Jefferson v. Reddish et al

Filing 57

Ruling granting in part and denying in part 50 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Warren W. Eginton on 1/4/2017. (LaMura, K.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
JORDAN JEFFERSON,
Plaintiff,

:
:
:
v.
:
:
THADDEUS REDDISH, MATTHEW
:
ABBATE, DAVID GULIUZZA, JUSTIN :
MARSHALL, ANGELO MAURIELLO, :
FRANK LIMON, ARIEL MELENDEZ, :
and CITY OF NEW HAVEN,
:
Defendants.
:

No. 3:12cv1543(WWE)

RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The genesis of this civil rights action is plaintiff Jordan Jefferson’s seizure at a
nightclub in New Haven, Connecticut. Plaintiff alleges violations of his Fourth, Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the individual
defendants, who are New Haven police officers. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that
defendants Reddish, Abbate, Guliuzza, Marshall and Mauriello are liable for falsely
arresting him, subjecting him to excessive force, and setting unreasonable bail bond in
violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and that defendants
Police Chief Limon, Assistant Chief Melendez and Sergeant Guliuzza are liable for
failing to train and supervise properly the officers, who committed the unconstitutional
acts. Plaintiff also alleges state law claims of negligent and intentional assault,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and liability of the City of New Haven pursuant
to Connecticut General Statutes § 52-557n(a)(1).
Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts. For the

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following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied
in part.
BACKGROUND
In support of the motion for summary judgment, the parties have submitted
statements of facts in compliance with Local Rule 56(a), along with exhibits and
supporting materials. The parties appear to disagree on most of the facts relevant to
this action.
Chief Limon and Assistant Chief Melendez have represented that the City of
New Haven experienced an escalation of crime in the downtown bar area. On October
2, 2010, the defendants entered the nightclub known as Alchemy/Elevate for
inspection. The nightclub had low lighting and the music was playing when the police
officers entered. Assistant Chief Melendez has represented that he perceived the need
to call for backup due to a “mass exodus.” Plaintiff maintains that there is conflicting
evidence in the record regarding how many individuals were leaving the nightclub when
the defendants entered the nightclub.
Defendants maintain that the occupancy limit of the club was 150 and that a
headcount revealed more than 250 people within the club at the time of the incident.
Plaintiff asserts that there is conflicting evidence concerning the number of people in
the club and occupancy limits.
After the nightclub lights were turned on and the music turned off, the officers
commenced a check of the patrons in conjunction with Connecticut Liquor Control. The
patrons were instructed to sit down and to take out their IDs. Assistant Chief Melendez
has indicated that he told the patrons to put away their cell phones “for the time being.”
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According to Officer Reddish, he also told the patrons to stay off and to put their cell
phones down.
Some of the officers found the patrons to be cooperative, while others indicated
that the patrons kept on moving around and failed to comply with instructions.
Plaintiff, who was a football player for Yale University aged 20 years old, was a
patron at the nightclub on that evening. He had consumed two beers and a mixed drink
prior to heading over to the nightclub. He recalls that the police ordered patrons not to
use their cell phones during the investigation. After hearing this order, plaintiff looked at
a notification on his phone and put it on silent. Officer Reddish then instructed him to
move to a different area.
Approximately ten minutes later, the police instructed patrons to form a single
line to exit the club. The line proceeded past the location where plaintiff was seated.
During the exiting process, another patron began to speak with plaintiff. Plaintiff was
instructed not speak to the individual. Plaintiff responded, “Why not? This is my friend.”
Officer Reddish advised plaintiff that he was under arrest, told him to stand up and
place his hands behind his back. Plaintiff complied with this instruction. An officer
whom plaintiff could not see grabbed his wrist and began to cuff him.
Plaintiff turned over left his shoulder towards the officer and asked him not to put
the cuffs on so tightly. Plaintiff has stated that he “asked him nicely.” Plaintiff maintains
that he was thereafter tased, that he made no movements, and that his left hand
remained cuffed. Defendants assert that plaintiff “attempted to prevent himself from
being brought to the ground by officers by spreading his feet to maintain his balance
and by holding his hands out to his side at waist height. Chief Limon was not present
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during plaintiff’s tasing.
The City of New Haven requires all officers to adhere to the training protocol
established by state standards. The defendant police officers have all successfully
completed the municipal police officer training academy program or a state-accepted
equivalent. Chief Limon was granted a Certificate of Comparative Compliance from the
State of Connecticut Police Officers Standards and Training Council. He has also
completed the necessary training requirements and was granted formal certification on
December 8, 2010.
DISCUSSION
A motion for summary judgment will be granted where there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The burden is on the
moving party to demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in
dispute. American International Group, Inc. v. London American International Corp.,
664 F. 2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. 1981). In determining whether a genuine factual issue
exists, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against
the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). "Only
when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary
judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F. 2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 849 (1991).
The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any material
factual issue genuinely in dispute. American International Group, Inc. v. London
American International Corp., 664 F. 2d 348, 351 (2d Cir. 1981). In determining
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whether a genuine factual issue exists, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw
all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
If a nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential
element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof, then summary
judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. If the nonmoving party
submits evidence which is "merely colorable," legally sufficient opposition to the motion
for summary judgment is not met. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the claims alleging excessive
bail, false arrest, and unreasonable force in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment. Defendants argue that such claims fail on the grounds of absolute
immunity, inapplicability and the explicit textual source of protection of the Fourth
Amendment. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). The
Court agrees that the Eight Amendment is inapplicable to the facts of this case.
Indeed, plaintiff has not posed an opposition to granting summary judgment on these
claims. "Federal courts may deem a claim abandoned when a party moves for
summary judgment on one ground and the party opposing summary judgment fails to
address the argument in any way." Taylor v. City of New York, 269 F.Supp.2d 68, 75
(E.D.N.Y. 2003). Summary judgment will be granted on the claims asserting Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The Court will proceed to review the false
arrest and excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment.

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False Arrest
Defendants assert that summary judgment is proper on plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment claims of false arrest because the officers arrested the plaintiff with
probable cause. Alternatively, defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified
immunity. Plaintiff was arrested on charges of Assault on a Police Officer in violation of
Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-167c, Inciting a Riot in violation of Connecticut
General Statutes § 53a-178, Interfering with a Police Officer in violation of Connecticut
General Statutes § 53a-167a, and Disorderly Conduct in violation of Connecticut
General Statutes § 53a-182.
“Probable cause is the single requirement for a lawful arrest under the Fourth
Amendment.” Romagnano v. Town of Colchester, 354 F.Supp.2d 129, 135 (D.Conn.
2004). “Probable cause is a compilation of facts and circumstances within the officer’s
knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution,
in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillipo, 443 U.S. 31, 37,
(1979). “The burden of establishing probable cause rests with the police, who must
establish that there was a quantum of evidence which amounted to more than a rumor
or suspicion, or even a strong reason to suspect.” Travis v. Village of Dobbs Ferry, 355
F.Supp.2d 740, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The “‘reasonable belief’ standard may require
less justification than the more familiar probable cause test.” United States v. Manley,
632 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). Probable cause
exists “when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and
circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief
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that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Weyant v.
Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1189 (1996).
In the case of a claim of false arrest, a police officer is entitled to qualified
immunity if: (1) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe there was
probable cause to make the arrest, or (2) reasonably competent police officers could
disagree as to whether there was probable cause to arrest. Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit
Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997). A party is entitled to summary judgment based
on qualified immunity if the court finds that the rights of the plaintiff were not clearly
established or that no reasonable jury could conclude that it was objectively
unreasonable for the defendant to believe that he was not clearly violating an
established federal right. Lee v. Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1996).
Defendants maintain that plaintiff’s claim for false arrest fails because the
undisputed facts establish that there was probable cause for at least the charge of
Interfering with an Officer, which provides: “A person is guilty of interfering with an
officer when such person obstructs, resists, hinders or endangers any peace officer ...
in the performance of such officer’s ... duties.” Section 53a-167 defines “interfering to
include obstruction, resistance, hindrance or endangerment....By using those words it is
apparent that the legislature intended to prohibit any act which would amount to
meddling in or hampering the activities of the police in the performance of their
duties.....Thus, the broad intent of § 53a-167a is to prohibit conduct that hampers the
activities of the police in the performance of their duties.” State v. Aloi, 280 Conn. 824,
832-33 (2007).
Defendants maintain that plaintiff disregarded the police order to refrain from
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using cell phones during the investigation and by becoming argumentative when
directed by the officer to refrain from speaking to the other patron in line. In this
instance, the evidence presented concerning plaintiff’s non-compliance with the cell
phone order and his alleged argumentativeness do not entitle defendants to the entry of
summary judgment on the merits or on the basis of qualified immunity. The scope of
the officers’ instruction to refrain from cell phone use is disputed. The question of
whether plaintiff’s conduct constituted non-compliance with the cell phone order or
whether he became argumentative represent questions of fact for the jury. Accordingly,
the Court cannot find that either probable cause or even arguable probable cause
existed for an arrest based on Interference with an Officer.
Defendants also assert that plaintiff resisted the officers’ efforts to bring him to
the ground and secure him in handcuffs by spreading his feet apart to maintain
balance. However, the evidentiary record includes the conflicting testimony of plaintiff
and the defendant officers. Accordingly, the facts concerning plaintiff’s alleged
resistance are disputed and cannot sustain a finding that the defendants are entitled to
a grant of summary judgment on the merits or on the basis of qualified immunity.
Summary judgment will be denied as to the false arrest claim.
Excessive Force
Defendants maintain that they are entitled to summary judgment on the Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim because the use of force was reasonable.
Alternatively, defendants assert that qualified immunity applies.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a claim by a citizen that law enforcement officials
used excessive force is reviewed under “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham
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v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). To determine whether excessive force occurred,
the Court considers the “objective reasonableness” of a police officer’s particular use of
force, the Court balances “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing interests at stake.” Graham,
490 U.S. at 396. This analysis requires careful attention to the individual circumstances
present, “including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. “Given the fact-specific
nature of the inquiry, granting summary judgment against a plaintiff on an excessive
force claim is not appropriate unless no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the
officers’ conduct was objectively unreasonable.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of West
Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir. 2004).
Here, plaintiff may demonstrate that the defendants’ use of force represented an
unreasonable use force in light of the circumstances. The question of whether the
amount of force used was excessive or objectively reasonable force remains a question
for the jury. Similarly, the disputed issues concerning the circumstances of defendants’
use of force precludes a finding that summary judgment applies on grounds of qualified
immunity. See Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not appropriate when there are facts in
dispute that are material to a determination of reasonableness.”). Accordingly, the
Court will deny summary judgment on this claim.

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Supervisory Liability
Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate on plaintiff’s allegations
of Fourth Amendment violations against defendants Chief Limon, Assistant Chief
Melendez, and Sergeant Guliuzza based on their allegedly grossly negligent
supervision of their subordinates.1
Section 1983 imposes liability only upon officials whose conduct has actually
caused a violation of an individual’s constitutional rights. Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d
252, 264 (2d Cir. 1999). Personal involvement of a supervisor may be established by
evidence that (1) the official participated directly in the challenged conduct; (2) the
official, after learning of a subordinate’s unlawful conduct, failed to remedy the wrong;
(3) the official created a policy or custom of fostering the unlawful conduct; (4) the
official was grossly negligent in supervising the subordinates who committed unlawful
acts; or (5) the official exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of others by failing
to act on information regarding the unlawful conduct of subordinates. Colon v.
Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995). A plaintiff may hold a municipal official liable
in his or her official capacity under § 1983 for supervision of employees if the official
should have known that the alleged inadequacy was “so likely to result in the violation
of constitutional rights,” that the official “can reasonably be said to have been
deliberately indifferent to the need." Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 298 (2d
Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 961 (1993). There must be an affirmative link
between the alleged constitutional deprivation and the act of the supervisor that caused
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Plaintiff’s opposition brief appears to have abandoned any failure to train basis
for supervisory liability.
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the alleged violation. Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 140 (2d Cir. 1999).
Defendants maintain that neither Chief Limon nor Assistant Chief Melendez were
present or personally involved in plaintiff’s arrest or the police officers’ use of force
against him. Plaintiff counters that he could demonstrate that defendants Limon,
Melendez and Guliuzza were personally involved in the constitutional deprivation and
that they were grossly negligent in supervising their subordinates such that the
constitutional deprivation occurred.
In responding to a question regarding who was present during the “interference”
incident, Sergeant Guliuzza stated: “Me, Two officers, um, Lieutenant Reddish, Curitis
Miller was there ...the Assistant Chief Melendez was there ... to my knowledge, the
Chief was there, I don’t know at what time or at what point he was not there.” A jury
should determine the credibility issues regarding who was present at what times during
plaintiff’s arrest and the use of force, and whether any of the supervisory defendants
were so grossly negligent in supervising their subordinates so as to incur liability.
Summary judgment will be denied as to this claim.
Assault and Battery
Defendants maintain that summary judgment should enter on the state law
assault and battery claims because defendants used a reasonable, and therefore
authorized, amount of force. A person is liable for tort of battery if he or she causes a
harmful contact with another person, and he or she intended to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with another person or an imminent apprehension of such contact.
Alteiri v. Colasso, 168 Conn. 329, 334 n.3 (1975). As previously discussed, the factual
circumstances of the alleged excessive force are disputed. Accordingly, summary
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judgment on the assault and batter claims must be denied due to disputed issues of
fact.
Negligence
Defendants move for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims sounding in
negligence based on discretionary act immunity.
A municipal employee enjoys qualified immunity from tort liability based on
unintentional conduct related to the performance of governmental or discretionary acts.
See Elliot v. City of Waterbury, 245 Conn. 385, 411 (1998). “The hallmark of a
discretionary act is that it requires the exercise of judgment.” Lombard v. Edward J.
Peters, Jr. P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 628 (2000). The manner in which a police officer
makes an arrest, including when to use force, is a discretionary act. See Gordon v.
Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 180-181 (1988) (policing community and
investigating those who break the law is discretionary function); see also Galindez v.
Miller, 285 F.Supp.2d 190, 195 (D.Conn. 2003) (determination of what level of force to
use under the circumstances “appears to fit” within framework of police discretion).
However, such immunity does not apply where the conduct subjects an
identifiable person to imminent harm. Bonamico v. City of Middletown, 47 Conn.App.
758, 761 (1998). In Doe v. Petersen, 279 Conn. 607, 615 (2006), the Connecticut
Supreme Court set forth that this exception requires “(1) an imminent harm; (2) an
identifiable victim; and (3) a public official to whom it is apparent that his or her conduct
is likely to subject that victim to that harm.” Id. at 616. “[T]he proper standard for
determining whether a harm was imminent is whether it was apparent to the municipal
defendant that the dangerous condition was so likely to cause harm that the defendant
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had a clear and unequivocal duty to act immediately to prevent the harm.” Haynes v.
Middletown, 314 Conn. 303, 322-23 (2014). Courts within this district have applied the
identifiable person-imminent harm exception in the context of excessive force claims
based on affirmative acts. Crawford v. City of New London, 2014 WL 186417, at *13 (
D. Conn. 2014). In this instance, plaintiff could constitute an identifiable victim of the
alleged harms caused by the force applied if such force is shown to be unauthorized as
excessive. As previously discussed, disputed issues of fact relevant to the officers’
conduct preclude summary judgment on whether the imminent harm exception applies
to bar the negligence claims. Summary judgment will be denied.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, defendants’ motion for summary judgment
[Doc. 50] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Summary judgment is GRANTED
on plaintiff’s claims of claims alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Summary judgment is DENIED on plaintiff’s claims of Fourth Amendment
violations based on false arrest and excessive force; and on his state law claims of
assault and battery, negligent assault, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Jury selection is scheduled for March 27, 2017, with trial to commence
thereafter.
/s/ Warren W. Eginton
Warren W. Eginton,
Senior U.S. District Judge
Dated this 4th day of January 2017 at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

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