Al Jaber v. USA

Filing 13

ORDER: The Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. No. 1 ) is hereby DENIED. The Clerk shall close this case. It is so ordered. Signed by Judge Alvin W. Thompson on 08/12/2014. (Bowers, J.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
------------------------------x
:
ALAA AL JABER,
:
:
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
:
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
:
:
Respondent.
:
:
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Civil No. 3:12CV1212(AWT)

RULING ON MOTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255
Petitioner Alaa Al Jaber, proceeding pro se, has filed a
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside or
correct his sentence.

The petitioner claims that he is entitled

to relief because (1) his counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance, and (2) the court erred in finding that
he was eligible for application of a 10 year mandatory minimum
sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 851 and 841(b)(1)(B).

For the

reasons set forth below, the petitioner’s contentions are
without merit, and the motion is being denied without a hearing.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 5, 2007, a federal grand jury returned an

Indictment against the petitioner and sixteen other defendants.
The Indictment charged the petitioner with conspiracy to possess
with the intent to distribute a kilogram or more of heroin in

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violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count One) and using a cellular
telephone to commit a drug trafficking offense in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (Count Twenty-Nine).

The petitioner pled not

guilty to both charges.
Prior to trial, the government filed a Second Offender
Information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, asserting that the
petitioner had previously been convicted in 2004 of a felony
drug offense in the Superior Court for the State of Maine.
Jury selection was conducted on June 13, 2008 and the trial
commenced on June 24, 2008.

Prior to the presentation of

evidence on June 24, 2008, the government moved to dismiss Count
Twenty-Nine of the Indictment.

After the government rested, the

petitioner sought to enter into evidence the plea petition of
one of the petitioner’s co-defendants, Sixto Polanco
(“Polanco”), but the court ruled that the plea petition was
inadmissible.

The petitioner then rested.

He did not testify

or call any other witnesses.
The jury returned a guilty verdict against the petitioner
on Count One on June 30, 2008.

In reaching its verdict, the

jury answered a special interrogatory and found that the amount
of heroin involved in the conspiracy that was reasonably
foreseeable to the petitioner was less than one kilogram, but
one hundred grams or more.

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After the jury returned its verdict, the court asked the
petitioner whether he affirmed or denied that he had previously
been convicted of the offense alleged in the Second Offender
Information.

The petitioner entered a verbal denial because his

counsel was still investigating the matter, and he subsequently
filed a written denial.

On January 7, 2009, the court held a

hearing regarding the Second Offender Information.

After

reviewing a certified copy of the judgment from the State of
Maine showing the petitioner’s previous conviction and examining
the transcript of the plea proceeding in that case, the court
determined that the government had met its burden of proving
that the prior conviction constituted a predicate offense for
purposes of 21 U.S.C. §§ 851 and 841(b)(1)(B).
On August 11, 2010, the court sentenced the petitioner to
the statutory minimum term of imprisonment of 120 months, to be
followed by a term of supervised release of 15 years.

The

petitioner filed a timely appeal arguing that the court abused
its discretion: (1) by denying the petitioner’s proffer of
Polanco’s plea petition, (2) by not granting the petitioner’s
motion for a bill of particulars, and (3) by not striking
certain testimony of one of the petitioner’s co-conspirators,
Francisco Rodriguez-Llorca (“Rodriguez-Llorca”).

The Second

Circuit affirmed the petitioner’s conviction on September 16,
2011.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Federal prisoners can challenge a criminal sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 only in limited circumstances.

The

Second Circuit has held that a “collateral attack on a final
judgment in a criminal case is generally available under § 2255
only for a constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the
sentencing court, or an error of law or fact that constitutes a
fundamental defect which inherently results in complete
miscarriage of justice.”

Graziano v. United States, 83 F.3d

587, 590 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).

Section 2255 provides that a district court should

grant a hearing “[u]nless the motion and the files and records
of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to
no relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

However, “[t]he language of

the statute does not strip the district courts of all discretion
to exercise their common sense.”
368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962).

Machibroda v. United States,

In making its determination regarding

the necessity of a hearing, a district court may draw upon its
personal knowledge and recollection of the case.

See Blackledge

v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 n.4 (1997); United States v. Aiello,
900 F.2d 528, 534 (2d Cir. 1990).

A § 2255 petition, or any

part of it, then, may be dismissed without a hearing if, after a
review of the record, the court determines that the motion is

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without merit because the allegations are insufficient as a
matter of law.
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The petitioner contends that his counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for: (1) failing to consult with
him on important decisions and keep him informed of important
developments, (2) failing to conduct an independent
investigation of the facts of the case, (3) failing to subpoena
certain witnesses, (4) failing to present the defense the
petitioner wanted him to, (5) failing to conduct an effective
cross-examination and give an effective closing argument, (6)
failing to discuss the Presentence Report (“PSR”) with the
petitioner and make objections to it, (7) failing to file a
reply brief on appeal, and (8) preventing the petitioner from
testifying at trial.

Each of the petitioner’s contentions lacks

merit.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
the petitioner must show that his “counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that “there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.”

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-

88, 694 (1984).

“The court ‘must indulge a strong presumption

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that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance,’ bearing in mind that ‘[t]here are
countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given
case’ and that ‘[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would
not defend a particular client in the same way.’”

United States

v. Aguirre, 912 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).

“The court’s central concern is

not with ‘grad[ing] counsel’s performance,’ but with discerning
‘whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the
result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a
breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on
to produce just results.’”

Id. at 560 (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 696-67) (internal citations omitted).
1.

Failure to Consult (Ground One)

The petitioner asserts that his counsel did not consult
with him on important decisions and did not keep him informed
about important developments, and that the failure to do so
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

This claim is

without merit.
The petitioner states that his counsel:
(a) did not consult with [him] before he file[d]
meritless pretrial motions[;] (b) did not verify or
even ask his client if he was actually innocent[;] (c)
did not accept any of his client’s defenses that
[would] actually prove his innocence[; and] (d) did
not ask his client if he ha[d] any issues to raise in
the appeal . . . .

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(Reply (Doc. No. 12) at 7).

While “consult[ing] with the

defendant on important decisions and . . . keep[ing] the
defendant informed of important developments in the course of
the prosecution” are basic duties of an attorney representing a
criminal defendant, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, the
petitioner’s counsel did not violate such duties in representing
the petitioner.
As to the contention that the petitioner’s counsel did not
consult with him prior to filing pre-trial motions, the
petitioner has not identified the pre-trial motions to which he
is referring.

Thus, even if the court were to conclude that

counsel was deficient for failing to consult with the petitioner
regarding pre-trial motions, the petitioner has not shown, or
even alleged, any prejudice that resulted from the failure to
consult.
Likewise, the petitioner has not shown that he was
prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to ask him whether he was
innocent.

As an initial matter, the petitioner states that he

asked his counsel to present a particular defense which, the
petitioner contends, would have proven his innocence.

Thus, it

appears that the petitioner did inform his counsel that he took
the position that he was innocent, so there was no prejudice
from any failure to ask.

However, even if the petitioner had

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not told his counsel that he was innocent, he has not shown how
that fact would have affected the defense strategy such that the
outcome at trial would have been different.
The petitioner’s third claim appears not to be that his
counsel did not consult with him, but rather that his counsel
did not present the defense that the petitioner wanted him to
present.

Although the petitioner does not state which defenses

he wanted his counsel to present, in Ground Four of the petition
the petitioner references a claimed defense that he was seeking
to purchase tires, and not heroin, from Rodriguez-Llorca because
the petitioner was a mechanic and Rodriguez-Llorca was a car
dealer.

Assuming this is the defense to which the petitioner is

referring, the decision not to present this defense1 was a sound
trial strategy of the petitioner’s counsel based on the evidence
presented by the government.

Thus, the failure to present the

petitioner’s preferred defense did not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.

See Henry v. Poole, 409 F.3d 48, 63 (2d

Cir. 2005) (“Actions or omissions by counsel that might be
considered sound trial strategy do not constitute ineffective
assistance.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Furthermore,

the petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced by the
failure to present the defense that he wanted.

1

The court notes that petitioner’s counsel did ask Rodriguez-Llorca about his
history of buying and selling cars and whether the petitioner had sought to
purchase cars from him.

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As to the claim that the petitioner’s counsel did not
consult with him about whether there were any specific issues
that he wanted to raise on appeal, the petitioner has not
identified any specific issue that he thinks his counsel should
have appealed but did not.2

Thus, the petitioner has not shown

he was prejudiced by the alleged failure to consult.
2.

Failure to Investigate (Ground Two)

The petitioner asserts that his counsel did not conduct an
independent investigation of the facts of the case.

This claim

appears to be related, at least in part, to the petitioner’s
allegation that his counsel did not present the petitioner’s
preferred defense.

To the extent the petitioner’s claim is that

his counsel did not present his defense that he was seeking to
purchase tires and not heroin, the failure to present the
defense did not constitute ineffective assistance.

See supra

Part III.A.1.
The petitioner also states in conclusory fashion that his
counsel “did not investigate the case, did not visit his client
or even ask if he was really guilty or not, and thus, did not
prepare any defense in the case[.]”
1-1) at 8).

(Habeas Petition (Doc. No.

However, the record reflects that even if the court

were to conclude that counsel did not investigate the facts of

2

To the extent the petitioner argues that his counsel should have appealed
the applicability of 21 U.S.C. § 851, this argument is addressed in Section
III.B, infra.

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the case, which is belied by the record, the petitioner has not
shown that he was prejudiced by the failure to do so.

The

petitioner does not identify any specific facts that he contends
his counsel would have uncovered had he conducted an
investigation, or a more thorough investigation, of the case.
Additionally, the record reflects that the petitioner’s counsel
was well-versed in the facts of the case.

So without a specific

assertion by the petitioner as to some failing of his counsel
that was a result of the failure to investigate, the petitioner
has not met his burden of showing that he was prejudiced.
3.

Failure to Subpoena Witnesses and Present
Documentary Evidence (Grounds Three and Five)

The petitioner states that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance in failing to subpoena two of the petitioner’s coconspirators, Polanco and Andres Bolanos (“Bolanos”), and
present certain documentary evidence.

Such claims are without

merit.
“Habeas claims based on complaints of uncalled witnesses
are not favored, because the presentation of testimonial
evidence is a matter of trial strategy and because allegations
of what a witness would have testified to are largely
speculative.”

Lou v. Mantello, No. 98-CV-5542(JG), 2001 WL

1152817, *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2001).

“The decision whether

to call any witnesses on behalf of the defendant, and if so

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which witnesses to call, is a tactical decision of the sort
engaged in by defense attorneys in almost every trial.”

United

States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1321 (2d Cir. 1987).
The petitioner contends that testimony from Polanco and
Bolanos would have conflicted with the trial testimony of
Rodriguez-Llorca and thereby undermined Rodriguez-Llorca’s
testimony.

However, the petitioner does not state why or how

Polanco and Bolanos’s testimony would have conflicted with that
of Rodriguez-Llorca.

While the petitioner does state that

Bolanos could have testified as to how much heroin was in each
bag of heroin, because Rodriguez-Llorca admitted he did not
know, the petitioner does not contend that Bolanos’s testimony
would have been helpful to him; he only appears to contend that
the testimony would establish more precisely how much heroin was
in each bag.
Furthermore, given the fact that Polanco and Bolanos had
pled guilty but had not yet been sentenced at the time of the
petitioner’s trial, it is unlikely that they would have
testified even if a subpoena had been issued.

In fact, the

petitioner states that his counsel advised him that they would
likely invoke their Fifth Amendment rights.

Thus, the

petitioner has not shown that counsel was ineffective for
failing to subpoena Polanco and Bolanos or that he was
prejudiced by the failure to do so.

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The petitioner also contends that his counsel was
ineffective by failing to “show the jury documental proof that
[Rodriguez-Llorca’s] regular job is a car dealer and that the
[petitioner’s] regular job is mechanic.”
No. 1-1) at 9).

(Habeas Petition (Doc.

However, as discussed above in Section III.A.1

n.1, the petitioner’s counsel did ask Rodriguez-Llorca on crossexamination whether he had sold cars, and Rodriguez-Llorca
answered in the affirmative.

Thus, it was unnecessary for

counsel to submit documentary evidence supporting that
uncontroverted fact, and the failure to submit the documentation
does not render counsel’s representation constitutionally
ineffective.
4.

Failure to Present Petitioner’s Defense (Ground
Four)

For the reasons set forth in Part III.A.1 above, the
petitioner has not shown that counsel rendered ineffective
assistance or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to
present his defense that he was seeking to purchase tires and
not heroin.
5.

Failure to Effectively Cross-Examine Witnesses
and Give an Effective Closing (Ground Six)

The petitioner contends that his counsel did not
effectively cross-examine Rodriguez-Llorca and that his counsel
did not point out various contradictions in Rodriguez-Llorca’s
testimony during his closing argument.

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The petitioner’s contentions are belied by the trial
record.

Through cross-examination, the petitioner’s counsel

called into question the details of Rodriguez-Llorca’s testimony
about a trip he took to Maine to deliver heroin to the
petitioner and elicited from Rodriguez-Llorca that he did not
know how much heroin was in each bag of heroin he delivered to
the petitioner.

Counsel also vigorously cross-examined the case

agents who testified at trial.

During his closing argument, the

petitioner’s counsel addressed the evidence, and the lack
thereof, and attacked the credibility of Rodriguez-Llorca.
Counsel emphasized that Rodriguez-Llorca did not know how much
heroin had been involved in his dealings with the petitioner.
Based on the evidence, counsel argued, the government had not
met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
petitioner was involved in the conspiracy.
Defense counsel’s performance during trial was well within
the bounds of objectively reasonable representation.

In

addition, the petitioner has not shown that the result would
have been different but for the alleged ineffective performance
by his counsel during cross-examination and closing argument.
6.

Failure to Discuss the PSR and Make Objections to
it (Ground Seven)

The petitioner contends that his counsel did not discuss
the PSR with him and that his counsel did not make the

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objections to the PSR desired by the petitioner.

The petitioner

states that he wanted his counsel to object to the heroin
quantity and the application of the mandatory minimum sentence.
The petitioner’s contention that his counsel did not
discuss the PSR with him is contradicted by the record of the
sentencing proceeding on August 11, 2010.

After swearing in the

interpreter and determining that the petitioner and the
interpreter could understand each other, the court inquired as
to whether counsel and the petitioner had reviewed the PSR:
The Court:
Mr. Einhorn, have you had an opportunity
to read the Presentence Report, as amended?
Mr. Einhorn:

I have, Your Honor, yes.

The Court: Has your client read it or has it been
summarized for him by you?
Mr. Einhorn:
The Court:

Both, Your Honor.

He’s read it in English?

Mr. Einhorn: Yes, Your Honor. I’ve given him a copy
quite some time ago, and I inquired of him this
morning.
He had help at Wyatt reading it, going
through it. And then I went through it again with him
piece-by-piece.
The Court: And does the defendant have any correction
or objections to the report, as amended?
Mr. Einhorn:

No, Your Honor . . . .

(Sentencing Tr. 8:3-8:17).

Despite being present at the hearing

and being able to understand what was going on, at no time did
the petitioner object to his counsel’s statements.

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Additionally, when the court asked the petitioner whether he
would like to make a statement, he did so and did not state that
his counsel had not gone over the PSR with him or that he had
objections to it.
As to the objections the petitioner states he wanted to
make to the PSR, counsel’s decision not to make those objections
at sentencing was reasonable under the circumstances.

The

petitioner’s counsel had previously objected to the application
of the mandatory minimum sentence, but the court, after holding
a hearing on the issue, determined that it applied.

Thus, it

was reasonable for the petitioner’s counsel to not attempt to
reargue the application of the mandatory minimum sentence during
the sentencing.

Also, in his sentencing memorandum, the

petitioner’s counsel challenged the quantity of heroin involved
in the offense and argued that “[t]he evidence against the
defendant at trial was wholly uncorroborated.”
Sentencing Mem. at 2).

(Def.’s

However, because of the mandatory

minimum term of incarceration of 10 years, challenging the
amount of heroin involved in the offense could not lower the
petitioner’s Guidelines range.

Thus, it was reasonable for

counsel not to challenge the quantity at sentencing, and even if
it was not, the petitioner did not suffer any prejudice from the
failure to do so.

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7.

Failure to File a Reply Brief on Appeal (Ground
Eight)

The petitioner contends that his counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a reply brief
in further support of his brief on appeal.

This contention is

without merit.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(c) provides that
“[t]he appellant may file a brief in reply to the appellee’s
brief.” (emphasis added).

Thus, the petitioner’s counsel was

not required to file a reply brief in response to the
government.

Additionally, the petitioner does not state what

claim or argument his counsel should have made in response to
the government’s brief and how the failure to do so resulted in
his conviction being affirmed.

Therefore, the petitioner has

not met his burden of showing that his counsel’s conduct fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and that he
suffered prejudice.
8.

Preventing the Petitioner from Testifying in His
Defense (Ground Nine)

The petitioner contends that his counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance because his counsel
prevented him from testifying in his own defense at trial.

The

petitioner’s contention is without merit because it is contrary
to the trial record.

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On June 30, 2008, before the jury was brought into the
courtroom on the fourth day of trial, the court addressed the
petitioner directly and discussed with him whether he would
testify:
The Court:
We have
bring the jury in.
discuss with Mr. Al
or not he’s going to

a few things to cover before we
The first thing I want to do is
Jaber his decision as to whether
testify.

When the jury comes in, we will turn to Mr. Einhorn
and tell him we’re ready for the defense case.
It’s
my understanding he’s going to say the defense rests,
which means that, Mr. Al Jaber, you won’t be
testifying. I want to be certain that you understand
that you have the right to testify in this case.
Do
you understand that, sir?
The Defendant:

Yes, sir.

The Court: Do you understand that the decision as to
whether to testify is ultimately your decision and
that it is a decision which is to be made by you only
after full consultation with your attorney, but it is
a decision that you must make, not your attorney? Do
you understand that, sir?
The Defendant:

Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: Do you believe you’ve had the opportunity
to have a full consultation with your attorney as to
what is in your best interest in terms of whether you
testify or do not testify?
The Defendant:

Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: Have you concluded that it is in your best
interest not to testify?
The Defendant:

Yes.

The Court: Do you understand that if you change your
mind at any point before Mr. Einhorn gets up and says
the defense rests, you should let me know and we can

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revisit this decision of yours?
that, sir?
The Defendant:

Do you understand

Yes.

The Court:
But you also understand that’s going to
happen in about ten minutes or so?
The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.
The Court:
Are you entirely comfortable with this
decision you’ve made, sir?
The Defendant:

Yes, Your Honor.

(Trial Tr. Vol. IV 530:4-531:17).

Thus, the record reflects

that the petitioner made the decision not to testify and was not
prevented by his counsel from doing so.
In his reply brief in support of his habeas petition, the
petitioner states that while he did choose not to testify, he
did so on his counsel’s advice.

Thus, the petitioner appears to

contend that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in
advising him not to testify.

However, the petitioner also

states that his counsel warned him that if he chose to testify,
he would be subject to cross-examination by the government and
also that he could receive a more severe sentence.
(Doc. No. 12) at 8).

(See Reply

In light of the risks associated with the

petitioner testifying, the advice by counsel not to testify did
not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.

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B.

Application of Mandatory Minimum Sentence

Prior to trial, the government filed a Second Offender
Information as authorized and required by 21 U.S.C. § 851.

It

asserted that the petitioner had previously been convicted of a
felony drug offense in the State of Maine.

After the guilty

verdict the court held a hearing and found that the mandatory
minimum sentence enhancement pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 851 and
841(b)(1)(B) was applicable to the petitioner’s sentencing.
The petitioner contends that “the [g]overnment enhancement
under 851 was not justifiable.”
at 14).

(Habeas Petition (Doc. No. 1-1)

The petitioner appears to argue that the court should

not have determined that his prior conviction constituted a
predicate offense for purposes of the enhancement.

The

petitioner did not raise this claim on appeal.
“[T]he general rule [is] that claims not raised on direct
appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the
petitioner shows cause and prejudice.”
States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003).

Massaro v. United

In order to show cause, the

petitioner must demonstrate either that (1) he was “represented
by counsel whose performance [was] . . . constitutionally
ineffective under the standard established in Strickland v.
Washington”; or (2) “some objective factor external to the
defense impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s
procedural rule.”

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1984).

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Such external factors include “that the factual or legal basis
for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel, or that
some ‘interference by officials’ made compliance impracticable
. . . .”

Id. (internal citation omitted).

In order to

establish prejudice, the petitioner must show “not merely that
the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but
that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage,
infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional
dimensions.”

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)

(emphasis in original).
The petitioner does not state, much less show, why he did
not raise this issue on appeal.

However, even if the court were

to construe the petitioner’s contentions as stating that he did
not appeal this issue because his counsel’s performance was
constitutionally ineffective, he could not prevail.
First, the petitioner has not shown that his counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
for failing to appeal the application of the mandatory minimum
sentence.

An “indigent defendant [does not have] a

constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press
nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a
matter of professional judgment, decides not to present those
points.”

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).

The

petitioner’s counsel did directly appeal three issues, but

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declined to appeal the application of the mandatory minimum
sentence.

Such a judgment was within the realm of reasonable

professional assistance given that the court had conducted a
hearing regarding the applicability of 21 U.S.C. §§ 851 and
841(b)(1)(B) and concluded, based on the evidence, that the
petitioner’s prior offense was a felony and qualified as a
“felony drug offense.”

Additionally, the petitioner has not

shown that he likely would have prevailed if the application of
the mandatory minimum sentence had been raised on appeal.
Therefore, because the petitioner has not shown cause for
failing to appeal and prejudice therefrom, the petitioner’s
argument is a direct challenge to his sentence and is
procedurally barred.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion to Vacate, Set

Aside or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. No.
1) is hereby DENIED.
The court will not issue a certificate of appealability
because the petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

The Clerk shall close this case.
It is so ordered.
Dated this 12th day of August 2014, at Hartford,
Connecticut.

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____________/s/ _____________
Alvin W. Thompson
United States District Judge

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