emails are actually dated November
11, 2009.
14

Thornquist.3

The Court finds these email are protected by the

attorney-client privilege as they are a confidential
communication between client and counsel where legal advice is
sought and provided.

Having determined that the attorney-client

privilege applies, the Court need not address the issue of work
product privilege.
The remaining three (3) emails are between Miller,
Thornquist, and Struzik.4 The first of the emails is time stamped
12:42 P.M., and is from Thornquist to Miller. Struzik is copied
on the email. The second email is dated November 11, 2009 and
time stamped 8:58 A.M.
Thornquist.

This email is from Struzik to

Miller is copied on this email.

These emails are

not protected by the attorney-client privilege as they fail to
meet the third prong of the attorney-client test.
opinion or advice is sought or given.

No legal

Moreover, the defendants

have failed to show that such emails were prepared in
anticipation of litigation, and not generated “in the ordinary
course of business, or [] otherwise would have been prepared
absent the prospect of litigation.”

Gucci, Am., Inc.., 271

F.R.D. at 74 (citations omitted).
3 For ease of reference, the emails referenced in this paragraph

are time stamped 12:36 P.M. and 12:40 P.M., respectively. Susan
H. Mack is also copied on the emails. She appears to have been
an employee with one of the defendants at the time this email
was sent.
4 Susan H. Mack is also copied on the emails referenced in this
paragraph.
15

The third email is also dated November 11, 2009 and is time
stamped 10:01 A.M.
Thornquist.

This email is sent by Miller to Struzik and

This email is protected by the attorney client

privilege, as it conveys legal advice from Miller to Thornquist
and Struzik.

The presence of Struzik does not destroy the

privilege of this communication, as his assistance was
indispensable to Miller in gathering information during the
course of the investigation regarding plaintiff. Sokol, 2008 WL
3166662, at *5 (quoting Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921) (“The client’s
or the attorney’s communications with the persons who act as the
attorney’s agents and whose assistance is indispensible to the
attorney’s work, are protected by the attorney-client
privilege.”).
Accordingly, defendants shall produce the following emails
to plaintiff by January 8, 2013: email dated November 10, 2009,
time stamped 12:24 P.M., and email dated November 11, 2009, time
stamped 8:58 A.M.
vi. Email Dated February 15, 2010
Defendants assert an attorney-client and work product
privilege for an email, with an attachment, dated February 15,
2010.

This email is sent from Miller to Struzik and concerns

plaintiff’s requested litigation hold on electronic data. The
Court finds that these documents do not satisfy the third
requirement of the attorney-client test, in that they were not

16

made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice.
However, the Court does find that this email is shielded by the
work product doctrine, as it was prepared in anticipation of
litigation and reflects some of Miller’s mental processes.

The

Court also finds that plaintiff has failed to meet his burden
that he cannot, without undue hardship, obtain the substantial
equivalent of information by other means.

In fact, plaintiff

has taken the deposition of the recipient of this email.

As

such, this email is protected by the work product doctrine.
4.

Issue 4 of Discovery Agenda: Imaging of the Trojanowski hard
drive
At the case management conference, plaintiff requested an

exact copy of the Trojanowski5 hard drive in defendants’
possession.

Based upon the representations of the parties,

defendants’ expert shall make a second copy of the Trojanowski
hard drive and provide it plaintiff.6

The parties agree that

the issue of the cost of producing such copy shall be resolved
at a later date.

However, the parties are encouraged to

amicably resolve this issue.

If the parties are unable to

5 Robert Trojanowski is the former CFO of defendant, St.

Vincent’s Special Needs Center. Trojanowski was terminated at
the same time as plaintiff.
6 At the follow up status conference, defendants reported that
their expert sent a copy of the Trojanowski hard drive to
plaintiff’s expert on January 2, 2013 via overnight mail. The
parties shall contact the Court if a copy of the Trojanowski
hard drive was not received by plaintiff’s expert on January 3,
2013.
17

agree, they are directed to contact chambers for a telephone
conference to resolve this issue.
5.

Issue 5 of Discovery Agenda: Plaintiff’s Second Request for
Production – Box of Desk Calendars and Office Contents
At the case management conference, plaintiff raised an

issue as to whether defendants had fully complied with his
second request for production dated October 25, 2012, which
seeks a box of plaintiff’s desk calendars and office contents.
Defendants agree to provide plaintiff with an inspection date to
examine the box in question.

Based upon the representations of

the parties, the parties shall agree within ten (10) days from
the date of this Order on an inspection date.
6.

Issue 6 of Discovery Agenda: Defendants’ Request for
Production of Document Identified During Third-Party
Deposition on November 26, 2012
During the deposition of a third-party witness, Mr. Rudner,

defendants learned that plaintiff received a list of plaintiff’s
appointments to cross reference with dates of when pornographic
materials were allegedly placed on defendants’ server.
Defendants requested a copy of this information from plaintiff’s
counsel.

There is some disagreement as to whether plaintiff’s

counsel agreed to produce this document(s).

Based upon the

representations of counsel during the case management
conference, plaintiff shall confirm whether the requested
document(s) will be produced to defendants.

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The parties are

directed to report back to the court via email by January 11,
2013 as to whether plaintiff will produce this document(s).
7.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the following motions are DENIED as moot:

defendants’ motion to compel deposition of plaintiff [Doc. #76];
plaintiff’s cross-motion to compel depositions of Susan Davis
and Pamela Tarulli [Doc. #79]; and defendants’ motion for
protective order and sanctions [Doc. #84].
Plaintiff’s motion to compel third-party Computer Science
Corporation’s response to subpoena duces tecum [Doc. #82] is
DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, as set forth above.
The parties’ letters dated December 18 and 19, 2012 will be
docketed by the Clerk.
This is not a recommended ruling.

This is a discovery

ruling and order which is reviewable pursuant to the "clearly
erroneous" statutory standard of review.

28 U.S.C. ' 636

(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(e) and 72(a); and Rule 2 of
the Local Rules for United States Magistrate Judges.

As such,

it is an order of the Court unless reversed or modified by the
district judge upon motion timely made.
SO ORDERED at Bridgeport this 7th day of January 2013.
________/s/_________________
HOLLY B. FITZSIMMONS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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