Arnold v. Doe et al
ORDER denying 39 Motion for TRO and for Preliminary Injunction; finding as moot 41 Motion for More Definite Statement; finding as moot 45 Motion to Correct Ruling; finding as moot 46 Motion for More Definite Statement; finding as moot 47 Motion for Extension of Time ; denying without prejudice 48 Motion to Appoint Counsel. See attached memorandum of decision. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on July 12, 2013. (Butler, Ayanna)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
CASE NO. 3:11-cv-1342(VLB)
JOHN DOE, ET AL.
RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
Pending before the Court are the defendants’ motions for more definite
statement and to modify scheduling order and the plaintiff’s motions for
injunctive relief, to correct ruling and for appointment of counsel. For the
reasons set forth below, the motions for more definite statement, to modify
scheduling order and for appointment of counsel are denied and the motion to
correct is denied in part and granted in part.
Motion for Injunctive Relief [Doc. No. 39]
The plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Osborn Correctional Institution
(“Osborn”) and has filed a motion entitled “Motion of Restraining Order & Motion
of Injunction” seeking a restraining order against all defendants and nondefendants and to be transferred to another prison facility. He refers to an
incident that occurred on September 22, 2012 at MacDougall Correctional
Institution (“MacDougall”), when Nurse Caroline tried to give him a shot of insulin
but the needle went through the muscle of his arm and into the bone causing him
extreme pain. On February 25, 2013, the Court addressed this incident and the
plaintiff’s request for relief pertaining to this incident. (See Rul. Mots. Injunctive
Relief, Doc. No. 43.)
The plaintiff claims that two of his legal books disappeared while he was
confined in the segregation unit in connection with the disciplinary report he
received for allegedly threatening Nurse Caroline. He states that the books cost
him $50.00. He contends that the individuals who confiscated his books were
attempting to interfere with his filing of civil actions and criminal charges against
The plaintiff alleges that at some point after the September 22, 2012
incident, his gum became swollen, infected and very painful. He states that
infections can become life-threatening for diabetics. He alleges that several
nurses did offer methods of treating the swollen gum until he could be seen by
staff in the MacDougall dental department. The nurses suggested that the
plaintiff brush with very warm salt water and prescribed him Motrin for the pain.
The plaintiff claims that on December 11, 2012, Correctional Officer Maloid
started to verbally harass him and told him to pour out the cup of hot water that
he was using to gargle with to alleviate the pain in his infected gum. Officer
Maloid also conducted a random search of the plaintiff’s cell. The plaintiff
received a disciplinary ticket in connection with this incident.
Personnel in the dental department at MacDougall evaluated and treated
the plaintiff on December 19, 2012. A dentist prescribed an anti-biotic for the
infected gum. The plaintiff seeks a “blanket restraining order over all
defendants” and “any correctional officer taking up the cause” for any of the
defendants. (See Mot. Restrain. Or., Doc. No. 39 at 1.) The plaintiff also seeks to
be transferred to Whiting Forensic Institute or to another prison facility within
To the extent that the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from individuals who
are not defendants, the Court cannot enjoin their actions. The Court must have in
personam jurisdiction over a person before it can validly enter an injunction
against him or her. See In re Rationis Enterprises, Inc. of Panama, 261 F.3d 264,
270 (2d Cir. 2001) (“A court may not grant a final, or even an interlocutory,
injunction over a party over whom it does not have personal jurisdiction.”)
(citation omitted); 11A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2956, at 335 (2d ed. 2001) (“A court ordinarily
does not have power to issue an order against a person who is not a party and
over whom it has not acquired in personam jurisdiction.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)
(providing, in pertinent part, that “[e]very order granting an injunction ... is
binding only upon the parties to the action ...”).
With regard to Officer Maloid, who is a defendant in this action, it is wellsettled that verbal harassment and threats alone do not constitute a cognizable
violation of an individual’s federally or constitutionally protected rights. See
Purcell v. Coughlin, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1986) (“allegations of verbal
harassment are insufficient to base a § 1983 claim if no specific injury is
alleged”); Gill v. Hoadley, 261 F. Supp. 2d 113, 129 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (plaintiff’s
claim that correctional officer exhibited hostile and abusive conduct towards him,
including threats and profanity was not actionable under § 1983) (collecting
cases); Beckles v. Bennett, No. 05 Civ. 2000(JSR), 2008 WL 821827, at *23
(S.D.N.Y. March 26, 2008) (alleged “threatening remarks that Plaintiff was ‘getting
no rec, only [defendant’s] foot up [plaintiff’s] behind’” was insufficient to state §
Furthermore, any claim that the actions of Officer Maloid were retaliatory is
conclusory. Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for exercising their
constitutional rights. To state a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show that his
conduct was protected by the Constitution or federal law and that this protected
conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the alleged retaliatory action
by prison officials. Bennett v. Goord, 343 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2003). Because
claims of retaliation are easily fabricated, courts consider such claims with
skepticism and require that they be supported by specific facts; conclusory
statements are not sufficient. See Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir.
The plaintiff offers no facts to suggest that the actions of defendant Maloid
in ordering him to pour out the hot water that he was using for his infected tooth
or subsequently searching his cell were taken in retaliation for his filing this
lawsuit. The plaintiff simply concludes that the conduct must have been
undertaken for retaliatory reasons. Thus, the plaintiff has failed to allege a causal
connection between the allegedly adverse conduct of defendant Maloid and his
filing of this lawsuit. The conclusory allegations of retaliation fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
The plaintiff’s claims that in December 2012, defendant Maloid verbally
harassed him and retaliated against him do not demonstrate that the plaintiff is in
danger of imminent harm. Thus, injunctive relief is not warranted.
Furthermore, the claims in the underlying Amended Complaint do not
involve dental issues, allegations of deprivation of property or denial of access to
the courts. This action pertains to the plaintiff’s required use of a colostomy bag
and treatment for his diabetes during the period from March 2010 through
December 2011. The Court notes that the plaintiff recently filed a new lawsuit
against dental personnel at MacDougall. See Arnold v. Dental Medical Personnel,
et al., Case No. 3:13cv442 (VLB). Because the plaintiff’s allegations and requests
for relief are unrelated to the claims in the Complaint, the request for injunctive
relief as to those claims is inappropriate. See De Beers Consol. Mines Ltd. v.
United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945) (preliminary injunction appropriate to
grant intermediate relief of “the same character as that which may be granted
finally,” but inappropriate where the injunction “deals with a matter lying wholly
outside of the issues in the suit.”)
With regard to the plaintiff’s claim of confiscation or loss of his legal
books, he has not demonstrated that he has suffered an irreparable injury
because his loss can remedied by monetary damages. See Wisdom Import Sales
Co., LLC v. Labatt Brewing Co., Ltd., 339 F.3fd 101, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2003)
(irreparable harm is defined “as certain and imminent harm for which a monetary
award does not adequately compensate. Thus, only harm shown to be noncompensable in terms of money damages provides the basis for awarding
injunctive relief.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme
Court has found that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
not violated when a prison inmate loses personal belongings due to the negligent
or intentional actions of correctional officers if the state provides an adequate
post-deprivation compensatory remedy. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533; Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981). The State of Connecticut provides an adequate
remedy for the kind of deprivation the plaintiff alleges. See State of Connecticut
Department of Correction Administrative Directive 9.6(16); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4141 et seq. The plaintiff can pursue his claim for the loss of his legal books with
the State of Connecticut Office of the Claims Commissioner.
In addition, the plaintiff has not alleged that the loss of his legal books has
prejudiced him in any way with regard to accessing the courts. Since filing the
motion for injunctive relief, the plaintiff has submitted a sixty-seven page reply,
including case law, in this action, multiple motions and an over-550 page
memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary judgment in another federal
case and a twenty-one page complaint accompanied by over 270 pages of
exhibits in a new federal action. See Reply Defs.’ Obj. Mot. Inj., Doc. No. 421;
Arnold v. Buck, et al., Case No. 11cv1343 (VLB) and Arnold v. Dental Medical
Personnel, et al., Case No. 3:13cv442 (VLB).
For all of the above reasons, the motion for restraining order and injunctive
relief is DENIED.
Motion of Correction to Court Ruling [Doc. No. 45]
On February 25, 2013, the Court denied three motions for injunctive relief
and a motion for reconsideration, granted a motion to correct with regard to
defendants in the Amended Complaint and dismissed the claims against the John
and Jane Doe defendants. (See Rul. Motions for Injunctive Relief,
Reconsideration and to Amend/Correct Complaint, Doc. No. 43.) The Court also
directed the plaintiff to file a second amended complaint that listed all defendants
in the caption on the first page. The second amended complaint was to be filed
by March 26, 2013. The plaintiff has not filed a second amended complaint.
The Court has considered the defendants’ response to the motion to injunctive
Instead, the plaintiff has filed a renewed motion to correct which is 366
pages in length. The first five pages of the motion are identical to the motion to
correct that the Court addressed in its February 25, 2013 Ruling. (See Doc. No.
19; Doc. No. 43.) To the extent that the plaintiff is re-filing the motion to correct,
it is denied as moot.
The Court notes that the bottom of page eight of the renewed motion to
correct includes a notation “Objection to Rulings - Rulings Corrections” and that
the top of page nine of the motion includes a notation “Objection to Rulings” and
a reference to the court’s February 25, 2013 Ruling. The Court liberally
construes pages eight through thirteen of the renewed motion to correct as a
motion for reconsideration of the February 25, 2013 Ruling on Motions for
Injunctive Relief, Reconsideration and to Amend/Correct Complaint, [Doc. No. 43].
As a preliminary matter, a motion for reconsideration must be filed within
fourteen days of the filing of the order the party seeks to challenge. See Rule
7(c), D. Conn. L. Civ. R. (“Motions for Reconsideration shall be filed and served
within fourteen (14) days of the filing of the decision or order from which relief is
sought . . .”). As indicated above, the section of the motion seeking
reconsideration of the Court’s February 25, 2013 Order begins on page eight.
Although page eight is dated February 28, 2013, the certification on page thirteen
of the motion indicates that it was not mailed to counsel for the defendants or the
Court until March 29, 2013. The motion was originally received for filing by the
relief as well as the plaintiff’s reply to the defendants’ response in ruling on the motion.
Court on April 1, 2013, but was returned to the plaintiff because he had not signed
the motion. (See Order Returning Submission, Doc. No. 44.) The plaintiff re-filed
the motion on April 22, 2013. Because the motion was filed more than fourteen
days after the filing of the February 25, 2013 Ruling, it is untimely.
Because the plaintiff proceeds pro se in this action, the Court will consider
the objections in the motion for reconsideration. A court should not grant a
motion for reconsideration if “the moving party seeks solely to re-litigate an issue
already decided.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995).
Thus, the standard governing motions for reconsideration is strict and
“reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to
controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked-matters ... that might
reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.“ Id.
The plaintiff first objects to the Court’s denial of two of his motions for
injunctive relief, [Docs. Nos. 27, 37], relating to conduct by defendant Caroline in
administering shots of insulin to him. He states that he asserted sufficient
allegations to demonstrate that he was in danger of imminent harm from Nurse
Caroline and asks the Court to hold a hearing on the motions. The plaintiff has
failed to point to any errors of fact that the Court overlooked in denying the
motions for injunctive relief. See Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257. Instead, he includes
allegations regarding an incident involving Nurse Caroline that occurred on
February 28, 2013 at MacDougall as evidence that he is in danger of imminent
harm if an order directing Nurse Caroline to refrain from treating him is not
issued by the Court. This new claim does not demonstrate that the Court
improperly denied the prior motions seeking injunctive relief against Nurse
Caroline. Accordingly, the ruling addressing the prior motions for injunctive
relief is affirmed.
The plaintiff also objects to the Court’s ruling on the third Motion for
Injunction, [Doc. No. 28] and the Motion for Reconsideration, [Doc. No. 36]
because he claims that he did not file either motion in this action. He contends
that he filed both motions in another civil action, Arnold v. Buck, et al., Case No.
3:11cv1343(VLB) and that neither motion is included on the docket of this action.
A review of the Motion for Injunction, [Doc. No. 28] reflects that it is captioned
William Arnold v. John Doe, et al., No. 3:11cv1342. The Motion for
Reconsideration [Doc. No. 36] also includes Case No. 3:11cv1342. Thus, the
Clerk properly docketed both motions in this action. The objections to the
Court’s ruling on both of these motions are without merit.
The plaintiff’s final objection is directed to the Court’s dismissal of the
claims against the John and Jane Doe defendants. The plaintiff refers the Court
to his Motion to Correct, [Doc. No. 19], and states that he did in fact identify the
John Doe defendant in the Amended Complaint as Correctional Officer Ajodhi.
The caption of the Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 9] included three Doe
defendants, two John Doe Correctional Officers and one Jane Doe Correctional
Officer. In the Ruling and Order addressing the claims in the Amended Complaint
[Doc. No. 15], the Court informed the plaintiff that service of the Amended
Complaint could not be effected against the Doe defendants until he identified
them by name and directed the plaintiff to file a notice indicating the names of the
John and Jane Doe defendants within ninety days.
Instead of filing a notice, the plaintiff filed a motion to correct notifying the
court of claims against three named defendants2 that had not been addressed in
the Ruling and Order. In that motion, the plaintiff also stated that the name of the
John Doe defendant was Correctional Officer Ajodhi. The caption of the
Amended Complaint included Correctional Officer John Doe and Correctional
Officer John Doe(A). The plaintiff did not indicate which John Doe defendant was
named Correctional Officer Ajodhi. Only John Doe(A) is mentioned in the body of
the Amended Complaint at page six, paragraph six. The plaintiff alleges that on
July 25, 2011, John Doe(A) denied him medical treatment and supplies in
connection with his colostomy bag which lead to the bag overflowing and spilling
its contents onto his body and clothes. The Court construes the plaintiff’s
motion as a request that he be granted leave to file an amended complaint to add
Correctional Officer Ajodhi as the Correctional Officer referred to as John Doe(A)
in the Amended Complaint. Because the plaintiff attempted to notify the Court
about the name of this John Doe defendant in a timely manner by including it in
Those defendants, were not in the caption of the Amended Complaint, but were
mentioned in the body of the Amended Complaint and/or description of parties and/or
exhibits attached to the Amended Complaint. Because it was apparent that the plaintiff
had intended to name H.S.A. Rickel Lightner, Nursing Supervisor Rebecca and
Correctional Officer Dean, previously referred to as Deam, as defendants and the Clerk
had inadvertently failed to scan in the page on which those defendants appeared when
the Amended Complaint was filed, the court permitted the plaintiff to file a second
amended complaint including those three individuals as defendants.
his motion to correct, [Doc. No. 19], the request for leave for leave to amend to
add Correctional Officer Ajodhi as a defendant is GRANTED.
The motion also includes a statement by the plaintiff that the Jane Doe
defendant listed in the caption of the Amended Complaint is Correctional Officer
Stanim. Jane Doe is referred to as Correctional Officer Jane Doe(B) in the body
of the Amended Complaint at page six, paragraph six. The plaintiff does not,
however, explain why he did not inform the court at an earlier date as to the name
of the Jane Doe defendant.
The Court will also construe the motion as a request for leave to file an
amended complaint to add Correctional Officer Stanim as the Correctional Officer
referred to as Jane Doe(B) in the Amended Complaint. Because the claims
against Correctional Officer Stanim as set forth in the Amended Complaint at
page six are not barred by the statute of limitations and the defendants would not
otherwise be prejudiced by the addition of this officer as a defendant, the request
for leave to amend is GRANTED.
To the extent that the plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the dismissal of the
Doe defendants, the motion is GRANTED, but the relief requested is DENIED AS
MOOT. The Court has permitted the plaintiff to add Correctional Officers Ajodhi
and Stanim who were previously identified as Jane Doe(B) and John Doe(A) and
the plaintiff has not otherwise identified the second John Doe defendant.
Second Amended Complaint
The Court notes that the remaining 255 pages of the Motion to Correct
addressed above appear to be the plaintiff’s attempt to file a second amended
complaint. Although some of the documents could be considered as parts of an
amended complaint, there is no first page that includes a caption with all of the
named defendants and there are no pages that include concise and specific
allegations against the named defendants. Thus, none of the documents
constitute a complete amended complaint and cannot be docketed as such. In
addition, the documents do not comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint "must contain . . . a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(d)(1) requires that "[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise,
and direct." Id. 8(d)(1). The purpose of Rule 8 is "to permit the defendant to have
a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know
whether there is a legal basis for recovery[.]" Ricciuti v. New York City Trans.
Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). In addition, "the rule
serves to sharpen the issues to be litigated and to confine discovery and the
presentation of evidence at trial within reasonable bounds." Powell v. Marine
Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (citation and quotation omitted).
Because the plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court will permit him thirty days
to file a complete Second Amended Complaint that complies with Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Second Amended Complaint should list all
defendants in the caption on the first page. Plaintiff has identified Correctional
Officers Santiago, Caputo, Jones, Scott, Bracket, Savada, Pertilla, Anderson,
Maloid, Guica, Cay, Gazalez, Curtis, Dean, Ajodhi and Stanim, Nurses Caroline,
Joy and Sandy Oliver, Nursing Supervisor Rebecca, H.S.A. Rikel Lightner and
Unit Manager Manley as the only defendants that he seeks to proceed against in
this action. The body of the Second Amended Complaint shall include concise
claims against these defendants and indicate the dates on which the alleged
violations of the plaintiff’s rights occurred.
The plaintiff may incorporate the allegations that are described on pages
six through nine of the First Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 9] into the Second
Amended Complaint. On those pages, the plaintiff describes events that have
occurred beginning in May 2010, relating to his required use of the colostomy
bag, surgical reversal of the colostomy and treatment for his diabetes condition
and the involvement of defendants Santiago, Jones, Scott, Bracket, Savada,
Pertilla, Anderson, Maloid, Guica, Cay, Gazalez, Curtis, Dean, Ajodhi, Stanim,
Caroline and Joy in the alleged deliberate indifference to his medical needs,
safety and conditions of confinement. The remainder of the First Amended
Complaint consists of exhibits and written notes that elaborate on or clarify the
allegations in pages six through nine and set forth allegations of deliberate
indifference to plaintiff’s medical needs against defendants Oliver, Caputo,
Manley, Lightner and Rebecca.3
Thus, the body of the Second Amended Complaint should include the
claims against defendants Santiago, Jones, Scott, Bracket, Savada, Pertilla,
Anderson, Maloid, Guica, Cay, Gazalez, Curtis, Dean, Ajodhi, Stanim, Caroline
and Joy that are listed in pages six to nine of the First Amended Complaint as
well as specific claims against defendants Caputo, Manley, Oliver, Lightner and
Rebecca that appear to be set forth in Exhibits G, I, V and Y to the First Amended
Complaint. The Clerk will send the plaintiff an Amended Complaint form that the
plaintiff should use in filing a Second Amended Complaint.
Motions for More Definite Statement [Docs. Nos. 41, 46]
The defendants claim that they cannot discern the nature of the allegations
against them from the 171 page First Amended Complaint. Pursuant to Rule
12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendants seek a Court order
directing the plaintiff to revise and amend the Amended Complaint filed in this
action. Because the Court has directed the plaintiff to file a Second Amended
Complaint that complies with Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., the motions for more definite
statement are DENIED AS MOOT.
Exhibit G to the Amended Complaint includes references to defendants Caputo
and Manley, Exhibit I to the Amended Complaint includes references to defendant Oliver
Motion to Modify Scheduling Order [Doc. No. 47]
The defendants seek to modify the deadlines for completion of discovery
and filing dispositive motions which were included in the Court’s July 20, 2012
Ruling and Order addressing the claims in the Amended Complaint. The
defendants contend that the deadlines for conducting discovery and filing
motions for summary judgment have expired and the Court has yet to rule on
their motions for more definite statement. The motion is DENIED AS MOOT. The
Court will enter a new scheduling order after the Second Amended Complaint is
Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 48]
The plaintiff seeks the appointment of pro bono counsel. The Second
Circuit repeatedly has cautioned the district courts against the routine
appointment of counsel. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 393 (2d
Cir. 1997); Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F. 2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1989). The
Second Circuit has made clear that before an appointment is even considered,
the indigent person must demonstrate that he is unable to obtain counsel. See
Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 996
The plaintiff claims that the issues involved in the case are complex and he
has limited knowledge of the law. He asserts that he has made mailed forty-five
and Lightner and Exhibits V and Y to Amended Complaint includes references to
letters to attorneys seeking assistance. He provides no evidence of his attempts
to find an attorney. Furthermore, the plaintiff does not allege that he attempted to
contact the Inmates’ Legal Assistance Program. The court concludes that the
plaintiff’s undocumented attempts to find counsel are insufficient to demonstrate
to the court that plaintiff cannot obtain legal assistance on his own. The
possibility that the plaintiff may be able to secure legal assistance or
representation independently precludes appointment of counsel by the court at
this time. Thus, the motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED.
The Motion for Restraining Order and Motion for Injunctive Relief [Doc. No.
39] is DENIED. The Motions for More Definite Statement [Docs. Nos. 41, 46] and
Motion to Modify Scheduling Order [Doc. No. 47] are DENIED AS MOOT. The
Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 48] is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to refiling at a later stage of litigation. Any renewed motion for
appointment of counsel shall be accompanied by a summary of any further
attempts to obtain counsel or legal assistance, including the names of the
attorneys contacted, the dates upon which plaintiff made those contacts and the
reasons why assistance was unavailable.
The Motion to Correct Ruling [Doc. No. 45] is DENIED AS MOOT to the
extent that it seeks to renew the motion to correct, [Doc. No. 19]. The court has
defendants Lightner and Rebecca.
also construed the Motion to Correct [Doc. No. 45], as a motion for
reconsideration and a motion for leave to amend. To the extent that the Court
has construed the Motion to Correct [Doc. No. 45] as a motion for reconsideration
of the February 25, 2013 Ruling [Doc. No. 43], the motion is GRANTED, but after
careful reconsideration, the February 25, 2013 Ruling [Doc. No. 43] is AFFIRMED
and any relief requested is denied. To the extent that the Court has construed
the Motion to Correct [Doc. No. 45] as a motion for leave to amend, the motion is
The plaintiff is permitted to file a Second Amended Complaint to add
Correctional Officer Stanim and Correctional Officer Ajodhi as defendants. The
Second Amended Complaint must comply with Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P. The
caption on the first page of the Second Amended Complaint shall include all
defendants: Correctional Officers Santiago, Caputo, Jones, Scott, Bracket,
Savada, Pertilla, Anderson, Maloid, Guica, Cay, Gazalez, Curtis, Dean, Ajodhi and
Stanim, Nurses Caroline, Joy and Sandy Oliver, Nursing Supervisor Rebecca,
H.S.A. Rikel Lightner and Unit Manager Manley as defendants. The body of the
Second Amended Complaint should include the claims against defendants
Santiago, Jones, Scott, Bracket, Savada, Pertilla, Anderson, Maloid, Guica, Cay,
Gazalez, Curtis, Dean, Ajodhi, Stanim, Caroline and Joy that are listed in pages
six to nine of the First Amended Complaint as well as specific claims against
defendants Caputo, Manley, Oliver, Lightner and Rebecca that appear to be set
forth in Exhibits G, I, V and Y to the First Amended Complaint. The Second
Amended Complaint should clearly and concisely set forth the factual allegations
against the defendants, including the dates on which the alleged unconstitutional
conduct occurred. The plaintiff does NOT need to attach any exhibits to the
Second Amended Complaint.
The Clerk shall send the plaintiff an Amended Complaint form with a copy
of this Ruling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: July 12, 2013.
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