Rhodes v. Murphy et al

Filing 7

PRISCS-INITIAL REVIEW ( RULING AND ORDER), Answer deadline updated for Galvez to 7/5/2012; Robert to 7/5/2012; Pantoja to 7/5/2012; Moller to 7/5/2012., Jane Doe, John Doe, Peter Murphy, Sanderson, Butler and Clifford terminated., ( Discovery due by 11/27/2012, Dispositive Motions due by 12/27/2012). Signed by Judge Dominic J. Squatrito on 4/26/2012. (Payton, R.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

LANCE RHODES,
Plaintiff,
PRISONER
CASE NO. 3:11-cv-696(DJS)

v.
PETER MURPHY, et al.,
Defendants.

RULING AND ORDER
The plaintiff, Lance Rhodes, incarcerated and pro se, has
filed a complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

He names Warden

Peter Murphy, Captain Moller, Maintenance Supervisor Clifford,
Lieutenant Galvez, Captain Butler, Nurse Robert and Correctional
Officers Sanderson, Pantoja and John Doe as defendants. The
complaint indicates that each defendant is being sued in his or
her individual capacity.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must review
prisoner civil complaints against governmental actors and
“dismiss ... any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted,” or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.”

Id.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Although detailed

allegations are not required, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.

A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

A complaint that includes only “labels and

conclusions," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action" or "naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual
enhancement,” does not meet the facial plausibility standard.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although courts still
have an obligation to liberally construe a pro se complaint, see
Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), the complaint
must include sufficient factual allegations to meet the standard
of facial plausibility.
The plaintiff alleges that on October 7, 2010, he was in
his cell and smelled smoke.
items within his cell.
Sanderson and John Doe.

The smoke was not coming from any

He informed Correctional Officers
They both searched the housing unit for

the source of the smoky odor, but did not discover it.

No one

else came to investigate the incident.
At approximately 4:30 a.m. on October 9, 2010, the plaintiff
woke up when he heard other inmates yelling and complaining about
smoke in the unit.

The unit was filled with dense smoke and the

smell of something burning.

Neither the fire alarms nor the

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smoke detectors went off.

Correctional Officer Pantoja was

inside the control room in the unit and she took no action to
alleviate or investigate the situation until 6:30 a.m.

At that

time, officers entered the unit, released inmates from their
cells and escorted them to the corridor leading to the main
building.
Lieutenant Galvez released the plaintiff from his cell, but
would not let the plaintiff cover his face with a towel to
prevent the inhalation of smoke.

Captain Moller was responsible

for overseeing the removal of the inmates from the housing unit
and directed other officers to lead the plaintiff and the rest of
his housing unit to the gym by going through the smoke-filled
area where the fire was located, instead of using the secondary
exit.
The plaintiff and other inmates remained in the gym for
eight hours.

The plaintiff did not receive adequate medical

attention or access to fresh air during that time.

Prison

officials returned the plaintiff to his cell at about 2:00 p.m.
When medical staff came to examine the plaintiff, he
complained of dizziness and uncontrollable coughing spells.
Medical staff sent the plaintiff to the medical unit for
evaluation and he received medical treatment for his breathing
difficulties.
On October 16, 2010, Nurse Rob refused to treat the

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plaintiff because the plaintiff would not sign an authorization
form.

The plaintiff believes that Nurse Rob refused to treat him

in retaliation for his submission of prior written complaints to
Nurse Rob’s superiors.
The plaintiff claims that he made a number of additional
requests to see a doctor regarding his breathing difficulties,
but his requests were ignored or denied.

The plaintiff seeks

compensatory and punitive monetary damages.
A prisoner’s conditions of confinement must meet “the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”

Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)(internal quotation marks
omitted).

This means that prison officials must provide for

inmates’ "basic human needs - e.g., food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, and reasonable safety.”

DeShaney v. Winnebago

County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989).

The

plaintiff must demonstrate both that he is incarcerated under
conditions that pose a substantial risk of serious harm and that
the defendant prison officials possessed culpable intent, that
is, the officials knew that the inmate faced a substantial risk
to his health or safety and disregarded that risk by failing to
take corrective action.
834, 837 (1994).

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

Allegations constituting mere negligence are

not cognizable under section 1983.

See Hayes v. New York City

Dep’t of Corrections, 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996).
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Although breathable air constitutes a basic human need, the
plaintiff does not allege any facts to suggest that Warden Murphy
was aware of his complaints about a burning smell in the housing
unit two days prior to the day the electrical fire caused prison
employees to evacuate the housing unit.

The plaintiff filed

grievances regarding the response to the electrical fire by
Department of Correction employees.
grievances.

Warden Murphy answered those

He indicated that he had investigated his staff’s

handling of the safety and security issues raised by the fire and
found that staff had responded in an appropriate manner.

Warden

Murphy’s responses to the plaintiff’s grievances do not suggest
that he was aware of the plaintiff’s complaints which were lodged
two days before the fire.

Thus, the plaintiff has not alleged

that Warden Murphy knew of and disregarded an excessive risk of
harm to him and has not met the subjective component of the
Eighth Amendment standard.

The conditions of confinement claim

against Warden Murphy is dismissed.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

The plaintiff alleges that on October 7, 2010, Officers Doe
and Sanderson responded to his complaints about a burning smell
by investigating possible sources within the housing unit and
then logging in the plaintiff’s complaints with the unit control
room officer as well as the maintenance department.

Officers Doe

and Sanderson were unsuccessful in finding the source of the
odor.

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Defendant Clifford is the Maintenance Supervisor at
MacDougall and Captain Butler was the Unit Manager on the days in
question.

The plaintiff asserts that he is not certain whether

either defendant Clifford or defendant Butler investigated his
complaints of a burning smell on October 7, 2010.
The allegations against these four defendants constitute
nothing more than negligence.

Claims of mere negligence,

however, will not support a section 1983 claim.
F.3d at 620.

See Hayes, 84

The claims against defendants Clifford, Butler, Doe

and Sanderson are dismissed as failing to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

After reviewing the allegations against the remaining
defendants, the court concludes that the case should proceed at
this time as to the claims of unconstitutional conditions of
confinement and deliberate indifference to medical needs against
defendants Galvez, Moller, Pantoja, and Robert in their
individual capacities.
ORDERS
The court enters the following orders:
(1) The claims against defendants Warden Murphy, Maintenance
Supervisor Clifford, Captain Butler and Correctional Officers Doe
and Sanderson are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
The claims in the complaint against defendants Captain Moller,
Lieutenant Galvez, Nurse Robert and Correctional Officer Pantoja

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in their individual capacities shall proceed.
(2) Within fourteen (14) days of this Order, the Pro Se
Prisoner Litigation Office shall ascertain from the Department of
Correction Office of Legal Affairs the current work addresses for
the defendants and mail waiver of service of process request
packets to each of the following defendants in his or her
individual capacity at his or her current work address:

Captain

Moller, Lieutenant Galvez, Nurse Robert and Correctional Officer
Pantoja.

On the thirty-fifth (35th) day after mailing, the Pro

Se Office shall report to the court on the status of all waiver
requests.

If any defendant fails to return the waiver request,

the Clerk shall make arrangements for in-person service by the
U.S. Marshals Service and the defendant shall be required to pay
the costs of such service in accordance with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(d).
(3)

The Pro Se Prisoner Litigation Office shall send a

courtesy copy of the complaint and this Order to the Connecticut
Attorney General and the Department of Correction Legal Affairs
Unit.
(4)

The Pro Se Prisoner Litigation Office shall send

written notice to the plaintiff of the status of this action,
along with a copy of this Order.
(5)

Defendants shall file their response to the complaint,

either an answer or motion to dismiss, within seventy (70) days

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from the date of this Order.

If the defendants choose to file an

answer, they shall admit or deny the allegations and respond to
the cognizable claims recited above.

They may also include any

and all additional defenses permitted by the Federal Rules.
(6)

Discovery, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

26 through 37, shall be completed within seven months (210 days)
from the date of this Order.

Discovery requests need not be

filed with the court.
(7)

All motions for summary judgment shall be filed within

eight months (240 days) from the date of this Order.
(8)

Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(a), a non-moving party

must respond to a dispositive motion within twenty-one (21) days
of the date the motion was filed.

If no response is filed, or

the response is not timely, the dispositive motion can be granted
absent objection.

SO ORDERED this 26th day of April, 2012, at Hartford,
Connecticut.

_____/s/ DJS_________________________________
Dominic J. Squatrito
United States District Judge

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