Daniels v. Murphy et al
Filing
82
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 60 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 7/17/2014. (Martin, M.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
LADEAN DANIELS,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 3:11-cv-00286 (SRU)
BRIAN K. MURPHY, et al.,
Defendants.
RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pro se plaintiff LaDean Daniels, currently incarcerated at Corrigan-Radgowski
Correctional Institution, in Uncasville, Connecticut, commenced this action against correctional
officials and employees affiliated with Northern Correctional Institution (“Northern”), alleging
that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights, as well as Title II of the Americans With
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. Daniels’ amended complaint, filed on
November 10, 2011, names former Commissioner Brian K. Murphy, Director of Security
Michael LaJoie, Warden Angel Quiros, Deputy Warden Lauren Powers, Health Services
Administrator Richard Furey, Dr. Carson Wright, Nurse Erin Dolan, and correctional officers
Goodhall and St. John as defendants.1
The defendants have moved for summary judgment (doc. # 60). For the reasons that
follow, the defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I.
Standard of Review
A. Motion for Summary Judgment
1
Daniels’ complaint names “Angel Quiros” as a defendant. That defendant’s name is
Angel Quiros, and I will refer to him as “Quiros” in this ruling. The clerk is directed to correct
the spelling of the name on the docket sheet accordingly.
1
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record demonstrates that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) (plaintiff
must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment).
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must construe the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all
reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970); see also Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d. 520, 523 (2d
Cir. 1992) (court is required to Aresolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party”). The court may not weigh the evidence, even when the court believes such
evidence is implausible. See Anderson, 447 U.S. at 249; R.B. Ventures, Ltd. v. Shane, 112 F.3d
54, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1995). When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported by
documentary and testimonial evidence, however, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must present sufficient probative evidence to
establish a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986);
Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995).
“Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is
summary judgment proper.” Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991); see also
Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir. 1992). If the nonmoving
party submits evidence that is “merely colorable,” or is not “significantly probative,” summary
judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
2
The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. As to materiality,
the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are
irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.
Id. at 247-48. To present a Agenuine@ issue of material fact, there must be contradictory evidence
“such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id. at 248.
If the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of
his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof at trial, then summary judgment is
appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. In such a situation, “there can be ‘no genuine issue as to
any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 322-23; accord
Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (movant’s
burden satisfied if he can point to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of
nonmoving party’s claim). In short, if there is no genuine issue of material fact, summary
judgment may enter. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Where one party is proceeding pro se, the court interprets the pro se party’s papers
liberally to “raise the strongest arguments [they] suggest[].” See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636,
639 (2d Cir. 2007). “The policy of liberally construing pro se submissions is driven by the
understanding that ‘[i]mplicit in the right to self-representation is an obligation on the part of the
court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of
important rights because of their lack of legal training.’” Id. (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d
90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). Despite this liberal interpretation, however, an unsupported assertion
3
cannot overcome a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Carey v. Crescenzi, 923
F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1991).
II.
Background2
On October 5, 2009, Commissioner Brian K. Murphy directed Warden Quiros and
District Administrator LaJoie to examine safety and security issues in the Security Risk Group
Safety Threat Member (“SRGSTM”) program at Northern. As a result, Murphy authorized a
policy requiring inmates in Phase 1 of the SRGSTM program to remain cuffed with their hands
behind their backs for all movement outside their cells, including during their one hour exercise
period.3
On June 22, 2010, Daniels was transferred to Northern, which had been designated as a
facility to house inmates who had been designated as SRGSTM members. Since 1996, Daniels
had been designated a SRGSTM member due to his affiliation with the 20 Love gang.4 State of
Connecticut Department of Correction Administrative Directive 6.14 defines a SRGSTM
member as an inmate
whose activity, behavior, status as a recognized Security Risk Group leader, and/or
whose activity, behavior or involvement in an event associated with a Security Risk
Group jeopardizes the safety of the public, staff or other inmate(s) and/or the security and
order of the facility.
2
The facts set forth here are taken from the defendants’ Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement
(doc. # 44-2) and Daniels’ response to that statement included in his opposition to defendants’
motion for summary judgment (doc. # 66), as well as supporting affidavits and exhibits. The
facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
3
The authorization changed the policy set forth in State of Connecticut Administrative
Directive 6.14, Security Risk Groups, effective January 15, 2009.
4
Daniels was transferred to Northern as a Phase 1 inmate and, after review of his status,
it was determined that he should complete the SRGSTM program. Daniels’ SRGSTM
designation continued throughout his years of incarceration and was still in effect when he was
discharged from Northern on May 10, 2010, and when he returned to Department of Correction
custody on June 7, 2010, before being transferred to Northern.
4
Inmates designated as SRGSTM are required to complete a three-phase program to be
considered for removal of the SRGSTM designation. Phase 1 is the first phase of the SRGSTM
program. Phase 1 inmates, who are all housed in Unit Two East at Northern, are required to
remain in their cells twenty-four hours each day, except for the option of: (1) one hour per day,
five days per week, for recreation in a controlled area; (2) three fifteen-minute showers per week;
(3) three fifteen-minute telephone calls per week; and (4) two thirty-minute non-contact visits
per week with immediate family if not on sanctions.5 If an inmate in Phase 1 remains disciplinefree for the four-month duration of Phase 1, he progresses to Phase 2, which is less restrictive
and shorter in duration, and, if successful in Phase 2, he progresses to Phase 3 and is permitted to
enjoy his recreation time without restraints.
Defendant Dr. Carson Wright is a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of
Connecticut. He is employed by the University of Connecticut Health Center, Correctional
Managed Health Care and has been assigned to work at Northern for approximately twelve
years. Dr. Wright treated Daniels during the relevant time period of his complaint, from June
2010 to October 2011.
III.
Discussion
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants argue that: (1)
defendants Murphy, LaJoie, and Powers were not personally involved in the incidents giving rise
to the complaint and, therefore, cannot be held liable for the alleged constitutional violations; (2)
no defendant violated Daniels’ Eighth Amendment rights due to the conditions of his
confinement or deliberate indifference; (3) Daniels has not stated a claim for a violation of the
5
Inmates are not required to participate in recreation, but if they chose to do so, Phase 1
inmates must attend recreation with their hands cuffed behind their backs.
5
ADA; and (4) the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the claim that
Daniels was unconstitutionally handcuffed during recreational periods.6
A. Personal Involvement
Daniels alleges that defendants Murphy, LaJoie, and Powers were aware of or approved
the handcuffing policy and, therefore, are liable for constitutional violations associated with it.
Defendants Murphy, Lajoie, and Powers argue that the claims against them should be dismissed
because they were not directly or personally involved in the actions alleged to have violated
Daniels’ constitutional rights.
Defendant Murphy is a supervisory official and, therefore, cannot be held liable under
section 1983 solely for the acts of his subordinates. See Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 210
(2d Cir. 1985). A plaintiff may show supervisory liability, however, by demonstrating one or
more of the following criteria:
(1) the defendant actually and directly participated in the alleged unconstitutional acts;
(2) the defendant failed to remedy a wrong after being informed of the wrong through a
report or appeal; (3) the defendant created or approved a policy or custom that sanctioned
objectionable conduct which rose to the level of a constitutional violation or allowed such
a policy or custom to continue; (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising the
correctional officers who committed the constitutional violation; and (5) the defendant
failed to take action in response to information regarding the occurrence of
unconstitutional conduct.
See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). In addition, a plaintiff
must demonstrate an affirmative causal link between the inaction of the supervisory official and
his injury. See Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 140 (2d Cir. 2002).
6
In his response to the Quiros Affidavit, Daniels states: “[t]he plaintiff is not challenging
the handcuff policy. Only stating the fact(s), that the plaintiff was forced to attend recreation . . .
and wear handcuffs behind the plaintiff’s back for (1) hour. The defendants did not
accommodate, the plaintiff [sic] ‘disability.’” See Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 2, (doc.
# 67-2), at 1-2. The defendants have assumed that Daniels intended to challenge the handcuff
policy and, in light of my duty to read a pro se party’s papers liberally, I will address Daniels’
complaint as though he has challenged the handcuffing policy.
6
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court found that a supervisor can
be held liable only “through the official’s own individual actions.” Id. at 676. This decision
arguably casts doubt on the continued viability of some of the categories for supervisory liability.
The Second Circuit, however, has not revisited the criteria for supervisory liability following
Iqbal. See Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2013). Because it is unclear
whether Iqbal overrules or limits Colon, the court will continue to apply the categories for
supervisory liability set forth in Colon.
The defendants admit that Murphy and LaJoie were involved in creating or approving the
handcuffing policy. Murphy authorized the new handcuffing policy and LaJoie appears to have
been involved in devising that policy. Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the ground of lack of personal involvement on the part of defendants Murphy and
LaJoie is denied with respect to Daniels’ Eighth Amendment claim for deprivation of the right to
meaningful exercise.
The basis of Daniels’ claim against Deputy Warden Powers is that Powers was aware of
the policy because she was present on unit rounds with Warden Quiros when Daniels complained
to Quiros about the policy, and has admitted awareness of the policy through her
acknowledgement of the 2011 Inmate Handbook. Further, Daniels asserts that he sent
grievances to Murphy, LaJoie, and Powers notifying them of the handcuffing policy being
enforced at Northern. Daniels has submitted no evidence in support of these allegations.
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment on the ground of lack of personal involvement is
granted with respect to Daniels’ deprivation of the right to meaningful exercise claim against
defendant Powers.
7
Daniels alleges that defendant Powers was aware of the denial of his medical treatment
requests, and that Murphy and LaJoie are otherwise liable for those denials. Daniels has not
submitted evidence of any letters that he sent to defendants Murphy, LaJoie, or Powers regarding
his medical treatment, nor has he provided any evidence demonstrating that those defendants
were otherwise aware of his medical treatment. Thus, Daniels has not shown that Murphy,
LaJoie, or Powers were on notice of the alleged deliberate indifference to his medical needs, and,
accordingly, I grant defendants Murphy, LaJoie, and Powers’ motion for summary judgment on
the ground of lack of personal involvement with respect to Daniels’ deliberate indifference
claim.
B. Deprivation of the Right to Meaningful Exercise
“It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under
which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 (1981). To
state an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must allege facts demonstrating failure of prison
officials to provide for inmates’ “basic human needs - e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
and reasonable safety.” DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
200 (1989).
An inmate may prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim “only where he proves both an
objective element–that the prison officials’ transgression was ‘sufficiently serious’–and a
subjective element–that the officials acted, or omitted to act, with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of
mind,’ i.e., with ‘deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.’” Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308
F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). The
objective element is satisfied where the inmate shows that the deprivation he alleges is
8
sufficiently serious, i.e., that his confinement under the alleged conditions violates contemporary
standards of decency. The subjective element requires the inmate to show that correctional
officials were aware of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. See id. at 185-86.
Defendants “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and . . . must also draw that inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 837.
Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit have
acknowledged that exercise is a basic human need that must be provided for inmates. See Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1991); Williams v. Greifinger, 97 F.3d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1996);
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 193 & n.25 (2d Cir. 1971), overruled on other grounds as
recognized by Davidson v. Scully, 114 F.3d 12 (2d Cir. 1997). Also, restrictions on exercise
should not be “routine.” Restrictions must be limited to unusual circumstances or situations
where restrictions are needed for disciplinary reasons. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737
(2002) (noting that penological concerns may be considered in reviewing an Eighth Amendment
claim); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“[P]rison administrators . . . should be
accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in
their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security.”).
The defendants argue that the handcuffing policy does not violate the Eighth Amendment
because it does not involve the unnecessary or wanton infliction of pain or punishment and, to
the contrary, that it is constitutional in light of the safety and security concerns of inmates and
correctional staff, and that Daniels was unrestrained in his cell, where he could exercise more
vigorously. Daniels argues that the handcuffing policy violated his constitutional right to be free
9
from cruel and unusual punishment and deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to exercise.
The defendants point to instances where Daniels played basketball and table tennis, and to a
statement in Daniels’ medical records that he “rarely misses rec.” See Def.’s Mem. in Support of
Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 9 (doc. # 60-9), at 5, 12, 13. The fact that Daniels occasionally
participated in athletic endeavors or rarely missed recreation time does not show that he could
meaningfully exercise in his cell. The most direct evidence defendants submit with respect to
Daniels’ ability to exercise meaningfully while in his cell comes from Dr. Wright, who states
that Daniels could perform calisthenics in his cell with or without heel lifts and, thus, achieve
substantial cardiovascular benefits and improve his overall health. See Wright Aff. (doc. # 60-7),
at ¶¶ 19-21. Daniels argues that he could not exercise meaningfully inside or outside of his cell
without proper medical devices. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. (doc. # 66), at ¶ 15
(“[T]he plaintiff was unable to exercise without adequate medical devices at recreation in
Northern . . . .”); id., at ¶ 18 (“The plaintiff could not exercise at outside recreation in “slippers”
and he could not rehabilitate his health even in a cell without adequate medical devices and pain
management.”). Those facts present disputed issues of material fact with respect to whether
Daniels could engage in meaningful exercise in his cell. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for
summary judgment with respect to the Eighth Amendment deprivation of exercise claim is
denied.7
C. Qualified Immunity
The defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity, even assuming that the
handcuffing policy was unconstitutional. The defendants have the burden of proving the
7
This claim is dismissed against defendant Powers for lack of personal involvement. See
supra.
10
affirmative defense of qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment or at trial. See
Vincent v. Yelich, 718 F.3d 157, 166 (2d Cir. 2013).
Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(quoting Harlow v, Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To determine if an official is entitled
to qualified immunity, the court considers whether (1) the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff
state a violation of a statutory or constitutional right by the official and (2) the right was clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. ___, ___,
131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (citation omitted). A negative answer to either question means that
immunity from monetary damages claims is appropriate. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. The
Supreme Court has held that district courts have the discretion to choose which of the two prongs
of the qualified immunity standard to decide first in view of the particular circumstances
surrounding the case to be decided. See id. at 236.
Under the second prong, a right is clearly established if, “at the time of the challenged
conduct . . . every ‘reasonable official would [have understood] that what he [was] doing
violate[d] that right.’” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2083 (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). There is no requirement that a case have been decided
that is directly on point, “but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate.” Id. “A broad general proposition” does not constitute a clearly
established right. See Reichle v. Howards, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2094 (2012). Rather, the
constitutional right allegedly violated must be established “in a ‘particularized’ sense so that the
‘contours’ of the right are clear to a reasonable official.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640).
11
The defendants do not address the first prong of the qualified immunity standard. Rather,
they assume that Daniels has stated a violation of a constitutional right and argue that in 2010
and 2011 there was no clearly established Second Circuit or Supreme Court law holding that
inmates in Phase 1 of the SRGTM Program had the right to exercise without handcuffs on. In
support of this argument, the defendants cite to multiple district court cases within this circuit as
well as two Connecticut Superior Court cases holding that recreating in restraints did not rise to
the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. Summ. J. (doc. #
60-11), at 25-7. The defendants further contend that, absent any law clearly establishing that an
inmate has a right to be free from recreating in restraints, a reasonable officer would not have
known that requiring Phase I SRGTM inmates to be handcuffed behind their backs during
recreation was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has held that prisoners have no right to be housed in comfortable
surroundings. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1980) (harsh or restrictive conditions
are part of the penalty criminal offenders pay for their crimes). As noted above, A prisoner’s
conditions of confinement, however, must meet “minimal civilized measures of life’s
necessities,” including exercise. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298, 304-05; see McGinnis, 348 F. App’x at
659; Greifinger, 97 F.3d at 704; Anderson, 757 F.2d at 35; Sostre, 442 F.2d at 193-94 & n.25. In
1996, however, the Second Circuit recognized that an inmate’s right to some opportunity to
exercise could be limited by legitimate safety and security concerns. See Greifinger, 97 F.3d at
704-05 (citing Sostre, 442 F.2d at 193). Thus, at the time the defendants required Daniels to
exercise in handcuffs behind his back, it was clearly established that an inmate had a right to
engage in exercise, but that right could be limited by considerations of safety and security on the
part of prison officials.
12
Here, there is a dispute whether Daniels could engage in meaningful exercise in or out of
his cell. See supra. Furthermore, the defendants have submitted insufficient evidence to support
any legitimate safety and security concerns behind the imposition of the policy requiring
SRGSTM inmates to be handcuffed behind their backs during recreation.8 See McGinnis, 348 F.
App’x at 659 (affirming dismissal on qualified immunity grounds claims alleging violation of
inmate’s right to exercise in restraints on ground that defendants established at trial that
limitations based on safety and security considerations were reasonable). Nor do they offer any
evidence of potentially feasible alternative exercise arrangements that were considered prior to
implementing the hand-cuffing policy. See Greifinger, 97 F.3d at 704-05 (recognizing that
deprivation of exercise must be limited to “unusual circumstances” and that feasibility of
alternative opportunities for exercise must be considered before imposing restrictions on inmate
exercise) (quoting Mitchell v. Rice, 954 F.2d 187, 193 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 905
(1992)). Absent this evidence, the court cannot conclude that it was objectively reasonable for
the defendants to believe that their actions did not violate Daniels’ right to engage in exercise.
See Gardner v. Murphy, 2014 WL 887076, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 6, 2014) (lack of evidence
regarding facts that would demonstrate reasonableness of defendants’ actions precluded grant of
8
Two recent decisions of this Court have addressed claims related to the SRGSTM
handcuffing policy, and “illustrate[] the type of evidence that defendants would need to submit to
defeat this claim.” See Gardner v. Murphy, 2014 WL 887076, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 6, 2014);
Taylor v. Murphy, 2011 WL 1343883 (D. Conn. Apr. 7, 2011). As in those cases, defendants
here have not submitted sufficient evidence to support their motion for summary judgment.
Rather, they have submitted, as in Taylor and Gardner “generic documents describing the policy
requiring certain inmates to be cuffed behind their backs whenever they leave their cells” and
“general correctional policies describing the origin, rationale, and parameters of the handcuffing
requirement.” Gardner, 2014 WL 887076, at **1, 7. Both Gardner and Taylor required more,
and so do I. In order to grant their motion for summary judgment, the defendants must provide,
“evidence proving the need for the handcuff requirement, the justification for applying that
requirement to the plaintiff . . . , [and] the availability to the plaintiff of a meaningful opportunity
for exercise within his cell.” Gardner, 2014 WL 887076, at * 7 (citing Taylor, 2011 WL
1343883, at **5-6).
13
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds); Taylor v. Murphy, 2011 WL 1343883, **46 (D. Conn. Apr. 7, 2011) (same); Williams v. Goord, 142 F. Supp. 2d, 416 428-29 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (denying motion for summary judgment on ground of qualified immunity because prison
officials’ belief that actions did not violate inmate’s right to exercise would be unreasonable if
jury were to find that restraints deprived inmate of meaningful out-of-cell exercise, in-cell
exercise was not available, and no justification existed for use of restraints).
The defendants have not met their burden on either prong of the qualified immunity
standard. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied on the affirmative defense
that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Daniels’ Eighth
Amendment deprivation of exercise claim. See Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir.
1999) (“Summary judgment on qualified immunity is not appropriate when there are facts in
dispute that are material to determination of reasonableness.”); Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845,
858 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that matter of officers’ qualified immunity could not be resolved as a
matter of law because determination whether it was reasonable for officers to believe their
actions met established legal principles depended on disputed version of facts).
D. Deliberate Indifference
Deliberate indifference by prison officials to a prisoner’s serious medical need constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must provide evidence of sufficiently
harmful acts or omissions and intent to either deny or unreasonably delay access to needed
medical care or the wanton infliction of unnecessary pain by prison personnel. See id. at 104-06.
“[N]ot every lapse in prison medical care will rise to the level of a constitutional violation,” id.;
rather, the conduct complained of must “shock the conscience” or constitute a “barbarous act.”
14
McCloud v. Delaney, 677 F. Supp. 230, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing United States ex rel. Hyde
v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1970)).
There are both subjective and objective components to the deliberate indifference
standard. See Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. Foote
v. Hathaway, 513 U.S. 1154 (1995). Objectively, the alleged deprivation must be “sufficiently
serious.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. The condition must produce death, degeneration, or extreme
pain. See Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996). Subjectively, the defendant
must have been actually aware of a substantial risk that the inmate would suffer serious harm as
a result of his actions or inactions. See Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279-80 (2d Cir.
2006). Thus, the fact that a prison official did not alleviate a significant risk that he should have
but did not perceive does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.
Daniels suffers from a musculoskeletal injury due to a gunshot wound to his right leg.
Correctional officials at Northern would not allow him to wear a special leg brace that he had
used prior to his incarceration there. Daniels also claims that he suffers from chronic back,
shoulder, hip, knee, ankle and foot pain, is taking medication for these conditions, and that, due
to his disabling conditions, he was required to use a cane in order to walk safely. During his
confinement at Northern, Daniels alleges, Warden Quiros, Assistant Warden Powers, Health
Services Administrator Richard Furey, Dr. Wright and Nurse Erin Dolan were deliberately
indifferent to his various medical needs and his disabilities. Specifically, Daniels alleges that
defendants Quiros, Powers, and Wright denied his attempts to get an ankle foot orthotic and that
Furey, Dolan, and Wright failed to enforce adequate treatment by restricting the Department of
Correction’s handling of his health concerns.9 Daniels also alleges that he experienced pain in
9
Daniels also alleges that Quiros was deliberately indifferent to his disability when he
15
his back due to his hands being handcuffed behind has back during recreation periods, and that
defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical claims for treatment of that back pain.
The defendants do not challenge Daniels’ allegations that the pain he allegedly suffered
as a result of being handcuffed during recreation was serious. The defendants, however, argue
that Daniels’ leg condition does not constitute a serious condition because it was not urgent and
did not risk producing death, degeneration, or extreme pain. Daniels has submitted evidence
describing the degeneration of his leg and spine, which he attributes to the failure to receive
adequate treatment for his leg and ankle condition. Accordingly, Daniels has satisfied at least
the “objective” prong of the deliberate indifference claim. Daniels’ deliberate indifference
claims nevertheless fail for two reasons. First, Daniels received care for numerous medical
conditions and, second, the defendants’ rejection of his grievances indicates a difference of
opinion with respect to the necessary medical treatment rather than deliberate indifference to his
needs.
1. Dr. Wright
Daniels’ medical records reflect that from June 2010 through October 2011, he was under
the care of Dr. Wright, other medical physicians, nurses and medical staff at Northern. Daniels
received treatment for or consideration of his various medical complaints by medical personnel
at Northern, including Dr. Wright, on several occasions during this time period.10 See Pl.’s
Response to Wright Aff. (doc. # 67-1), at ¶¶ 7, 18, 27, 29.
failed to address the pain he experienced in his back as a result of being handcuffed during
recreation. He also alleges that Quiros denied him access to an ankle foot orthotic and that the
inadequate substitute provided shows Quiros’ deliberate indifference to his medical needs.
10
Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. (doc. # 67), at 16. Daniels complains that the
defendants’ set of medical records is incomplete and, thus fails to cover the entire time of his
housing at Northern, which ran from June 22, 2010 until May 17, 2011. Defendants respond that
Daniels’ entire medical record was not included because of it is “extremely voluminous and
16
The medical records reflect that Dr. Wright was responsive to Daniels’ complaints about
back pain. On the dates that Dr. Wright treated Daniels for these complaints, he examined him
and prescribed medication. Defs.’ Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 9 (doc. # 60-9), at
6-10, 13-16. When Daniels complained about his leg, defendants would not allow him to have
an ankle foot orthotic due to potential safety risks. In lieu of the orthotic, Daniels was prescribed
medication, provided with x-rays, MRIs, heel lift shoe inserts, and released from Northern, with
special shoes and a cane. See id. at 5-6, 9, 16.
Dr. Wright states that the medical records reflect that he properly treated Daniels’
complaints of pain and hand numbness and that Daniels’ health was not adversely affected by the
use of restraints. See Defs.’ Mem. in Support of Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 7, Wright Aff. (doc. # 607), at ¶¶ 14-16. The claim that Dr. Wright did not provide Daniels with his requested treatment
does not constitute deliberate indifference on the part of Dr. Wright, but rather Daniels’
disagreement with Dr. Wright’s diagnosis of the severity of the conditions and treatment of those
conditions. Such a claim is not cognizable under the Eighth Amendment. See Chance v.
Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that “[i]t is well-established that mere
disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim,” and “[s]o long as
the treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treatment does
not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation”); Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 215 (2d Cir.
1986) (disagreement with the type of medical care provided is insufficient to state a
constitutional claim; rather “[t]he essential test is one of medical necessity and not one simply of
desirability”).
contains many entries that are not relevant to the allegations [sic] his complaint.” Defs.’ Rep. Br.
(doc. # 69), at 2.
17
Because Daniels has failed to offer any evidence to contradict the results of physical
examinations undertaken by Dr. Wright or the treatment prescribed by Dr. Wright and other
medical professionals at Northern from June 2010 through October 2011, he has not
demonstrated that Dr. Wright was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. There
are no issues of material fact in dispute regarding the medical treatment provided by defendant
Wright. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to the Eighth
Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to medical needs against defendant Dr. Wright.
2. Dolan, Furey, and Quiros11
Daniels also alleges that defendants Dolan and Furey were deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs by frustrating his attempts to get treatment, see Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J.
(doc. # 67), at ¶¶ 9, 16, and that Quiros was indifferent to his needs by denying Daniels’ attempt
to get an ankle foot orthotic. There is insufficient evidence that Dolan and Furey frustrated
Daniels’ attempts to receive medical treatment. Indeed, Daniels visited medical personal for
treatment several times throughout his incarceration. Daniels also argues that Quiros was
indifferent to Daniels’ medical needs, however, much like his claims against the other
defendants, the claim amounts to a disagreement over the necessity of the ankle foot orthotic and
the denial of that treatment pursuant to prison policy. Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to
summary judgment with respect to Daniels’ deliberate indifference claim against Dolan, Furey,
and Quiros.
E. ADA claim
11
No claim for deliberate indifference lies against defendant Powers because Daniels has
not demonstrated that Powers was personally involved in or even on notice of the alleged
deliberate indifference to Daniels’ medical needs. See supra. Daniels does not appear to have
brought a deliberate indifference claim against defendants Goodhall or St. John.
18
Title II of the ADA authorizes suits by private citizens for money damages against public
entities that violate section 12132. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (incorporating by reference 29 U.S.C.
§ 794a). It provides, in relevant part: “Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in
or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Supreme Court has held that
Title II of the ADA applies to state prisoners. See Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,
213 (1998).
Daniels contends that chronic conditions stemming from his gunshot wound constitute a
disability within the meaning of Title II of the ADA. He makes two types of allegations: (1) that
he received inadequate treatment of his disability, which did not allow him to participate in
recreation; and (2) that the requirement that he be handcuffed during recreation denied him of the
right to meaningful exercise, in light of his disability. The defendants argue that Daniels cannot
establish that he was denied the opportunity to participate in state services or was otherwise
discriminated against because of his disability.
The defendants argue that they provided Daniels with a reasonable accommodation—the
heel lifts—that the defendants were not required to suffer an undue hardship in providing its
accommodation to Daniels, and that Daniels, nevertheless, had a meaningful opportunity to
exercise in his cell without the accommodation. Specifically, defendants argue that the provision
of the ankle foot orthotic that Daniels requested would impose an undue hardship because that
orthotic was too dangerous for use in a maximum security prison, especially where a safer
alternative was available.
19
To establish an “undue hardship” defense, the defendants must show “(a) that making a
reasonable accommodation would cause it hardship, and (b) that the hardship would be undue.”
Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 221 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
The ADA defines undue hardship to include “the cost of the accommodation, the overall
financial resources of the employer, and the type of operation of the employer.” Id. (citing 42
U.S.C. § 12111(10)). Daniels has not responded with any argument or evidence to the
defendants’ argument that the provision of the ankle foot orthotic to him during recreation would
pose a danger to staff and inmates. Nor has Daniels offered evidence that, in light of the danger
posed by the ankle foot orthotic, the heel lifts he was given were not a reasonable
accommodation.
Concerning Daniels’ second argument, that, in light of his disability, he was due the
reasonable accommodation of being permitted to participate in recreation time without
handcuffs, he has not presented any evidence that exercise without handcuffs would
accommodate his disability. Further, he has not presented sufficient evidence to show that
allowing him to recreate outside of his cell without handcuffs would not, in light of the safety
concerns, impose an undue hardship on the defendants. Because Daniels has failed to establish a
prima facie case of failure to provide him with a reasonable accommodation, I grant defendants’
motion for summary judgment with respect to Daniels’ Title II ADA claim.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion for summary judgment (doc. # 60) is
granted in part and denied in part as follows: the motion for summary judgment is granted with
respect to the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and the ADA claim against all
defendants, and with respect to the Eight Amendment deprivation of the right to meaningful
20
exercise claim against defendant Powers. The motion for summary judgment is denied with
respect to the Eighth Amendment deprivation of the right to meaningful exercise claim against
defendants Murphy, LaJoie, Quiros, Goodhall, and St. John.
It is so ordered.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 17th day of July 2014.
/s/ Stefan R. Underhill________
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge
21
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