Schadee v. Maldonado et al
Filing
8
PRISCS-INITIAL REVIEW ORDER, Quiros terminated., Answer deadline updated for Scholds to 2/6/2013; Santiago to 2/6/2013; Correa to 2/6/2013; Maldonado to 2/6/2013; Emmelmann to 2/6/2013; Govani to 2/6/2013; Pease to 2/6/2013; Vasefiak to 2/6/2013; Mat lasz to 2/6/2013; Kitt to 2/6/2013; Pafumi to 2/6/2013; Lajoie to 2/6/2013; Kidd to 2/6/2013; Wiseman to 2/6/2013; Bowman to 2/6/2013; Delpeschio to 2/6/2013; Siwicki to 2/6/2013; Faucher to 2/6/2013; Scruggs to 2/6/2013; Hartly to 2/6/2013; Marinelli to 2/6/2013., ( Discovery due by 6/28/2013, Dispositive Motions due by 7/29/2013). Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on 11/28/2012. (Payton, R.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
SEAN SCHADEE,
Plaintiff,
PRISONER
CASE NO. 3:12-cv-614(VLB)
v.
WARDEN MALDONADO, et al.,
Defendants.
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER
The plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Cheshire Correctional Institution in
Cheshire, Connecticut, has filed a complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The
plaintiff sues Wardens Maldonado and Quiros, Deputy Warden Faucher, Captain
Marinelli, Lieutenants Pafumi, Correa and Siwicki, Registered Nurse Scruggs,
District Administrator Lajoie, Food Supervisor Gouoni, Correctional Officers
Scholds, Kidd, Kitt, Bowman, Wiseman, Jasefiak, Emmelmann, Pease, Hartly,
Delpaschio, Santiago and Matlasz.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must review prisoner civil
complaints against governmental actors and “dismiss ... any portion of [a]
complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted,” or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” Id. This requirement applies both where the inmate has paid
the filing fee and where he is proceeding in forma pauperis. See Carr v. Dvorin,
171 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Although detailed allegations are not required, “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A complaint that
includes only “‘labels and conclusions,’ ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action’ or ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’
” does not meet the facial plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)). Although courts still have an obligation
to liberally construe a pro se complaint, see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.
2009), the complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to meet the
standard of facial plausibility.
The plaintiff alleges that in April 2011, he was confined at Northern
Correctional Institution. On April 13, 2011, the plaintiff engaged in a heated
telephone conversation with his girl friend in the 3-west day room at Northern.
Officer Scholds ordered the plaintiff to finish his telephone call and the plaintiff
complied with the order. As the plaintiff exited the day room with Officer Scholds
at his side, the plaintiff started a verbal argument with Officer Kidd who was on
the other side of the day room. The argument escalated until Officers Kidd and
Scholds punched him in the face. These officers tripped the plaintiff causing him
to fall to the floor. Officers Kidd and Scholds then proceeded to kick and punch
the plaintiff as he lay on the ground.
Officer Kitt called a code. In response, Officers Bowman, Wiseman,
Jasefiak, Emmelmann, Pease, Hartly, Delpaschio, Santiago and Matlasz,
Lieutenants Siwicki, Pafumi and Correa and Food Supervisor Gouoni came to the
scene. These defendants and Officer Kitt joined in kicking, punching, kneeing
and twisting the plaintiff’s wrists, fingers, elbows and legs. One or more of these
defendants also sprayed pepper spray at the plaintiff. These defendants
continued to beat the plaintiff after he was handcuffed and lay on the floor.
Lieutenants Pafumi, Siwicki and Correa, Captain Marinelli and Deputy Warden
Faucher were present at the scene, but failed to intervene.
The plaintiff was placed in leg shackles and a tether chain, dragged from
the day room, decontaminated for short time in a shower and escorted to a
medical examination room. Nurse Scruggs directed the plaintiff to place his face
in a sink to rinse his eyes, but he was unable to open his eyes. Nurse Scruggs
became agitated and ordered the officers to take the plaintiff to his cell. The
plaintiff was placed in a cell and remained in in-cell restraints until later that day.
That afternoon, a lieutenant escorted the plaintiff to the medical unit for
observation. The plaintiff remained in the medical unit until April 15, 2011 due to
his injuries.
The plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the use of force by the defendants.
Warden Maldonado denied the grievance on June 13, 2011. District Administrator
LaJoie denied the appeal of the grievance on June 27, 2011. The plaintiff seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages.
The plaintiff alleges that Warden Quiros was the official warden of Northern
at the time that he filed a level 1 grievance regarding the use of force by other
defendants on April 13, 2011. The plaintiff does not allege, however, that Warden
Quiros received the grievance, was aware of or involved in the incident or that he
responded to the grievance. In fact, Warden Maldonado responded to the
grievance. The plaintiff has failed to allege that Warden Quiros violated his
constitutionally or federally protected rights. The claims against defendant
Quiros are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
The court concludes that the allegations in the complaint state plausible
claims of excessive force, failure to protect and deliberate indifference to medical
needs against defendants Maldonado, Faucher, Marinelli, Pafumi, Correa,
Siwicki, Scruggs, Lajoie, Gouoni, Scholds, Kidd, Kitt, Bowman, Wiseman,
Jasefiak, Emmelmann, Pease, Hartly, Delpaschio, Santiago and Matlasz. To the
extent that plaintiff asserts section 1983 claims against these defendants in their
official capacities, the claims for money damages are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (Eleventh
Amendment, which protects the state from suits for monetary relief, also protects
state officials sued for damages in their official capacity); Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 342 (1979) (Section 1983 does not override a state’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity). The section 1983 claims for money damages against
defendants Maldonado, Faucher, Marinelli, Pafumi, Correa, Siwicki, Scruggs,
Lajoie, Gouoni, Scholds, Kidd, Kitt, Bowman, Wiseman, Jasefiak, Emmelmann,
Pease, Hartly, Delpaschio, Santiago and Matlasz in their official capacities are
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2).
ORDERS
The court enters the following orders:
(1)
All claims against defendant Quiros are DISMISSED pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The claims for money damages against defendants
Maldonado, Faucher, Marinelli, Pafumi, Correa, Siwicki, Scruggs, Lajoie, Gouoni,
Scholds, Kidd, Kitt, Bowman, Wiseman, Jasefiak, Emmelmann, Pease, Hartly,
Delpaschio, Santiago and Matlasz in their official capacities are DISMISSED
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2). The claims for excessive force, failure to
protect and deliberate indifference to medical needs shall proceed against
defendants defendants Maldonado, Faucher, Marinelli, Pafumi, Correa, Siwicki,
Scruggs, Lajoie, Gouoni, Scholds, Kidd, Kitt, Bowman, Wiseman, Jasefiak,
Emmelmann, Pease, Hartly, Delpaschio, Santiago and Matlasz in their individual
capacities and in their official capacities to the extent that the plaintiff seeks
injunctive and declaratory relief.
(2)
Within fourteen (14) days of this Order, the U.S. Marshals Service
shall serve the summons, a copy of the Complaint [doc. #1] and this Order on all
defendants except defendant Quiros in their official capacities by delivering the
necessary documents in person to the Office of the Attorney General, 55 Elm
Street, Hartford, CT 06141.
(3)
Within fourteen (14) days of this Order, the Pro Se Prisoner Litigation
Office shall ascertain from the Department of Correction Office of Legal Affairs
the current work addresses for defendants Warden Maldonado, Deputy Warden
Faucher, Captain Marinelli, Lieutenants Pafumi, Correa and Siwicki, Registered
Nurse Scruggs, District Administrator Lajoie, Food Supervisor Gouoni,
Correctional Officers Scholds, Kidd, Kitt, Bowman, Wiseman, Jasefiak,
Emmelmann, Pease, Hartly, Delpaschio, Santiago and Matlasz and mail waiver of
service of process request packets to each defendant in his or her individual
capacity at his or her current work address. On the thirty-fifth (35th) day after
mailing, the Pro Se Office shall report to the court on the status of all waiver
requests. If any defendant fails to return the waiver request, the Clerk shall make
arrangements for in-person service by the U.S. Marshals Service and the
defendant shall be required to pay the costs of such service in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d).
(4)
The Pro Se Prisoner Litigation Office shall send a courtesy copy of
the complaint and this Order to the Connecticut Attorney General and the
Department of Correction Legal Affairs Unit.
(5)
The Pro Se Prisoner Litigation Office shall send written
notice to the plaintiff of the status of this action, along with a copy of this Order.
(6)
Defendants shall file their response to the complaint, either an
answer or motion to dismiss, within seventy (70) days from the date of this order.
If the defendants choose to file an answer, they shall admit or deny the
allegations and respond to the cognizable claims recited above. They may also
include any and all additional defenses permitted by the Federal Rules.
(7)
Discovery, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
26 through 37, shall be completed within seven months (210 days) from the date
of this order. Discovery requests need not be filed with the court.
(8)
All motions for summary judgment shall be filed within
eight months (240 days) from the date of this order.
(9)
Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(a), a non-moving party
must respond to a dispositive motion within twenty-one (21) days of the date the
motion was filed. If no response is filed, or the response is not timely, the
dispositive motion can be granted absent objection.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
________/s/________________
Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: November 28, 2012.
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