Navin v. HSBC Bank USA, NA et al

Filing 35

ORDER denying 32 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Stefan R. Underhill on 8/2/2013. (Carter, J.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
JEFFREY NAVIN,
Plaintiff,
No. 3:12-cv-00752 (SRU)
v.
HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE
HOLDERS OF DEUTSCHE ALT-A
SECURITIES, INC., MORTGAGE LOAN
TRUST, SERIES 2005-6 C/O AMERICAS
SERVICING COMPANY FOR
NORWEST HOME IMPROVEMENT,
WELLS FARGO,
and WELLS FARGO BANK,
Defendants.
RULING ON PLANTIFF’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Plaintiff Jeffrey Navin (“Navin”) brought this action alleging the defendants violated a
variety of federal and state consumer protection statutes by foreclosing on a piece of real
property owned by Navin. On February 15, 2013, I granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss
the complaint as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the applicable statute of limitations.
See Minute Entry (doc. # 30). Before the court is Navin’s motion for reconsideration. Because
Navin failed to produce any evidence that demonstrates there is a claim upon which this court
may provide relief, Navin’s motion for reconsideration (doc. # 32) is DENIED.
I.

Background
On October 5, 2005, Navin executed a promissory note in the principal amount of

$1,313,000 to American Brokers Conduit. To secure repayment of the loan, Navin conveyed his
interest in a piece of real property by executing a mortgage deed in favor of Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems (a nominee of American Brokers Conduit). Eventually the mortgage and
note were assigned to defendant HSBC Bank USA (“HSBC”) and recorded on June 14, 2007.
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Navin made payments until March 1, 2007, and subsequently has not made any payments on the
principal or the interest of the loan.
HSBC timely notified Navin that he was in default and commenced a foreclosure action
against the mortgaged property in Connecticut Superior Court in June 2007. Navin disputed the
legality of the assignment of the mortgage and note to HSBC, and consequently the standing of
HSBC to bring the foreclosure action. The Connecticut Superior Court granted HSBC’s motion
for summary judgment in November 2009, and ordered the foreclosure. The Connecticut Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision relying on Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Fequiere, 119 Conn.
App. 570 (2010), ruling that the holder of a promissory note may foreclose on property securing
that note even if the mortgage has not been properly assigned. HSBC Bank, N.A. v. Navin, 129
Conn. App. 707, 711 (2011). The Connecticut Supreme Court denied review. HSBC Bank USA,
N.A. v. Navin, 302 Conn. 948 (2011).
On May 18, 2012, Navin filed the instant complaint containing three separate counts. See
Compl. (doc. # 1). Count I asserts a variety of claims essentially alleging that the defendants
committed unfair and deceptive practices in violation of various unspecified federal and state
consumer protection laws with regards to the servicing of Navin’s loan. See id. ¶¶ 21-35. Count
II alleges violations of Connecticut consumer protection laws by unfair and deceptive consumer
practices. Id. ¶¶ 36-38. Finally, Count III alleges unfair and deceptive consumer practices in the
origination of the loan made to Navin. Id. ¶¶ 39-41.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively, a motion for more definite
statement (doc. # 16). At the February 15, 2013, hearing on the defendants’ motion, I ruled that
the majority of Navin’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Navin had
already litigated those same issues and lost in state court. To the extent those claims were based

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on the invalidity of the assignment of the mortgage and note to the defendants, I ruled that this
court lacks jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would necessarily involve disturbing the decisions
of the state court. Further, I concluded the only claims not encompassed by the decisions of the
state courts were violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§
42-110a et seq. (“CUTPA”). However, due to the apparent lack of account activity after Navin
stopped making payments on his mortgage in 2007, and because CUTPA has a three-year statute
of limitations, I dismissed those claims as time-barred. Notwithstanding that ruling, I informed
Navin that, if he is able to show any mortgage account activity in the period of time not barred
by the statute of limitations, I would reconsider the dismissal. Navin responded by filing the
instant motion for reconsideration.
II.

Standard of Review
The standard for granting motions for reconsideration is strict; motions for

reconsideration “will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling
decisions or data that the court overlooked – matters, in other words, that might reasonably be
expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d
255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). Motions for reconsideration will not be granted where the party merely
seeks to relitigate an issue that has already been decided. Id. The three major grounds for
granting a motion for reconsideration in the Second Circuit are: (1) an intervening change of
controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence, or (3) the need to correct a clear error or
prevent manifest injustice. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245,
1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4478).
III.

Discussion
In the present case, Navin brings a multitude of claims, but the scope of claims this court
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may adjudicate is narrow. At the hearing on February 15, 2013, I dismissed Navin’s complaint
in its entirety because he failed to allege any harms that may be redressed by this court.
Subsequently, Navin has not produced any evidence that allows me to reconsider that ruling.
A. Claims Precluded by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Navin’s main contention seems to be that HSBC was not the rightful holder of the
promissory note at the time the bank brought the foreclosure action. However, because those
issues were already litigated and decided upon by the state courts, I am barred from considering
those claims by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine aims to prevent a plaintiff who lost
in state court from attempting to have his claims reheard in federal court. See Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “Rooker-Feldman directs federal
courts to abstain from considering claims when four requirements are met: (1) the plaintiff lost in
state court, (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment, (3) the
plaintiff invites district court review of that judgment, and (4) the state court judgment was
entered before the plaintiff’s federal suit commenced.” McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154
(2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir.
2005)).
Here, all elements of the Rooker-Feldman test are met. Each claim Navin brings in this
court regarding validity of the assignment of the note was already brought in state court where
Navin lost. See HSBC Bank, N.A. v. Navin, 129 Conn. App. 707, 709 (2011). Navin’s
allegations in the present action are a direct invitation for this court to review the final judgment
of the state courts with which he disagrees. Therefore, I must decline this invitation. This court
is barred from considering the merits of Navin’s cause of action on the “rightful holder” theory

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of the case by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Navin has presented no facts or arguments that
persuade me to reconsider my previous ruling on those matters.
B. CUTPA Statute of Limitations
The only remaining claims over which this court may have jurisdiction are Navin’s
claims regarding unfair and deceptive handling of the loan accounts in violation of CUTPA.
There is a three-year statute of limitations on CUTPA claims. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110g.
The present action alleging violations of CUTPA was filed on May 18, 2012. See Compl. (doc.
# 1). Thus, to have an actionable claim under CUTPA, Navin must allege violations that
occurred after May 18, 2009.
During the hearing on February 15, 2013, I granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the
CUTPA claims because Navin failed to plead with specificity any activity in the account that fell
within the statutory limitations period. If there is no activity in the mortgage account, logically,
there can be no basis upon which a CUTPA claim can be made against the defendants. The
dismissal contained one caveat: should Navin be able to produce evidence showing any activity
in the mortgage account within the limitations period, the dismissal would be reconsidered.1
Navin was unable to produce any such evidence. The evidence Navin did offer (labeled
“Exhibit A” in doc. # 32) demonstrates only that he previously held a mortgage serviced by
Wells Fargo, nothing more. The evidence fails to demonstrate any activity in the mortgage
account that would not be time-barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, Navin has failed to
state any claim upon which this court could afford him relief.
The standard for a motion to reconsider is strict and the burden rests with the plaintiff to

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The plaintiff would still have to allege and prove the bank perpetrated some type of
fraud with regards to this account, but alleging there was account activity in the three years
preceding the filing of this lawsuit would at least set forth the factual predicate of a claim upon
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produce law or facts calling into question the ruling against him. Navin has failed to meet that
burden. There has been no intervening change in the controlling law of this case. Nor has the
plaintiff pointed to any clear error on the part of the court. And despite an opportunity to do so,
Navin has failed to produce any evidence to suggest this court should reconsider its ruling on the
motion to dismiss.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Navin’s motion for reconsideration (doc. # 32) is DENIED.
It is so ordered.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 2nd day of August 2013.

/s/ Stefan R. Underhill
Stefan R. Underhill
United States District Judge

which Navin could proceed.
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