Luciano v. Semple et al
ORDER denying 3 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See attached memorandum of decision. Signed by Judge Vanessa L. Bryant on March 14, 2013. (Butler, Ayanna)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
JUSTICE C. LUCIANO
WARDEN SCOTT SEMPLE, ET AL.
RULING DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Pending before the court is the plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief. [Doc.
3]. The plaintiff filed this motion when he was incarcerated at Garner Correctional
Institution (“Garner”). The allegations in the complaint relate to the plaintiff’s
removal from his cell at Garner on April 8, 2012, by an extraction team made up of
eight correctional officers. The plaintiff complains that individuals at Garner have
not responded to his attempts to exhaust his administrative remedies or his April
2012 request under the Freedom of Information Act. He asks the court to order
two Garner correctional officers not to work in the same housing unit where he is
confined. The plaintiff also states that the defendants intend to take retaliatory
action in the form of a transfer to another prison facility. The plaintiff claims the
defendants have not treated the injuries he suffered on April 8, 2012, including
blurred vision and hearing loss. He asks to be sent to the University of
Connecticut Health Center (“UCONN”) for treatment. For the reasons set forth
below, the motion is DENIED.
Although a showing that irreparable injury will be suffered before a
decision on the merits may be reached is insufficient by itself to require the
granting of a preliminary injunction, it is nevertheless the most significant
condition which must be demonstrated. See Faiveley Transport Malmo AB v.
Wabtec Corp., 559 F. 3d 10, 118 (2d Cir. 2009). To demonstrate irreparable harm,
plaintiff must show an “‘injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual
and imminent and that cannot be remedied by an award of monetary damages.’”
Forest City Daly Housing, Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144, 153 (2d
Cir. 1999) (quoting Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 162 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998)).
While a hearing is generally required on a properly supported motion for
preliminary injunction, oral argument and testimony is not required in all cases.
See Kern v. Clark, 331 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 2003). Where, as here, “the record
before the district court permits it to conclude that there is no factual dispute
which must be resolved by an evidentiary hearing, a preliminary injunction may
be granted or denied without hearing oral testimony.” 7 James W. Moore, et al.,
Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 65.04 (2d ed.1995].
In this case, the court finds that oral testimony and argument is not
necessary. The plaintiff is now incarcerated at MacDougall Correctional
Institution (“MacDougall”). The defendants are all employed at Garner. The
alleged refusal of the defendants to respond to grievances filed by the plaintiff
regarding the cell extraction that occurred on April 8, 2012 did not preclude the
plaintiff from filing this action, nor does it subject the plaintiff to imminent harm.
Furthermore, the plaintiff has recently contacted the court and has
identified the Doe defendants who made up the cell extraction team and who
allegedly used excessive force against him on April 8, 2012. Thus, it is apparent
that the information requested by the plaintiff through the Freedom of Information
Act concerning the intervention and use of force by the cell extraction team
members has been provided to the plaintiff.
At this point, the plaintiff’s allegation that any transfer to another prison
would be retaliatory is only speculative. Furthermore, the plaintiff does not
allege how any transfer might subject him to irreparable injury. There is no
information before the court to suggest that the plaintiff is not receiving medical
treatment at MacDougall or that he requires treatment at UCONN.
Absent any allegations of irreparable injury, the plaintiff fails to satisfy the
first requirement for the issuance of injunctive relief. Because there is no
showing of irreparable harm, the Court need not examine the other requirements
for the issuance of injunctive relief. See Reuters Ltd. v. United Press Int’l, Inc.,
903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir. 1990) (party seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate
irreparable harm “before other requirements for the issuance of an injunction will
be considered”). Furthermore, the court concludes that the plaintiff’s claims for
injunctive relief relating to his conditions of confinement at Garner are now moot.
See Mawhinney v. Henderson, 542 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1976) (inmate’s request for
injunctive relief against correctional staff or conditions of confinement at a
particular correctional institution becomes moot when the inmate is discharged
or transferred to a different correctional institution); Martin-Trigona v. Shiff, 702
F.2d 380, 386 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The hallmark of a moot case or controversy is that
the relief sought can no longer be given or is no longer needed”).
Accordingly, for all the reasons set forth above, the motion seeking
injunctive relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: March 14, 2013.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?