Reyes v. Astrue
Filing
20
ORDER denying 16 motion for summary judgment; denying 16 motion to remand to agency; granting 19 motion to affirm the decision of the commissioner. Signed by Judge Alfred V. Covello on February 26, 2013. (Gentile, N.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
LUCIANO REYES,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
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Civil No. 3:11CV01403(AVC)
RULING ON THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REVERSE AND THE DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
This is an action seeking a review of a denial of an
application for social security benefits.1
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
It is brought
The plaintiff, Luciano Reyes,
alleges that he is entitled to receive disability insurance
benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”).
Reyes now moves for an order reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner”) that denied his claims to DIB and SSI.
In the
alternative, Reyes seeks an order remanding this case for a
1
Under the Social Security Act, the “Commissioner of Social Security
is directed to make findings of fact, and decisions as to the rights
of any individual applying for a payment under [the Act].” 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(b)(1). The Commissioner’s authority to make such findings and
decisions is delegated to administrative law judges (“ALJs”). See
C.F.R. §§ 404.929 et seq. Claimants can in turn appeal an ALJ’s
decision to the Social Security Appeals Council. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.967 et seq. Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act provides
that “[t]he court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and
transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or
without remanding the cause for a rehearing.”
rehearing.
The Commissioner, in turn, has moved for an order
affirming his decision.
The issues presented are: (1) whether the administrative
law judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding that Reyes’ low back and
ankle pain are non-severe impairments; and (2) whether the ALJ
erred in finding that Reyes has the residual functional capacity
to perform light work.
For the reasons that follow, the plaintiff’s motion for an
order reversing or remanding the decision of the Commissioner is
denied, and the defendant’s motion for an order affirming the
decision of the Commissioner is granted.
FACTS
Examination of the record discloses the following:
Reyes was 50 years old on the date of the ALJ’s decision.
He completed his second year of high school and has previous
work experience, mostly as a construction laborer.
Reyes
alleged disability based on diabetes, high blood pressure (also
known as hypertension), low back pain, and ankle pain.
On July 17, 2009, Reyes filed an application for social
security benefits and alleged a disability onset date of
November 1, 2008.
On September 9, 2009, his application for SSI
2
was initially denied.
On September 29, 2009, his application
for DIB was initially denied.2
From August 18, 2009, to October 16, 2010, Reyes was a
patient of the Bridgeport Community Health Center (“BCHC”).
On
August 18, 2009, Reyes received a physical examination at BCHC.
A physical examination form indicated that Reyes had a history
of diabetes and high blood pressure.
The form also indicated
that Reyes complained of pain in his left ankle.
On August 27, 2009, Reyes visited Dr. Luis Cruz for a
consultative examination.
Dr. Cruz noted that, at the time,
“[n]o medical records were available for review” and “the source
of information was the claimant.”
Reyes told Dr. Cruz that he
fell from a tree during his childhood, which resulted in an
ankle injury and chronic low back pain.
Dr. Cruz remarked that
Reyes “displayed an antalgic gait, but did not use any assistive
device.”
Dr. Cruz further stated that Reyes had “no difficulty
getting on and off the examining table.”
Upon examination, Dr.
Cruz observed that there were “good pulses throughout” Reyes’
extremities.
Dr. Cruz also reported “[i]n the supine position,
[the] passive range of motion of all extremities is grossly
normal” and “no evidence of muscle wasting.”
2
On February 18, 2010, both applications were denied upon
reconsideration.
3
On September 8, 2009, Dr. Nathaniel Kaplan, a non-examining
state agency physician, stated that there was no record of a
medically determinable impairment relating to Reyes’ allegations
of low back pain.
Dr. Kaplan further noted that Reyes had
reported an ability to prepare daily meals, drive, manage his
finances, and shop.
Ultimately, Dr. Kaplan found that Reyes did
not have a severe physical impairment.
On September 18, 2009, Reyes returned to BCHC, complaining
of low back pain.
He was diagnosed with diabetes and
hypertension, and received prescriptions for treatment.
Reyes
was also diagnosed with obesity.
On February 11, 2010, Dr. Joseph Connolly Jr., a nonexamining state agency physician, completed a case analysis.
Dr. Connolly reported “no significant physical findings
concerning [Reyes’] ankle or back,” and concluded that Reyes did
not have a medically determinable impairment.
On August 2, 2010, Reyes visited BCHC, again complaining of
low back pain, as well as leg and foot pain.
The prior
diagnoses of diabetes, hypertension, and obesity were noted and
Reyes’ medications were adjusted.
On October 6, 2010, Reyes revisited BCHC, complaining of
continued pain in his lower back and legs.
The diagnoses of
diabetes, hypertension, and obesity were again noted.
4
An MRI of
Reyes’ spine was ordered to investigate his ongoing complaints
of back pain.
On January 5, 2011, Reyes visited the Hospital of Saint
Raphael’s and received an MRI of his spine.
The MRI produced
the following information: 1) “the lumbar spine is in normal
alignment”; 2) “[f]rom L1 through L4 there is no significant
disc herniation”; 3) “[m]inimal disc bulging at L3-4 and L4-5”;
4) “minimal disc desiccation” at “L4-5 and L5-S1”; and 5) a
“mild broad-based disc bulge and mild bilateral facet
arthropathy” at L5-S1.
On February 22, 2011, Reyes returned to the Hospital of
Saint Raphael’s for a physical examination.
Reyes was reported
as having “5/5 strength” throughout his lower extremities,
intact sensation, and a negative straight leg raise,
bilaterally.
A review of his MRI “revealed a very mild disc
bulge at L5-SI with mild facet hypertrophy.”
Following the
examination, Reyes was counseled on weight loss, encouraged to
take anti-inflammatories, and directed to follow up with his
primary care physician.
After denial of his application for benefits initially and
upon reconsideration, Reyes requested a hearing before an ALJ.
On March 7, 2011, he appeared before the ALJ for the hearing,
where he was represented by counsel.
Beyond his diabetes and
high blood pressure, Reyes testified that he suffered from pain
5
“in his lower disc” that radiated down his left leg and into his
ankle.
Reyes acknowledged that he received a prescription for
this pain, yet admitted that he had not refilled it after
running out.
He “guessed” that he could have afforded to do so.
Additionally, Reyes indicated that he was capable of mowing his
lawn, cleaning and washing his car, and fixing the windows on
his two-story home by using a ladder.
Reyes did add, however,
that when he physically overexerts himself, his ability to walk
the next day is limited.
On March 14, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding Reyes
not disabled.
Based on the evidence of record, the ALJ found
that “the claimant’s diabetes, with peripheral neuropathy,
limits [his] capacity to perform some basic work-related
activities” and thus the “impairment rises to the level of
‘severe.’”
The ALJ found, however, that “the claimant’s alleged
low back pain and left ankle pain do not result in any workrelated limitations and, as such, are non-severe.”
Similarly,
Reyes’ hypertension and obesity were found to be non-severeimpairments.
The ALJ concluded that “the claimant’s testimony
relative to the duration, intensity, and limiting effects of
[his diabetes], as well as other alleged impairments, is not
6
entirely credible, to the extent that it is inconsistent with
the evidence of record.”3
On August 30, 2011, The Appeals Council issued a notice to
Reyes denying his request for review and thereby making the
ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
30, 2012, Reyes filed the complaint in this case.
On March
Reyes has
filed a motion to reverse or remand the Commissioner’s decision
and the Commissioner has filed a motion to affirm his decision.
STANDARD
“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to
any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, [are] conclusive
. . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Accordingly, the court may not
make a de novo determination of whether a plaintiff is disabled
in reviewing a denial of disability benefits.
Id.; Wagner v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir.
1990).
Rather, the court’s function is to ascertain whether the
Commissioner applied the correct legal principles in reaching
his conclusion, and whether the decision is supported by
substantial evidence.
Cir. 1987).
Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d
Therefore, absent legal error, this court may not
set aside the decision of the Commissioner if it is supported by
substantial evidence.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d
3
The ALJ also found that “the claimant does not have a severe mental
impairment.” Reyes does not challenge this finding.
7
Cir. 1982).
Further, if the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, that decision will be
sustained, even where there may also be substantial evidence to
support the plaintiff’s contrary position.
Schauer v.
Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1982).
The Second Circuit has defined substantial evidence as
“‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’”
Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d
255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971)).
Substantial evidence must be “more than a
scintilla or touch of proof here and there in the record.”
Id.
DISCUSSION
I.
The Social Security Act
The Social Security Act establishes that benefits are
payable to individuals who have a disability.
423(a)(1).
42 U.S.C. §
“The term ‘disability’ means . . . [an] inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1).
In order to be considered disabled, an individual’s
impairment must be “of such severity that he is not only unable
to do his previous work but cannot . . . engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy . . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
8
“‘[W]ork which
exists in the national economy’ means work which exists in
significant numbers either in the region where such individual
lives or in several regions of the country.”4
Id.
However,
“[i]solated jobs that exist only in very limited numbers in
relatively few locations outside of the region where [the
claimant] live[s] are not considered ‘work which exists in the
national economy.’”
II.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(b).
Motions to Reverse and to Affirm
Reyes moves to reverse the Commissioner’s decision to deny
him benefits, arguing that the decision is not supported by
substantial evidence and is the product of various errors.
The
Commissioner has responded by filing a motion to affirm, arguing
that the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is
free of errors.
A. Severity Determinations
Reyes first argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that
“[his] low back and ankle pain are not ‘severe’” impairments,
and that “had the ALJ not so concluded. . . . Rule 201.09 of the
Medical Vocational Guidelines would have dictated a finding that
[he] is disabled.”5
Specifically, Reyes criticizes the ALJ for
4
The determination of whether such work exists in the national
economy is made without regard to: 1) “whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which [the claimant] lives”; 2) “whether a specific
job vacancy exists for [the claimant]”; or 3) “whether [the claimant]
would be hired if he applied for work.” Id.
5
Reyes does not challenge any other individual severity
determinations made by the ALJ.
9
arriving at this conclusion after “rel[ying] heavily on the
report of the consultative examiner, Dr. Cruz” which “pre-dates
the MRI.”
He further argues that the ALJ “erred by relying on
his own medical expertise” when he “concluded that since the
findings of the MRI [were] ‘mild,’ the record did not
demonstrate the severity of pain about which [Reyes]
complained.”6
In response, the Commissioner argues that “the ALJ
reasonably found that [Reyes’] low back and ankle pain did not
rise to the level of a severe impairment.”
Specifically, the
Commissioner argues that “the ALJ considered other substantial
record evidence, in addition to Dr. Cruz’s evaluation.”
The
Commissioner further argues that “the ALJ did not . . .
erroneously rely on ‘his own medical expertise’ in determining
that [Reyes’] back pain did not rise to the level of a severe
impairment.”
Rather, the Commissioner contends the ALJ echoed
the post-MRI report stating that it “revealed a very mild disc
bulge . . . with only mild facet hypertrophy,” and also
“considered opinions from Dr. Kaplan and Dr. Connolly, state
6
Reyes also contends that “the ALJ did not, as he should have,
consider how severe his back pain and obesity are in combination.”
The court, however, finds no merit to this argument because the ALJ
expressly noted Reyes’ record of obesity but found that “[his]
obesity, solely and/or combination with his diabetes, with peripheral
neuropathy, or his alleged (non-severe) impairment[] of low back pain
. . . does not result in any work-related limitations.”
10
agency physicians who reviewed the record evidence and found
that [Reyes] did not have a severe physical impairment.”
A claimant seeking social security benefits must bear the
burden of showing that he has a medically severe impairment or
combination of impairments.
146 n. 5 (1987).
See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137,
“The severity regulation requires the claimant
to show that he has an “impairment or combination of impairments
which significantly limits” “the abilities and aptitudes
necessary to do most jobs.”
404.1520(c), 404.1421(b)).
Id. at 146 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§
“An impairment or combination of
impairments is found ‘not severe’ and a finding of ‘not
disabled’ is made . . . when medical evidence establishes only a
slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities
which would have no more than a minimal effect on an
individual’s ability to work . . . .”
SSR 85-28.
20 C.F.R. §
404.1520 provides the ALJ with a five step evaluation process.7
Here, the ALJ’s decision follows the applicable five-step
process in its assessment of Reyes’ alleged disability.
First,
the ALJ determined that Reyes was not performing any substantial
7
Section 404.1520 provides that the commissioner follows a “five-step
sequential evaluation process” in determining if an individual is
disabled and entitled to benefits. The steps are as follows: 1)
consideration of the claimant’s work activity and determination of
whether he or she is performing “substantial gainful activity;” 2)
and 3) determination of the “medical severity of the impairment;” 4)
assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity and past
relevant work; and 5) consideration of residual functional capacity
and claimant’s age, education, and work experience in order to
determine whether the claimant can make an adjustment to other work.
11
gainful activity.
Second, the ALJ determined that Reyes had the
severe impairment of diabetes with peripheral neuropathy, and
the non-severe impairments of alleged low back and left ankle
pain, hypertension and/or hyperlipidemia, and obesity.
Third,
the ALJ concluded that Reyes did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met the statutory listing of
impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
The ALJ determined that Reyes retained the residual functional
capacity to perform the full range of light work as defined in
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b).
Fourth, the ALJ concluded
that Reyes could not perform his previous work as a construction
or landscaping laborer.
Finally, the ALJ concluded that based
upon Reyes’ residual functional capacity, age, education, and
work experience, a finding of “not disabled” was directed by
Rule 202.10 of the Medical Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 2.
In making his severity determination regarding Reyes’
alleged low back and ankle pain, the ALJ relied on objective
medical reports of a number of examining and non-examining
medical experts.
Dr. Cruz, the consultative examiner, was only
one such expert whose report was referenced by the ALJ.8
8
The ALJ
The ALJ cited Dr. Cruz’s remarks that Reyes had “’good pulses
throughout’ his extremities, with no edema.” He also referenced Dr.
Cruz’s report that “[i]n the supine position, [the] passive range of
motion of all extremities is grossly normal” and that Reyes had “no
evidence of muscle wasting.”
12
expressly accorded “great weight” to the findings of nonexamining state agency physicians Dr. Kaplan and Dr. Connolly,
both of whom are cited for their findings that Reyes did not
have a severe physical impairment.
The ALJ also referenced
Reyes’ post-MRI physical examination report, which expressly
indicated that Reyes had “very mild” to “mild” physical
impairments in parts of his spine.9
The ALJ was entitled to make a determination that the
defendant’s subjective complaints of pain were inconsistent with
the objective medical evidence.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a)(“In
determining whether you are disabled, we consider all your
symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which your symptoms
can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective
medical evidence and other evidence.”)
Therefore, the ALJ did
not err or “improperly rely[] on his own medical expertise” by
finding that the medical evidence did not support Reyes’ claim
of disabling low back and ankle pain.
Reyes’ claims of error lack merit because the ALJ
considered a full breadth of medical evidence in making his
determination that the alleged low back and ankle pain were non-
9
The record shows the ALJ used the post-MRI report’s exact language,
rather than his own, to describe its findings as “mild.” The ALJ
quoted the following excerpt from the report verbatim: “Review of an
MRI today . . . revealed a very mild disc bulge at L5-S1 with mild
facet hypertrophy.” The ALJ further noted that the same report
“revealed negative straight leg raise, bilaterally; intact sensation,
and 5/5 strength throughout his lower extremities.”
13
severe impairments.
The record reveals that Reyes did not
furnish the ALJ with any medical evidence showing how his
alleged impairments of low back and ankle pain limited his
ability to work.
Nor does Reyes presently make a specific
argument, beyond conclusory statements, as to precisely how the
medical evidence supports his allegations of disabling pain.
Accordingly, the court concludes that the ALJ properly
considered the evidence of record and that his conclusion is
supported by substantial evidence of record.
B. Residual Functional Capacity
Reyes next argues that “there is no medical evidence that
[he] can perform light work.”
Specifically, Reyes contends the
ALJ erred in rendering a residual functional capacity
determination that “fails to inform in any meaningful,
reviewable way of the specific evidence the ALJ considered in
determining that [Reyes’] complaints were not credible.”
Reyes
further argues that “[a] claimant with a good work record is
entitled to substantial credibility.”
Similarly, Reyes contends
that “where a claimant’s subjective evidence of pain is
accompanied by objective medical evidence, as exists here (i.e.,
the MRI), it is entitled to greater weight.”10
10
Reyes also contends that “while the ALJ considered [his] testimony
concerning chores [he] performed, he did not consider the corollary,
that he always suffers the next day.” The court finds that this
argument lacks merit. First, the allegation that Reyes “always”
suffers the day after doing chores is overstated and not supported by
14
In response, the Commissioner argues that “substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s [residual functional capacity]
finding.”
Specifically, the Commissioner contends that the
ALJ’s finding is supported by “objective medical evidence,”
“medical opinions,” “the nature of [Reyes’] treatment,” and “his
daily activities.”
The Commissioner further argues that while
“‘a good work history may be deemed probative of credibility,’
it remains just one of many factors appropriately considered in
assessing credibility.”
“In determining the claimant’s physical ability, or
residual work capacity, the [Commissioner] must consider
objective medical facts, diagnoses and medical opinions based on
such facts. . . .”
Cir. 1984).
Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 585 (2d
The Second Circuit has stated that “the subjective
evidence of [an] appellant's pain, based on her own testimony
and the medical reports of examining physicians, is more than
ample to establish her disability, if believed.”
Marcus v.
Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
The
ALJ may use discretion to evaluate the credibility of a
claimant, “based on medical findings and other evidence.”
Id.
his testimony. Second, the ALJ expressly considered that “[Reyes]
indicated that he ‘sometimes’ has difficulty walking if he overdoes
something” and that “[w]hen [Reyes] works too hard one day, the next
day, he will have problems with his left leg.” However, after
assessing the evidence of record, the ALJ found that Reyes’ testimony
was “not entirely credible.”
15
While it is true that “a good work history may be deemed
probative of credibility,” it is “just one of many factors”
appropriately considered in assessing credibility.
Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 502 (2d Cir. 1998).
Schaal v.
In reviewing this
challenge, it is the function of the Commissioner, not the
court, to appraise the credibility of witnesses, including the
claimant.
See Carroll v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 705
F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983).
The claimant bears the burden of
proof during the evaluation process, but the Commissioner must
show that there is work that the claimant can do.
See Curry v.
Apfel, 209 F.3d 117, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2000).
The ALJ determined that Reyes “has the residual functional
capacity to perform the full range of light work.”11
He reached
this determination “after a review of the entire evidence of
record, including the objective medical evidence of record, as
well as the claimant’s testimony, provided at hearing.”
As
previously discussed, the ALJ properly found the objective
medical evidence did not support Reyes’ subjective allegations
that he had any severe impairments beyond the diabetes with
peripheral neuropathy.
As directed under regulations
promulgated by the Social Security Administration, the ALJ
nonetheless looked beyond the objective medical evidence and
11
Light work requires the ability to lift up to 20 pounds
occasionally, lift 10 pounds frequently, stand and walk for up to 6
hours a day, and sit for up to two hours. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1567(b); SSR 83-10.
16
assessed the credibility of Reyes’ testimony regarding his
various symptoms.
See 20 C.F.R. § 1529(c)(3).
Among other
factors, the ALJ explicitly assessed Reyes’ credibility in light
of his daily activities, his medications, and the intensity and
limiting effects of his alleged impairments.12
Therefore, the
ALJ did not, as Reyes contends, “fail[] to inform in any
meaningful, reviewable way of the specific evidence [he]
considered in determining that [Reyes’] complaints were not
credible.”
Further, these discussions all lend credence to our
conclusion that the ALJ’s credibility and residual functional
capacity determinations are both supported by substantial
evidence.
The ALJ also expressly acknowledged Reyes’ testimony
regarding his good work history, remarking that “he had worked
for 30 years,” mostly “in construction, as a laborer.”
However,
the ALJ was entitled to consider this work history as one factor
12
With regard to daily activities, the ALJ noted that Reyes testified
that he “lives by himself, in a house . . . cleans his house and does
some outside chores. . . . cleans his car and takes it for a ride . .
. . does his own grocery shopping. . . . participate[es] in church
activities . . . . [and] fixes his own meals.”
With regard to medications, the ALJ noted that Reyes testified that
he “does not take any medication for his back pain. He was prescribed
pills for his back pain, but they ran out, and he has not refilled the
prescription.”
With regard to the intensity and limiting effects of the alleged
impairments, the ALJ noted that Reyes testified that “he ‘sometimes’
has difficultly walking if he overdoes something . . . . he can lift
5-10 pounds but tries not to lift 20 pounds . . . . he has problems
sitting if he sits for more than 4 hours.””
17
among the others while assessing Reyes’ credibility.
See
Schaal, 134 F.3d at 502.
Reyes makes no specific argument beyond conclusory
statements as to precisely how his ailments combine to limit him
in such a way that would merit altering the ALJ’s decision.
The
court concludes, therefore, that the ALJ properly considered the
evidence of record and that his conclusion is supported by
substantial evidence of record.
CONCLUSION
Reyes’ motion for an order reversing or remanding the
Commissioner’s decision (document no. 16) is DENIED and the
Commissioner’s motion to affirm that decision (document no. 19)
is GRANTED.
It is so ordered this 25th day of February 2013, at
Hartford, Connecticut.
______/s/ ____
____
Alfred V. Covello, U.S.D.J.
18
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