Wanamaker v. Westport Board of Education et al
Filing
99
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 63 Motion for Summary Judgment; adopting 90 Recommended Ruling. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 3/27/2014. (Martella, Laura)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
SALLY J. WANAMAKER,
No. 3:11-cv-1791 (MPS)
Plaintiff,
v.
TOWN OF WESTPORT BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
Defendant.
RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
After reviewing the record, the Court OVERRULES the Defendant’s Objection [Doc.
#95] and ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Garfinkel’s Recommended Ruling [Doc. #90].
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #63] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
IN PART, as set forth in Magistrate Judge Garfinkel’s Recommended Ruling. The Court adds
only the following comments on the collateral estoppel argument in the Defendant’s Objection.
Defendant argues that findings by the “Impartial Hearing Panel” that considered whether
Plaintiff’s contract was properly terminated under Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 10-151(d) collaterally
estop her from re-litigating certain issues here. While I agree that findings of fact made by the
Panel may not be re-litigated in this proceeding, see Matusick v. Erie County Water Auth., 739
F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2014), none of the findings Defendant cites involved issues identical to those
being contested in this lawsuit. For example, Defendant argues that the Panel’s finding that the
computer technology and classroom teaching assignments are “interchangeable” and that “the
essential responsibilities of the positions are the same” (Def.’s Obj. at 18) precludes re-litigation
of several issues in this action.
Whatever that finding might have meant in the contract-
termination proceeding before the Impartial Panel, the Panel took pains to make clear that it did
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not mean that Plaintiff was precluded from litigating whether the two positions were different
enough to support any discrimination claims she might assert in court. (See, e.g., Impartial
Panel’s Findings of Fact and Recommendation [Doc. #64-36] at para. 29 (“We express no view
as to whether [the classroom teacher and computer teacher positions] are interchangeable under
state anti-discrimination laws.”); para. 46 (“We express no views as to whether state antidiscrimination laws operate as an external limit on [the authority of the Superintendent to assign
elementary teachers to the computer teacher assignment or vice versa]; para. 47 (“We express no
views as to whether the Connecticut anti-discrimination laws prohibit or otherwise affect the
practice of shifting a teacher returning from an unpaid leave of absence occasioned by a
complication from pregnancy from technology teacher to classroom teacher.”); para. 143-44
(“While we have found that the assignment of classroom teacher and the assignment of
technology teacher are considered interchangeable and comparable by the Westport Schools and
by the collective bargaining agreement with the Westport Education Associations, we express no
view as to the state law claims advanced by Ms. Wanamaker in this proceeding. We express no
view as to whether the failure by the Westport administration to remove a teacher from the
assignment of technology teacher and replace her with Ms. Wanamaker violated state law.”
(emphasis added).)
Similarly, the Panel’s determination that Plaintiff “abandoned” her position does not
foreclose the litigation of any issues in this case. First, as a matter of labeling, the Panel’s
conclusion that Plaintiff abandoned her position was not a finding of fact at all but a
characterization of Plaintiff’s behavior used by the Panel in its “Recommendation” that there was
an adequate legal ground to terminate her – specifically, “other due and sufficient cause” – under
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-151(d)(6). (See id. at 17.) Second, the underlying finding of fact – that
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Plaintiff “did not accept a position of classroom teacher on her return from unpaid leave, and did
not report for the classroom teacher assignment” for the 2010-2011 school year, see id. – does
not preclude Plaintiff from asserting that the refusal by the Defendant to reinstate her to the
computer teaching position was an adverse employment action. I agree with Magistrate Judge
Garfinkel’s finding that there are disputed issues of fact on the question whether the proposed
transfer to the classroom teaching position altered the terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s
employment in a materially negative way. (See Doc. #90 at 42.) If Plaintiff ultimately prevails
on that issue, then her failure to accept what amounted to a lesser position does not undermine
her claims.
The remaining arguments raised in Defendant’s Objection are fully addressed by
Magistrate Judge Garfinkel’s Recommended Ruling, and I adopt the adopt the reasoning therein
in rejecting those arguments.
For the reasons set forth above and in Magistrate Judge Garfinkel’s Recommended
Ruling, I grant in part and deny in part Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Michael P. Shea, U.S.D.J.
Dated:
Hartford, Connecticut
March 27, 2014
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