Best v. Smith et al

Filing 27

ORDER granting 21 Motion for Summary Judgment. Please see attached Ruling & Order for further detail. The Clerk may close the case. Signed by Judge Robert N. Chatigny on 9/24/2014. (Rickevicius, L.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
LEONARD BEST,
Plaintiff,
v.
LT. ALLEN SMITH, ET AL.
Defendants.

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CASE NO. 3:11-cv-1656(RNC)

RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff Leonard Best, a Connecticut inmate, brings this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Correctional Lieutenant Allen
Smith, Correctional Officers Jason Hogan, Rafal Matuszczak and
Christopher Johnson, and Warden Jon Brighthaupt claiming violations
of his rights to privacy and procedural due process.
have moved for summary judgment [ECF No. 21].

Defendants

For the reasons that

follow, the motion for summary judgment is granted.
I.

Background
The summary judgment record shows the following.

On or about

February 16, 2011, the Department of Correction ("DOC") began an
investigation into phone calls made by plaintiff.
56(a)(1) Statement (ECF No. 21-2) ¶ 1.

Defs.' Rule

Sometime thereafter,

plaintiff was summoned to the Intelligence Unit's office at
Cheshire where he met with Hogan and Smith.
¶¶ 8-9.

Am. Compl. (ECF No. 7)

They sought to get information from him about a "crooked"

correctional officer, but he explained that he could not assist
them.

Id. ¶¶ 10-14.

On August 23, 2011, plaintiff was issued a Class A ticket for
conspiring to convey contraband within the correctional facility.
Defs.' Rule 56(a)(1) Statement (ECF No. 21-2) ¶ 3.

He was placed

in restrictive housing and interviewed by the intelligence team.
Aff. of Rafal Matuszczak, Ex. A, Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No.
21-1) ¶ 13; Am. Compl. (ECF No. 7) ¶¶ 16, 23-28.

The next day, a

hearing was held on the Class A ticket pursuant to Administrative
Directive 9.5.

See

Aff. of Rafal Matuszczak, Ex. A, Defs.' Mot.

for Summ. J. (ECF No. 21-1) ¶¶ 13-14; Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF
No. 21) ¶¶ 3, 5.1
alleged offense.
5.

At the hearing, plaintiff pleaded guilty to the
Defs.' Rule 56(a)(1) Statement (ECF No. 21-2) ¶

As a result, he received seven days in restrictive housing.

Id. ¶ 6.
In connection with plaintiff’s transfer to restrictive
housing, he was subjected to a strip search that included a visual
body cavity search.
his right to privacy.

Id. ¶ 7.

He claims that the search violated

Am. Compl. (ECF No. 7) ¶ 49.

1

He further

Administrative Directive 9.5 requires that an inmate
receive a copy of the disciplinary report at least 24 hours prior
to any hearing, ¶ 24, and that an inmate be allowed a minimum of
24 hours, from notice to hearing, to prepare a defense, ¶ 26. It
further requires that the hearing officer produce a disciplinary
process report within 24 hours of the hearing that includes a
summary of testimony, the finding, and the reasons. ¶ 36.
Finally, the Directive provides that the inmate may be allowed to
question witnesses or to rebut evidence and information
presented, ¶ 31(H), may be allowed to present witness testimony,
¶ 27, and shall be present at the hearing barring circumstances
not alleged to have occurred in the present case, ¶ 31(B).
2

claims that his due process rights were violated because the Class
A disciplinary charge was falsely issued by Smith, Hogan,
Matuszczak and Johnson in an attempt to force him to provide
information about his alleged co-conspirator.

Id. ¶ 46.

In

addition, he challenges the loss of ten days of good time credit
that resulted from the disciplinary charge.

Id. ¶ 51; ¶ 52 at 12.

Plaintiff wrote to Warden Brighthaupt to complain about the
disciplinary report but he did not receive a response.

Id. ¶ 46.

He filed a level one inmate grievance about the false charge but
Brighthaupt did not respond.

Id. ¶ 54.

three appeals also went unanswered.

His level two and level

Id. ¶ 55.

He alleges that

Brighthaupt's inaction constitutes a due process violation.

Id. ¶

56.
II.

Legal Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment may be granted when there is no "genuine

issue as to any material fact" and, based on the undisputed facts,
the movant is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Civ. P. 56(c).

Fed. R.

See D'Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149

(2d Cir. 1998).

A genuine issue of fact exists "if the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party."
248 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

In assessing the evidence, the court must review the

record as a whole, credit all evidence favoring the nonmovant, give
the nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and
disregard evidence favorable to the movant that a jury would not
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have to believe.

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530

U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000).

Conclusory allegations, conjecture, and

speculation are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact for
trial.

Shannon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir.

2003).
III.

Discussion
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment

because plaintiff has not presented evidence to support a finding
that his rights were violated.

I agree.

A. Right to Privacy
Plaintiff claims that his right to privacy was violated when
he was subjected to a strip search, including a visual body cavity
search, in connection with his transfer to restrictive housing.
Construed broadly, the complaint alleges that the search was
unreasonable.

However, plaintiff does not challenge Administrative

Directive 6.7, pursuant to which the search was conducted.
A strip search of an inmate, including a visual body cavity
search, does not violate the constitution when it is conducted in a
reasonable manner for a legitimate penological purpose.

See Covino

v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 77-80 (2d Cir. 1992) (random visual body
cavity searches conducted pursuant to established procedures were
"reasonably related to legitimate penological interests" and not
unreasonable; prisoner had a limited right to bodily privacy, but
the regulation permitting such searches was reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests – security and discipline – and
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there were no alternatives that would allow the prisoner to
exercise his limited bodily privacy rights while matching the
effectiveness of the challenged searches);

Miller v. Bailey, No.

05-CV-5493(CBA)(LB), 2008 WL 1787692, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. April 17,
2008)("several Courts have held that strip searches of prisoners in
the presence of other inmates and staff is not constitutionally
defective, especially in light of legitimate security concerns.")
(collecting cases); Mathie v. Fries, 935 F. Supp. 1284, 1299
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) aff'd, 121 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[A] prisoner
may be subjected to strip searches and body cavity searches
conducted in a reasonable manner.").
When, as here, a DOC inmate has pleaded guilty to conspiracy
to convey contraband in a correctional facility, a strip search and
visual body cavity search prior to his transfer to restrictive
housing, conducted pursuant to DOC Administrative Directive 6.7, is
reasonably related to a legitimate security concern and thus not
unconstitutional.

See, e.g., Powell v. Cusimano, 326 F. Supp. 2d

322, 336 (D. Conn. 2004) (rejecting argument that unnecessary
number of persons present during search violated inmate's right to
privacy and explaining: "[t]he Court finds that the DOC's
Administrative Directive 6.7(5)(D) is reasonable on its face.
Absent any challenge to the Directive from the plaintiff, the Court
declines to undertake further analysis of the directive under the
four prongs articulated in Turner [to determine the reasonableness
of a prison regulation].").
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B. Right to Due Process
Even though plaintiff pleaded guilty to the Class A ticket,
which resulted in seven days in administrative segregation and the
loss of ten days of good time credit, he now asserts that the
charges against him were false and unsupported by evidence.
Plaintiff's complaint does not appear to challenge the disciplinary
hearing he received, nor does he name as a defendant anyone
involved in the hearing.2

Instead, he asserts that the defendants

involved in the investigation against him issued a false
disciplinary ticket to try to get information regarding alleged
smuggling of contraband into the prison.
"[A] prison inmate has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity
from being falsely accused of conduct which may result in the
deprivation of a protected liberty interest.

The plaintiff, as all

other prison inmates, has the right not to be deprived of a
protected liberty interest without due process of law."

Freeman v.

Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Boddie v.
Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining that "a
prison inmate has no general constitutional right to be free from
being falsely accused in a misbehavior report" and that "[t]here
must be more," such as alleged retaliation).

2

Here, plaintiff does

Plaintiff's opposition to the motion for summary judgment
asserts that the hearing officers are "incorporated and included
by proxy" because they conducted a hearing based on fabricated
evidence; he alleges that his due process rights were violated
because "all information was not fully heard, filtered and sorted
to reveal the actual truth." Pl.'s Opp'n (ECF No. 26) at 3.
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not allege that the disciplinary ticket was issued in retaliation
for the exercise of any constitutionally protected right.
Compare Jones v. Coughlin, 45 F.3d 677, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1995) ("At
the doctrinal level, we have held that a prisoner has a substantive
due process right not to be subjected to false misconduct charges
as retaliation for his exercise of a constitutional right such as
petitioning the government for redress of his grievances, and that
this right is distinct from the procedural due process claim at
issue in Freeman.") with Garrido v. Coughlin, 716 F. Supp. 98, 101
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (no substantive constitutional violation where
complaint alleges that false disciplinary action arose out of a
verbal confrontation, an isolated incident of personal enmity).
"Thus, as long as the prison officials provided the inmate with
procedural due process requirements . . . the filing of unfounded
charges does not give rise to a per se constitutional violation
actionable under section 1983."

McEachin v. Selsky, 9:04-CV-0083

FJS/RFT, 2010 WL 3259975 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2010) report and
recommendation adopted, 9:04-CV-0083 FJS/RFT, 2010 WL 3259982
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2010) (citing Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 587
(2d Cir. 1988)); see also Grillo v. Coughlin, 31 F.3d 53, 56 (2d
Cir. 1994) (explaining that a fair hearing that comports with due
process standards "cure[s] a constitutional violation otherwise
resulting from a false accusation").
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), due process requires that "[a]n
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inmate charged with a violation must be given (1) advance written
notice of the charges at least 24 hours before the hearing; (2) the
opportunity to appear at the hearing, to call witnesses, and to
present rebuttal evidence; and (3) a written statement by the
factfinders as to the evidence relied on for their decision, and
the reasons for the prison committee's action."
at 953.

Freeman, 808 F.2d

Plaintiff offers no evidence that the minimum requirements

prescribed by Wolff were not met, nor does he appear to dispute
defendants' assertion that the disciplinary hearing was conducted
in accordance with Administrative Directive 9.5.3

Accordingly,

plaintiff's claim that his rights were violated by the filing of a
false disciplinary ticket, to which he ultimately pleaded guilty,
is unavailing.

See also Coleman v. Sutton, 530 F. Supp. 2d 451,

453 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) aff'd, 355 F. App'x 566 (2d Cir. 2009)("[E]ven
viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the
undisputed facts establish that defendants are entitled to summary

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The only allegation in the complaint that the process did
not comply with Administrative Directive 9.5 is plaintiff's
assertion that he was not served with a copy of the disciplinary
report within 24 hours of the defendants' discovery of the
alleged misconduct as required by Administrative Directive 9.5 ¶
21. See Am. Compl. (ECF No. 7) ¶ 43. This is not one of
requirements for a disciplinary hearing under Wolff, however.
Moreover, although, as plaintiff asserts, he was not given a copy
of his disciplinary report within 24 hours of the initiation of
the investigation against him, defendants assert and plaintiff
does not appear to dispute that the investigation ended on August
23, 2011, and he was given a copy of the disciplinary report
within 24 hours of the close of the investigation. See Aff. of
Rafal Matuszczak, Ex. A, Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 21-1)
¶¶ 10-11, 13.
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judgment.

For one thing, plaintiff pleaded guilty to the charge[s]

in the misbehavior report filed against him . . . .

That alone

defeats any claim based on the issuance of the report.").4
C. Claims against Warden Brighthaupt
Warden Brighthaupt is entitled to summary judgment as to the
claims against him related to his alleged failure to respond to
plaintiff's complaint and remedy the alleged wrongs.

As described

above, plaintiff's constitutional rights were not violated.
Therefore, Brighthaupt is not liable for any deprivation of
constitutional rights based on his alleged failure to remedy
wrongdoing.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 21] is
hereby granted.

The Clerk may close the case.

So ordered this 24th day of September 2014.
___________________/s/________________
Robert N. Chatigny
United States District Judge

4

Further, to the extent plaintiff seeks to challenge the
disciplinary process that resulted in the loss of ten days of
good time credits, such a challenge is not cognizable under §
1983. "Where a successful section 1983 action by a plaintiff
'necessarily implies the invalidity of the deprivation of his
good-time credits, the cause of action is not cognizable under §
1983." Jamison v. Dee, 99 CIV. 5854 (SHS), 2000 WL 502871
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2000) aff'd, 4 F. App'x 81 (2d Cir.
2001)(citing Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997)). In such
circumstances, "the prisoner may not maintain an action under §
1983 unless he has shown that the sanction . . . ha[s] been
overturned through administrative channels or by a state or
federal court." Peralta v. Vasquez, 467 F.3d 98, 100 (2d Cir.
2006). Plaintiff has not made that showing.
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