Richter v. Connecticut Judicial Branch et al

Filing 28

RULING (see attached) denying 27 Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Signed by Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr. on February 27, 2013. (Dorais, L.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

ELIZABETH A. RICHTER
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 3:12-CV-1638 (JBA)

THE CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH,
O’CONNELL, ATTMORE & MORRIS, LLC,
and JUDGE HERBERT BARALL,
Defendants.

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

In this pro se action under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et al.,
against State of Connecticut judicial officials and a private law firm, Plaintiff moved on February
25, 2013 for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Doc. #27.

Counsel for

Defendants were served with the motion papers electronically. Judge Janet Bond Arterton, the
assigned Judge, being away from the Courthouse, Plaintiff's application was referred to me as the
Duty Judge.
To the extent that Plaintiff's motion functions as an ex parte application for a temporary
restraining order, I DENY that relief, since there is no showing that immediate relief is essential to
prevent imminent irreparable harm, the Plaintiff's client (William MacVicar) having been evicted.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (a court may issue a temporary restraining order only upon movant
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establishing "immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage" in the absence of relief).1
Plaintiff's application expresses the concern that "[w]ithout the intervention of this court, any future
clients of mine will be subjected to similar violations of their ADA rights." Doc. 27-1 (Affidavit)
at ¶ 32. That concern may be addressed within the context of Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction. Judge Arterton is returning to the Courthouse soon, and Plaintiff should communicate
with her Chambers with regard to scheduling for that motion and any other issues arising out of the
case (including, if Plaintiff is so inclined) a renewal of her application for a temporary restraining
order.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. #27) is DENIED on
the present record.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: New Haven, Connecticut
February 27, 2013
/s/Charles S. Haight, Jr.
Charles S. Haight, Jr.
Senior United States District Judge
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See, e.g., Garcia v. Yonkers School Dist., 561 F.3d 97, 106 (2d Cir. 2009) (a temporary
restraining order is issued when "speed is needed . . . to prevent irreparable harm") (internal
quotations and citation omitted); Local 1814, Intern. Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. New York
Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 965 F.2d 1224, 1228 (2d Cir. 1992) ("traditional standards which govern
consideration of an application for a temporary restraining order . . . are the same standards as those
which govern a preliminary injunction, and the first inquiry is therefore whether the [movant] will
suffer irreparable injury"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 953 (1992). See also Reuters Ltd. v. United Press
Int'l, Inc., 903 F.2d 904, 907 (2d Cir.1990) ("[A] showing of probable irreparable harm is the single
most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.... Irreparable harm must be
shown by the moving party to be imminent, not remote or speculative, ... and the alleged injury must
be one incapable of being fully remedied by monetary damages.") (internal citations and quotations
omitted); Control Systems, Inc. v. Realized Solutions, Inc., No. 3:11cv1423 (PCD), 2011 WL
4433750, at *3 (D.Conn. Sept. 22, 2011) (applying "irreparable harm" standard to temporary
restraining order).
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