Goins v. Murphy et al

Filing 35

ORDER: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 34 ) is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk shall close this case. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 9/2/2014. (Wang, M.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
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STEPHEN L. GOINS,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
BRIAN K. MURPHY, MICHAEL LAJOIE, :
ANGEL QUIROS, and LAUREN POWERS, :
:
Defendants.
:
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Civil No.

3:11cv858(AWT)

ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants‟ Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. No. 34) is hereby GRANTED.
Background
The pro se plaintiff, Stephen L. Goins, was incarcerated at
Northern Correctional Institution in Somers, Connecticut during
the time period relevant to this action.

While at Northern, the

plaintiff was designated as a Security Risk Group Safety Threat
Member (“SRGSTM”).

Under that designation, the plaintiff was

required to have his hands shackled behind his back during all
of his recreation periods.

The plaintiff claims that his

constitutional rights were violated when he was forced to
exercise with his hands cuffed behind his back from July 15,
2010 to February 16, 2011.

He alleges that he was unable to

engage in meaningful exercise with his hands behind his back and
has suffered neck and shoulder pain and cuts and abrasions on
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his wrists.

The plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive

damages.
The defendants are current or former Department of
Correction employees.

The defendants have moved to dismiss the

action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure on the basis of qualified immunity to the extent the
claims have been brought against the defendants in their
individual capacities.1

The defendants have served upon the

plaintiff a Notice to Pro Se Litigant Opposing Motion to Dismiss
as Required by Local Rule 12(A) via first-class mail.

To date,

no response to the instant motion has been filed.
Legal Standard
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
court must accept as true all factual allegations in the
complaint and must draw inferences in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff.

See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff‟s obligation to provide the „grounds‟
of his „entitle[ment] to relief‟ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 550, 555 (2007), citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
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The court dismissed all claims against the defendants for monetary damages
to the extent the defendants were sued in their official capacities. (See
Initial Review Order, Doc. No. 6, 3.)

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265, 286 (1986)(on a motion to dismiss, courts “are not bound to
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation”).

“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked

assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”

Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
557 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

“Factual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level, on the assumption that all allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
(citations omitted).

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

However, the plaintiff must plead “only

enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”

Id. at 570.

“The function of a motion to dismiss is

„merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to
assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in
support thereof.‟”

Mytych v. May Dept. Store Co., 34 F. Supp.

2d 130, 131 (D. Conn. 1999), quoting Ryder Energy Distribution
v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.
1984).

“The issue on a motion to dismiss is not whether the

plaintiff will prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to
offer evidence to support his claims.”

United States v. Yale

New Haven Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D. Conn. 1990) (citing
Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 232).
In its review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, the court may consider “only the facts alleged in the
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pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by
reference in the pleadings and matters of which judicial notice
may be taken.” Samuels v. Air Transport Local 504, 992 F.2d 12,
15 (2d Cir. 1993).
When considering the sufficiency of the allegations in a
pro se complaint, the court applies “less stringent standards
than [those applied to] formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see also Branham v.
Meachum, 77 F.3d 626, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the
court should interpret the plaintiff‟s complaint “to raise the
strongest arguments [it] suggest[s].” Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d
787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994).
Discussion
“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials
from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1)
that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,
and (2) that right was „clearly established‟ at the time of the
challenged conduct.”

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080

(2011) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
“A Government official‟s conduct violates clearly established
law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of
a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official
would have understood that what he is doing violates that
right.”

Id. at 2083 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
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635, 640 (1987)) (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).

The Second Circuit applies a three-step inquiry in

determining when a right is clearly established.
First, the particular right under consideration must
be defined with reasonable specificity. Next, the
court must determine whether the decisional law of the
Supreme Court or the appropriate circuit court has
clearly established the right in question. The
ultimate inquiry is whether in light of preexisting
law the unlawfulness of the defendant official's
actions is apparent.
Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-640).

“If an official‟s conduct did

not violate a clearly established constitutional right, or if
the official reasonably believed that his conduct did not
violate such a right, then he is protected by qualified
immunity.”

Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2013).

No Supreme Court or Second Circuit case has held that
handcuffing an inmate during recreation for security reasons is
unconstitutional.

See, e.g., Morgan v. Rowland, No.

3:01CV1107(CFD), 2006 WL 695813, at *7-8 (Mar. 17, 2006)
(granting summary judgment on the plaintiff‟s claim that he was
required to attend recreation in restraints and concluding that
the defendants would have been entitled to qualified immunity).
Therefore, even if the plaintiff could prove that a violation
did occur, the defendants are protected by qualified immunity.

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Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the defendants‟ motion to
dismiss is being granted.

The Clerk shall close this case.

It is so ordered.
Signed this 2nd day of September 2014 at Hartford,
Connecticut.

/s/
Alvin W. Thompson
United States District Judge

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