Robinson v. Arnone et al

Filing 51

ORDER. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Doc. # 42 is DENIED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the respondents and to close this case. See attached order. Signed by Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer on 1/19/16. (Adriance, S.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

SHAWN L. ROBINSON,
Petitioner,
v.

No. 3:12-cv-1323 (JAM)

LEO C. ARNONE, et al.,
Respondents.

RULING DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Shawn Robinson brings this action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. He is serving a sentence of 45 years of imprisonment following his conviction in
a Connecticut state court on multiple charges arising from his attack on a correctional officer
during a prison riot in 1990. He now contends that he had conflicts with and did not have
constitutionally effective assistance of counsel at trial, that he was wrongly denied access to
personnel files of correctional officers who testified against him, and that he was convicted by a
jury from which minority jurors were systematically excluded. Because it is clear that the
Connecticut state courts did not unreasonably apply federal law in rejecting all of these claims, I
will deny the petition.
BACKGROUND
On April 19, 1990, petitioner was present during a riot among inmates at the Connecticut
Correctional Institution at Somers. According to the State’s trial evidence, petitioner slashed a
correctional officer on the neck with a sharp metal instrument. Petitioner then put the weapon
into a paper bag and walked away. Although the officer who was attacked did not see who did it,
a second correctional officer testified that he saw the attack. Still a third correctional officer
testified that he saw petitioner with a dark object in his hand, and a fourth correctional officer

heard petitioner urge other inmates to kill him shortly after the attack on the first correctional
officer. See State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 715-16 (1993).
Petitioner was tried before a jury on charges of first- and second-degree assault, rioting at
a correctional institution, possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional
institution, and being a persistent serious felony offender (having prior robbery convictions). He
was convicted on all charges except first-degree assault and was sentenced to a total effective
sentence of 45 years of imprisonment. Id. at 713-14. His conviction was affirmed on direct
appeal, id., and he has filed multiple state petitions for writs of habeas corpus that have been
denied. Doc. #42 at 3; Doc. #47 at 2-3; see also Robinson v. Warden, 2009 WL 1333799 (Conn.
Super. 2009); Robinson v. Commissioner of Correction, 129 Conn. App. 699 (2011). Petitioner
has now filed the instant federal habeas corpus petition that raises several claims.
DISCUSSION
Federal courts have very limited authority to overturn state court convictions. A state
court defendant who seeks relief by way of a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must show that his state court conviction was rendered by means of a very
clear violation of federal law—i.e., that the state court’s adjudication of his claims ―(1) resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,‖ or that it ―(2) resulted in
a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2); see also Chrysler v.
Guiney, 806 F.3d 104, 118 (2d Cir. 2015) (reviewing governing standard).
This is a ―highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands
that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.‖ Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170,

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181 (2011) (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). As the
Supreme Court has more recently explained, ―[w]hen reviewing state criminal convictions on
collateral review, federal judges are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning
their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong.‖ Woods v.
Donald, 135 S. Ct 1372, 1376 (2015) (per curiam).
Disputes and Disagreements with Trial Counsel
Petitioner’s primary argument is that the Connecticut state courts unreasonably applied
federal law with respect to the trial court’s alleged mishandling of his disputes and disagreements
with his trial counsel (Attorney Brian Karpe) during the course of trial. The specifics of these
disagreements were described at length by the Connecticut Supreme Court as follows:
At trial, the defendant had a number of disputes with his attorney, Brian Karpe,
and on several occasions made known to the court that he did not want Karpe to continue
to represent him. While the jury was being selected, the defendant moved to ―fire‖ Karpe.
The defendant explained that he and Karpe had disagreed over certain things ―in the
General Statutes and the Practice Book dealing with my case.‖ Karpe told the court that
he and the defendant had had disagreements ―on some trial tactics.‖ In response, the trial
court explained to the defendant that his counsel had control over trial strategy and
tactics. The trial court further remarked that ―from what I have seen of Mr. Karpe's
representation, I see nothing that would cause me to fire him and replace him with
another attorney.‖ The defendant then complained that Karpe had not come to prison to
consult with him about the case. He also stated that he wished to file a motion that some
of the state's remarks to the prospective jurors were biased. In response, Karpe moved to
withdraw due to the defendant's expressions of dissatisfaction with his services. The court
denied Karpe's motion, explaining that there was no reason, especially at that point in the
trial with the jury being selected, to remove him from the case. The defendant, however,
commented that he felt that Karpe had no desire to try his case. The court reminded the
defendant that, despite his persistent protests, it had denied his motion to dismiss Karpe.
The court then proceeded with jury selection.
Two days later, just as court convened, Karpe again moved to withdraw from the
case because the defendant had informed him that he did not believe that Karpe was
prepared. Karpe represented that the defendant had stated that he believed that he could
have questioned the prospective jurors more effectively than Karpe, and that the
defendant had ―made allegations that I'm trying to railroad him.‖ Karpe also stated that he
believed that the attorney-client relationship had broken down and that he should be
excused from further representation of the defendant. The court informed the defendant
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that, if he was dissatisfied with Karpe's representation, he had a right to represent himself,
if he wished to do so. The defendant responded that he did not wish to represent himself.
He said he only desired ―good representation,‖ and complained that Karpe had failed to
obtain items he had previously requested, such as exact copies of disciplinary reports,
medical records, and all of the incident reports pertaining to the events of April 19, 1990.
Karpe told the court that the state had given him access to the incident reports and that he
had dictated these and provided the defendant with copies of transcribed versions. The
trial court then stated that it was treating the dialogue among itself, the defendant and
Karpe as a motion to replace Karpe with new counsel. It then denied the motion.
The next day, during jury selection, Karpe again moved to withdraw because the
defendant refused to speak with him. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant
then turned and faced the rear of the courtroom during the voir dire of prospective jurors,
claiming that he had no voice in the questions that were being asked of the jurors. Later,
after the jury had been selected, at the outset of the state's presentation of evidence, Karpe
again moved to withdraw. He told the trial court that the defendant had threatened that if
Karpe was trying to ―railroad‖ him, he ―would certainly stop it.‖ The trial court denied
the motion and explained to the defendant that Karpe was acting in his best interests and
that it would be to his advantage to cooperate with his counsel. Karpe then told the court
that the defendant had indicated to him that he would prefer to represent himself. The
court asked the defendant if he wished to proceed pro se. The defendant did not respond,
and the court interpreted his silence as indicating that he did not wish to do so.
After the defense had rested, the defendant became agitated. He stated that he
wanted to fire Karpe ―because I ain't resting nothing yet.‖ He told the court that he
wished to call other witnesses and to return to the witness stand. The court told the
defendant that it could not honor his requests. The defendant then left the courtroom with
Karpe. Karpe returned to the courtroom shortly thereafter and apologized for his client's
behavior. The court then asked Karpe whether he had spoken with his client after they
left the courtroom together. Karpe responded that he had, and explained to the court that
the defendant was upset and had elected to absent himself from the trial. The defendant
did not attend the trial for the rest of that day, but did appear for closing arguments on the
following day.
State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. at 722-24.
The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected defendant’s argument. It noted that a trial judge
has substantial discretion with respect to complaints of a defendant about his attorney, especially
complaints that are raised on the eve of or during trial. Id. at 725-26. The court further noted that
most of petitioner’s complaints were about matters of trial strategy within the discretion of

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defense counsel and concluded that the trial court had made an adequate inquiry into petitioner’s
complaints about counsel. Id. at 726-27.
The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that ―[v]iewing the entire record, we regard
the trial court’s tolerance of the defendant’s complaints concerning his counsel as evincing a
high degree of judicial solicitude toward the defendant's concerns.‖ Id. at 727. In addition, the
court observed that ―[d]espite the defendant’s repeated attempts to thwart his counsel’s efforts to
represent him, it appears that the attorney-client relationship endured,‖ and that ―[w]hatever
breakdown occurred in the attorney-client privilege in this case was largely the result of the
defendant's own actions and threats.‖ Id. at 727-28.
Although petitioner disagrees with the Connecticut Supreme Court’s resolution of this
claim, he has fallen well short of showing that its resolution of this very factbound issue amounts
to an unreasonable application of federal law as that law has been determined by the United
States Supreme Court. The Connecticut Supreme Court relied in part on Second Circuit
precedent to evaluate what response is required from a trial court when a defendant has a
―seemingly substantial complaint about counsel.‖ Id. at 727 (citing McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d
927 (2d Cir. 1981)). As the court correctly noted, despite the tension between petitioner and his
trial counsel, petitioner’s ―counsel still managed to articulate the [petitioner’s] concerns and
make motions that‖ petitioner had requested. Id. at 272. The court further observed that McKee
held that a ―defendant is not entitled to demand a reassignment of counsel simply on the basis of
a breakdown in communication, which he himself induced.‖ Id.
Notably, the decision in McKee was from the Second Circuit and not the United States
Supreme Court. Even if the Connecticut courts had unreasonably applied McKee, I could not

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grant habeas corpus relief under § 2254 unless the state courts had unreasonably applied settled
Supreme Court precedent. See Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1378.
Petitioner’s brief relies on the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Morrissey,
461 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1972), but in that case the Second Circuit did no more than make clear that
a trial judge must inquire into a defendant’s complaints about counsel and further noted that ―the
right to counsel cannot be . . . manipulated so as to obstruct the orderly procedure in the courts or
to interfere with the fair administration of justice.‖ Id. at 669 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also United States v. John Doe No. 1, 272 F.3d 116, 122-26 (2d Cir. 2001)
(fuller description of obligations of trial court to inquire into disagreements between defendant
and counsel).
It is evident here that the trial court in petitioner’s case did in fact inquire into petitioner’s
disagreement with his counsel. Petitioner has not identified any United States Supreme Court
precedent that required a greater level of inquiry or that required the trial court to have
automatically appointed replacement counsel upon request (or, as petitioner suggested at oral
argument, to have recessed the trial or appointed independent counsel to meet with petitioner).
Petitioner also cites Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). But Cuyler does not dictate
a different result here, because Cuyler involved a wholly different factual and legal context
involving a trial court’s duty to inquire into potential conflicts of interest that stem from an
attorney’s simultaneous representation of multiple criminal defendant clients. Id. at 346-50. In
short, petitioner has not shown that the Connecticut state courts’ denial of his claim concerning
his disagreements with trial counsel amounted to an unreasonable application of federal law as
determined by the United States Supreme Court.

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Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of
counsel. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed in light of the well-established,
two-part standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). First, a defendant must show deficient performance—that counsel’s conduct ―fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness‖ established by ―prevailing professional norms‖—and,
second, a defendant must show that this deficient performance caused prejudice. Id. at 687–88.
As to the showing of deficient performance, ―[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance
must be highly deferential,‖ and ―a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance‖ and that ―the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.‖ Id. at 689. As to the showing of
prejudice, there must be a ―reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.‖ Id. at 694. The Strickland test itself is
deferential to the strategic choices of counsel, and when a Strickland claim is presented by way
of a state court prisoner’s federal petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a
federal court’s review of an ineffective assistance claim becomes ―doubly deferential‖ to the
determinations of trial counsel and the state courts. See Woods, 135 S. Ct. at 1376 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Petitioner raises two claims of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. First, he argues
that Attorney Karpe failed to adequately and timely object when the prosecution impeached
petitioner not only with evidence of petitioner’s prior robbery convictions but also with evidence
that he had been sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment for those convictions.1 On direct appeal,

1

As the record shows, the State elicited the length of petitioner’s sentence only after petitioner wrongly or
mistakenly denied on cross-examination that he had been previously convicted. Petitioner’s claim is that his trial

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the Connecticut Supreme Court rejected defendant’s argument that the admission of this
sentencing information was improper and further concluded that any error from its admission
was harmless, because there was no question that the impeachment with the robbery convictions
themselves was proper and because the jury already knew that defendant was serving time in
prison. Robinson, 227 Conn. at 737-38.
Second, petitioner argues that Attorney Karpe failed to prevent the admission of a prior
prison disciplinary ticket that accused him of possessing a metal shank several months before the
incident for which petitioner was on trial. This evidence was admitted only after petitioner had
denied on cross-examination that he had ever possessed a shank.
The record is somewhat murky whether petitioner fully raised and exhausted either of
these two specific ineffective assistance claims before the Connecticut courts. Petitioner did raise
certain challenges to the effectiveness of his trial counsel, and a state habeas court denied those
challenges by oral ruling in 2012. See Doc. #47 at 9. On the assumption that these claims were
properly exhausted, I conclude in light of the highly deferential standard that applies to the
review of such claims in the context of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that the state courts did not
unreasonably apply the standards governing constitutional claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The impeaching evidence at issue was properly relevant to and prompted by petitioner’s
own trial testimony, and petitioner has not shown why any objection would necessarily have had
merit, much less why any error caused unfair prejudice.
Right to Present Defense / Access to Personnel Files
Petitioner next argues that his constitutional right to present a defense was violated when
he was denied the right to review the personnel files of each of the four correctional officers who
counsel should have realized that he was confused about what a ―conviction‖ was and interceded before the State
adduced additional information about the convictions to substantiate its claims that the convictions had occurred.
See Doc. #46 at 8-10.

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testified against him at trial. He subpoenaed their personnel files for the stated purpose of
reviewing them for information pertaining to past complaints by these correctional officers
against him. See Robinson, 227 Conn. at 744. Instead of allowing defense counsel to review each
of the officers’ files, the trial judge conducted an in camera review of the files and disclosed
portions of the files that were deemed relevant to petitioner’s request. Ibid. Petitioner did not
object at the time to the trial court’s decision to conduct an in camera review. Id. at 744-45.
Petitioner, however, contended on direct appeal that the denial of access to these files was a
violation of his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. Id. at
744. The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected this claim and did so after conducting its own
review of the personnel files, concluding that ―the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
withholding any information in those files.‖ Id. at 745.
Petitioner now contends that he was denied his right to present a defense and relies on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Under Brady v. Maryland,
―the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.‖ Id. at 432; see also United States v. Certified
Environmental Services, Inc., 753 F.3d 72, 91 (2d Cir. 2014).
The Brady rule requires disclosure not only of evidence that is exculpatory in the
traditional sense (e.g., evidence that it was another person who committed the crime in question),
but also impeachment information (e.g., evidence of a witness’s bias or lack of credibility). See
id. That said, the Brady rule does not require disclosure of all information that might prove
helpful to a criminal defendant. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37 (1995). Instead,
what Brady requires is the disclosure of materially exculpatory/impeachment information—that

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―a prosecutor must disclose evidence if, without such disclosure, a reasonable probability will
exist that the outcome of a trial in which the evidence had been disclosed would have been
different.‖ United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 2001).
The Brady rule may well apply to compel disclosure of materials from a testifying law
enforcement officer’s personnel file. Nevertheless, the rule’s application in this context has
proved controversially difficult to enforce and administer. See generally Jonathan Abel, Brady's
Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files and the Battle Splitting the
Prosecution Team, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 743 (2015).
Here, even assuming that petitioner properly exhausted his Brady claim in the
Connecticut courts,2 it is apparent that the Connecticut Supreme Court’s resolution of
petitioner’s claim did not amount to an unreasonable application of Brady or, more generally, the
right of a criminal defendant to present a defense. To the contrary, the record makes clear that
both the trial court and the Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the personnel files to ensure
production of information that was responsive to petitioner’s stated reason for seeking review of
the files. There is nothing to suggest that any material information was withheld from petitioner
that conceivably could have led to a different outcome at trial.
At oral argument, petitioner contended that the Constitution affords the right for defense
counsel to conduct an independent review of the personnel files of law enforcement officers to
make an independent determination of what information within these files would be helpful to
the defense. This argument has some practical and intuitive appeal, because of the superior
ability of defense counsel to know what information is truly of value in light of the particulars of

2

It appears from the Connecticut Supreme Court’s ruling that petitioner’s claim was solely under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, rather than under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
from which the Brady rule arises. I will assume for purposes of this ruling that petitioner properly exhausted his
Brady claim in the Connecticut state courts.

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the defense that counsel plans to present. But the argument runs contrary to long established law.
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), the Supreme Court conclusively rejected a
defendant’s argument that—rather than have a prosecutor or trial court conduct an in camera
review of government files for exculpatory information—defense counsel should be permitted to
do so. ―A defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does not include the unsupervised
authority to search through the Commonwealth’s files,‖ and ―[d]efense counsel has no
constitutional right to conduct his own search of the State's files to argue relevance.‖ Id. at 59.
Similarly, the Second Circuit has ruled that ―[t]ypically, the prosecution itself makes the
initial determination as to what evidence must be disclosed to the defense‖ and that only ―in
some circumstances the trial court should not rely on the Government's representations as to the
materiality of potential impeachment evidence, but should instead undertake an independent in
camera review of relevant Government files to determine materiality.‖ United States v. Leung,
40 F.3d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1994). Otherwise, ―criminal defendants have no constitutional right to
know the contents of Government files in order to present arguments in favor of disclosure.‖ Id
at 583. In light of these precedents, petitioner has not shown that the Connecticut state courts’
denial of his claim of access to personnel files amounted to an unreasonable application of
federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court.
Jury Composition
Petitioner contends that his constitutional rights were violated because there were no
African Americans or Latinos in the pool of more than 60 persons who were summoned as part
of the jury venire for his trial. He argues that the lack of minority jurors was the result of
systematic exclusion in violation of Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). Significantly,
however, petitioner did not pursue this federal constitutional challenge before the Connecticut

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Supreme Court; to the contrary, petitioner ―abandoned his federal constitutional claim‖ on direct
appeal and pursued only a state constitutional challenge to the composition of the jury pool.
Robinson, 227 Conn. at 720. The federal claim therefore has not been exhausted and has also
been procedurally defaulted in the state courts. If a claim has not been exhausted in the state
courts, I cannot grant relief under § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Chrysler, 806 F.3d at
116. And if it is clear a petitioner under § 2254 has procedurally defaulted an unexhausted claim,
a dismissal with prejudice is appropriate because a default is an adequate and independent state
ground for decision. See Junulawicz v. CT Comm’n of Correction, 2015 WL 5797015, at *3 (D.
Conn. 2015). Although a procedural default may be excused in the event a well-founded claim of
actual innocence, petitioner has made no more than a one-page, conclusory claim of actual
innocence that cites no evidence and is insufficient to surmount a procedural bar. See House v.
Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537-40 (2006). I will therefore dismiss petitioner’s claim challenging the
composition of his jury.
CONCLUSION
The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. Because petitioner has not made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), no
certificate of appealability shall enter. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the
respondents and to close this case.
It is so ordered.
Dated at New Haven this 19th day of January 2016.
/s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer
Jeffrey Alker Meyer
United States District Judge

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