First Mercury Insurance Company v. Shawmut Woodworking & Supply, Inc. et al

Filing 158

ORDER; Plaintiff's Motion 151 for entry of final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants on the issue of Plaintiff's duty to defend, in accordance with the Court's September 23, 2014 Ruling 139 on Motions for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Janet Bond Arterton on 4/6/2015. (Morril, Gregory)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
FIRST MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHAWMUT WOODWORKING & SUPPLY, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 3:12cv1096 (JBA)

April 6, 2015

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT

On September 23, 2014, this Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
Defendants, holding that Plaintiff First Mercury Insurance Company (“First Mercury”)
has a duty to defend Defendants Shawmut Woodworking & Supply, Inc. (“Shawmut”)
and Shepard Steel Company (“Shepard”) in state court lawsuits brought by employees of
Shepard’s subcontractor, Fast Trek Steel. Those state court lawsuits remain pending.
Plaintiff now moves [Doc. # 151] for entry of final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b), or in the alternative, for certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).1 At the
telephonic conference held with counsel on the record of March 19, 2015, the parties
confirmed that there was no objection to granting this motion.
I.

Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that “[w]hen an action presents

more than one claim for relief . . . the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one
or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that
there is no just reason for delay.” The Supreme Court has “outlined the steps to be

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The Court does not reach the 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) issue.

followed in making determinations under Rule 54(b).

A district court must first

determine that it is dealing with a ‘final judgment.’ It must be a ‘judgment’ in the sense
that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be ‘final’ in the sense
that it is ‘an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple
claims action.’” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980) (quoting
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 436 (1956)). “Once having found finality,
the district court must go on to determine whether there is any just reason for delay[,] . .
. tak[ing] into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved.”
Id. at 8.
“In general, a Rule 54(b) certification of the dismissal of fewer than all the claims
in an action should not be granted if the same or closely related issues remain to be
litigated.” Harriscom Svenska AB v. Harris Corp., 947 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1991)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Claims are separable if they involve at least some
different questions of fact and law and could be separately enforced.” Avondale Indus.,
Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1203 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
II.

Discussion
In this case, the Court has granted summary judgment on the issue of the duty to

defend but not on the issue of the duty to indemnify. The Court’s grant of summary
judgment on the duty to defend was a final judgment on one of two separable claims
raised by Plaintiff. “It is well-settled that the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify are
separate and distinct questions of fact and law.” Id.; see also Steadfast Ins. Co. v. The
Purdue Frederick Co., No. X08CV020191697S, 2004 WL 2166258, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct.
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Sept. 1, 2004) (“The Connecticut Supreme Court has consistently and regularly
recognized that an insurer’s duty to defend is distinct from its duty to indemnify.” (citing
DaCruz v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 268 Conn. 675, 687–88 (2004); Smedley Co.
v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 143 Conn. 510, 516–17 (1956))). Because “the
claim adjudicated, and upon which final judgment was entered, was separable from the
other claims presented,” Avondale, 887 F.2d at 1204, the Court turns now to an
examination of the equities and judicial administrative interests.
All parties are likely to benefit from the entry of final judgment on the duty to
defend issue.

Plaintiff will have the opportunity to appeal the Court’s decision

immediately, and if the Second Circuit affirms this Court’s decision on the duty to
defend, Defendants will obtain certainty that they will not later be responsible for
reimbursing Plaintiff for the vast sum of money that is being spent on their defense. The
equities thus favor granting Plaintiff’s motion for judgment. Judicial economy also favors
entry of final judgment because “an appellate ruling that the insurer was not obliged to
defend would ‘end this coverage case,’ mooting the indemnification . . . issue[].” PennAm. Ins. Co. v. Mapp, 521 F.3d 290, 296 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Res. Bankshares Corp. v.
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 323 F.Supp.2d 709, 723 (E.D.Va. 2004)).

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III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion [Doc. # 151] for entry of final

judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter
judgment in favor of Defendants on the issue of Plaintiff’s duty to defend, in accordance
with the Court’s September 23, 2014 Ruling [Doc. # 139] on Motions for Summary
Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Janet Bond Arterton, U.S.D.J.

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 6th day of April, 2015.

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