Ironshore Indemnity, Inc. v. Corle Buildings Systems, Inc.

Filing 79

RULING denying 77 Motion to Dismiss filed by Third-Party Defendant Kenneth F. Mann. Signed by Judge Janet C. Hall on 7/24/13. (Torrenti, R.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
IRONSHORE INDEMNITY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORLE BUILDING SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.
R&R IRONWORKS, INC., et al.,
Third-Party Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:12-CV-78 (JCH)

JULY 24, 2013

RULING RE: MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT KENNETH F. MANN (DOC. NO. 77)
I.

INTRODUCTION
On January 17, 2012, plaintiff Ironshore Indemnity, Inc. (“Ironshore”) commenced

this action by filing a Complaint (Doc. No. 1) against defendant and third-party plaintiff
Corle Buildings Systems, Inc. (“Corle”). On December 4, 2012, Corle filed a Third-Party
Complaint (Doc. No. 36) against several third-party defendants, including Kenneth F.
Mann (“Mann”). Before this court is Mann’s Motion to Dismiss the Third-Party
Complaint (“Mot. to Dismiss”) (Doc. No. 77).
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On or about January 27, 2011, a pre-engineered building owned by USA Hauling

and Recycling (“USA Hauling”) and located in Milford, Connecticut collapsed. ThirdParty Compl. ¶ 9. Ironshore provided property insurance coverage to USA Hauling at
the time. Compl. ¶ 5. Ironshore alleges that Corle is liable and legally responsible for
Ironshore’s losses for a number of reasons, including negligent design of the building.
See Third-Party Compl. ¶ 12 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 13).
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Corle hired Mann, as a professional engineer, in conjunction with the
construction of the building. Third-Party Compl. at Count 5, ¶ 2.1 Under the terms of
the contract between Corle and Mann, Mann was to review the drawings and
calculations for the building to determine whether they were proper and compliant with
applicable codes. Id. at Count 5, ¶ 4. Mann reviewed the drawings and calculations
and affixed his seal to the drawings. Id. at Count 5, ¶ 5. Corle alleges that Mann, “as
the licensed engineer, reviewed the drawings and calculations and overall design in
order to assure that the pre-engineered building complied with all applicable codes and
was proper.” Id. at Count 5, ¶ 7.
III.

STANDARD
When deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), the court must determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable
claim by making allegations that, if true, would show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (interpreting Rule 12(b)(6), in
accordance with Rule 8(a)(2), to require allegations with “enough heft to ‘show that the
pleader is entitled to relief’” (alteration omitted)). The court takes the factual allegations
of the complaint to be true, Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 4 (2010),
and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 43
(2d Cir. 2009). However, the tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations as
true is inapplicable to “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

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Each Count of the Third-Party Complaint restarts paragraph numbering at 1.

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To survive a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The
plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556).
The plausibility standard does not impose an across-the-board, heightened fact
pleading standard. See Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2008). The
plausibility standard does not “require[] a complaint to include specific evidence [or]
factual allegations in addition to those required by Rule 8.” Arista Records, LLC v. Doe
3, 604 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2010); see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(holding that dismissal was inconsistent with the “liberal pleading standards set forth by
Rule 8(a)(2)”). However, the plausibility standard does impose some burden to make
factual allegations supporting a claim for relief. As the Court explained in Iqbal, it “does
not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and
conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alterations, citations, and internal quotation
marks omitted). Under the Second Circuit’s gloss, the plausibility standard is “flexible,”
obliging the plaintiff “to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts

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where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.” Boykin, 521 F.3d at
213 (citation omitted); accord Arista Records, 604 F.3d at 120.
IV.

DISCUSSION
Corle seeks indemnification from Mann “to the extent there was any negligence

in the design of the building.” Third-Party Compl. at Count 5, ¶ 7. The only issue that
Mann raises in his Motion to Dismiss is the timeliness of the Corle’s action against him.2
Mann notes that the collapse of the building occurred in 2011, more than ten years after
he “placed his professional engineering seal on the design drawings of the . . . building.”
Mot. to Dismiss at 1. Mann argues that Corle’s action is barred under section 52-584a
of the Connecticut General Statutes, which sets a seven-year statute of limitations for
indemnification actions brought against professional engineers. See Mot. to Dismiss at
2. Section 52-584a reads, in relevant part:
No action or arbitration . . . to recover damages for any deficiency in the
design, planning, contract administration, supervision, observation of
construction or construction of . . . an improvement to real property . . . , or
for contribution or indemnity which is brought as a result of any such claim
for damages shall be brought against any . . . professional engineer . . .
performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, observation of
construction or construction of, . . . such improvement more than seven
years after substantial completion of such improvement.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-584(a).
Corle argues that section 52-584a does not bar its action against Mann because
section 52-584a is overridden by section 52-598, which states: “Notwithstanding any
provision of this chapter, an action for indemnification may be brought within three years
from the date of the determination of the action against the party which is seeking

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Mann does not contest that the building collapsed or that he “placed his professional
engineering seal on the design drawings of the . . . building in 2001.” See Mot. to Dismiss at 1.

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indemnification by either judgment or settlement.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-598a. The
court agrees with Corle.
In Town of Beacon Falls v. Towers Golde, LLC, No. CV096001345S, 2010 WL
2365849 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 6, 2010), the Connecticut Superior Court held that
section 52-598a “overrides” section 52-584a. First, the court noted that section 52598a’s introductory language “[n]otwithstanding any provision of this chapter” clearly
applies to section 52-584a, “since both sections are contained in chapter 926 of the
General Statutes, which is entitled ‘statute of limitations.’” Id. at *2. Second, the court
reasoned that the word “notwithstanding” is “sufficiently precise to constitute a specific
legislative override of another statute.” Id. (citing Velez v. Comm’r of Corr., 250 Conn.
536, 544 (1999)). Third, the court noted that section 52-598a “specifically refers to an
‘action for indemnification,’ which is the precise subject matter” of section 52-584a. Id.
Finally, the court dispensed of arguments regarding the legislature’s intent and policy
considerations, stating that the court “cannot revisit the policy determinations made by
the legislature, but instead must rely on the languages of the statutes it enacts.” Id.
(citing Verrastro v. Sivertsen, 188 Conn. 213, 220 (1982)).
Although the Beacon Falls decision is not binding on this court, the court finds
the Connecticut Superior Court’s interpretation of its state statutes persuasive.
Moreover, the Second Circuit has held that “the phrase ‘notwithstanding any other
provision of the law’ is one that ‘clearly signals the drafter’s intention that the provisions
of the ‘notwithstanding’ section override conflicting provisions of any other section.”
Conyers v. Rossides, 558 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2009) (alteration omitted) (quoting
Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993)). To read section 52-598a

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otherwise would render that provision “largely superfluous.” See Beacon Falls, 2010
WL 2365849, at *2. Accordingly, the court concludes that the seven-year statute of
limitations in section 52-584a does not bar Corle’s claim against Mann.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Third-Party Defendant

Kenneth F. Mann (Doc. No. 77) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 24th day of July, 2013.
/s/ Janet C. Hall
Janet C. Hall
United States District Judge

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