Schreiber v. United Technologies Corporation et al

Filing 49

ORDER granting 26 Motion to Dismiss. The clerk is instructed to close this case. Signed by Judge Warren W. Eginton on 9/7/12. (Ladd-Smith, I.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
GLENN R. SHREIBER,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP.,
PRATT & WHITNEY,
LOUIS R. CHENEVERT,
GREGORY J. HAYES,
DAVID P. HESS,
PETER A. GUTERMANN,
ROBERT E. MCGUINNESS,
WALTER F. EELLS, JR.,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

3:11-cv-01409-WWE

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Pro se plaintiff Glenn Shreiber filed this action against defendants United Technologies
Corp. (“UTC”), Pratt & Whitney (“Pratt”), Louis Chenevert, Gregory Hayes, David Hess, Peter
Gutermann, Robert McGuinness, and Walter Eells, Jr. based primarily on breach of contract
claims. Plaintiff also claims dissatisfaction with Pratt for garnishing his wages and for falsely
accusing him of forging documents.
For the following reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted.
BACKGROUND
For purposes of ruling on this motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the allegations of the
complaint as true and draws all inferences in favor of plaintiff.
Pro se plaintiff’s amended complaint consists of ten counts, some of which are
redundant, most of which do not state valid causes of action, e.g., “Count VI: False and
Misleading Worker Accusations . . . Count VII: Failure to State a Cause of Action or Give
1

Relief.” Therefore, the Court reviews the sufficiency of plaintiff’s pleadings mindful of its duty
to construe more liberally his pro se complaint.
Essentially, plaintiff has claimed that defendants have dishonored and defaulted on eleven
contracts and administrative notices sent to defendants by plaintiff. These contracts and notices
were properly served via Brandywine Process Servers Ltd. to the UTC registered agent known as
The Corporation Trust Company. Plaintiff argues that since defendants never rebutted or
disagreed with any of the eleven contracts and notices, they are valid and entitle him to millions
of dollars.
Additionally, plaintiff contends that securities fraud and trafficking may have occurred
since defendants were unwilling to produce any valid judgments or valid court orders to justify
pay attachments or pay garnishments. Plaintiff did not agree with any pay garnishments and
argues that the garnishments were not authorized. Defendants contends that Pratt received three
wage garnishment orders: one from the California Department of Child Support Services and two
from the Connecticut Superior Court. These orders were attached as exhibits to defendants’
motion to dismiss. The Court considers these materials because the complaint is found to rely
heavily upon the documents’ terms and effects rendering them integral to the complaint. See
Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006).
Finally, plaintiff claims he was falsely accused of forgery and falsifying company records
and that the basis for his termination was unreasonable. However, plaintiff admits to giving
himself powers of attorney for UTC. Plaintiff requests that he be made whole for all losses in
the amount that defendants have failed to “disagree with” - pursuant to the eleven contracts and
notices - in the amount of $142,000,000.00
2

DISCUSSION
The function of a motion to dismiss is "merely to assess the legal feasibility of the
complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof."
Ryder Energy Distribution v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.
1984). When deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations as
true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader. Hishon v. King, 467 U.S. 69, 73
(1984). The complaint must contain the grounds upon which the claim rests through factual
allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). A plaintiff is obliged to amplify a claim with some factual
allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A document filed pro se is to be liberally
construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 214
(2d Cir. 2008). The Court reviews the sufficiency of plaintiff’s pleadings mindful of this duty to
construe more liberally his pro se complaint.
The primary thrust of plaintiff’s complaint is a breach of contract claim based on letters
he sent to defendants since October, 2010. Plaintiff’s letters demanded that Pratt pay him the
amounts withheld from his paychecks because of garnishment orders. In essence, plaintiff claims
that, because defendants didn’t respond to his letters, they accepted his demands for millions of
dollars. However, “[s]ilence alone does not constitute an ‘expression of acceptance’ of an offer
or a counteroffer under normal circumstances.” Beech Aircraft Corp. V. Flexible Tubing Corp.,
3

270 F. Supp 548, 558 (D. Conn. 1967). It does not here. Thus, plaintiff’s claims based on
breach of contract are not plausible.
Considering defendants’ reliance on court orders in garnishing plaintiff’s wages,
plaintiff’s claim that such garnishment was invalid requires amplification to render it plausible.
The orders themselves provided opportunity for plaintiff to challenge them. Plaintiff’s cannot
simply disregard that opportunity in favor of claiming that defendants compliance with the court
order was improper. Such a claim is insufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.
Plaintiff’s claim that he was falsely accused of forging company records as the basis for
his termination is similarly without merit. Defendants assert that at some point in February 2011,
plaintiff copied from the SEC’s website various powers of attorney signed by members of UTC’s
Board of Directors and forged them to include his name. Subsequently, plaintiff sent Pratt a
letter containing a copy of the forged powers of attorney. In the letter, plaintiff made a demand
for $32,168,717.86 and stated that, within three days, he would have the authority as UTC’s
power of attorney to perfect his claim. Accordingly, Pratt decided to terminate plaintiff’s
employment.
Plaintiff’s amended complaint [Doc. 29, ¶ 33] admits that plaintiff created his “own”
powers of attorney for UTC, and that this was the reason for his termination. Thus, the claim that
plaintiff was falsely accused is not facially plausible.
Even considering his pro se status, plaintiff has failed to “plead[] factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Therefore, his complaint will be dismissed in its
4

entirety.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Clerk is
instructed to close this case.

Dated this 7th day of September, 2012 at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

________________/s/_____________________
WARREN W. EGINTON
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

5