Jackson et al v. Bloomfield et al

Filing 114

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 79 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 80 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Michael P. Shea on 3/18/2015. (Luedeman, R.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
CLARA ANN JACKSON,
MARK WILSON,
SHARNTAE WILSON,
ASHLEY ALRIDGE,
CLARA ANN JACKSON,
as next best friend of Janae Alridge,
Plaintiffs,

: Case No. 3:12-cv-00924 (MPS)
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
v.
:
:
TOWN OF BLOOMFIELD,
:
BETSY J. HARD, Police Chief
:
JEFFREY L. BLATTER, Police Chief
:
MICHAEL DRISCOLL, Police Sgt.
:
JOHN FOX, Police Officer
:
JAMES SALVATORE, Police Officer
:
BRIAN GRANT, Police Officer
:
BRUCE KAZ, State Marshal
:
Defendants.
:
March 18, 2015
____________________________________________________________________________
RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I.

Introduction

The plaintiffs in this case, Clara Ann Jackson, Mark Wilson, Sharntae Wilson, Ashley
Alridge, and Janae Alridge, are members of an extended family that includes nonparty Kevin
Jackson. They allege that Connecticut State Marshal Bruce Kaz violated their constitutional
rights and committed common law torts by harassing them after attempting to serve capias
warrants on Kevin Jackson. The remaining defendants (collectively, the “Bloomfield
Defendants”) are sued under similar claims arising from the Town of Bloomfield Police
Department’s response to the incident involving Bruce Kaz, including direct intervention by
police officers at the scene.

Bruce Kaz and the Bloomfield Defendants have separately filed motions for summary
judgment, both of which the Court addresses in this ruling. As detailed herein, the Court will
grant in part and deny in part both motions. The claims in the complaint are too numerous to
summarize here; the Court will address each count in the complaint under a separate heading.
II.

Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue exists as
to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). If the moving
party carries its burden, “the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence
demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654
F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011).
An issue of fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.” Konikoff v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 234 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2000). “A
dispute regarding a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Williams v. Utica Coll. of Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d
112, 116 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Assessments of
credibility and choices between conflicting versions of the events are matters for the jury, not for
the court on summary judgment. Any weighing of the evidence is the prerogative of the finder of
fact, not an exercise for the court on summary judgment.” Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011
(2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

2

III.

Facts

The following facts are undisputed:
Bruce Kaz (“Marshal Kaz”) is a Connecticut State Marshal, i.e., a person who, under
Connecticut law, has “authority to provide legal execution and service of process . . . as an
independent contractor compensated on a fee for service basis.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6-38a(a).
Some time after 9:00 p.m. on May 29, 2010, Marshal Kaz arrived at a residence at 26 Forest
Lane, Bloomfield, Connecticut to execute capias warrants on Kevin Jackson (“Mr. Jackson”).
The address listed on the capias was 17 Wakefield Circle, East Hartford, but Marshal Kaz knew
that Mr. Jackson’s wife Clara Ann Jackson (“Ms. Jackson”) owned 26 Forest Lane, and Marshal
Kaz had been told by a third party that Mr. Jackson was living there as well. Accompanying
Marshal Kaz was Kurt Murphy (“Mr. Murphy”), a friend of Marshal Kaz who was not a marshal
but sometimes rode along with Marshal Kaz when he was on duty. Inside the residence at that
time, Ms. Jackson was hosting her brother Mark Wilson (“Mr. Wilson”) and his wife Sharntae
Wilson (“Ms. Wilson”) to celebrate the Wilsons’ wedding anniversary. Ms. Jackson’s daughters,
Ashley Alridge and Janae Alridge, were also inside the residence.
As Marshal Kaz approached the residence, the front door was open, permitting him to see
through the clear-glass storm door and into the kitchen area of the residence. Marshal Kaz
knocked on the storm door. Ms. Jackson came to the door and spoke to Marshal Kaz through the
storm door. Marshal Kaz told Ms. Jackson that he wanted to speak with a man whom he could
see seated in the kitchen. Mr. Wilson then appeared at the door and presented his identification to
Marshal Kaz. Ms. Jackson and Mr. Wilson were able infer that Marshal Kaz was a law
enforcement officer because Marshal Kaz was wearing a marshal badge around his neck and
“duty belt” with a firearm.

3

They told Marshal Kaz that the person he was looking for was not at the residence, but
Marshal Kaz did not believe them. Marshal Kaz ran around to the back of the residence,
suspecting that Mr. Jackson might leave to avoid service of the capias warrants, but he did not
see anyone exit the residence. He then returned to the front of the residence, finding that the front
door had been closed. He went to his car, which was parked a few houses down the street, and
telephoned the Town of Bloomfield Police Department (“Bloomfield PD”). Marshal Kaz told the
police dispatcher that he was attempting to serve a capias warrant on Mr. Jackson and needed
assistance. He then instructed Mr. Murphy to stand to the side of the residence to monitor the
rear exits.
Marshal Kaz again approached the front door of the residence. Ms. Jackson opened a
window facing the street and asked Marshal Kaz what he wanted. She reiterated that the person
that Marshal Kaz was looking for was not at the residence, and asked him what he wanted.
Marshal Kaz continued to stand on the front steps of the residence. Shortly after this
conversation, the front door opened, and Ms. Jackson, her two daughters, and Mr. and Ms.
Wilson all exited the residence. As the group walked toward their parked cars, Marshal Kaz
moved out in front of them, walking backwards and facing them. The group got into the
Wilsons’ car, and Mr. Wilson started the engine. Ms. Wilson was in the front passenger seat, and
Ms. Jackson and her daughters sat in the back.
Just as Mr. Wilson began to drive the car forward, Marshal Kaz positioned himself in
front of the car, blocking it from moving further. As he did so, two Bloomfield PD cruisers
arrived. Two Bloomfield PD officers, John Fox (“Officer Fox”) and James Salvatore (“Officer
Salvatore”), approached the car and ordered Mr. Wilson to turn off the engine and step out of the
car. Mr. Wilson initially did not get out, but then stepped out of the car after one of the officers

4

threatened to use mace spray if he did not exit. Both officers then forced Mr. Wilson to the
ground and handcuffed him. In doing so, one officer kicked Mr. Wilson’s legs and pushed him
down, and both officers held Mr. Wilson’s arms and used their knees to apply pressure to his
body. Ms. Wilson then got out of the car and called out to the officers. Marshal Kaz grabbed Ms.
Wilson from behind, forced her to the ground, and held her there. While on her knees, Ms.
Wilson reached back and grabbed Marshal Kaz’s testicles, at which point he said, “She’s got my
balls!” Officers Fox and Salvatore left Mr. Wilson, who was already handcuffed, and went over
to Ms. Wilson to handcuff her.
There was no further physical contact between the officers and the Wilsons after they had
been handcuffed. Bloomfield PD officer Brian Grant (“Officer Grant”) and Sergeant Michael
Driscoll (“Sgt. Driscoll”) arrived at the scene after the Wilsons had been handcuffed. Ms.
Jackson and her daughters had remained in the car during the physical encounter between the
Wilsons and the police officers. Ms. Jackson observed the encounter, was upset by what she saw,
and had trouble sleeping after the incident, but did not seek professional counseling. One of her
daughters, Ashley Alridge, was unable to see what happened after the Wilsons were forced to the
ground. She was upset by the incident and had trouble sleeping but did not seek professional
counseling. Ms. Jackson’s other daughter, Janae Alridge, also was unable to see what happened
after the Wilsons were forced to the ground. She was upset by the incident but did not seek
professional counseling.
The following facts are disputed:
The parties dispute the justification for Marshal Kaz’s presence at the residence. Marshal
Kaz claims that Mr. Jackson was a resident of 26 Forest Lane and that he saw Mr. Jackson there
on the night of the incident. But the plaintiffs testified that Mr. Jackson was not at the residence

5

that night. Mr. Wilson Dep. at 35; Janae Alridge Dep. at 9. The plaintiffs say that Ms. Jackson
and Mr. Jackson had separated, and Mr. Jackson had moved out approximately three weeks prior
to May 29, 2010, and was living with his mother. Mr. Wilson Dep. at 218; Ms. Jackson Dep. at
53, 61-62; Janae Alridge Dep. at 31-32; Ashley Alridge Dep. at 37. Marshal Kaz claims that on
May 29, 2010, there was a car parked in front of the residence that he believed to be used by Mr.
Jackson, whereas Ms. Jackson testified that it was her car, and Mr. Jackson had not used it since
moving out. Ms. Jackson Dep. at 64-65.
The parties dispute what the plaintiffs knew about Marshal Kaz’s purpose for visiting the
residence. Marshal Kaz claims that he identified himself and that Ms. Jackson knew that Mr.
Jackson was being sought for service of capias warrants. Ms. Jackson testified that she knew
only that Mr. Jackson owed child support arising from a prior relationship, but did not know
about the capias warrants. Ms. Jackson Dep. at 44-45, 66. The plaintiffs testified that Marshal
Kaz did not announce his purpose for visiting the residence, and they only found out about the
capias warrants after the incident, while overhearing Marshal Kaz talk to Sgt. Driscoll. Mr.
Wilson Dep. at 217-18; Ms. Wilson Dep. at 170; Ms. Jackson Dep. at 57. The plaintiffs also
testified that Marshal Kaz was very vague in his requests and never asked for Mr. Jackson by
name, first asking to speak to “him” (pointing to the kitchen) and then asking to speak to “the
other man” once Mr. Wilson had come to the door. Ms. Jackson Dep. at 22; Ms. Wilson Dep. at
24-26; Mr. Wilson Dep. at 37. According to the plaintiffs, Ms. Jackson and Mr. Wilson then told
Marshal Kaz that there was no other man at home. Ms. Wilson Dep. at 27; Marshal Kaz Dep. at
100, 263.
The parties dispute what happened as the plaintiffs were leaving the residence. Marshal
Kaz claims that he merely walked backwards in front of the group, instructing them to stay to

6

speak with Bloomfield PD officers who were on their way, but did not try to detain them. He
says that the plaintiffs physically assaulted him, and he only touched them in order to defend
himself. Marshal Kaz Aff. ¶ 17. But the plaintiffs have testified that Marshal Kaz told them that
they were under arrest and could not leave, and attempted to block them from leaving—first by
blocking the front door, then by blocking the path to their cars, and finally by throwing himself
in front of the Wilsons’ car. Ms. Wilson Dep. at 36-38; Ms. Jackson Dep. at 31-33; Mr. Wilson
Dep. at 61-71; Janae Alridge Dep. at 12, 16; Ashley Alridge Dep. at 18-22. They further testified
that Marshal Kaz was the one to initiate physical contact when he grabbed and held Ms.
Jackson’s wrist and her daughter Janae Alridge’s wrist, grabbing Ms. Jackson’s wrist tightly
enough to bend her bracelet and send it flying off her wrist. Ms. Jackson Dep. at 31-33; Ms.
Wilson Dep. at 42; Mr. Wilson Dep. at 75-76; Janae Alridge Dep. at 12, 16; Ashley Alridge Dep.
at 18-22. Ms. Jackson’s wrist caused her pain for a couple of weeks, and she sought treatment in
the form of a single visit to a doctor who instructed her to apply ice and take over-the-counter
anti-inflammatory drugs. Ms. Jackson Dep. at 79.
The parties dispute the nature of the encounter between Mr. Wilson and the Bloomfield
PD. Although both sides agree that the officers ordered Mr. Wilson to leave the car more than
once—the first demand made with the car window being closed and a later demand accompanied
by a threat to use mace spray—the remaining details differ between their accounts. The
defendants characterize Mr. Wilson as noncompliant, even testifying that Mr. Wilson “swat[ted]
at the police officers.” Marshal Kaz Dep. at 197; see also Officer Fox Dep. at 51-52. They claim
that Mr. Wilson was noncompliant enough that they had to assume an active role in extracting
him from the car, by opening the door and removing the keys from the ignition themselves, and
then had to force him to the ground because he refused to sit.

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But according to the plaintiffs, Mr. Wilson was startled when the police officers initially
banged on the car window and made their first demand. Mr. Wilson then rolled down the
window and asked the officers, “Do you know why you’re here?” The officers made no attempt
to speak to him about what was happening before ordering him out of the car a second time and
threatening to use mace spray. Mr. Wilson Dep. at 92-96; Ms. Jackson Dep. at 37-38; Ms.
Wilson Dep. at 52-54. At that point, Mr. Wilson promptly cooperated and exited the car on his
own, with his hands up. But the officers nonetheless quickly forced him to the ground by kicking
his legs and pulling his arms behind him. Mr. Wilson Dep. at 94; Ms. Jackson Dep. at 37-38,
100-101; Ms. Wilson Dep. at 54-56; Ashley Alridge Dep. at 26; Janae Alridge Dep. at 22.
According to the plaintiffs, the officers then continued to push Mr. Wilson into the ground and
force their knees into his back for at least thirty seconds, even though Mr. Wilson was not
resisting and was calling out in pain and telling the officers that he had a bad back. Mr. Wilson
Dep. at 107-08; Ms. Jackson Dep. at 104-05; Ms. Wilson Dep. at 57, 62.
The parties dispute the nature of the encounter between Ms. Wilson and the Bloomfield
PD. The defendants claim that Ms. Wilson interfered with the officers as they were dealing with
Mr. Wilson, grabbing at them and standing closely enough that she could have reached for the
officers’ guns. The plaintiffs dispute those claims. They allege that Ms. Wilson never even
approached Officers Fox and Salvatore before Marshal Kaz grabbed her arms from behind and
kicked her feet from under her, forcing her to her knees; they say instead that she stood ten to
fifteen feet away from Officers Fox and Salvatore and shouted at them to stop because Mr.
Wilson had a bad back. Ms. Jackson Dep. at 112-13, 137; Mr. Wilson Dep. at 109; Ms. Wilson
Dep. at 62, 99, 165. They also claim that when Officers Fox and Salvatore came over to where
Ms. Wilson and Marshal Kaz were, they did not “subdue” Ms. Wilson, but instead kicked her,

8

jumped on her back, twisted her arms, pushed her face into the ground, and forced their knees
into her back before handcuffing her, even though she was not resisting. Ms. Wilson Dep. at 6566; Mr. Wilson Dep. at 110, 120.
The parties dispute what happened after the incident. Both Mr. and Ms. Wilson testified
that when Sgt. Driscoll arrived at the scene, he told Marshal Kaz that Marshal Kaz was wrong to
detain them. Mr. Wilson Dep. at 121; Ms. Wilson Dep. at 102. Sgt. Driscoll then told the
Wilsons that they had been handcuffed because they touched an officer and that they could make
a statement if they wanted. Mr. Wilson Dep. at 121; Ms. Wilson Dep. at 104. The Wilsons were
then permitted to get into their own car and drive to meet the officers at the police station, where
Sgt. Driscoll then told them that Officer Fox, as the arresting officer, would take their statements,
and they would have to come back during business hours if they wanted to file a formal
complaint. Mr. Wilson Dep. at 122, 140-41; Ms. Wilson Dep. at 108. The Wilsons then visited
the police station a few days later to lodge a complaint about the incident and spoke with Jeffrey
Blatter (“Mr. Blatter”), who presented himself as Acting Chief of the Bloomfield PD. Mr.
Wilson Dep. at 160-63; Ms. Wilson Dep. at 110-11. During the conversation, Mr. Blatter did not
apologize, attempted to justify the officers’ actions as “following the lead of the marshal,” and
said that “they were looking into if there was something that they could have done different.”
Mr. Wilson Dep. at 161-63.
Weeks later, the police obtained a warrant to arrest the Wilsons on charges filed in
connection with the incident, but no arrest took place because they turned themselves in and
were booked and released on bond. Ms. Wilson Dep. at 115; Mr. Wilson Arrest Warrant and
Information (dated June 11, 2010), Exh. 11 to Pl.’s Opp. (ECF No. 93-13); Ms. Wilson Arrest
Warrant and Information (dated June 10, 2010), Exh. 12 to Pl.’s Opp. (ECF No. 93-14). Sgt.

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Driscoll supervised Officer Fox’s preparation of the arrest warrant application. Sgt. Driscoll Dep.
at 27. The charges were later dropped. Ms. Wilson Dep. at 115.
The parties agree that Betsy Hard (“Ms. Hard”) was previously the Chief of Police of the
Town of Bloomfield but was not Chief at the time of the incident. But the parties dispute Mr.
Blatter’s status at the time of the incident. The defendants claim that Mr. Blatter was not the
Chief of Police of the Town of Bloomfield, whereas the plaintiffs claim that Mr. Blatter had
assumed duties of the Chief and was presenting himself as Acting Chief at the time of the
incident, as the permanent position of Chief was vacant at that point. The plaintiffs also cite a
document—a Bloomfield PD “Employee Performance Self-Evaluation”—that contains Mr.
Blatter’s name and describes his duties between July 1, 2009, and June 30, 2010, which included
“assum[ing] command of the department in the absence of the Chief of Police.” Exh. 3 to Pl.’s
Opp.
IV.

Discussion of the Bloomfield Defendants’ Motion

A.

Liability of Ms. Hard, Mr. Blatter, Sgt. Driscoll, and Officer Grant
in Their Individual Capacities 1

In several counts in the complaint (Counts 1-12), the plaintiffs bring claims against
“Bloomfield Police Officers,” without specifying which defendants are included under that label.
Although the principal allegations arise from the direct actions of only two officers—Officers
Fox and Salvatore—a broader reading of the term “Bloomfield Police Officers” would also
include Ms. Hard, Mr. Blatter, Sgt. Driscoll, and Officer Grant. In most instances, however, the

1

The complaint also names the Bloomfield Defendants in their official capacities. The Court will consider
these claims under Count 14 in the context of the Monell claim against the Town of Bloomfield. See Seri v. Town of
Newtown, 573 F. Supp. 2d 661, 671 (D. Conn. 2008) (“Section 1983 claims against municipal employees sued in
their official capacity are treated as claims against the municipality itself. Therefore, in order to assert a viable claim
against a municipal employee in his official capacity, the plaintiff must have a viable Monell claim against the
municipality.”) (citations omitted).

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claims against those latter defendants must be dismissed because they were not sufficiently
involved in the alleged misconduct. Thus, before separately considering all the counts in the
complaint, the Court will address the overarching issue of Ms. Hard’s, Mr. Blatter’s, Sgt.
Driscoll’s, and Officer Grant’s liability.
The defendants argue that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Ms. Hard, Mr. Blatter,
Sgt. Driscoll, and Officer Grant were personally involved in any of the alleged misconduct. The
plaintiffs do not oppose the motion as to Officer Grant 2 and have presented no evidence that
would sustain claims against him individually; summary judgment is therefore GRANTED as to
all claims against Officer Grant.
As to Ms. Hard’s, Mr. Blatter’s, and Sgt. Discroll’s liability for the constitutional torts
(Counts 1-8), such liability may arise from their personal involvement as supervisors even if they
did not directly commit the torts. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995). But “a
supervisor cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior for the constitutional torts
of his subordinates; he must be personally involved in a constitutional violation in order to
generate liability under § 1983.” Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 116 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)).
Prior to Iqbal, we held that: “The personal involvement of a supervisory
defendant may be shown by evidence that: (1) the defendant participated directly
in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of
the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the
defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices
occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) the defendant
was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful
acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of
[plaintiffs] by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts
were occurring.”
2

The plaintiffs represent in their opposition brief that they “will withdraw their cause of action as to
Defendant Bloomfield Police Officer Brian Grant.” Pl.’s Opp. at 26.

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Id. (quoting Colon, 58 F.3d at 873). The Second Circuit has so far declined to clarify the
contours of supervisory liability after Iqbal. Id. at 117. This Court has generally continued to
apply Colon, though it is unclear whether Iqbal overrules or limits Colon. See Boyd v. Arnone,
No. 3:11CV824 AWT, 2014 WL 4851885, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2014); Friedland v. Otero,
No. 3:11CV606 JBA, 2014 WL 1247992, at *10 (D. Conn. Mar. 25, 2014). Colon must,
however, be applied in a manner consistent with Iqbal’s requirement that “a plaintiff must plead
that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.” 556 U.S. at 676.
On the basis of the record construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Court
finds evidence of personal involvement on the part of Sgt. Driscoll in the alleged malicious
prosecution of the Wilsons, but not the false arrest or use of unreasonable force. The Court finds
no evidence of personal involvement on the part of Ms. Hard or Mr. Blatter in any of the alleged
constitutional torts.
The plaintiffs have brought forth no evidence linking Ms. Hard to the alleged
constitutional violations under any of the theories recognized by Colon. The plaintiffs concede
that Ms. Hard was no longer Chief of the Bloomfield PD in May 2010, and the only evidence
bearing on this issue is an affidavit from Bloomfield’s Director of Human Resources, submitted
by the defendants, attesting that Ms. Hard retired from her position effective November 5, 2009,
more than six months before the incident at Ms. Jackson’s residence. Cindy Coville Aff. ¶ 6. The
plaintiffs cannot rest their claim against Ms. Hard on nothing more than the bare accusation that
she “was responsible for implementing and enforcing policies regarding the use of force and
investigations,” Pl.’s Opp. at 25, without identifying specific policies implemented by Ms. Hard
and their relationship to the alleged constitutional violations. See, e.g., Austin v. Pappas, No.

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04CV7263 (KMK)(LMS), 2008 WL 857528, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (granting summary
judgment to defendants where there was “no evidence in the record to support a theory that
Defendant Cola created a policy or custom that fostered and led to the alleged violation of
Plaintiff’s rights”); Porter v. City of New York, No. 1:03CV6463-ENV-LB, 2007 WL 1791149,
at *8 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2007) (“A plaintiff cannot stave off summary judgment merely by
offering conclusory allegations that such high-ranking officials failed to train, supervise, or
discipline employees . . . .”).
Because the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute as to Ms. Hard’s
personal involvement, the Court GRANTS summary judgment as to the federal constitutional
claims against Ms. Hard in her individual capacity, as well as the analogous claims under
Sections 7 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution. See Morales v. Town of Glastonbury, No. 3:09CV-713 JCH, 2012 WL 124582, at *7-8 (D. Conn. Jan. 17, 2012) (applying the same analysis of
a defendant’s personal involvement to federal Section 1983 claims and analogous state
constitutional claims); Carey v. Maloney, 480 F. Supp. 2d 548, 561 (D. Conn. 2007) (same).
The plaintiffs have also failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute as to Mr. Blatter’s
personal involvement in the false arrest of, and use of unreasonable force against, Mr. and Ms.
Wilson. Those constitutional violations are alleged to have occurred on May 29, 2010, during the
incident at Ms. Jackson’s residence, when Officers Fox and Salvatore “subdued” the Wilsons
and handcuffed them. There is no allegation in the complaint, much less any evidence, of later
false arrests 3 or uses of unreasonable force. The only evidence relating to Mr. Blatter’s
involvement—that the Wilsons met with him a few days after the May 29 incident to file a

3

“In analyzing claims alleging the constitutional tort of false arrest, we have generally looked to the law of
the state in which the arrest occurred.” Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation
marks omitted). “Under Connecticut law, [f]alse imprisonment, or false arrest, is the unlawful restraint by one
person of the physical liberty of another.” Id. at 204 (same).

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complaint—therefore fails to establish personal liability. See Rahman v. Fisher, 607 F. Supp. 2d
580, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Receiving post hoc notice does not constitute personal involvement .
. . . [A] supervisor may be liable for her failure to remedy a violation only in those circumstances
where the violation is ongoing and the defendant has an opportunity to stop the violation after
being informed of it.”); Platt v. Inc. Vill. of Southampton, 391 F. App’x 62, 65 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“We cannot say, however, that an allegation that a supervisory official ignored a letter
protesting past unconstitutional conduct is, without more, sufficient to state a claim that the
official was ‘personally involved’ in the unconstitutional conduct.”).
As to Mr. Blatter’s involvement in the malicious prosecution initiated by the filing of
criminal charges and arrest warrants for the Wilsons, the plaintiffs have produced no evidence
that Mr. Blatter played a role in initiating or approving those charges. 4 If he was in fact Acting
Chief at the time, Mr. Blatter may well have had the power to involve himself in the decision
whether to prosecute, but there is no evidence that he did or that he was even aware of the
charges. The fact that the plaintiffs met with Mr. Blatter and lodged a complaint about the May
29, 2010, incident sheds no light on what Mr. Blatter did subsequently. A fact-finder may not
infer that Mr. Blatter was personally involved and hold him liable for the prosecution merely
because he occupied a high rank within the Bloomfield PD; doing so would be an impermissible

4

“In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show
a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim
under state law.” Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). “To establish the tort of
malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant initiated or procured the institution of criminal
proceedings against the plaintiff; (2) the criminal proceedings have terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the
defendant acted without probable cause; and (4) the defendant acted with malice, primarily for a purpose other than
that of bringing an offender to justice.” Karwowski v. Fardy, 984 A.2d 776, 781-82 (Conn. App. 2009) (quotation
marks omitted).

14

application of respondeat superior. The Court therefore GRANTS summary judgment as to the
constitutional tort claims against Mr. Blatter.
As to Sgt. Driscoll, there is no dispute that he arrived at the scene after the physical
altercation had ended, giving him no opportunity to prevent the alleged false arrest or use of
unreasonable force. But Sgt. Driscoll himself admitted in his deposition that he supervised
Officer Fox’s preparation of the arrest warrants for the Wilsons and that, in that role, he would
ordinarily review the affidavit and could modify it prior to its being submitted if he felt that it
was prudent to do so. Sgt. Driscoll Dep. at 27, 76. There is also evidence that Sgt. Driscoll was
aware that the Wilsons were uncomfortable with and resistant to giving their statements to
Officer Fox because it was he who allegedly assaulted them. Pl’s L.R. 56(a) Statement ¶ 42. A
reasonable jury could thus infer that Sgt. Driscoll was aware of information that required him to
do more than simply accept Officer Fox’s version of events and proofread the affidavit. In short,
there is enough evidence in the record to raise a genuine dispute as to his personal involvement
in the prosecution of the Wilsons. The Court therefore DENIES summary judgment as to the
claims of malicious prosecution against Sgt. Driscoll in his individual capacity but GRANTS
summary judgment as to the claims for false arrest and the use of unreasonable force.
The claims against the “Bloomfield Police Officers” under the common law of
Connecticut (Counts 9-12) are evaluated under a similar standard. “The settled rule appears to be
that public officials are exempt from liability to answer for the unlawful acts of their
subordinates, unless there is a statute creating such liability” or unless the official “personally
directed or authorized” the acts. Leger v. Kelley, 110 A.2d 635, 639 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1954),
aff’d, 116 A.2d 429 (Conn. 1955) (citing Reiter v. Illinois Nat. Cas. Co., 73 N.E.2d 412, 417-18
(Ill. 1947) (collecting cases from several jurisdictions)); see also Restatement (Second) of

15

Agency § 358 (1958) (“The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to create liability
against an agent for the conduct of servants and other agents of the principal appointed by him,
even though other agents are subject to his orders in the execution of the principal’s affairs. He
is, however, subject to liability . . . if he directs or permits tortious conduct by them or fails
properly to exercise control over them.”); accord Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 7.01 cmt. d
(2006).
The record contains no evidence that Ms. Hard, Mr. Blatter, or Sgt. Driscoll directed or
authorized Officers Fox and Salvatore to assault and batter the plaintiffs (Count 12), inflict
emotional distress upon the plaintiffs (Counts 10-11), or engage in any other negligent, reckless
or willful misconduct (Count 9). Nor is there any evidence that those defendants knew or
reasonably should have known that Officer Fox or Officer Salvatore had a propensity to engage
in such misconduct or that such misconduct was otherwise foreseeable. Summary judgment is
therefore GRANTED on Counts 9-12 as to Ms. Hard, Mr. Blatter, and Sgt. Driscoll.
B.

Count 1: Mr. Wilson against Sgt. Driscoll (Malicious Prosecution) and
Officers Fox and Salvatore (False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution) for
Violation of the Fourth Amendment 5
i.

False Arrest on May 29, 2010

The defendants argue that Mr. Wilson’s claim for false arrest fails as a matter of law
because there was probable cause—or at least arguable probable cause—to arrest him during the
incident at Ms. Jackson’s residence on May 29, 2010. The Court disagrees and therefore denies
summary judgment on the claim.
“Under Connecticut law, [f]alse imprisonment, or false arrest, is the unlawful restraint by
one person of the physical liberty of another.” Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 204 (2d
5

Count 1, along with Counts 3, 5, 7, 18, and 20, originally also included claims under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, which the Court dismissed in an oral ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
ECF No. 51.

16

Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). “And, in Connecticut, a false arrest claim cannot lie when
the challenged arrest was supported by probable cause.” Id. at 203. “[P]robable cause to arrest
exists when police officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and
circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the
person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723
F.3d 382, 389-90 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). “[P]robable cause depends upon the
reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the
arrest, and . . . the probable cause inquiry is objective rather than subjective.” Jaegly v. Couch,
439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006) (same).
Moreover, because the defendants have asserted a defense of qualified immunity, Mr.
Wilson must be able to prove that the existence of probable cause is not even “arguable.”
Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Even if probable cause to arrest is
ultimately found not to have existed, an arresting officer will still be entitled to qualified
immunity from a suit for damages if he can establish that there was ‘arguable probable cause’ to
arrest.”). “Arguable probable cause exists if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the
officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could
disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
The defendants claim that there was arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Wilson for
violating Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167a, which prohibits “interfering with an officer” by
“obstruct[ing], resist[ing], hinder[ing] or endanger[ing] any peace officer . . . in the performance
of such peace officer’s . . . duties.” A violation of Section 53a-167a requires “specific intent to
interfere with an officer.” State v. Colon, 978 A.2d 99, 103 (Conn. App. 2009). “Connecticut
precedent hold[s] that merely questioning police authority or even protesting police actions does

17

not constitute proscribed interference with an officer.” Berg v. Sorbo, No. 14-1208-CV, 2015
WL 895383, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2015) (citing State v. Williams, 534 A.2d 230, 238 (Conn.
1987)).
The defendants characterize Mr. Wilson as highly uncooperative when asked to exit his
car, but according to the plaintiffs’ depositions, Mr. Wilson was cooperative and did not resist
Officers Fox’s and Salvatore’s orders. Under the plaintiffs’ version of events, the only
circumstance approaching “resistance” or “interference” was the slight delay in responding to the
first order to exit, which is easily attributable to the time that Mr. Wilson took to roll down the
window and ask the officers if they knew why they were there, which cannot constitute
interference under Section 53a-167a, especially when construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs. See Berg, 2015 WL 895383, at *2; Williams, 534 A.2d at 238.
If the plaintiffs’ version is assumed to be true and construed in the light most favorable to
them, there would not have been arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Wilson—that is, it was
objectively unreasonable to believe that there was probable cause, and officers of reasonable
competence could not disagree on whether the probable cause test was met. There is therefore a
genuine factual dispute on this issue, and summary judgment must be DENIED as to Mr.
Wilson’s claim for false arrest under Count 1.
ii.

Malicious Prosecution

The defendants argue that Mr. Wilson’s claim for malicious prosecution fails as a matter
of law because (1) the June 2010 warrant issued by the Superior Court creates a presumption of
probable cause to prosecute Mr. Wilson, and (2) even if the presumption were rebutted by
evidence of misrepresentations in the affidavit supporting the warrant, a “corrected affidavit”

18

would still establish probable cause—or at least arguable probable cause. The Court disagrees
and therefore denies summary judgment on this claim.
“To establish the tort of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant
initiated or procured the institution of criminal proceedings against the plaintiff; (2) the criminal
proceedings have terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the defendant acted without probable
cause; and (4) the defendant acted with malice, primarily for a purpose other than that of
bringing an offender to justice.” Karwowski v. Fardy, 984 A.2d 776, 781-82 (Conn. App. 2009)
(quotation marks omitted). “Malice may be inferred from lack of probable cause.” Vandersluis v.
Weil, 407 A.2d 982, 985 (Conn. 1978).
Where, as here, a magistrate has issued a warrant finding probable cause to initiate the
prosecution, the required showing changes. “[A] plaintiff who argues that a warrant was issued
on less than probable cause . . . must make a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made a false statement in
his affidavit and that the allegedly false statement was necessary to the finding of probable
cause.” Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991) (quotation marks
omitted). “[R]ecklessness may be inferred where the omitted information was critical to the
probable cause determination.” Id. at 871. “To determine whether errors in an affidavit were
necessary to the probable cause finding, we rely upon the corrected affidavit doctrine, under
which errors in the affidavit are not material if, after crossing out any allegedly false information
and supplying any omitted facts, the corrected affidavit would have supported a finding of
probable cause.” Pines v. Bailey, 563 F. App’x 814, 817 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks
omitted).

19

The warrant and information charging Mr. Wilson with violating Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a167a (“interfering with an officer”) were based on Officer Fox’s affidavit. In it, Officer Fox
claims that Mr. Wilson “leaned back into his seat and said he is not getting out” when asked to
exit his car. Exh. 11 to Pl.’s Opp. at 5. He says that Mr. Wilson “continued to yell and leaned
back into his seat” when again instructed to exit. Id. at 6. He says that Mr. Wilson “was
extremely irate” and “kept yelling and his fists were clenched and he stepped forward toward
Officer Salvatore,” ignoring a command to sit down on the curb. Id. But the plaintiffs have
introduced evidence contradicting all of those assertions, and instead showing that Mr. Wilson
took a brief moment to ask the officers if they knew why they were there and then exited the car
voluntarily with his hands raised.
If the truth of the plaintiffs’ version is assumed, then there are critical differences
between that version and what appears in the affidavit, which permits an inference of
recklessness in Officer Fox’s preparation of the affidavit. The Court therefore considers the
corrected affidavit and finds that it “would not support a reasonable officer’s belief that probable
cause existed,” Escalera, 361 F.3d at 744—that is, would not provide arguable probable cause to
prosecute Mr. Wilson—for the same reasons that there was not arguable probable cause to arrest
Mr. Wilson under the plaintiffs’ version of events, see supra Subsection IV.B.i. There is
therefore a genuine factual dispute on this issue, and summary judgment must be DENIED as to
Mr. Wilson’s claim for malicious prosecution under Count 1.

20

C.

Count 2: Mr. Wilson against Sgt. Driscoll (Malicious Prosecution) and
Officers Fox and Salvatore (False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution) for
Violation of Article I, Sections 7 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution 6

The defendants argue that Count 2 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
because Connecticut does not recognize a constitutional tort under Article I, Sections 7 and 9 of
the Connecticut Constitution in cases such as this because the allegations are not sufficiently
“egregious.” The Court considered and rejected this argument when it was presented in the
motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the allegations were sufficiently egregious to
give rise to a constitutional tort under the cause of action recognized in Binette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d
688, 692 (Conn. 1998) and limited to cases of “egregious misconduct” by Martin v. Brady, 780
A.2d 961, 966 (Conn. App. 2001).
Based on the record pertaining to what Mr. Wilson was allegedly subjected to by the
Bloomfield PD officers, there is evidence to support the original allegations in the complaint,
which this Court has already found to be sufficiently egregious to give rise to a cause of action
under Binette. Applying the same standards to Count 2 as were applied to Count 1 7—except for
the doctrine of qualified immunity8—the Court finds a genuine factual dispute as to whether
there was probable cause to arrest and prosecute Mr. Wilson and therefore DENIES summary
judgment as to Count 2.

6

Count 2, along with Counts 4, 6, and 8, originally also included claims under Article I, Section 8 of the
Connecticut Constitution, which the Court dismissed in an oral ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
ECF No. 51.
7
See State v. Kelly, 95 A.3d 1081, 1091 (Conn. 2014) (“[T]he standards governing our analysis for purposes
of article first, § 7, mirror those set forth by the United States Supreme Court . . . with regard to [federal] fourth
amendment analysis . . . Because reasonableness is the touchstone of both the fourth amendment and article first, §
7, persuasive federal precedent applying that standard is particularly relevant to our state constitutional inquiry.”)
(quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. Jenkins, 3 A.3d 806, 839 n.39 (Conn. 2010) (“[I]n the search and
seizure context, article first, § 9, is our criminal due process provision that does not provide protections greater than
those afforded by either the fourth amendment or its coordinate specific state constitutional provision, article first, §
7.”).
8
“[T]here is no Connecticut precedent establishing the same qualified immunity defense available under §
1983 for Connecticut constitutional violations.” Gilliam v. Town of Windsor Locks, No. 3:03CV1201 AVC, 2006
WL 581208, at *7 (D. Conn. Mar. 7, 2006).

21

D.

Count 3: Ms. Wilson against Sgt. Driscoll (Malicious Prosecution), and
Officers Fox and Salvatore (False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution) for
Violation of the Fourth Amendment

The defendants argue that Ms. Wilson’s claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution
fail as a matter of law for the same reason as Mr. Wilson’s claims: the existence of arguable
probable cause. The defendants claim that probable cause existed to arrest Ms. Wilson for
violating Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167a (“interfering with an officer,” see supra Section IV.B) and
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-61 (third-degree assault) and later prosecute her for those crimes. No
party disputes that Officers Fox and Salvatore witnessed Marshal Kaz yell out in pain, “She’s got
my balls,” as he was holding Ms. Wilson down and that she made physical contact with him.
Even construing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs—and, in the case of the
malicious prosecution claim, correcting the supporting affidavit to reflect the plaintiffs’ version
of events—there was arguable probable cause to believe that Ms. Wilson had committed an
assault, in that officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to whether probable cause
existed. Escalera, 361 F.3d at 743. Summary judgment is therefore GRANTED as to Count 3.
E.

Count 4: Ms. Wilson against Sgt. Driscoll (Malicious Prosecution) and
Officers Fox and Salvatore (False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution) for
Violation of Article I, Sections 7 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution

Assuming arguendo that the allegations about the Bloomfield PD’s conduct towards Ms.
Wilson are sufficiently egregious to give rise to a cause of action under Binette, the Court
nonetheless finds no genuine dispute of material fact. The doctrines of qualified immunity and
arguable probable cause have not been held to apply to violations of the Connecticut
Constitution, see supra note 8, but even analyzing the claim under the ordinary probable cause
standard, the facts discussed in the previous paragraph leave no genuine dispute as to whether

22

there was probable cause to arrest and prosecute Ms. Wilson for third-degree assault. The Court
therefore GRANTS summary judgment as to Count 4.
F.

Count 5: Mr. Wilson against Officers Fox and Salvatore
for Violation of the Fourth Amendment
(Unreasonable Force)

The defendants argue that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Officers Fox and Salvatore used reasonable force against Mr. Wilson. The Court disagrees and
therefore must deny summary judgment on this count.
“Determining whether a use of force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. We ask whether
the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. In doing so, we consider the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.” Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d 217, 231 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citations
omitted) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)). And because the officers have
asserted a defense of qualified immunity, Mr. Wilson’s cause of action for excessive force will
succeed only if “it would [have been] clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful”
under the circumstances. Cowan ex rel. Estate of Cooper v. Breen, 352 F.3d 756, 761 (2d Cir.
2003).
The Graham factors are in dispute with regard to Mr. Wilson. The Court has already
determined that there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether there was arguable probable
cause to believe that any crime had been committed by Mr. Wilson. And the parties dispute the

23

degree of Mr. Wilson’s resistance. The defendants characterize him as uncooperative. The
plaintiffs contend that he complied with the officers’ orders within a reasonable time, exited the
car with his hands up, and put up no resistance. And the parties also dispute the exact amount of
force that was used against Mr. Wilson, including the length of time that he was held to the
ground.
“Given the fact-specific nature of the inquiry, granting summary judgment against a
plaintiff on an excessive force claim is not appropriate unless no reasonable factfinder could
conclude that the officers’ conduct was objectively unreasonable.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W.
Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir. 2004). Under the plaintiffs’ version of the facts, a jury
could reasonably conclude that Officers Fox’s and Salvatore’s conduct was objectively
unreasonable, in that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct was
unlawful. The Court therefore DENIES summary judgment as to Count 5.
G.

Count 6: Mr. Wilson against Officers Fox and Salvatore
for Violation of Article I, Sections 7 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution
(Unreasonable Force)

For the reasons already set out with regard to Count 5, the Court finds that there is a
genuine dispute of fact as to whether Officers Fox’s and Salvatore’s use of force against Mr.
Wilson was reasonable, and therefore DENIES summary judgment as to Count 6.
H.

Count 7: Ms. Wilson against Officers Fox and Salvatore
for Violation of the Fourth Amendment
(Unreasonable Force)

Applying the same legal standards set out under Count 5, the Court finds that the
defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as to the reasonableness of the force used
against Ms. Wilson. As with Mr. Wilson, both the amount of resistance on Ms. Wilson’s part and
the amount of force used by the officers are disputed. Under the version of the record most

24

favorable to Ms. Wilson, Officers Fox and Salvatore jumped on her back, kicked her, and pushed
her face into the ground, even though she was unarmed, was already on her knees when they
arrived, posed little threat to their safety, and put up no resistance to their arrest. While there is
no dispute that Ms. Wilson had grabbed Marshal Kaz’s testicles, a reasonable jury could still
conclude that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that Officer Fox’s and Salvatore’s use of
force against Ms. Wilson was excessive and unlawful under the circumstances. The Court
therefore DENIES summary judgment as to Count 7.
I.

Count 8: Ms. Wilson against Officers Fox and Salvatore
for Violation of Article I, Sections 7 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution
(Unreasonable Force)

For the reasons already set out with regard to Count 7, the Court finds that there is a
genuine dispute of fact as to whether Officer Fox’s and Salvatore’s use of force against Ms.
Wilson was reasonable, and therefore DENIES summary judgment as to Count 8.
J.

Count 9: Mr. Wilson and Ms. Wilson against Officers Fox and Salvatore
for Willful, Reckless and/or Negligent Conduct
and against the Town of Bloomfield for Negligent Conduct 9
i.

Negligent Conduct by Officers Fox and Salvatore and the Town

Absent the valid application of an exception, the doctrine of governmental immunity
would bar the plaintiffs’ recovery for any claims of negligence in this case, because the actions
of the police officers at issue involved the exercise of discretion. See Violano v. Fernandez, 907
A.2d 1188, 1194 (Conn. 2006) (“Municipal officials are immunized from liability for negligence
arising out of their discretionary acts . . . .”); Williams v. City of New Haven, 707 A.2d 1251,
1253 (Conn. 1998) (“[A] municipality is immune from liability for negligence unless the
legislature has enacted a statute abrogating that immunity.”).

9

Count 9 originally also included claims against the Town of Bloomfield for reckless or willful conduct,
which the Court dismissed in an oral ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 51.

25

“There are three exceptions to discretionary act immunity . . . . [L]iability may be
imposed when the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to
act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm . . . .” Violano, 907 A.2d
at 1194 (quotation marks omitted). Such circumstances would also expose municipalities to
liability. Doe v. Petersen, 903 A.2d 191, 193 (Conn. 2006).
“[T]his test requires three things: (1) an imminent harm; (2) an identifiable victim; and
(3) a public official to whom it is apparent that his or her conduct is likely to subject that victim
to that harm.” Id. at 616. The first factor is met when “the potential for harm [is] sufficiently
immediate,” and the second factor is met when “the harm occurs within a limited temporal and
geographical zone, involving a temporary condition.” Cotto v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New
Haven, 984 A.2d 58, 64 (Conn. 2009). “The criteria of ‘identifiable person’ and ‘imminent harm’
must be evaluated with reference to each other. An allegedly identifiable person must be
identifiable as a potential victim of a specific imminent harm. Likewise, the alleged imminent
harm must be imminent in terms of its impact on a specific identifiable person.” Peterson, 903
A.2d at 200.
As to the Wilsons, summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity is
precluded by the imminent harm exception, given that there is evidence that the Wilsons were
the identifiable victims of physical injuries inflicted by Officers Fox and Salvatore themselves.
See, e.g., Belanger v. City of Hartford, 578 F. Supp. 2d 360, 367 (D. Conn. 2008); Roguz v.
Walsh, No. 09-1052 TLM, 2012 WL 6049580, at *9 (D. Conn. Dec. 5, 2012). The Court
therefore DENIES summary judgment on Count 9 against Officers Fox and Salvatore and the
Town of Bloomfield, as to claims for negligent conduct.

26

ii.

Willful/Reckless Conduct by Officers Fox and Salvatore

The defendants argue that Count 9’s allegations of reckless or willful misconduct on the
part of Officers Fox and Salvatore fail as a matter of law because the evidence demonstrates, at
most, negligent conduct.
The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. . . .
[T]he terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice . . . have been treated as
meaning the same thing. . . . [W]illful, wanton, or reckless conduct tends to take
on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure
from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent. It is
at least clear that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere
mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than
mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention.
Craig v. Driscoll, 813 A.2d 1003, 1022 (Conn. 2003) (internal citations omitted), superseded by
statute on other grounds, Public Acts 2003, No. 03-91, as recognized in O’Dell v. Kozee, 53
A.3d 178, 197 (Conn. 2012). If it resolved all factual disputes as to the details of the incident in
favor of the plaintiffs’ testimony, a reasonable jury could conclude that Officers Fox’s and
Salvatore’s conduct was reckless or willful, in that it was highly unreasonable, involving an
extreme departure from ordinary care. The Court therefore DENIES summary judgment on
Count 9 against Officers Fox and Salvatore as to claims for reckless or willful conduct.
K.

Count 10: Ms. Jackson, Mr. Wilson, Ms. Wilson, Ashley Alridge, and Janae
Alridge against Officers Fox and Salvatore
for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The defendants contend that the plaintiffs fail to state a claim for intentional infliction of
emotion distress against Officers Fox and Salvatore. A claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress requires showing: “(1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or
that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct;
(2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant’s conduct was the cause
of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was
27

severe.” Reyes v. City of Bridgeport, 100 A.3d 50, 60 n.13 (Conn. App. 2014). The defendants
argue that Officers Fox and Salvatore’s conduct was not extreme and outrageous.
Conduct is “extreme and outrageous” when it “exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by
decent society.” Id. Summary judgment as to whether conduct was extreme and outrageous is
inappropriate where “reasonable minds could disagree about whether the Officers’ actions were
sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support liability, and a reasonable juror could conclude
that they were.” DeRafelo v. Littlejohn, No. 3:10-CV-207 CSH, 2012 WL 2459396, at *6 (D.
Conn. June 27, 2012). Reading the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and in
comparison to precedents involving similar conduct by police offers in which Connecticut courts
denied summary judgment, this Court cannot say as a matter of law that Officers Fox’s and
Salvatore’s conduct was not extreme and outrageous. See Balogh v. City of Shelton, No.
CV990067521S, 2002 WL 523225, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2002); Hyde v. Pysz, No.
CV054003674, 2006 WL 894926, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 2006). This remains a
disputed issue of fact for the jury, and the Court must therefore DENY summary judgment as to
Count 10.
L.

Count 11: Ms. Jackson, Mr. Wilson, Ms. Wilson, Ashley Alridge, and Janae
Alridge against Officers Fox and Salvatore
for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The defendants argue that Ms. Jackson, Ashley Alridge, and Janae Alridge have
produced insufficient evidence to meet the elements of negligent infliction of emotional distress
under a theory of bystander emotional distress.
[A] bystander may recover damages for emotional distress under the rule of
reasonable foreseeability if the bystander satisfies the following conditions: (1) he
or she is closely related to the injury victim, such as the parent or the sibling of
the victim; (2) the emotional injury of the bystander is caused by the
contemporaneous sensory perception of the event or conduct that causes the
injury, or by arriving on the scene soon thereafter and before substantial change
28

has occurred in the victim’s condition or location; (3) the injury of the victim
must be substantial, resulting in his or her death or serious physical injury; and (4)
the bystander’s emotional injury must be serious, beyond that which would be
anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not the result of an abnormal
response.
Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 865 (Conn. 1996).
As to Ashley and Janae Alridge, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs cannot prove the
second element of contemporaneous sensory perception, or perception “immediately after the
injury causing event.” Id. at 863. In Ashley Alridge’s deposition, she testified that once Mr.
Wilson, her uncle, was “taken to the ground” she was not “able to see any other interactions
between [her] uncle and the police.” Ashley Alridge Dep. at 45. She also testified that she could
not discern which defendant had taken Ms. Wilson to the ground, and that she was “not able to
see any further interactions between [her] Aunt Sharntae and whoever it was who had taken her
down.” Id. at 46-47. Similarly, Janae Alridge testified in her deposition that she had no “other
recollection of interactions between [her] uncle and the police officers other than him being
taken to the ground,” Janae Alridge Dep. at 41, and did not “recall anything else about the
interaction with [her] aunt other than her being brought to the ground,” id. at 44.
The Court agrees that the plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence that Ashley or
Janae Alridge perceived the events that caused “serious physical injury” while they were
happening or immediately thereafter. The plaintiffs argue that this Court should not interpret the
second Clohessy criterion too narrowly, but they admit in their Local Rule 56(a) statement that
Ashley and Janae Alridge remember only that the police forced the Wilsons to the ground. And
they offer no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that merely seeing their aunt
and uncle forced to the ground made them witnesses to “serious physical injury.” Summary
judgment is therefore GRANTED as to Ashley and Janae Alridge’s claims for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
29

As to Ms. Jackson, however, there remains a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether she has satisfied the elements of bystander emotional distress. She testified to having
observed a great deal more than her daughters did, including seeing the police press their knees
into her brother’s (Mr. Wilson’s) back for approximately a minute, while he screamed out in
pain. Ms. Jackson Dep. at 138.
The defendants also challenge Ms. Jackson’s claim under the fourth Clohessy criterion—
that the bystander’s emotional injury must be “serious”—but admit in their Local Rule 56(a)
statement that Ms. Jackson was upset by what she saw and had trouble sleeping for months. Ms.
Jackson also testified that she has become afraid of the police and has flashbacks of the incident
when she sees police cars. Ms. Jackson Dep. at 80, 141. The defendants argue that Ms. Jackson’s
emotional injury is insufficiently serious, in that she did not suffer “neuroses, psychoses, chronic
depression, phobia, shock or the like,” quoting from Clohessy a list of “examples” of serious
emotional distress. Aside from that list quoted from Clohessy—which is expressly “nonexhaustive” and is itself a quotation from a Louisiana Supreme Court decision included as part of
a lengthy string citation—the defendants offer no authority for the proposition that Ms. Jackson’s
emotional injury is, as a matter of law, not “serious.” Because a reasonable jury could conclude
on the basis of Ms. Jackson’s testimony that she has suffered an emotional injury “beyond that
which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not the result of an abnormal
response,” Clohessy, 675 A.2d at 865, summary judgment is DENIED as to Ms. Jackson’s
claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 10

10

The Court rejected the defendants’ governmental immunity argument with regard to the Wilsons’ claims
under Count 9, in light of the “imminent harm” exception to governmental immunity. The Court’s reasoning as to
Count 9 also applies to the Wilsons’ and Ms. Jackson’s claims under Count 11 for negligent infliction of emotional
distress.

30

M.

Count 12: Mr. Wilson and Ms. Wilson against Officers Fox and Salvatore
for Assault and Battery 11

The defendants argue that the Wilsons’ claims under the common law of assault and
battery fail as a matter of law because Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-22(b) permits peace officers to use
reasonable force to effect an arrest or defend themselves and third persons. 12 Under an analogous
New York statute with very similar language, “[i]n effect, the test for whether a plaintiff can
maintain [state law assault and battery] cause[s] of action against law enforcement officials is the
exact same test as the one used to analyze a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.”
Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 986 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Having already found a genuine dispute under Counts 5 and 7 as to the reasonableness of
the force used by Officers Fox and Salvatore against Mr. and Ms. Wilson, the Court DENIES
summary judgment as to the Wilsons’ claim for assault and battery.
N.

Count 14 13: Ms. Jackson, Mr. Wilson, and Ms. Wilson
against the Town of Bloomfield for Violation of the Fourth Amendment
(Inadequate Policy and Custom) 14

The plaintiffs seek damages against the Town of Bloomfield and allege under Count 14
that the Town had policies and customs that caused the violations of Ms. Jackson’s and the
Wilsons’ constitutional rights. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs have not made a sufficient

11
Count 12 was originally brought by Ms. Jackson, Mr. Wilson, Ms. Wilson, and Janae Alridge, but the
Court dismissed the claims by Ms. Jackson and Janae Alridge in an oral ruling on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. ECF No. 51.
12
That statute reads: “Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, a peace officer, special policeman
appointed under section 29-18b, motor vehicle inspector designated under section 14-8 and certified pursuant to
section 7-294d or authorized official of the Department of Correction or the Board of Pardons and Paroles is
justified in using physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such
to be necessary to: (1) Effect an arrest or prevent the escape from custody of a person whom he or she reasonably
believes to have committed an offense, unless he or she knows that the arrest or custody is unauthorized; or (2)
defend himself or herself or a third person from the use or imminent use of physical force while effecting or
attempting to effect an arrest or while preventing or attempting to prevent an escape.” Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a22.
13
Count 13 was dismissed in an oral ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 51.
14
Count 14 originally also named Ms. Hard and Mr. Blatter, but the overarching issue of those defendants’
individual liability on all the counts in the complaint has already been addressed, supra Section IV.A.

31

showing under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and its
progeny to enable them to seek damages from the Town. The Court agrees and therefore grants
summary judgment on this claim.
First, the plaintiffs appear to have abandoned this claim. In their opposition to the motion
for summary judgment, they make no attempt to rebut the defendants’ challenge or to argue in
favor of Monell liability. They also state at one point in their brief that they “will withdraw their
cause of action . . . as to the Defendant Town of Bloomfield.” Pl.’s Opp. at 26.
Even if the plaintiffs had not abandoned this claim, there would be no evidence in the
record to support it. “[I]solated acts . . . by non-policymaking municipal employees are generally
not sufficient to demonstrate a municipal custom, policy, or usage that would justify municipal
liability.” Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2012). But “[a] municipal
policymaking official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to the unconstitutional actions, or risk of
unconstitutional actions, of municipal employees can in certain circumstances satisfy the test for
a municipal custom, policy, or usage that is actionable under Section 1983.” Id. “‘[D]eliberate
indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a
known or obvious consequence of his action” and “that the official made a conscious choice.” Id.
The complaint alleges deliberate indifference in connection with the Town’s failure to
train its police officers adequately, but the record does not support this theory of liability. “[A]
municipality can be liable for failing to train its employees where it acts with deliberate
indifference in disregarding the risk that its employees will unconstitutionally apply its policies
without more training,” but plaintiffs must “identify a specific deficiency in the city’s training
program and establish that that deficiency is closely related to the ultimate injury, such that it
actually caused the constitutional deprivation.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d

32

113, 129 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs have introduced no evidence
establishing specific deficiencies in the Town’s training program or a causal relationship
between a deficiency and the alleged constitutional violations.
The complaint also alleges deliberate indifference in connection with Ms. Hard and Mr.
Blatter’s failure to supervise and/or discipline Officers Fox and Salvatore. 15 To prevail on this
theory of deliberate indifference, the plaintiffs “must show that the need for more or better
supervision to protect against constitutional violations was obvious.” Vann v. City of New York,
72 F.3d 1040, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added). “An obvious need may be demonstrated
through proof of repeated complaints of civil rights violations; deliberate indifference may be
inferred if the complaints are followed by no meaningful attempt on the part of the municipality
to investigate or to forestall further incidents.” Id. A need may also be “obvious” enough to
permit an inference of deliberate indifference where a supervisory official fails to intervene after
personally witnessing an instance of “blatantly unconstitutional” conduct. Amnesty Am., 361
F.3d at 128.
There is no evidence that Ms. Hard, who had retired months earlier, had any awareness of
the officers’ conduct or the risk thereof, or had any ability to intervene. See supra Section IV.A.
The only evidence related to Mr. Blatter’s awareness or involvement shows that he met with the
plaintiffs a few days after the May 29, 2010, incident to hear their complaint, and that during
their conversation he attempted to justify the officers’ conduct and told them that the department
was looking into whether things could have been handled differently. Based on that limited
evidence, the subsequent alleged malicious prosecution is the only constitutional injury that
could have been caused by Mr. Blatter’s failure to investigate or rectify the situation.

15

For the purpose of this discussion, the Court assumes without deciding that Mr. Blatter, in his role as
Acting Chief at the time, had policymaking authority.

33

Even assuming that the conversation with the plaintiffs alerted Mr. Blatter to the
possibility that probable cause to prosecute Mr. Wilson was lacking, the record does not contain
any evidence from which a fact-finder could conclude that he failed to prevent the prosecution
because of his “deliberate indifference, rather than mere negligence or bureaucratic inaction.”
Amnesty Am., 361 F.3d at 128. There is no direct evidence suggesting that Mr. Blatter made a
conscious choice not to take remedial action, as the record is silent as to what he did after
meeting with the plaintiffs and whether he approved or was even aware of the prosecution of the
Wilsons. See supra Section IV.A. There is also no evidentiary basis to infer deliberate
indifference from the presence of an “obvious” need for intervention. Mr. Blatter did not witness
the events at Ms. Jackson’s residence, and there is nothing in the record showing that he or the
Bloomfield PD had received repeated complaints about constitutional violations by Officer Fox,
Officer Salvatore, or any other members of the Bloomfield PD.
The plaintiffs have abandoned their Monell claim and, in any event, failed to provide
evidence of deliberate indifference on the part of policymaking officials. There is therefore no
basis to hold the Town liable for the alleged constitutional torts, and summary judgment must be
GRANTED as to Count 14.
O.

Count 16 16: Against the Town of Bloomfield
for Indemnifying Employees under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465

The defendants argue that Count 16 fails as a matter of law, inasmuch as the Town of
Bloomfield’s liability under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465 to indemnify its employees is entirely
derivative of the plaintiffs’ claims against the Bloomfield PD officers for negligent conduct,
which themselves fail as a matter of law. But this argument fails, as the Court has determined

16

The complaint skips from Count 14 to Count 16.

34

that the plaintiffs’ claims against the Bloomfield PD officers for negligent conduct do not fail as
a matter of law. The Court therefore DENIES summary judgment as to Count 16.
P.

Count 17: Against the Town of Bloomfield
for Negligence of Employees under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n 17

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n functionally places the same liability on municipalities as
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465. Grady v. Town of Somers, 984 A.2d 684, 699 (Conn. 2009) (“[W]e
previously have recognized that §§ 7–465 and 52–557n are coextensive . . . .”) (quotation marks
omitted). The difference is procedural and pertains to how the actions are pled and whether the
municipal employees are themselves pursued as defendants. See id.; Burton v. City of Stamford,
971 A.2d 739, 750-51 (Conn. App. 2009). Plaintiffs may plead both, though it may be redundant
to do so. See, e.g., Padula v. City of W. Haven, No. CV075013408, 2008 WL 2745902, at *3 n.4
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 16, 2008); Silver v. Town of W. Hartford, No. CV98-0585357-S, 1999
WL 966468, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 1999). Thus, for the reasons already set out with
regard to Count 16, the Court DENIES summary judgment as to Count 17.
V.

Discussion of Marshal Kaz’s Motion

A.

Sovereign Immunity and the Capacity in Which Marshal Kaz Is Sued

Before separately considering all the counts against Marshal Kaz in the complaint, the
Court will address Marshal Kaz’s global argument that the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by
sovereign immunity because the claims are brought against him only in his official capacity as a
state officer.
Under federal law, which governs Marshal Kaz’s immunity defense to the plaintiffs’
claims under Section 1983, “[s]uits against state officials in their official capacity . . . should be
treated as suits against the State,” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991), whereas “officers sued
17

Count 17 originally also included claims against the Town of Bloomfield for reckless conduct, which the
Court dismissed in an oral ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 51.

35

in their personal capacity come to court as individuals,” id. at 27. The Eleventh Amendment,
which bars damages suits against the states in federal court, “does not erect a barrier against suits
to impose individual and personal liability on state officials under § 1983.” Id. at 30-31
(quotation marks omitted).
Notwithstanding a single sentence in the complaint alleging that Marshal Kaz “was acting
in his official capacity in the performance of his duties . . . under color of state law,” a full reading of

the complaint leaves little doubt that the plaintiffs are suing Marshal Kaz personally/individually.
Compl. ¶ 5. The summons attached to the complaint and the caption on the first page of the
complaint both identify Marshal Kaz as a defendant in his official and individual capacities, and
the prayer for relief seeks “[c]ompensatory or actual damages, jointly and severally, against all
Defendants named in their individual capacity.” Id. at 1, 34; see also Shabazz v. Coughlin, 852
F.2d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Notwithstanding the complaint’s ambiguous language and the
defendants’ numerous affirmative defenses, Shabazz’s request for punitive and compensatory
damages, coupled with the defendants’ summary judgment motion on qualified immunity but not
Eleventh Amendment grounds, suggests that the parties believed that this action is a personal
capacity suit.”).
As for the claims brought under state law, “[i]f the plaintiff’s complaint reasonably may
be construed to bring claims against the defendants in their individual capacities, then sovereign
immunity would not bar those claims.” Miller v. Egan, 828 A.2d 549, 555 (Conn. 2003). The
Connecticut Supreme Court has
set forth four criteria to determine whether an action is in effect, one against the
state and cannot be maintained without its consent: (1) a state official has been
sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state;
(3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment,
though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the
state or subject it to liability.
36

Id. at 556 (quotation marks omitted).
The plaintiffs have not sought injunctive or declaratory relief, and they earlier
voluntarily dismissed claims against the State Marshals Commission, the state agency
that licenses and regulates state marshals. In addition, all of the plaintiffs’ claims against
Marshal Kaz allege reckless or willful conduct, or negligent conduct outside the scope of
Marshal Kaz’s employment, which would not expose the state itself to liability for
damages under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5-141d(a). 18 In short, neither the third nor the fourth
criterion has been met as to those claims. See Staton v. Cassavechia, No. 3:08-CV-142
JCH, 2011 WL 3040911, at *3-4 (D. Conn. July 25, 2011). The plaintiffs may therefore
proceed against Marshal Kaz in his personal/individual capacity.

18

That statute provides for indemnification of state officers: “The state shall save harmless and indemnify any
state officer or employee, as defined in section 4-141, and any member of the Public Defender Services Commission
from financial loss and expense arising out of any claim, demand, suit or judgment by reason of his alleged
negligence or alleged deprivation of any person’s civil rights or other act or omission resulting in damage or injury,
if the officer, employee or member is found to have been acting in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of
his employment and such act or omission is found not to have been wanton, reckless or malicious.” Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 5-141d(a).
The complaint is ambiguous as to whether the plaintiffs seek damages from the state for Marshal Kaz’s
negligent conduct, in that it contains the allegation that Marshal Kaz was acting within the scope of his employment.
But the plaintiffs have eliminated any ambiguity by narrowing their claims through their briefing on the motion for
summary judgment; they argue that Marshal Kaz is liable for his negligence only insofar as it was outside the scope
of his employment, which relieves the state of any possible liability. Furthermore, it seems that this is the theory
originally contemplated by the complaint. In order to have pursued relief from the state for Marshal Kaz’s
negligence, the plaintiffs would have needed to present the claims to the state claim commissioner under Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 4-165, which the complaint fails altogether to address. This omission is made more meaningful by the fact
that the complaint does expressly address the issue of damages and indemnification from the Town of Bloomfield
under analogous statutory provisions relating to municipalities.
The Court also notes that the indemnification provision of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5-141d(a) may not apply to
Marshal Kaz at all, even if the plaintiffs were suing Marshal Kaz for negligent conduct within the scope of his
employment, because state marshals are generally considered independent contractors, rather than state employees
or officers. Kim v. Emt, 102 A.3d 137, 140 (Conn. App. 2014) (“State marshals are not, however, state employees . .
. . Rather, state marshals are independent contractors . . . .”); Conn. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 2007-002, 2007 WL 852970,
at *8 (Feb. 2, 2007) (“State marshals are not state officers or state employees within the meaning of Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 4-165 and § 5-141d.”); but see Mason v. Barbieri, No. CV085011263S, 2010 WL 1888711, at *3 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Apr. 14, 2010). The Court expresses no opinion on this issue.

37

B.

Count 18: Ms. Jackson and Janae Alridge against Marshal Kaz
for Violation of the Fourth Amendment
(Unreasonable Force)

Marshal Kaz argues that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he used
reasonable force against Ms. Jackson and Janae Alridge. Applying the legal standards already set
out in the discussion of Counts 5-8, the Court disagrees and therefore must deny summary
judgment on this count.
In his brief, Marshal Kaz himself acknowledges, “It is at the point where the Plaintiffs
exited the house and Marhsal Kaz advised Mrs. Jackson that she stay and wait for the police that
the parties’ accounts of the facts diverge. . . . Marshal Kaz attests that he was attacked by the
Plaintiffs and now sought to have them remain on the Premises so that the Bloomfield Police
could investigate this assault in addition to assisting him with Kevin Jackson, while Plaintiffs
claim that Marshal Kaz grabbed at Mrs. Jackson and Janae Alridge’s wrists in his efforts to
detain them . . . .” Marshal Kaz Br. (ECF No. 81), at 38.
Under the plaintiffs’ disputed version of the facts, Marshal Kaz was an overzealous
aggressor, who had been repeatedly told that the person upon whom he sought to serve capias
warrants was not at Ms. Jackson’s residence, who had little to no reason to suspect otherwise,
and who used physical force—including direct bodily contact with Janae Alridge and Ms.
Jackson that was strong enough, at least in the case of Ms. Jackson, to break a bracelet—to
detain people who were not the subject of the capias warrant, had done nothing illegal, and were
merely attempting to leave the residence together. A reasonable jury, viewing the plaintiffs’
version of events in the light most favorable to them, might conclude that Marshal Kaz’s conduct
was objectively unreasonable, and further, that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that the
conduct was unlawful. The Court therefore DENIES summary judgment as to Count 18.

38

C.

Count 19: Ms. Jackson and Janae Alridge against Marshal Kaz
for Violation of Article I, Sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution
(Unreasonable Force)

For the reasons already set out with regard to Count 18, the Court finds that there is a
genuine dispute of fact as to whether Marshal Kaz’s use of force against Ms. Jackson and Janae
Alridge was reasonable, and therefore DENIES summary judgment as to Count 19.
D.

Count 20: Ms. Wilson against Marshal Kaz
for Violation of the Fourth Amendment
(Unreasonable Force)

Marshal Kaz argues that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he used
reasonable force against Ms. Wilson. Applying the legal standards already set out in the
discussion of Counts 5-8, the Court disagrees and therefore must deny summary judgment on
this count.
Marshal Kaz argues that his use of force against Ms. Wilson—grabbing her arms from
behind, kicking her feet out, and forcing her to the ground—was reasonable because he was a
peace officer authorized to use reasonable force to effect warrantless arrests. But this merely
begs the question of whether or not the force was reasonable under the circumstances. Although
the record could support the conclusion that Ms. Wilson was interfering with Officers Fox and
Salvatore’s arrest of Mr. Wilson, a jury could reasonably credit the testimony that Ms. Wilson
merely stood in place and called out to Officers Fox and Salvatore from a distance of ten to
fifteen feet. Accepting the plaintiffs’ version of events and viewing the record in the light most
favorable to them, a reasonable jury could conclude that Marshal Kaz’s conduct towards Ms.
Wilson was objectively unreasonable, and further, that it would be clear to a reasonable officer
that the conduct was unlawful. The Court therefore DENIES summary judgment as to Count 20.

39

E.

Count 21: Ms. Wilson against Marshal Kaz
for Violation of Article I, Sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution
(Unreasonable Force)

For the reasons already set out with regard to Count 20, the Court finds that there is a
genuine dispute of fact as to whether Marshal Kaz’s use of force against Ms. Wilson was
reasonable, and therefore DENIES summary judgment as to Count 21.
F.

Count 22: Ms. Jackson, Mr. Wilson, Ms. Wilson, Ashley Alridge, and Janae
Alridge against Marshal Kaz for Willful, Reckless and/or Negligent Conduct
i.

Negligent Conduct by Marshal Kaz

Marshal Kaz argues that any claims under Count 22 based on his negligence are barred
by the statutory immunity granted to state employees under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-165, which
provides: “No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not
wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of
his or her employment.” 19 “In other words, state employees may not be held personally liable for
their negligent actions performed within the scope of their employment. . . . State employees do
not, however, have statutory immunity for wanton, reckless or malicious actions, or for actions
not performed within the scope of their employment.” Miller v. Egan, 828 A.2d 549, 561-62
(Conn. 2003).
“In order to determine if a state actor’s conduct is caused in the discharge of his or her
duties or within the granted statutory authority, it is necessary to examine the nature of the

19

Although the plaintiffs have not challenged Marshal Kaz’s reliance on Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-165, the Court
notes that there is reason to doubt that the statute applies to the personal/individual liability of state marshals, who
are independent contractors. See supra note 18. Nonetheless, a similarly worded statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6-38a(b)
provides: “Any state marshal, shall, in the performance of execution or service of process functions, have the right
of entry on private property and no such person shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless
or malicious, caused by the discharge of such functions.” Case law interpreting Section 6-38a(b) is very limited, but
at least one court has applied the provision in the same manner as Section 4-165. Bonito Mfg., Inc. v. Criscuolo, No.
X10UWYCV106010297, 2014 WL 6462303, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2014). Further, the plain text of
Section 6-38a(b) suggests that this Court’s analysis would reach the same result, inasmuch as Marshal Kaz’s actions
were taken in connection with an attempt to serve process.

40

alleged conduct and its relationship to the duties incidental to the employment.” Martin v. Brady,
802 A.2d 814, 818 (Conn. 2002). The Martin court’s analysis focused on the underlying purpose
behind the officer’s actions, rather than the means used to achieve that purpose. Even where
there were allegations of significant misconduct, including excessive force, in the execution of
an arrest warrant, the court held the officer’s actions to be within the scope of his employment
where they were part of “an attempt to effectuate th[e] arrest” and did not involve “improper and
self-serving motives” or “misuse of governmental authority for personal gain.” Id. at 818-19.
Although the plaintiffs have submitted sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that
Marshal Kaz acted negligently in executing the capias warrants, there is no dispute that serving
the warrants was Marshal Kaz’s underlying purpose for being at Ms. Jackson’s residence that
evening. There is no evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Marshal Kaz’s
motivations were for personal gain or driven by “purely personal considerations entirely
extraneous to his employer’s interest.” Id. at 818. The Court therefore GRANTS summary
judgment on Count 22 as to claims for negligent conduct.
ii.

Reckless/Willful Conduct by Marshal Kaz

Marshal Kaz argues that Count 22’s allegations of reckless or willful misconduct on his
part fail as a matter of law because there is no genuine dispute of fact as to whether his conduct
was reckless or willful.
The state of mind amounting to recklessness may be inferred from conduct. . . .
[T]he terms wilful, wanton or reckless, in practice . . . have been treated as
meaning the same thing. . . . [W]illful, wanton, or reckless conduct tends to take
on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure
from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent. It is
at least clear that such aggravated negligence must be more than any mere
mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than
mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simply inattention.

41

Craig v. Driscoll, 813 A.2d 1003, 1022 (Conn. 2003) (internal citations omitted),
superseded by statute on other grounds, Public Acts 2003, No. 03-91, as recognized in O’Dell v.
Kozee, 53 A.3d 178, 197 (Conn. 2012). As already discussed with regard to Count 18, there are
significant factual disputes about the reasonableness of Marshal Kaz’s conduct, including the
factual basis for his belief that the plaintiffs were lying and facilitating Mr. Jackson’s avoidance
of service of the warrant, the extent to which he restrained the plaintiffs’ movements, and the
details of the physical altercation outside Ms. Jackson’s residence. A reasonable jury, accepting
the plaintiffs’ version of events fully and drawing all inferences in their favor, could conclude
that Marshal Kaz’s actions constituted highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme
departure from ordinary care. Summary judgment is therefore DENIED on Count 22 as to claims
of reckless or willful conduct.
G.

Count 23: Ms. Jackson, Mr. Wilson, Ms. Wilson, Ashley Alridge, and Janae
Alridge against Marshal Kaz for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Marshal Kaz argues that the plaintiffs’ claim against him for intentional infliction of
emotional distress fails as a matter of law because his conduct was not extreme and outrageous,
and as to the claims by Ms. Jackson and her daughters, there is insufficient evidence of severe
emotional distress because those three plaintiffs did not seek medical treatment for their
emotional distress.
First, for substantially the same reasons set out with regard to Count 10, the Court finds
that there is a genuine dispute of fact as to the extreme and outrageous nature of Marshal Kaz’s
conduct. Second, the fact that Ms. Jackson and her daughters did not seek medical treatment for
their emotional distress does not preclude a finding that it was severe. Birdsall v. City of
Hartford, 249 F. Supp. 2d 163, 175 (D. Conn. 2003) (“Just as the fact of treatment is not
sufficient to prove the existence of severe emotional distress, the absence of treatment does not
42

preclude proof of severe emotional distress.”). Those plaintiffs have testified under oath that they
were upset, had trouble sleeping, and felt distrustful of police as a result of the incident at Ms.
Jackson’s residence, including Marshal Kaz’s actions. Whether those claims rise to the level of
severe emotional distress is a question for the jury. The Court therefore DENIES summary
judgment as to Count 23.
H.

Count 24: Ms. Jackson, Mr. Wilson, Ms. Wilson, Ashley Alridge, and Janae
Alridge against Marshal Kaz for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

For the reasons already set out with regard to Count 22, the Court finds that the plaintiffs’
claims based on Marshal Kaz’s negligence, including negligent infliction of emotional distress,
are barred by statutory immunity. See, e.g., Davila v. Messier, No. 3:13-CV-81 SRU, 2014 WL
4638854, at *10 (D. Conn. Sept. 17, 2014). Summary judgment is therefore GRANTED as to
Count 24.
I.

Count 25: Ms. Jackson, Mr. Wilson, Ms. Wilson, Ashley Alridge, and Janae
Alridge against Marshal Kaz for Assault and Battery

Marshal Kaz argues that the assault and battery claims by Ms. Jackson, Ms. Wilson, and
Janae Alridge fail as a matter of law because his physical contact with them was justified as the
reasonable use of force under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-22(b) and § 54-1f. Having already found a
genuine dispute under Counts 18-21 as to the reasonableness of the force used by Marshal Kaz
against Ms. Jackson, Ms. Wilson, and Janae Alridge, the Court DENIES summary judgment as
to those plaintiffs’ claim for assault and battery.
Marshal Kaz also argues that there is no evidence that he ever touched Mr. Wilson or
Ashley Alridge, which precludes a claim for battery because battery requires that “a harmful
contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly result[].” Alteiri v. Colasso, 362 A.2d
798, 801 n.3 (Conn. 1975). The Court agrees. But the Court also agrees with the plaintiffs that

43

the claim of assault survives because it requires no evidence that physical contact actually
occurred. Dewitt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 501 A.2d 768, 770 (Conn. App. 1985) (“A
civil assault is the intentional causing of imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact
in another.”). The Court therefore GRANTS summary judgment as to Mr. Wilson’s and Ashley
Alridge’s claims for battery, but DENIES summary judgment as to their claims for assault.
J.

Count 26: Ms. Jackson, Mr. Wilson, Ms. Wilson, Ashley Alridge, and Janae
Alridge against Marshal Kaz for Unlawful Restraint

Marshal Kaz argues that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for unlawful restraint,
also known as false imprisonment, because the plaintiffs were never actually confined; that is,
even assuming that Marshal Kaz attempted to confine them, he failed to do so. “To prevail on a
claim of false imprisonment, the plaintiff must prove that his physical liberty has been restrained
by the defendant and that the restraint was against his will, that is, that he did not consent to the
restraint or acquiesce in it willingly.” Berry v. Loiseau, 614 A.2d 414, 432 (Conn. 1992). “Any
period of such restraint, however brief in duration, is sufficient to constitute a basis for liability.”
Id. False imprisonment is an intentional tort, and therefore “[a] person is not liable for false
imprisonment unless his act is done for the purpose of imposing a confinement, or with
knowledge that such confinement will, to a substantial certainty, result from it.” Rivera v. Double
A Transp., Inc., 727 A.2d 204, 209 (Conn. 1999).
The plaintiffs have produced testimony that all of them were blocked by Marshal Kaz as
they tried to leave Ms. Jackson’s residence, first at the door, then as they walked, and again after
they got into the Wilsons’ car, and that Marshal Kaz told them that they could not leave. The fact
that the plaintiffs were ultimately able to make progress towards leaving does not preclude a
finding that their physical liberty was restrained against their will at various points for some
duration, however brief. There is also sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Marshal Kaz
44

acted with the intention to impose a confinement on the plaintiffs. Summary judgment is
therefore DENIED as to Count 26.
K.

Count 27: Ms. Jackson, Mr. Wilson, Ms. Wilson, Ashley Alridge, and Janae
Alridge against Marshal Kaz
for Negligent/Erroneous Service of Process under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6-29

For the reasons already set out with regard to Count 22, the Court finds that the plaintiffs’
claims based on Marshal Kaz’s negligence, including negligence in carrying out the duties
imposed by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6-29 et seq., are barred by statutory immunity. Summary
judgment is therefore GRANTED as to Count 27.
L.

Count 28: Ms. Jackson, Mr. Wilson, Ms. Wilson, Ashley Alridge, and Janae
Alridge against Marshal Kaz
for “Unduly Execution” of Process under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6-32

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6-32 makes a state marshal liable to “the party aggrieved” for failure
to “duly and promptly execute and return” process or for making “false or illegal return thereof.”
The plaintiffs have not made any allegations, much less provided evidence, relating to the
prompt and due execution of the capias warrant for Mr. Jackson or a false return thereof, or why
the plaintiffs would be aggrieved by a violation of the statute. Summary judgment is therefore
GRANTED as to Count 28.
M.

Count 30 20: Mr. Wilson and Ms. Wilson against the Bloomfield Defendants
and Marshal Kaz for “Bystander Liability”

The Court construes Count 30, a broad claim for “bystander liability,” as merely an
express invocation of a theory under which the Wilsons may recover for their emotional distress
under Counts 10, 11, 23, and 24—that is, the bystander theory recognized in Clohessy v.
Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 860 (Conn. 1996) (“Under certain circumstances, which are hereinafter
delineated, we conclude that a tortfeasor may owe a legal duty to a bystander.”). Having already
20

Count 29 was brought against the State Marshal Commission, a party that was voluntarily dismissed from
the case on March 4, 2014. ECF No. 50.

45

addressed the defendants’ arguments as to those counts, including arguments about bystander
liability, the Court need not address Count 30 separately.
VI.

Conclusion

As detailed above, the Bloomfield Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
79) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The case against the Bloomfield
Defendants proceeds only as to:
o

Count 1, for claims by Mark Wilson against Michael Driscoll, John Fox, and James
Salvatore in only their individual capacities for violation of the Fourth Amendment in the
form of malicious prosecution, and John Fox and James Salvatore in only their individual
capacities for violation of the Fourth Amendment in the form of false arrest;

o

Count 2, for the same claims as Count 1 brought under Article I, Sections 7 and 9 of the
Connecticut Constitution;

o

Count 5, for claims by Mark Wilson against John Fox and James Salvatore in only their
individual capacities for violation of the Fourth Amendment in the form of the use of
unreasonable force;

o

Count 6, for the same claims as Count 5 brought under Article I, Sections 7 and 9 of the
Connecticut Constitution;

o

Count 7, for claims by Sharntae Wilson against John Fox and James Salvatore in only
their individual capacities for violation of the Fourth Amendment in the form of the use
of unreasonable force;

o

Count 8, for the same claims as Count 5 brought under Article I, Sections 7 and 9 of the
Connecticut Constitution;

46

o

Count 9, for claims by Mark Wilson and Sharntae Wilson against John Fox and James
Salvatore in only their individual capacities for reckless or willful conduct, and against
John Fox, James Salvatore, and the Town of Bloomfield for negligent conduct;

o

Count 10, for claims by Clara Ann Jackson, Mark Wilson, Sharntae Wilson, Ashley
Alridge, and Janae Alridge against John Fox and James Salvatore in only their individual
capacities for intentional infliction of emotional distress;

o

Count 11, for claims by Clara Ann Jackson, Mark Wilson, and Sharntae Wilson against
John Fox and James Salvatore for negligent infliction of emotional distress;

o

Count 12, for claims by Mark Wilson and Sharntae Wilson against John Fox and James
Salvatore in only their individual capacities for assault and battery;

o

Count 16, for claims against the Town of Bloomfield for indemnity of its employees’
negligent conduct under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-465;

o

Count 17, for claims against the Town of Bloomfield for its employees’ negligent
conduct under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n.
As detailed above, Bruce Kaz’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 80) is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The case against Bruce Kaz proceeds only as
to:
o

Count 18, for claims by Clara Ann Jackson and Janae Alridge against Bruce Kaz in only
his individual capacity for violation of the Fourth Amendment in the form of the use of
unreasonable force;

o

Count 19, for the same claims as Count 18 brought under Article I, Sections 7 and 9 of
the Connecticut Constitution;

47

o

Count 20, for claims by Sharntae Wilson against Bruce Kaz in only his individual
capacity for violation of the Fourth Amendment in the form of the use of unreasonable
force;

o

Count 21, for the same claims as Count 20 brought under Article I, Sections 7 and 9 of
the Connecticut Constitution;

o

Count 22, for claims by Clara Ann Jackson, Mark Wilson, Sharntae Wilson, Ashley
Alridge, and Janae Alridge against Bruce Kaz in only his individual capacity for reckless
or willful conduct;

o

Count 23, for claims by Clara Ann Jackson, Mark Wilson, Sharntae Wilson, Ashley
Alridge, and Janae Alridge against Bruce Kaz in only his individual capacity for
intentional infliction of emotional distress;

o

Count 25, for claims by Clara Ann Jackson, Sharntae Wilson, and Janae Alridge against
Bruce Kaz in only his individual capacity for assault and battery, and for claims by Mark
Wilson and Ashley Alridge against Bruce Kaz in only his individual capacity for assault;

o

Count 26, for claims by Clara Ann Jackson, Mark Wilson, Sharntae Wilson, Ashley
Alridge, and Janae Alridge against Bruce Kaz in only his individual capacity for unlawful
restraint (false imprisonment).

SO ORDERED this 18th day of March, 2015, at Hartford, Connecticut.

/s/
a
Michael P. Shea
United States District Judge

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