Brown v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co

Filing 53

ORDER: Plaintiff's Motion 50 for Reconsideration is DENIED. Signed by Judge Janet Bond Arterton on 12/4/2013. (Bonneau, J)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
RALSTON BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant.

Civil No. 3:11cv1435 (JBA)

December 4, 2013

RULING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Plaintiff Ralston Brown, proceeding pro se, brought this action against Defendant
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company alleging negligent misrepresentation, gross
negligence, negligence, obstruction of justice, violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act (“CUTPA”), and three counts of fraud arising from Defendant’s denial of
Plaintiff’s claim for insurance proceeds and the subsequent litigation regarding that
denial. (See Amend. Compl. [Doc. # 40].) Defendant moved to dismiss the action in its
entirety, arguing (1) that Plaintiff’s claims were barred under the doctrine of res judicata,
(2) that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff could not show that
the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, (3) that the action should be dismissed
under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, and (4) that Plaintiff failed to state a claim
for which relief can be granted. (See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [Doc. # 41].)
The Court granted [Doc. # 46] Defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding, pursuant
to the doctrine of res judicata, that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by Judge Droney’s ruling
granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in Plaintiff’s prior federal suit
related to this insurance coverage dispute. See Brown v. State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company, No. 10cv833 (CFD) (hereinafter “Brown II”), 2011 WL 4396747 (D. Conn.
Sept. 20, 2011). The Court further held that to the extent that Judge Droney denied as

futile Plaintiff’s attempts to amend his complaint in Brown II to add many of the claims
alleged in the present suit, that ruling also had preclusive effect. (See Ruling on Mot. to
Dismiss at 6 n.2.) Finally, the Court held that Plaintiff’s claims for gross negligence and
obstruction of justice failed as a matter of law. (See id.) Plaintiff now moves [Doc. # 50]
for reconsideration of the Court’s ruling. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion
will be denied.
II.

Legal Standard
Motions for reconsideration require the movant to set “forth concisely the matter

or controlling decisions which [the movant] believes the Court overlooked in the initial
decision or order.” D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 7(c)1. The Second Circuit has explained that
“[t]he major grounds justifying reconsideration are ‘an intervening change of controlling
law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice.’” Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255
(2d Cir. 1992) (quoting 18B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 4478). This standard is “strict,” however, and reconsideration should be
granted only if “the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the
conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.
1995). If “the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided,” the court
should deny the motion for reconsideration and adhere to its prior decision. Id.
II.

Discussion
Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the Court’s order dismissing this action,

arguing (1) that the ruling in Brown II cannot have preclusive effect because it was issued
four days after Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action; (2) that the allegations in
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Brown II are different from the allegations in this case because Brown II was a suit for
recovery of insurance proceeds while the instant action relates to Defendant’s alleged
fraud in denying Plaintiff’s insurance claim; and (3) that res judicata cannot bar this suit
because the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.1
Plaintiff argues that this suit cannot be barred under the doctrine of res judicata
because the present suit was filed four days before a final judgment on the merits was
entered in Brown II. Courts have recognized a general rule that “as between actions
pending at the same time, res judicata attaches to the first judgment regardless of the
sequence in which the actions were commenced.” Federal Practice & Procedure § 4404;
see also Gresham Park Cmty. Org. v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1241 (5th Cir. 1981),
overruled on other grounds, Wood v. Orange Cnty., 715 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he
general rule is that a judgment has preclusive effect in all suits pending at the time of
decision, regardless of when the pending suit was filed.”); Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d
1143, 1154 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[I]t is clear that even though the Southern District action was
filed before the Eastern District action, when the latter proceeded to final judgment first it
became a bar to the former if the underlying claims are the same.”). “This rule is
supported in part by the time-honored tradition that a second court is often free to
proceed with an action instituted on the same claim as a prior in personam action.”
Federal Practice & Procedure § 4404 (citing Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U.S.
611, 615–617 (1926)). Thus, although this Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims at

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Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s opposition [Doc. # 51] to his motion to
dismiss was untimely and should therefore be disregarded by the Court. Pursuant to
Local Rule 7(a), Defendant’s opposition was due twenty-one days after Plaintiff’s motion
for reconsideration was filed on April 22, 2013. Therefore, Defendant’s opposition was
timely. Furthermore, even if Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration had been unopposed,
the Court would still conclude that it lacks merit.
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the time they were filed, as soon as the final judgment was entered in Brown II and
Defendant raised the issue of res judicata in this case, Plaintiff’s claims were barred by
that prior judgment. See DiMauro v. Pavia, 492 F. Supp. 1051, 1060 (D. Conn. 1979)
aff’d, 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979) (“A decree may be relied upon as res judicata although
it is rendered after the initiation of proceedings in which the bar is then asserted.” (citing
Princess Lida v. Thompson, 205 U.S. 456 (1939)). Therefore, the sequence in which
Plaintiff’s prior actions were filed and proceeded to judgment does not alter this Court’s
conclusion that res judicata bars the present suit.
Plaintiff also argues that the allegations in Brown II were unrelated to the instant
action and that res judicata is therefore inapplicable. The Court addressed this argument
in its ruling on Defendant’s motion to dismiss and concluded that it was without merit.
(See Ruling on Mot. to Dismiss at 5–7.) This case and the Brown II matter arise out of the
same transaction or series of transactions in that all of Plaintiff’s claims relate to the
denial of his insurance claim and the ensuing state court litigation related to that denial.
Plaintiff could have raised his present claims in Brown II because all of the alleged
misstatements occurred prior to the entry of judgment in that case, and Plaintiff did in
fact raise or attempt to raise many of these same issues in Brown II. To the extent that
Judge Droney denied as futile Plaintiff’s motion to amend his Brown II complaint to add
his present claims, that decision also has preclusive effect on the instant action. (See id. at
6 n.2.) Plaintiff has not brought to the Court’s attention any facts or case law that it
overlooked in its prior ruling that would alter these conclusions.

Therefore, this

argument does not present a sufficient ground for the Court to reconsider its prior ruling.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that “[t]his case . . . survived the doctrine of res judicata
because this [C]ourt exercised its disc[retion] to hear the issues on the merits by allowing
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[P]laintiff the opportunity to amend the September 16, 2011 . . . complaint.” (See Mot.
for Reconsideration at 1.) Plaintiff cites no case law in support of this argument, nor
could this Court locate any. In permitting Plaintiff to amend his complaint, the Court
merely exercised its discretion to afford Plaintiff one final opportunity to address
Defendant’s anticipated arguments in favor of dismissal, which had been raised during
the parties’ pre-filing conference. The Court did not purport to express any opinion on
the merits of Defendant’s arguments regarding the application of res judicata. Nor could
the fact that Plaintiff amended his complaint have nullified the preclusive effect of the
judgment in Brown II. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s argument in favor
of reconsideration is without merit.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion [Doc. # 50] for Reconsideration is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Janet Bond Arterton, U.S.D.J.

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 4th day of December, 2013.

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