Gonzalez v. Waterbury Police Dept et al
Filing
146
ORDER re 67 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Waterbury Police Dept, Robert Liquindoli, Jason Lanoie, Eduardo Rivera, Waterbury, Ct., City Of, Tim Jamseson, James Dickey, Tim Jackson, Max Torres, Richard Hamel, 99 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment. The City of Waterbury is dismissed from the case. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 3/11/2016. (Landman, M)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
GABRIEL GONZALEZ,
Plaintiff,
No. 3:12-cv-478 (SRU)
v.
WATERBURY POLICE DEPT., et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
This case arises out of a police “sting” operation that resulted in a high-speed chase and
ultimately the arrest of Gabriel Gonzalez. Gonzalez alleges that the defendant police officers
used excessive force both in the officers‟ unsuccessful attempt to seize him during the highspeed pursuit and their subsequent successful attempt to place him under arrest. Such conduct,
Gonzalez claims, was in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Connecticut state law, Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 14-283a. In addition to claims filed against the individual officers, Gonzalez alleges a
section 1983 violation against the City of Waterbury based on the Waterbury Police
Department‟s (the “Department”) alleged failure to train, supervise, and discipline the defendant
police officers.
On May 5, 2015, I conducted oral argument on the defendants‟ partial motion for
summary judgment (doc. # 67). See Doc. # 99. I granted summary judgment on Counts III, IV,
and VIII in their entirety. With respect to Count I, I granted summary judgment on all
allegations except the Fourth Amendment claims against Richard Hamel, Jason Lanoie, Max
Torres, and Tim Jackson. The Fourth Amendment claims against those defendants will proceed
to trial.
With respect to Count II, I granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Waterbury
with respect to Gonzalez‟s claim of failure to train, and I took under advisement his claim of
failure to supervise and discipline its officers. I ordered the City to produce information
regarding all claims of excessive force from 2005 to 2010, along with information regarding the
investigations of those claims, the results of those investigations, and any imposed discipline.
With respect to Counts V-VII, I granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants
with the exception of the claims against Hamel, Lanoie, Torres, and Jackson. The claims against
those defendants will proceed to trial. As a result of my ruling, I dismissed defendants Robert
Liquindoli, James Dickey, and Eduardo Rivera from the lawsuit.
On July 7, 2015, I held a telephone conference with the parties regarding the defendants‟
purported inability to produce documents of past excessive force complaints and investigations,
which related to the portion of Count II that I took under advisement (“the Monell claim”).1 I
ordered the parties to determine whether and to what extent the Waterbury Police Department
destroyed documents related to excessive force complaints from 2005 to 2010, and who in the
department ordered the destruction of such documents.
On August 10, 2015, I held another telephone conference with the parties after Gonzalez
noticed three depositions and issued corresponding subpoenas duces tecum. During the call, I
held that the subpoenas were proper to the extent that they sought information that I had
previously determined to be relevant to the Monell claim. I reminded counsel for Gonzalez that
the scope of the depositions was limited to information regarding excessive force claims from
2005 to 2010 and the circumstances of the Department‟s destruction of relevant documents.
1
I refer to it as a Monell claim because the remaining claim asserted in Count II relates to the City of Waterbury‟s
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is governed by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978),
and its progeny.
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Thereafter, Gonzalez was able to take the depositions of Waterbury Police Department
Sgt. Mark Russo, Sgt. Anthony Alvelo, and William Covel. On January 24, 2016, Gonzalez
filed a supplemental memorandum objecting to defendants‟ motion for summary judgment on
the Monell claim (Count II). See Doc. # 129. In his motion, Gonzalez argues that he has raised a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the Department‟s knowledge about its officers‟ past
unconstitutional practice of using excessive force, and, if the jury were to resolve that issue in his
favor, the jury could find the Department knew or should have known that its inadequate
supervision was so likely to result in an unconstitutional use of excessive force that it constitutes
deliberate indifference.
The defendants respond by asserting that Gonzalez‟s arguments in his supplemental
memorandum should be disregarded because they were never raised in his initial opposition to
the motion for summary judgment. Specifically, defendants argue that Gonzalez attempts to
raise an issue of fact using Dr. R. Paul McCauley‟s opinions, which were not disclosed as part of
Gonzalez‟s original Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement.
Even if it were proper to consider the opinions of Dr. McCauley at this stage of the
litigation, defendants contend that Gonzalez has failed to establish any evidence creating a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to the issue about which I permitted additional
discovery. Defendants point out that, in order to resolve the outstanding motion for summary
judgment on the Monell claim, I gave Gonzalez an opportunity to discover and present evidence
of prior excessive force claims and the investigations of those claims. Defendants argue that
Gonzalez‟s supplemental objection to the motion for summary judgment does not present such
evidence.
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I.
Discussion
I need not rule on the admissibility of Dr. McCauley‟s expert opinion because I conclude
that neither his opinion, nor any evidence disclosed as a result of the extended discovery, has
created a genuine issue of material fact pertinent to the availability of summary judgment on the
Monell claim. For the following reasons, I grant summary judgment on the Monell claim (Count
II) in favor of the City of Waterbury.
For suits filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a municipality is not vicariously liable for the
torts of its employees or agents. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; see also, e.g., Board of County
Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997). As a
precondition to liability under section 1983, “the governmental body itself [must] „subject[]‟ a
person to a deprivation of rights or „cause[]‟ a person „to be subjected‟ to such deprivation.”
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011). Therefore, in order for municipal or official
capacity liability to be imposed, there must be “a direct causal link between a municipal policy
or custom, and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
385 (1989); see also Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that
plaintiff must show that municipality is actually responsible for her injury).
One way of establishing that a municipality directly caused the alleged constitutional
deprivation is by demonstrating that the municipality failed to adequately supervise and/or
discipline its employees. See Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2007). A claim of
failure to adequately supervise or discipline rests on the ability of a plaintiff to prove that: (1) the
defendants “should have known their inadequate supervision was so likely to result in the alleged
deprivations so as [to] constitute deliberate indifference”; (2) there were “obvious and severe
deficiencies in the . . . defendants‟ supervision that reflect a purposeful rather than negligent
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course of action”; and (3) there was “a causal relationship between the failure to supervise and
the alleged deprivations to plaintiffs.” Id.
There is no question that the term “deliberate indifference” is meant to encompass
purposeful or reckless conduct, not mere negligence. Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72,
81 (2d Cir. 2012). There are several ways to establish that a municipality‟s failure to supervise
or discipline constituted deliberate indifference. The plaintiff may show that “a policymaking
official was aware of constitutional injury, or the risk of constitutional injury, but failed to take
appropriate action to prevent or sanction violations of constitutional rights.” Id. Typically, that
involves establishing a “pattern of similar constitutional violations” to the one alleged in the
complaint. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. A plaintiff may “show a sufficiently widespread
practice among police officers of [unconstitutional] abuse of the rights of [civilians].” See Jones,
691 F.3d at 82. A plaintiff may also show that Department officers were in some way
predisposed to unconstitutional action against certain individuals and such predisposition was
known, or should have been known, to the supervisory personnel who did not act to counter it.
Id. Finally, a plaintiff may establish deliberate indifference by showing that supervisory
personnel were inclined to violate constitutional rights and that inclination had been
“communicated to line officers so as to give them the sense that they could engage in such abuse
of rights without rising appropriate disciplinary consequences.” Id. In other words, a
municipality would be liable if it explicitly or implicitly sanctioned such conduct by
communicating that such conduct would be overlooked.
If, however, plaintiff offers no evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct or a topdown custom, policy, or practice encouraging unconstitutional behavior, the municipality is not
liable. See id. In Jones, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court‟s judgment as a matter of
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law in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff failed to establish a custom, policy, or usage
of not disciplining officers who had violated the constitutional rights of black people. See id.
Though there was ample evidence of unconstitutional conduct by individual officers, there was
no evidence that such conduct was attributable to a custom or policy of the department. Id.
Failure to show a widespread pattern of abusive conduct towards black people made it
impossible for the plaintiff to establish that the supervising officers knew or should have known
of such conduct. Id. Without being able to establish such knowledge or recklessness on the part
of the supervising officials, the plaintiff in Jones could not make out a Monell claim. See id.
Even in circumstances where the supervisory official should have reviewed prior
complaints of misconduct, Monell liability can only be established if the official‟s conduct rises
beyond the level of mere negligence. Atwood v. Town of Ellington, 427 F. Supp. 2d 136, 148 (D.
Conn. 2006). In Atwood, the court held that a municipality was not liable for a supervisor‟s
failure to screen a subordinate who had a past history of sexual misconduct. See id. The court
held so notwithstanding the fact that the supervising official acknowledged that he failed to
review the complaint against the employee and that, had he reviewed the complaint, he would
have taken it into consideration in deciding whether to reappoint the employee. See id.
The substance of Gonzalez‟s allegations, both in the original opposition to the motion for
summary judgment and in his supplemental objection, raise sweeping concerns about the
competency of Waterbury‟s Internal Affairs Division. He does not, however, identify any
incidents where the division received a complaint like Gonzalez‟s and failed to address it.
Though he attempts to establish a pattern or practice of police misconduct by providing a
summary of lawsuits filed against Waterbury police officers, that information only weakens his
position. Out of the thousands of arrests that occurred in the City of Waterbury during the
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relevant period, there were only a handful of complaints of excessive force. Most importantly,
only one of those cases resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. See Pl.‟s Ex. 13 (doc. #
88-2). The information cited by Gonzalez does not establish a pattern or practice of
unconstitutional deprivations.
At oral argument in May 2015, I took the motion for summary judgment on Count II
under advisement in order to permit Gonzalez to substantiate his Monell claim after further
discovery. I granted limited discovery regarding excessive force complaints that occurred from
2005 to 2010. If Gonzalez were able to uncover a substantial number of excessive force
complaints, he might have been able to prove that the Department was on notice of the likelihood
that its officers would engage in the use of unconstitutionally excessive force. If so, Gonzalez
might have been able to prove that the City of Waterbury was liable for its failure to adequately
supervise or discipline its officers in the face of a known likelihood of future constitutional
violations.
After conducting such discovery, Gonzalez has failed to establish a pattern or practice of
unconstitutional deprivations by Waterbury police officers. At most, Gonzalez was able to
obtain further information regarding the alleged lack of competence of the Internal Affairs
Division (“IAD”). To the extent that he attempts to establish Monell liability on the basis of the
Department‟s failure to adequately investigate Gonzalez‟s own allegations of excessive force,
such an attempt is futile. One cannot use the municipality‟s conduct after the fact to show that
the municipality‟s prior practice caused the unconstitutional deprivation.
To the extent that Gonzalez has uncovered information regarding the general lack of
competence of the IAD, such information does not create a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to municipal liability. At most, it suggests that the IAD was negligent in its investigation
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of complaints lodged against Department officers. Because Gonzalez fails to establish a pattern
or practice or excessive force violations, he cannot establish that the Department knew or should
have known that its suboptimal complaint procedure was so likely to result in the alleged
deprivations that the procedure constituted deliberate indifference. Reynolds, 506 F.3d at 193.
Accordingly, Gonzalez cannot establish a “direct causal link between the municipal policy or
custom, and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. at 385.
II.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the City of Waterbury‟s motion for summary judgment on
Count II of the amended complaint (doc. # 67) is granted. The City of Waterbury is dismissed
from this case.
So ordered.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 11th day of March 2016.
/s/ STEFAN R. UNDERHILL
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge
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