Loguidice v. Hartford, et al
Filing
70
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 46 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Victor A. Bolden on 7/7/2015. (Shin, D.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
STEPHEN J. LOGUIDICE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF HARTFORD, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:11-cv-786 (VAB)
RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Stephen J. LoGuidice, brings this action against the City of Hartford and Chief
Daryl K. Roberts, Detective James McGillivray, Detective Kevin Salkeld, Officer Robert Shelby,
and John Doe, an unidentified police sergeant, all of the Hartford Police Department. Mr.
LoGuidice alleges Defendants deprived him of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and committed common law torts against him.
Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 46] to dismiss this action in
its entirety. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
On the evening of June 6, 2009, Stephen LoGuidice traveled to a concert in Hartford,
Connecticut, with his friends Antonio Proto and Erin Herb. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 10. As they were
passing through a McDonald’s parking lot near the concert venue, Mr. LoGuidice and Mr. Proto
began to wrestle in a playful manner. See, e.g., LoGuidice Dep. 18:21-19:21; Herb Aff. ¶ 4-5.
Two detectives with the Hartford Police Department, who were in plainclothes and an unmarked
car, drove up near the two friends, who were by this point wrestling on the ground. See, e.g.,
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The factual summary is based on a review of the pleadings, the Local Rule 56 Statements, and exhibits
accompanying the filings of the parties.
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LoGuidice Dep. 20:3-5; LoGuidice Aff. ¶¶ 6-7; Herb Aff. ¶ 7-8; Rule 56(a) Statement ¶ 25.
Detective McGillivray called out from the car to the two friends, but Mr. LoGuidice did not hear
what was said. See, e.g., LoGuidice Dep. 20:5-7; LoGuidice Aff. ¶ 9. Mr. LoGuidice
approached the car and asked what Detective McGillivray had said. See, e.g., Rule 56(a)
Statement ¶¶ 32-33; Herb Aff. ¶ 11. Detective McGillivray opened the car door. According to
Plaintiff’s account of events, Detective McGillivray opened the door forcefully into him,
knocking him onto the ground (see, e.g., LoGuidice Aff. ¶ 12; Herb Aff. ¶ 13), while Defendants
assert that Mr. LoGuidice, agitated and threatening, approached the vehicle and pushed the door
forcefully into Detective McGillivray as the police officer attempted to exit the car (see, e.g.,
Wiebusch Aff. Exh. A-3, at 4; Salkeld Dep. 30:11-13, 31:7-32:2).
It is undisputed that Detective McGillivray hit Mr. LoGuidice in the head with his handheld police radio. See, e.g., Def. Br. at 3. Plaintiff claims Detective McGillivray struck Mr.
LoGuidice in the head between three and six times with the radio, and that Mr. LoGuidice lost
consciousness as a result and awoke in handcuffs and drenched in blood. See, e.g., LoGuidice
Dep. 25:19-26:5, 26:23-25. He was transported by ambulance to a hospital, where he was
treated for lacerations. See, e.g., LoGuidice Dep. 28:21-25; LoGuidice Aff. ¶ 18. After this
incident, Mr. LoGuidice claims to have suffered several months of insomnia and to suffer from
fear and anxiety of police to this day. See, e.g., LoGuidice Aff. ¶ 19.
Mr. LoGuidice commenced this suit in Connecticut state court in April 2011, seeking
damages allegedly resulting from this incident from the City of Hartford, Hartford Police Chief
Daryl K. Roberts, Hartford Police Detectives James McGillivray and Kevin Salkeld, and
Hartford Police Officer Robert A. Shelby, Jr., as well as an unidentified Hartford Police sergeant.
On May 12, 2011, Defendants removed the case to this Court. The Complaint contains eight
counts: use of excessive force against Detectives McGillivray and Salkeld, Officer Shelby, and
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Sergeant Doe, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution; unreasonable arrest against McGillivray and Salkeld, under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; assault and
battery against McGillivray; false arrest against McGillivray, intentional infliction of emotional
distress against McGillivray; negligent infliction of emotional distress against McGillivray,
negligence against McGillivray, Salkeld, Shelby, and Doe; and deliberate indifference against
the City of Hartford and Chief Roberts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 16, 2014, Defendants
moved for summary judgment on all counts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standard for Summary Judgment
A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the court determines that
there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that the facts as to which there is no such
issue warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir.
2005). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court may not try issues of fact, but
must leave those issues to the jury. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986). Thus, the trial court’s task is “carefully limited to discerning whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined . . .
to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs.,
Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).
“[T]he moving party bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to summary
judgment.” United Transp. Union v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 588 F.3d 805, 809 (2d Cir.
2009). Once the moving party has satisfied that burden, in order to defeat the motion, “the party
opposing summary judgment . . . must set forth ‘specific facts’ demonstrating that there is ‘a
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genuine issue for trial.’” Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e)). Summary judgment is inappropriate only if the issue to be resolved is both
genuine and related to a material fact.
The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. An issue is “genuine . . . if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted). A material fact is one that would
“affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. Only those facts that must be
decided in order to resolve a claim or defense will prevent summary judgment from being
granted. Immaterial or minor facts will not prevent summary judgment. See Howard v. Gleason
Corp., 901 F .2d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1990).
When reviewing the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the court must “assess
the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant and . . . draw all reasonable inferences
in its favor.” Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000). However, the
inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant must be supported by evidence. “[M]ere speculation
and conjecture” is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, Stern v. Trustees of
Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 315 (2d Cir. 1997), as is the “mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the [nonmovant’s] position,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
B.
Claims Against Chief Roberts, Officer Shelby, and Unidentified Officer
Defendants move for summary judgment on the claims against Chief Daryl K. Roberts,
Officer Robert A. Shelby, and an unidentified officer of the Hartford Police Department, and Mr.
LoGuidice does not contest any of Defendants’ arguments on these claims. In fact, Mr.
LoGuidice explicitly concedes that his failure to intervene claims against Officers Shelby and
Doe would fail. Therefore, all claims against Chief Roberts, Officer Shelby, and Officer Doe
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shall be dismissed. See DeMoss v. Norwalk Bd. of Ed., 21 F. Supp. 3d 154, 172 (D. Conn. 2014)
(“Federal courts may deem a claim abandoned when a party moves for summary judgment on
one ground and the party opposing summary judgment fails to address the argument in any
way.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
C.
Claims For Unreasonable and False Arrest
Mr. LoGuidice also does not contest summary judgment on his claims for unreasonable
arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and for false arrest
under Connecticut state law. Mr. LoGuidice instead explicitly concedes that his claim for false
arrest would fail, and he further states that he does not object to summary judgment on Count
Four. Therefore, Counts Two and Four of his Complaint, which assert these claims, shall also be
dismissed.
D.
Count One: Excessive Force Claims Against McGillivray and Salkeld
Mr. LoGuidice alleges that, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, Detective
McGillivray used an unreasonable and excessive amount of force in arresting him on June 6,
2009, and Detective Salkeld failed to intervene in this use of excessive force. Defendants move
for summary judgment on this count on the grounds of qualified immunity. The Court denies
summary judgment on these grounds.
1. Standard for Qualified Immunity
Federal law provides a private right of action for money damages from government
officials who, acting “under color” of law, have violated an individual’s constitutional or
statutory rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, “to ensure that fear of liability will not unduly
inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties, the officials may claim qualified immunity[.]”
Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2030 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages “insofar as their
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conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
“Even where the plaintiff’s federal rights and the scope of the official’s permissible
conduct are clearly established, the qualified immunity defense protects a government actor if it
was ‘objectively reasonable’ for him to believe that his actions were lawful at the time of the
challenged act.” Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 420 (2d Cir. 1995). In short, “if any reasonable
trier of fact could find that the defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable, then the
defendants are not entitled to summary judgment,” whereas “if the court determines that the only
conclusion a rational jury could reach is that reasonable officers would disagree about the
legality of the defendants’ conduct under the circumstances, summary judgment for the officers
is appropriate.” Id. at 420-21. Furthermore, “[i]f there is no dispute about the material facts, the
district court should assess the reasonableness of the defendants’ conduct under the
circumstances presented in order to determine on summary judgment whether the defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at 421. However, “summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds is not appropriate when there are facts in dispute that are material to a
determination of reasonableness.” Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 240 (2d Cir.
2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
2. Excessive Force Claim Against McGillivray
There is no question that the right at issue in this case—to be free from excessive force—
was clearly established at the time of the incident, and therefore this Court must move directly to
the “objective reasonableness” inquiry. Lennon, 66 F.3d at 423. In determining whether a use of
force was excessive under the Fourth Amendment, a court must “ask ‘whether the officers’
actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,
without regard to their underlying intent or motivation[,]’” considering, e.g., “‘the severity of the
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crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’”
Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 231 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 396, 397 (1989)).
The contrasting accounts of both Mr. LoGuidice’s and Detective McGillivray’s conduct
leading up to the handcuffing present factual issues on the reasonableness of the degree of force
employed. For example, Mr. LoGuidice and Ms. Herb testified that Detective McGillivray and
Detective Salkeld did not identify themselves as police officers, but Detective Salkeld testified
that Detective McGillivray clearly identified themselves. Compare LoGuidice Aff. ¶ 8 and Herb
Aff. ¶ 9 with Salkeld Dep. 29:20-30:5. There also are differences in the parties’ respective
accounts of the altercation between Detective McGillivray and Mr. LoGuidice. Mr. LoGuidice
and Ms. Herb testified that Detective McGillivray flung his car door open without provocation,
knocking over Mr. LoGuidice, who was a foot or two away from the officers’ car at the time, and
then, standing straddled over Mr. LoGuidice, “violently beat” Mr. LoGuidice with his walkie
talkie until Mr. LoGuidice lost consciousness. LoGuidice Dep. 23:23-26:15; see also Herb Aff.
¶¶ 12-19.
Detective Salkeld, on the other hand, testified that Detective McGillivray opened his car
door before Mr. LoGuidice reached the car, and that Mr. LoGuidice began struggling with
Detective McGillivray as soon as Detective McGillivray’s feet were out of the vehicle, with Mr.
LoGuidice pushing Detective McGillivray back into the car with the car door and pinning him
there. Salkeld Dep. 31:7-32:2. Detective Salkeld further testified that Detective McGillivray
“cleared himself of the door,” that Detective McGillivray attempted to wrestle Mr. LoGuidice to
the ground, that Detective McGillivray and Mr. LoGuidice “were swinging at each other,” that
Detective McGillivray ended up striking Mr. LoGuidice in the head at least once with his radio,
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and that eventually the two officers were able to restrain and handcuff Mr. LoGuidice. Salkeld
Dep. 32:5-34:21.
These and other differences in the parties’ accounts touch upon all three of the
considerations suggested by Graham: the severity of the crime at issue, whether Mr. LoGuidice
posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he was actively
resisting arrest. Where “the parties’ versions of the facts differ markedly,” summary judgment is
inappropriate on qualified immunity grounds. Kerman, 261 F.3d at 240. Therefore, the Court
denies summary judgment with respect to the Section 1983 excessive force claim against
Detective McGillivray.
3. Failure to Intervene Claim Against Salkeld
“It is widely recognized that all law enforcement officials have an affirmative duty to
intervene to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law
enforcement officers in their presence,” and a police officer is liable for failing to intercede when
excessive force is being used when there was “a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the
harm from occurring.” Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994). Defendants assert
that Detective Salkeld had no such opportunity because, even though it is undisputed that he
observed Detective McGillivray strike Mr. LoGuidice with a police radio, Detective Salkeld
estimated that the altercation took less than one minute, which was not enough time for him to
get out of the car and take any action to prevent the alleged violation of Mr. Logudice’s rights.
Def. Br. at 12-13.
“Whether an officer had sufficient time to intercede or was capable of preventing the
harm being caused by another officer is an issue of fact for the jury unless, considering all the
evidence, a reasonable jury could not possibly conclude otherwise.” Branen, 17 F.3d at 557.
Furthermore, intervention need not be physical. See, e.g., Durham v. Nu’Man, 97 F.3d 862, 868
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(6th Cir. 1996) (“Coming to [plaintiff’s] aid would not have required [defendant] to become
physically involved in the incident.”); Morales v. Town of Glastonbury, No. 3:09-cv-713, 2012
WL 124582, at *5, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4796, at *17 (D. Conn. Jan. 17, 2012) (where “time
elapsed between the first and second strikes” by fellow police officers, defendant officers had
potential “opportunity to intervene, at least verbally”). The Court cannot find as a matter of law
that Detective Salkeld had no opportunity to intervene in the use of force against Mr. LoGuidice,
viewing the facts of this case in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Therefore, summary
judgment as to the Section 1983 claim against Detective Salkeld is denied.
E.
Count Three: Assault and Battery Claim Against McGillivray
“To establish a claim for assault and battery, plaintiff must prove that defendants applied
force or violence to him and that the application of force or violence was unlawful.” Ochoa v.
City of W. Haven, No. 3:08-cv-00024, 2011 WL 3267705, at *10, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83087,
at *30 (D. Conn. July 29, 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Defendants
argue that, because the amount of force used in this case was objectively reasonable, and
therefore lawful, the assault and battery claims necessarily fail. See Def. Br. at 32. Because the
Court has concluded that there are genuine material factual disputes regarding whether Detective
McGillivray used excessive force in effectuating Mr. LoGuidice’s arrest, Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is also denied as to the claims of assault and battery. See Orell v. Muckle,
No. 3:11-cv-00097, 2012 WL 3231017, at *6, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115077, at *16 (D. Conn.
Aug. 6, 2012) (denying summary judgment on assault and battery claims on the basis of
unresolved factual disputes regarding excessive force claim).
F.
Count Five: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim Against
McGillivray
Under Connecticut law, four elements must be established to prevail under a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress: “(1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional
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distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his
conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant’s conduct was
the cause of the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff
was severe.” Appleton v. Bd. of Educ. of Town of Stonington, 254 Conn. 205, 210 (Conn. 2000)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Courts have held that the use of excessive force
can establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Frappier v. City of
Waterbury, No. 3:07-cv-1457, 2008 WL 4980362, at *3, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94550, at *8 (D.
Conn. Nov. 20, 2008).
Defendants argue that summary judgment is warranted on Mr. LoGuidice’s claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress (1) because “Detective McGillivray did not engage in
excessive force” and (2) because Mr. LoGuidice’s emotional distress was, as a matter of law, not
severe. Def. Br. at 34-35. Both arguments fall short because the Court has found that material
issues of fact exist regarding Mr. LoGuidice’s underlying claim of excessive force. See
Zadrowski v. Town of Plainville, No. 3:09-cv-1367, 2013 WL 5435491, at *13, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 140396, at *40 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2013) (rejecting defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s
emotional distress was not severe and that summary judgment therefore should be granted
because “summary judgment on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is often
inappropriate when there is an associated excessive force claim with disputed issues of fact” and
even in the absence of medical evidence, plaintiff need only “present[] significant, nonconclusory statements supporting a finding of ‘severe’ emotional distress” to survive summary
judgment). Moreover, Mr. LoGuidice has testified to having suffered fear and anxiety as a result
of this incident. Thus, summary judgment on Mr. LoGuidice’s claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress is denied.
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G.
Count Six: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim Against
McGillivray
To prevail on a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show
that a “defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing
emotional distress and that that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.”
Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 446 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Courts in this district have determined that use of excessive force “also can state a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.” Ochoa, 2011 WL 3267705, at *11, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83087, at *30 (D. Conn. July 29, 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
However, Defendants argue that Detective McGillivray has governmental immunity from
liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Under Connecticut law, municipal
employees generally have qualified immunity in the performance of discretionary governmental
acts. See Mulligan v. Rioux, 229 Conn. 716, 727-28 (Conn. 1994). There are three exceptions to
this discretionary act immunity: (1) when the alleged conduct involves malice, wantonness, or
intent to injure; (2) when a statute provides for a cause of action against a municipality or
municipal official for failure to enforce certain laws; and (3) when the circumstances make it
apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an
identifiable person to imminent harm. Doe v. Petersen, 279 Conn. 607, 615-16 (Conn. 2006).
This final exception to discretionary act immunity applies here. “Connecticut courts have
held that where, as here, an officer is alleged to have used excessive force against a person, he
may be found to have subjected an identifiable person to imminent harm and therefore is not
protected from suit by the doctrine of governmental immunity.” Odom v. Matteo, 772 F. Supp.
2d 377, 395 (D. Conn. 2011) (collecting cases). Therefore, summary judgment is denied with
respect to Mr. LoGuidice’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.
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H.
Count Seven: Negligence Claim Against McGillivray and Salkeld
Mr. LoGuidice asserts a claim for negligence against Detective McGillivray for his
alleged failure to exercise reasonable care in his use of force against Mr. LoGuidice and a claim
for negligence against Detective Salkeld for his failure to intervene. Defendants argue that they
are protected by governmental immunity for their discretionary acts comprising the bases for
these claims. However, as discussed supra Section II.F., negligence-based claims against
Detective McGillivray for his alleged use of excessive force fall into one of the exceptions for
discretionary act immunity under Connecticut law. For similar reasons, the claim for negligence
against Detective Salkeld falls into the same exception. Mr. LoGuidice was an identifiable
person subjected to imminent harm by Detective Salkeld’s failure to act. See, e.g., Morales,
2012 WL 124582, at *10, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4796, at *30 (D. Conn. Jan. 17, 2012); Carey
v. Maloney, 480 F. Supp. 2d 548, 560 (D. Conn. 2007). Therefore, the negligence claims against
both officers shall proceed.
I.
Count Eight: Monell Claim Against City of Hartford
A municipality is only subject to liability under § 1983 when the violation of the
plaintiff’s federally protected right is attributable to the enforcement or execution of a municipal
policy, practice, or custom. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “The
policy or custom need not be memorialized in a specific rule or regulation.” Kern v. City of
Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir.1996). Instead, “a plaintiff may be able to prove the existence
of a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal
policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of
law.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Furthermore, “plaintiffs must show that the official policy, practice or custom
was the ‘moving force [behind] the constitutional violation,’ [] which is to say that it actually
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caused the constitutional deprivation.” Hernandez v. Connecticut Court Support Servs. Div., 726
F. Supp. 2d 153, 156-57 (D. Conn. 2009) (internal citations omitted). Mr. LoGuidice cannot
meet that burden here and his Monell claim must be dismissed.
Mr. LoGuidice argues that the City’s allegedly deliberately indifferent failure to train,
supervise, screen, discipline, transfer, counsel, and/or otherwise control its police officers
provide the basis for municipal liability in this case. However, Mr. LoGuidice has provided no
evidence to support these conclusory allegations. He can point to nothing in the record that
concerns the training, supervision, screening, discipline, transfer, counsel, or control of the City’s
police officers. Instead, he argues that the assault itself provides sufficient basis for a reasonable
jury to infer that there was inadequate screening, training, and hiring.
For a finding of municipal liability under a theory of inadequate training, plaintiffs must
“establish not only that the officials’ purported failure to train occurred under circumstances that
could constitute deliberate indifference, but also that plaintiffs identify a specific deficiency in
the city’s training program and establish that that deficiency is ‘closely related to the ultimate
injury,’ such that it ‘actually caused’ the constitutional deprivation,” i.e., “that ‘the officer’s
shortcomings . . . resulted from . . . a faulty training program’ rather than from the negligent
administration of a sound program or other unrelated circumstances.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of
W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 390-91 (1989)). While a plaintiff “need only plead that the city’s failure to train caused the
constitutional violation” at the motion to dismiss stage, at the summary judgment stage, “[a]fter
discovery, . . . a plaintiff is expected to proffer evidence from which a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that the training program was actually inadequate, and that the inadequacy was
closely related to the violation.” Id. at 130 n.10. Mr. LoGuidice has not even attempted to do so,
in spite of having had nearly three years in which to conduct discovery.
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Similarly, while Mr. LoGuidice argues that an official policy can be inferred from the
omissions of a municipality’s supervisory officials, see Def. Br. at 17, he points to no omissions
by any supervisory officials in this case from which such a policy of deliberate indifference can
be inferred. Just as there is no evidence that the City failed to provide adequate training to its
officers, there is no evidence in the record of a failure by the City to supervise or screen its
officers.
Because of the complete absence of relevant evidence regarding Monell liability,
summary judgment is granted on Count Eight of the Complaint.
J.
Count Nine: Indemnification and Municipal Liability Claims Against City of
Hartford
1.
Indemnification
“Connecticut General Statute Section 7-465 allows a plaintiff to seek indemnity from a
municipality based upon the actions of a municipal employee within the scope of his municipal
employment,” Jones v. City of Hartford, 285 F. Supp. 2d 174, 190 (D. Conn. 2003), so long as
“the injury ‘was not the result of any wilful or wanton act,’” Carey, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 567
(quoting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465). The City does not assert that the statute does not apply to
this case. Because summary judgment has been denied as to allegations for which the City
would be required to indemnify its employees, summary judgment is denied as to Mr.
LoGuidice’s claim for indemnification.
2.
Municipal Liability
“Connecticut General Statute section 52-557n(a)(1) provides in part that, ‘[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to
person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision
or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official
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duties . . . .’” Morales, 2012 WL 124582, at *11, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4796, at *37 (D. Conn.
Jan. 17, 2012) (quoting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n). And while the statute extends “the same
discretionary act immunity that applies to municipal officials to the municipalities themselves,”
Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 320 (Conn. 2006), “the Connecticut Supreme Court
continues to apply the common law exemptions to governmental immunity set forth above,”
Carey, 480 F. Supp. 2d 548, 566-67 (D. Conn. 2007) (citing Petersen, 279 Conn. at 614). As
described supra, Mr. LoGuidice’s claims include allegations of negligence as to which
governmental immunity does not apply. Thus, summary judgment is denied as to his claim for
municipal liability under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part.
The Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Chief Daryl K. Roberts, Officer
Robert A. Shelby, and unidentified Officer John Doe on all claims against them in the complaint.
All claims against the Chief Roberts, Officer Shelby, and Officer Doe are hereby DISMISSED.
The Clerk is directed to terminate Daryl K. Roberts, Robert A. Shelby, and John Doe from this
case.
With regard to the remaining defendants, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in
favor of the City of Hartford on Count Eight, and DENIES summary judgment, and the requests
for qualified immunity and governmental immunity, on all remaining claims against the City of
Hartford, Detective James McGillivray, and Detective Kevin Salkeld.
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SO ORDERED this 7th day of July, 2015, at Bridgeport, Connecticut.
/s/ Victor A. Bolden
VICTOR A. BOLDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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