Deas v. USA

Filing 39

ORDER denying 36 Motion for Reconsideration; denying 38 Sealed Motion. The Clerk shall unseal 38 Sealed Motion. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 5/12/2015. (Pollack, R.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

VIDA DEAS,
Petitioner,

No. 3:12-cv-275 (SRU)

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
RULING ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Vida Deas was convicted of three narcotics offenses by jury verdict on April 24, 2009.
On September 30, 2011, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and
sentence. He subsequently filed a petition, which he amended twice, seeking to vacate, set aside,
or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. I denied that petition as lacking merit on
August 11, 2014 (doc. # 33). On September 9, 2014, Deas filed a motion for reconsideration of
that ruling pursuant to Rules 52(b), 59(e), 60(b)(3) and 60(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“First Motion”) (doc. # 36). He filed the motion with a supporting affidavit, which he
supplemented several days later with an additional affidavit (doc. # 37). He later filed a motion
seeking relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) (“Second Motion”) (doc. # 38). 1
The substance of Deas’s First Motion and affidavits is his contention that one of the
witnesses against him, Byron Turner, lied in his testimony in order to receive a more lenient
sentence himself, and that the Assistant United States Attorneys who prosecuted the case knew
or should have known that the testimony was false. Deas attempts to support that allegation with
what he alleges are inconsistencies in Turner’s testimony, or inconsistencies between Turner’s
trial testimony and statements he made in proffer sessions with the government. Deas alleges that
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For reasons that are unclear, the motion was filed under seal, though it does not contain any sensitive information.
The Clerk shall accordingly unseal the Second Motion.

Turner perjured himself on three general issues: (1) the timeline of Turner’s introduction to his
cocaine supplier, Artan Isufaj, and the duration of his business relationship; (2) the nature of
Deas’s involvement in the contacts between Turner and Isufaj and whether Turner saw or merely
believed that Deas purchased cocaine from Isufaj; and (3) whether Turner was proficient at
converting powder cocaine into crack because he learned from his brother, or whether he relied
on Deas to convert it, or whether he learned from Deas how to convert it.
The standard for granting motions for reconsideration is strict. They “will generally be
denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion
reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). The three
major grounds for granting a motion for reconsideration in the Second Circuit are: (1) an
intervening change of controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence, or (3) the need to
correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. v. Nat’l
Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478). Motions for
reconsideration will not be granted where the party merely seeks to relitigate an issue that has
already been decided. Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.
Motions under Rule 60(b)(3) alleging fraud by an adverse party cannot be granted
without “clear and convincing evidence of material misrepresentations.” Fleming v. New York
Univ., 865 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1989). The concept of “fraud on the court” under Rule
60(d)(3)—distinct from fraud on an adverse party—is “limited to fraud which seriously affects
the integrity of the normal process of adjudication” and “embraces only that species of fraud
which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court

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so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging
cases.” Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1325 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Deas does not meet the high bar for granting a motion for reconsideration. He points to
no change of law or new evidence to upset the denial of his section 2255 petition, nor to any
clear error or manifest injustice in that denial. His argument that Turner’s testimony constituted
fraud by an adverse party and fraud on the court under Rules 60(b)(3) and 60(d)(3) is an
assertion of fraud on the trial court, apparently seeking reconsideration of the judgment of his
conviction. It is not an assertion of fraud on this court, which would have affected the denial of
his section 2255 petition; and it is only that denial that is the subject of the motion for
reconsideration. Moreover, even if the allegations of fraud on the court were properly raised,
they would be unavailing. Deas asserts that Turner lied in his testimony against him, but he
points to no new evidence that he could not have used when he had the opportunity to cross
examine Turner at trial. Though Deas swears in his affidavits that Turner lied and alleges that
Turner’s testimony was self-contradictory or contradicted by statements Turner made in proffer
sessions with the government, he points to no such contradiction that could constitute clear and
convincing evidence of a material misrepresentation.
In his Second Motion, Deas argues that crack cocaine, of the sort relevant to his offense
conduct, should fall under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(IV) and not under (b)(1)(A)(iii)—the
former refers to “any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of” coca
leaves, cocaine, ecgonine, or their various derivatives, and the latter refers to “a mixture or
substance … which contains cocaine base”—or that it is ambiguous whether crack cocaine
should fall under one provision or the other, so the rule of lenity should work to his advantage
and he should not be penalized under the stricter quantity requirement of (b)(1)(A)(iii). That

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argument fails. The Supreme Court has unanimously held that the term “cocaine base” used in
section 841(b)(1) refers to “cocaine in its chemically basic form,” DePierre v. United States, 131
S. Ct. 2225, 2237 (2011), which includes crack cocaine, freebase cocaine, and coca paste (as
opposed to powder cocaine, or cocaine hydrochloride, which is cocaine in its salt form). Id. at
2228 (“Chemically, therefore, there is no difference between the cocaine in coca paste, crack
cocaine, and freebase—all are cocaine in its base form.”). The “cocaine base” of section
841(b)(1)(A)(iii) thus includes crack cocaine and applies to the conduct underlying Deas’s
conviction.
For the foregoing reasons, both the First Motion and the Second Motion are denied.
So ordered.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 12th day of May 2015.
/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge

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