Beckford v. New Haven et al
Filing
29
ORDER granting 16 Motion to Dismiss. See attached Memorandum of Decision. The Clerk is directed to terminate the City of New Haven as a party. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 12/12/11. (Hildebrand, J.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
JANAY BECKFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF NEW HAVEN and
RONALD E. PRESSLY, JR.,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:11-cv-498 (VLB)
:
:
December 12, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
[Doc. #16]
The Plaintiff, Janay Beckford ("Beckford"), brings this action for monetary
damages against the City of New Haven ("New Haven") and Officer Ronald E.
Pressley ("Pressley").
The Plaintiff alleges claims of deprivation of her rights to due process and
equal protection under the law in violation of Title 42 of the United States Code
§1983. (Count One). The Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant violated her
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. (Count Two).
The Plaintiff also alleges state common law violations of assault and battery,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. (Counts Three, Four, and Five).
Currently pending before the court is the Defendant, City of New Haven's
motion to dismiss Counts One through Five of the Amended Complaint, which
relate specifically to allegations against the City of New Haven for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.
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I.
Factual Background
The Parties' pleadings and the submissions filed in accord with the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss establish the following undisputed facts.
Plaintiff is a resident of the Defendant-City of New Haven, a municipal
corporation within the State of Connecticut. [Dkt. #28, Amended Compl., ¶¶1-2].
Defendant Pressley is a Police Officer who, at all relevant times, was employed by
the Police Department of the City of New Haven. [Id. at ¶3]. Plaintiff further
alleges that Defendant Pressley was at all times relevant to the actions described
acting in his capacity as the agent, servant, and employee of the City of New
Haven Police Department. [Id.].
On the evening of May 19, 2009, Plaintiff was driving home on Dixwell
Avenue, in New Haven, Connecticut when she heard her friend Roshaud Saffold
[“Saffold”] talking loudly. [Dkt. #28, Amended Compl., ¶7]. Plaintiff then parked
her car on West Avy Street and walked over to Saffold. [Id.]. As Plaintiff was
walking back to her car with Saffold, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Pressley
approached Plaintiff and Saffold in a police cruiser, shining his headlights on
them. [Id. at ¶8]. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Pressley then got out of
his car, pulled out his taser, and fired his taser, hitting Saffold. [Id.]. Another
police cruise then approached. [Dkt. #28, Amended Compl., ¶9]. As Defendant
Pressley continued to taser Saffold, Plaintiff asked Pressley “why do you keep
tasering him while he is down on the ground?” [Id.]. Plaintiff instructed Saffold to
remain on the ground and he complied.
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Defendant Pressley and the other Police Officer then asked Plaintiff for her
name and address and any information she had about Safford. Plaintiff asserts
that she responded to these requests. [Dkt. #28, Amended Compl., ¶10]. Plaintiff
then contends that Defendant Pressley approached her from behind and asked
her “what the fuck is your name.” Plaintiff alleges that she responded, “excuse
me?” and Defendant Pressley replied, “your fucking name, I am the fucking law.”
[Id. at ¶11]. After Plaintiff told Defendant Pressley that she had already provided
the Officers with the requested information, Plaintiff contends that Defendant
Pressley threw Plaintiff on a fence, while the other Officer grabbed a fist full of
her hair and forced her face fully into the fence. [Id. at ¶¶12-13].
Defendant Pressley and two other New Haven police officers then
handcuffed the Plaintiff, lifting her right arm and placing it behind her back,
causing Plaintiff to feel a crack and a pop in her right arm. [Dkt. #28, Amended
Compl., ¶14]. As Plaintiff cried out in pain, Defendant Pressley placed her in a
police cruiser and drove her to Science Park in New Haven. [Id.]. While in the
police cruise, Plaintiff informed Defendant Pressley and the other police officer
that she was experiencing pain in her right arm and received no response. [Id. at
¶15]. When the transport wagon arrived, the Transport Officer noticed that
Plaintiff’s right arm was swelling. He called an ambulance and Plaintiff was
transported to the emergency room at St. Raphael’s Hospital for medical
attention. [Id. at ¶16].
II.
Standard of Review
“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a
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‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). While Rule 8 does not
require detailed factual allegations, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Where a
complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it
‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to
relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955,
167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court
should follow a “two-pronged approach” to evaluate the sufficiency of the
complaint. Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). “A court ‘can
choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. at 1949-50). “At the second step, a court should determine whether the
‘well-pleaded factual allegations,’ assumed to be true, ‘plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950). “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer
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possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949
(internal quotation marks omitted).
III.
Discussion
A. Counts One and Two: §1983 Claims
Counts One and Two of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint set forth claims
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§1983 and 1988. Specifically, In Count one, Plaintiff alleges
that the police officers’ actions:
[D]eprived the Plaintiff of her right to travel, the freedom
from unreasonable search, seizure and detention, to be
safe in her person and property, right to be free from
excessive force by law enforcement personnel, the
freedom from false imprisonment, her right to be free
from unconstitutional abridgement of the privileges as
an American to be free from the aforementioned,
unreasonable search, seizure and detention by the
Defendant, City of New Haven Police Officers, the
freedom from the Defendants aforementioned actions in
depriving the Plaintiff of her rights of due process and
equal protection of the law. [Dkt. #28, Amended Compl.,
¶18].
Although titled “First Count: (Defendant, City of New Haven)”, the only
reference in Count One to the Defendant City of New Haven include: (1) the
statement that Defendant Pressley was a Police Officer with the Police
Department of the City of New Haven and “at all times mentioned was acting in
such capacity as the agent, servant, and employee of the Defendant City of New
Haven Police;” and (2) the statement that the Defendant City of New Haven “was
and still is a municipality of the State of Connecticut, which owned, operated,
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managed, directed and controlled the City of New Haven Police Department which
employed the named Defendant Officers.” [Id. at ¶¶3, 6].
Count Two, titled “Second Count: (Deprivation and/or Violation of Civil
Rights by the Defendant City of New Haven)”, alleges that the forceful detention,
arrest, search and handcuffing of the Plaintiff caused her “bodily harm, extreme
pain without just and legal cause, thereby [sic] violating her rights under the
Laws and Constitution of the United States in particular 42 U.S.C Sections 1983
and 1988, and the Fourth, Amendment to the United States Constitution.” [Dkt.
#28, Amended Compl., ¶19]. Specifically, in Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that the
conduct of the officers violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and constituted unlawful detention, false
arrest, and excessive force. [Id. at ¶¶19, 21]. The only reference to the basis for
the Defendant City of New Haven’s liability is Plaintiff’s assertion that the City of
New Haven, through its Police Chief and Police Officers, failed to enforce the laws
of Connecticut and regulations of the New Haven Police Department, creating an
atmosphere of unlawfulness in which police officers use excessive force. [Id. at
¶22].
Both Counts One and Count Two allege liability on the part of the
Defendant City of New Haven, a municipality. “In order to prevail on a claim
against a municipality under section 1983 based on acts of a public official, a
plaintiff is required to prove: (1) actions taken under color of law; (2) deprivation
of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4) damages; and (5) that an
official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury.” Roe v. City of
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Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). The fifth element, requiring an official policy, “can only be
satisfied where a plaintiff proves that a ‘municipal policy of some nature caused a
constitutional tort.’ ” Ochoa v. City of West Haven, 2011 WL 3267705, at *8
(D.Conn. July 29, 2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). “Proof of a single incident
of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell,
unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing,
unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal
policymaker.” Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85
L.Ed.2d 791 (1985).
A plaintiff may “establish municipal liability by showing that a municipal
policy or custom existed as a result of the municipality's deliberate indifference
to the violation of constitutional rights, either by inadequate training or
supervision.” Russo v. City of Hartford, 341 F. Supp. 2d 85, 107 (D. Conn. 2004).
“A municipal policy may be pronounced or tacit and reflected in either action or
inaction. In the latter respect, a city's policy of inaction in light of notice that its
program will cause constitutional violations is the functional equivalent of a
decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.” Cash v. County of Erie, 654
F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“Where a § 1983 plaintiff can establish that the facts available to city
policymakers put them on actual or constructive notice that the particular
omission is substantially certain to result in the violation of the constitutional
rights of their citizens, the dictates of Monell are satisfied.” City of Canton v.
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Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396 (1989). “[W]here a policymaking official exhibits
deliberate indifference to constitutional deprivations caused by subordinates,
such that the official's inaction constitutes a deliberate choice, that acquiescence
may be properly thought of as a city policy or custom that is actionable under §
1983.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F. 3d 113, 126 (2d Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
“As the Supreme Court has cautioned, ‘deliberate indifference’ is ‘a
stringent standard of fault’ and … necessarily depends on a careful assessment
of the facts at issue in a particular case” Cash, 654 F.3d at 334 (quoting Connick
v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011)). The Second Circuit has instructed that
the “operative inquiry is whether those facts demonstrate that the policymaker's
inaction was the result of ‘conscious choice’ and not ‘mere negligence.’” Id.
(citations omitted). Deliberate indifference then “may be inferred where ‘the need
for more or better supervision to protect against constitutional violations was
obvious,’ but the policy maker ‘fail[ed] to make meaningful efforts to address the
risk of harm to plaintiffs.’” Id. (quoting Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040,
1049 (2d Cir. 1995) and Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2007)). In
addition, “a plaintiff must prove that “‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’
caused the alleged constitutional injury.” Cash, 654 F.3d at 333 (quoting Connick
v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011)).
In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant City of New Haven is liable
for the purported unconstitutional conduct of Defendant Pressley on the basis of
Defendant Pressley’s status as “the agent, servant, and employee of the
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Defendant City of New Haven Police,” an entity “owned, operated, managed
directed and controlled” by the Defendant City of New Haven. [Dkt. #28, Amended
Compl. ¶¶3,6]. Such a theory of respondeat superior municipal liability under
§1983 has been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court. See Monell, 436 U.S. at
690 (“we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it
employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable
under §1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”).
Although Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss asserts that Plaintiff does not rely on a respondeat superior
theory of liability, it is well established that a memorandum of law in opposition to
a motion to dismiss, even where supported by affidavits, cannot be used to cure
a defective complaint. See Jacobson v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 445 F.Supp.
518, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting a motion to dismiss despite plaintiff’s attempt
to cure statutory deficiencies in the complaint through a memorandum of law on
the grounds that “a party is not entitled to amend his pleading through
statements in his brief”). Moreover, even if the defect could be so cured, the
memorandum does not satisfy the pleading standard as it fails to state with
particularity the factual basis upon which municipal liability is asserted as
required by Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 8(a)(1).
Therefore, to the extent that the language in Count One of the Amended
Complaint clearly relies solely on a theory of respondeat superior and makes no
reference whatsoever to a policy, statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adapted and promulgated by the City of New Haven, nor a policy or
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custom inferred from the City of New Haven’s deliberate indifference to the
unconstitutional conduct of New Haven police officers, Plaintiff has failed to
plausibly state a claim for which relief may be granted and Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Count One must be granted.
Plaintiff’s allegations of municipal liability under Count Two are similarly
deficient. Plaintiff explicitly acknowledges the “rules and regulations of the City
of New Haven regarding the use of excessive force,” suggesting that policies
against such practices exist but are not being observed. Thus, Plaintiff appears to
be raising a claim of municipal liability premised on deliberate indifference,
arguing that unspecified officials of the City of New Haven knew or should have
known of systematic violations of the regulations regarding excessive force,
failed to enforce these regulations, “thereby creating an atmosphere of
lawlessness.” [Dkt. #28, Amended Compl. ¶22]. These allegations, however, are
merely conclusory, and are unsubstantiated by facts to permit an inference of
deliberate indifference. See Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir.
1993).
Plaintiff has not provided any specific facts to indicate that the City of New
Haven’s alleged failure to enforce its regulations regarding excessive force to
prevent any harm to Plaintiff was the result of a conscious choice, as opposed to
mere negligence. See Cash, 654 F.3d at 334 (stating that the operative inquiry
regarding allegations of deliberate indifference is “whether those facts
demonstrate that the policymaker’s inaction was the result of ‘conscious choice’
and not ‘mere negligence.’”) (citations omitted). Moreover, while she alleges that
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other incidents of excessive force have occurred, Plaintiff has raised no specific
facts to demonstrate that the City of New Haven had either actual or constructive
notice of systematic excessive force violations by New Haven police officers in
general or other acts of excessive force perpetrated by Officer Pressley. See
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011) (holding that deliberate
indifference “is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal
actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.”) (citation
omitted). Nor has Plaintiff alleged particular facts indicating that excessive force
violations by New Haven police officers were obvious and the City of New Haven
failed to take any steps to address the risk of harm to allow the Court to infer
deliberate indifference. See Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2007).
Although the words “failure to train” do not appear anywhere in either
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint, or Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of
Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss raises a failure to train
theory of liability. However, Plaintiff raises no specific factual allegations
regarding a failure to train in her Complaint beyond the conclusory allegations
that Defendant City of New Haven “failed to enforce” the relevant laws pertaining
to use of force, “creating an atmosphere of lawlessness.” As the Supreme Court
has held, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees
is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of
failure to train.” Connick 131 S.Ct. at 1360 (citing Board of County Com’rs of
Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409, 117 S.Ct. 1392 (1997)). Absent an
evidence of a pattern of similar violations to provide “notice that a course of
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training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to
have deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of
constitutional rights.” Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1360. Even if the memorandum was
factually sufficient, it would not have cured the pleading deficiency. See
Jacobson, 445 F.Supp. at 526.
Therefore here, assuming arguendo that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
raises a claim of municipal liability on a theory of failure to train, absent any
factual allegations whatsoever regarding a pattern of excessive force violations
by the New Haven Police Department, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as
to Count Two of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be granted.
B. Counts Three, Four and Five: Connecticut Common Law Tort Claims
Plaintiff has also raised several state common law tort claims against the
Defendant City of New Haven, including Assault and Battery, Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress, and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.
“Under Connecticut law, a municipality is not vicariously liable for the torts
of its employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior. While this immunity
may be abrogated by statute, no such statute has been cited by Plaintiff.” Ochoa,
2011 WL 3267705, at *11 (citing Pinnock v. City of New Haven, 553 F.Supp.2d 130,
145 (D.Conn. 2008). Moreover, it is well established in Connecticut that “a
political subdivision of the state is immune to suit based on intentional infliction
of emotional distress by an employee.” See Miles v. City of Hartford, 719
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F.Supp.2d 207, 218 (D.Conn. 2010). Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Counts Three, Four and Five of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
IV.
Conclusion
Based upon the above reasoning, the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to terminate Defendant City of New Haven as a
Defendant in the action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______/s/____________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: December 12, 2011
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